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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

Why? We find little evidence of a strong ingroup bonus. Instead, support drops among outgroups: voters who are not part of the targeted group, do not identify with it, or see it as less deserving.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

But in our experiment, targeted pledges produced lower average support than a broad-based pledge.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

💫 New paper! @elisadeisshelbig.bsky.social, @theresmatthiess.bsky.social & I are happy to see our new paper published in open access with the @ejprjournal.bsky.social Do group-targeted campaign pledges pay off electorally? We test this with a preregistered survey experiment in Germany.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 07/05/2026

Pre-electoral alliances (vital to survive in the current system) trap parties in bloc-based strategies that are very costly to revise post-election and hinder the search for majorities. At the same time, the “victories” produced by tactical withdrawals and barrage voting remain deeply ambiguous.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 07/05/2026

… yet the system no longer reliably delivers what was supposed to justify these costs: stable majorities, clear mandates, and effective government. Governments are increasingly unstable and incapable of governing.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 07/05/2026

This is the broader context in which I took part yesterday in a cross-party conference at the French National Assembly on electoral reform: “Proportional representation: the ballot is open.”

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 07/05/2026

This is politically dangerous. The more voters feel that their strategic mobilisation is misread, the greater the risk that they end up abstaining or refusing to contribute to the “barrage” next time. The far right may then not even need to convince a majority.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 07/05/2026

The 2026 budget, in particular, could only be adopted through the use of Article 49.3, a constitutional device that allows the government to pass a bill unless a no-confidence motion succeeds, i.e. without a vote.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 07/05/2026

In theory, the current parliamentary fragmentation should encourage negotiations to construct majorities. But institutions, electoral incentives and political habits keep pushing parties to behave as if unilateral government remained possible.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 07/05/2026

Can France still be governed under its current electoral system? After almost two years of parliamentary fragmentation, the situation remains unsettled: huge frustration, no stable majority and a presidential election already casting its polarising shadow over parliamentary life.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 30/01/2026

Liebe Survey-Erfahrene in 🇩🇪, @elisadeisshelbig.bsky.social, @theresmatthiess.bsky.social und ich hätten Fragen an Euch 🤓 1) Gibt es Bedenken gegen die Erhebung von PLZ oder Gemeinde, um lokale soz.-ökon. Indikatoren zu mergen? 2) Kennt Ihr gute Datensätze auf PLZ-/Gemeindeebene? 🙏 🙏 🙏

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 26/01/2026

Ce billet est tiré de notre chapitre dans French Democracy in Distress (Palgrave, 2025), codirigé par Elodie Druez, @frederic-gonthier.bsky.social, Camille Kelbel, Nonna Mayer, Felix-Christopher von Nostiz et @vtiberj.bsky.social. Lecture idoine pour s’y retrouver dans la crise politique actuelle !

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 16/12/2025

Résultat : des électeurs légitimement frustrés et des représentants bien en peine de tirer de l’élection un mandat lisible et de gouverner.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 16/12/2025

Mais cette justification ne tient plus : dans une France structurée en trois blocs (comme le montre notre graphe sur l'évolution du vote pour les plus grandes formations), la mécanique majoritaire conserve ses biais… mais sans plus parvenir à produire de majorité.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 16/12/2025

Longtemps, on a toléré ces distorsions au de la gouvernabilité. L’idée était qu’un système majoritaire fabrique une majorité claire et permette à un camp de gouverner.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 16/12/2025

⚠️ Problème n°2 : une fois les votes exprimés, la traduction en sièges produit de nouvelles distorsions de représentation : aucun pays européen n'atteint un tel écart entre % de voix et % de sièges. Qui profite de ces effets ? Les plus grands partis.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 24/11/2025

With @elisadeisshelbig.bsky.social, @theresmatthiess.bsky.social, we are designing a survey experiment with low-income Germans 🇩🇪 Survey folks: any tips on reliable institutes, good practices, or any useful approach for harder-to-reach groups? We are really grateful for any hint or experience 🙏

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

The need to relax Germany’s constitutional debt brake isn’t new. 🔴 SPD and 🟢 Greens have long made the case that the situation (in particular with regard to infrastructures and climate transition) would become intractable otherwise. Merz and the ⚫️ CDU knew this.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

Merz’s U-turn on the debt brake could thus be seen as an example of coalition constraints: election pledges meet the realities of bargaining. Compromise is inevitable when multiple parties must govern together. But there’s more to the story.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

... and the SPD has made relaxing the debt brake a precondition. Important pledges (which we measure as those repeated several times in the program) are pushed by the coalition partners and more likely to survive:

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

This should favor the CDU which controls almost twice as many seats as the SPD. At the same time, the SPD is pivotal for government-formation. The CDU has not much alternative.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

8/ Larger parties dominate negotiations and secure more (up to 75%) of their pledges, while small parties place much less (down to 40% for the Greens in 2002). Gamson's Law seems to extend from office to policy payoffs.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

7/ Contentious promises (even those repeated loudly in campaigns) are often filtered out. Coalition agreements are shaped by consensus.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

6/ Our analysis of 6,275 electoral pledges and coalition agreements in Germany over 20 years shows that many campaign pledges do not survive coalition negotiations. Are there any patterns?

