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Federico Trombetta

@icotrombetta.bsky.social
456 followers 371 following 56 posts

Economist. Political Economy theory & applied game theory (accountability, selection, populism). PhD Warwick Econ, AP-TT Universita' Cattolica. #firstgen #inter

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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 06/07/2026
Looking forward to seeing you soon in Milano, for some great #PoliticalEconomy!
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 06/07/2026
When? From 6th October 2026, every other Tuesday. Why? To get feedback on your work (incl. early stages projects. Both theory and empirics) and chat with other political economists in the Milan area. #networking For more details, here is the call: drive.google.com/file/d/18q2F...
drive.google.com
Call 2026 2027.pdf
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 06/07/2026
docs.google.com
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 06/07/2026
🚨 Davide Cipullo, Tommaso Colussi, Domenico Rossignoli and I are happy to share the call for the 26/27 Political Economy – Work in progress seminars. Tuesday, 5-6 pm, Universita’ Cattolica. Open to anyone doing political economy! Link: docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1F...
docs.google.com
Political Economy WIP - 2026/27
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 12/01/2026
Time to release the calendar for the second term of our UniCatt Political Economy WIP seminars, jointly organized with Tommaso Colussi, Davide Cipullo and Domenico Rossignoli. Tuesday, 5pm, Universita' Cattolica. Everyone welcome!
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 12/01/2026
Thank you for hosting an article on the paper with @matteogamalerio.bsky.social on anti-revolving door policies, political selection and policymaking.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Details, and robustness in the full draft (ieb.ub.edu/publication/...). Happy to hear your feedback. 🙌
ieb.ub.edu
2025/03: Jumping without parachutes. revolving doors and political incentives – IEB
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Big picture: Not all “more value to political careers” policies are alike. A wage reduction and a PCO cut both change expected returns, but they hit different politicians differently—so they can have opposite selection effects. Design matters.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Takeaways: 1. Cooling-off periods can improve candidate human capital (education ↑). 2. But they can strengthen short-term pandering among lower-HC incumbents (taxes ↓). Anti-revolving-door rules can be a double-edged sword.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Who drives this? Exactly who the model predicts: non-graduate, non-term-limited mayors show the strongest tax cuts; graduate or term-limited mayors don’t move. That’s classic pandering under higher loss costs.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
In-office behavior: among mayors elected before 2013 (so selection is held constant), the reform increases the cost of losing. We see lower local income-tax revenues after 2013 in treated municipalities—consistent with avoiding unpopular tax hikes.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Selection result: the reform raises education. Average education of both mayoral candidates and elected mayors increases by ≈ +2 years around the threshold (~+13% vs. a ~15-year mean). “Pay peanuts, get monkeys”? Maybe—but how you pay matters.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Also, high education mayors are less likely to take up positions in a SOE immediately after the end of their mandate.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
First check: does the law bite? Yes. The reform cuts the chance that mayors land top SOE posts by ~5 percentage points around the threshold, with no effect on firms where the state holds only a minority (placebo).
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Empirical setting & policy shock: Italy’s Severino Law (2013) introduced 1–2 year cooling-off periods for local politicians moving into top jobs at SOEs/bureaucracy; it applies only above a 15,000-inhabitant threshold—perfect for a difference-in-discontinuity design.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
• But PCOs are especially valuable to lower human-capital politicians → reducing them deters those candidates more. Overall: reduction in PCO value and in wage can have opposite effects.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Theory result in a nutshell: • Conditional on holding office, lowering the value of PCOs raises the cost of losing—similar to a wage increase while in office → more incentive to avoid unpopular policies.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
First, we build a model. Ingredients: standard accountability + endogenous entry + PCOs available to politicians kicked out from office. Assumption: PCOs more attractive for low human capital politicians.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Idea: Politicians often have “politically connected outside options” (PCOs)—post-office jobs in the bureaucracy or state-owned firms (SOEs). Cut their value and you change both selection into politics and behavior in office. Is it just like a reduction in office wages? Not really…
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Do revolving doors shape who runs for office and how they govern? Short answer: yes—and not always the way you’d expect. New version of my paper with @matteogamalerio.bsky.social builds a model and looks at Italy’s 2013 “Severino” reform (cooling-off period). 🧵