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

5/ Following the elections in February, a new CDU-SPD grand coalition is being formed. Both have agreed to reform the debt brake — a red line emphasized by the CDU during the whole campaign (see their website below). This reform will unlock €1,000 billion in new borrowing.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

The coalition lost its financial foundation when the Constitutional Court blocked the reallocation of 60 billion € Covid funds. ➡️ Scholz called early elections.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

The current German deadlock was already about policy conflict in the outgoing coalition: 🟡 The FDP made budget discipline non-negotiable. 🔴 The SPD and 🟢 Greens insisted on massive investments (climate, defense, infrastructure).

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

We look at how coalition partners negotiate policy, frequently resulting in reversal on pledges. While research (notably by the great @theresmatthiess.bsky.social) shows that coalition agreements are well implemented, we know less about how well these agreements reflect the partners’ promises.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

🧵 Germany is heading toward a new ⚫️🔴GroKo, and Merz and SPD are pushing through a constitutional reform that will allow €1.000 billion in new debt. What happened to the CDU’s promise of budgetary rigor? Our WP with @elisadeisshelbig.bsky.social sheds light on this. Let’s talk coalition politics.👇

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 05/12/2024

The President can activate art. 16 and exert both the executive and legislative powers for a limited period, after consultation with the president of both assemblies and the PM. He has met all three today.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 04/12/2024

Some suggest that Macron might argue the functioning of the State is at stake and use his full powers to pass the 2025 budget before the end of the year.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 04/12/2024

Macron cannot dissolve Parliament until June. He excludes so far resigning. He could: - Reappoint Barnier - Try to form a "technical" government - Search for a new PM.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 04/12/2024

Anticipating that the bill on social security funding would not garner majority support, Barnier tried to bypass Parliament by tying the bill to a confidence vote procedure (49.3): if no vote brings down government, the law is passed.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 04/12/2024

Le Pen took credit from decisions that were actually pushed by other groups (e.g. on pensions, drug reimbursement) and the government's communication helped her to take this credit.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 04/12/2024

RN acted as kingmaker and saboteur. While blocking taxes on electricity and cuts to business subsidies, the RN pressured Barnier on immigration, pensions, and social security cuts. Barnier made concessions, including cutting state medical assistance for illegal immigrants.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 04/12/2024

Their budget faced attacks from all groups and France is also subject to an excessive deficit procedure and must make huge cuts and/or raise taxes.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 04/12/2024

The RN intensified opposition as (1) Le Pen risks ineligibility for misappropriation of public funds and (2) the governments faces the test of the adoption of a budget for 2025.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 04/12/2024

In this context, Macron chose Barnier over other potential PMs vetoed by Marine Le Pen. But his government could rely neither on support from macronists and right-wing MPs nor on the RN's passive support.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 04/12/2024

Macron’s bloc had lost but remained pivotal, as this presentation of all winning connected coalitions (by @Ben_Guinaudeau) shows. They could have oriented their negotiations to the left or right.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 04/12/2024

The Barnier government was born out of this summer's legislative elections which delivered no majority. The left bloc claimed legitimacy to form government (being the biggest) but rejected compromises in the name of securing a parliamentary majority.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 04/12/2024

The French Parliament has just brought down Michel Barnier’s government via a vote of no confidence – a first since 1962. A 🧵 on what is happening, what to expect next - and how the far right is capitalizing on the crisis.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 22/11/2024

Greens hope to benefit from a favorable dynamic and to surpass the SPD, in which case a coalition between Christian-democrats and greens would not be entirely excluded.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 22/11/2024

At this point, the most likely scenario could be a grand coalition with the SPD (15%), even though according to the latest polls, this alliance could fall short of a majority.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 22/11/2024

Polls suggest Friedrich Merz's CDU/CSU will emerge as the strongest party with 33% but far from a majority. Coalitions are tricky: Merz excludes working with the far-right AfD (credited with 18%), while the FDP’s collapse (<4%) limits centrist options.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 22/11/2024

Olaf Scholz (SPD) responded by firing him. The FDP exited the government, leaving Scholz to govern in a minority. He invoked public conflicts, legislative blockades, and loss of trust" to justify this surprising move.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 22/11/2024

💥 Breaking point: In this context, the FDP distanced itself from coalition partners. Finance minister Christian Lindner took diverging stances and recently drafted manifesto for a complete reorientation of economic and climate policies, rolling back key coalition agreements.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 22/11/2024

📉 Intermediary elections: the Ampel parties suffered historic losses in recent regional elections. SPD, Greens, and FDP hit record lows in Thuringia and Saxony, with the FDP wiped out of all state parliaments. Only in Brandenburg did the SPD manage a narrow recovery.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 22/11/2024

SPD and Greens now want more leeway for public debt so as to fund the policies demanded by economic and social actors, the FDP hangs on to the debt brake.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 22/11/2024

🚨 Budget crisis: Managing these challenges while funding climate transition & increasing military expenses is hard after the invalidation by the Constitutional Court of €60B fund for climate/economic transition. This fund had given latitude to accommodate the coalition's diverging priorities.

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Isabelle Guinaudeau @iguinaudeau.bsky.social · 22/11/2024

💶 Economic challenges: Germany is in its second year of recession. The country struggles with rising energy costs, deindustrialization fears, and aging infrastructures.

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