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Takeaways: 1. Cooling-off periods can improve candidate human capital (education ↑). 2. But they can strengthen short-term pandering among lower-HC incumbents (taxes ↓). Anti-revolving-door rules can be a double-edged sword.
000
Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Who drives this? Exactly who the model predicts: non-graduate, non-term-limited mayors show the strongest tax cuts; graduate or term-limited mayors don’t move. That’s classic pandering under higher loss costs.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
In-office behavior: among mayors elected before 2013 (so selection is held constant), the reform increases the cost of losing. We see lower local income-tax revenues after 2013 in treated municipalities—consistent with avoiding unpopular tax hikes.
100
Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Selection result: the reform raises education. Average education of both mayoral candidates and elected mayors increases by ≈ +2 years around the threshold (~+13% vs. a ~15-year mean). “Pay peanuts, get monkeys”? Maybe—but how you pay matters.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Also, high education mayors are less likely to take up positions in a SOE immediately after the end of their mandate.
100
Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
First check: does the law bite? Yes. The reform cuts the chance that mayors land top SOE posts by ~5 percentage points around the threshold, with no effect on firms where the state holds only a minority (placebo).
100
Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Empirical setting & policy shock: Italy’s Severino Law (2013) introduced 1–2 year cooling-off periods for local politicians moving into top jobs at SOEs/bureaucracy; it applies only above a 15,000-inhabitant threshold—perfect for a difference-in-discontinuity design.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
• But PCOs are especially valuable to lower human-capital politicians → reducing them deters those candidates more. Overall: reduction in PCO value and in wage can have opposite effects.
100
Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Theory result in a nutshell: • Conditional on holding office, lowering the value of PCOs raises the cost of losing—similar to a wage increase while in office → more incentive to avoid unpopular policies.
100
Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
First, we build a model. Ingredients: standard accountability + endogenous entry + PCOs available to politicians kicked out from office. Assumption: PCOs more attractive for low human capital politicians.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 19/11/2025
Idea: Politicians often have “politically connected outside options” (PCOs)—post-office jobs in the bureaucracy or state-owned firms (SOEs). Cut their value and you change both selection into politics and behavior in office. Is it just like a reduction in office wages? Not really…
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 21/10/2025
Great suff happening in California!
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Reposted by Federico Trombetta
Giovanna Invernizzi @ginvernizzi.bsky.social · 05/10/2025
Please share! Call for papers in the formal theory section at EPSS 2026 @epssnet.bsky.social. Call for papers is open: epssnet.org/belfast-2026... We welcome individual and panel submissions on all substantive areas of political science!
epssnet.org
Call for Papers | EPSS Belfast 2026 Conference
Submit your abstract or full paper for EPSS Belfast 2026. Share cutting‑edge political science research, network with peers & contribute to academic impact.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 01/10/2025
🚨Time to release the calendar for the next term of our Political Economy Work-in-progress seminars! Tuesday, 5-6pm, Universita' Cattolica. You're welcome to join us! #EconBsky #PoliSciBsky As usual, organized with Davide Cipullo, Tommaso Colussi and Domenico Rossignoli.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 30/09/2025
LAST DAY!!!
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Reposted by Federico Trombetta
Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 04/08/2025
🚨Davide Cipullo, Tommaso Colussi, Domenico Rossignoli and I are excited to open the call for the 2nd UniCatt Political Economy workshop! We have 2 great keynotes: Alessandra Casella and David Yanagizawa-Drott. Send us your papers (theory or empirics) and let us meet in Milano on December 18.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 23/09/2025
ONLY ONE WEEK LEFT to send us your Political Economy papers and enjoy our workshop. Submission link: forms.gle/wFXpNaqqtBxQ... Deadline: 30th September.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 05/09/2025
🚨Less than 1 month to submit your paper for the 2nd UniCatt Pol Econ Workshop! Milano, 18th December. Alessandra Casella and David Yanagizawa-Drott will be our keynote speakers. #econsky #poliscisky Deadline: September 30th.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 25/08/2025
Less than 1 week left to apply for a slot in our Political Economy - Work in progress seminars! Tuesday, 5-6pm, Universita' Cattolica in Milano. Theory, applied micro, experiments... as long as it's Pol Econ!
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 04/08/2025
Submission deadline: September 30. Submissions: forms.gle/wFXpNaqqtBxQ... Detailed call: drive.google.com/file/d/12H6r...
forms.gle
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 04/08/2025
🚨Davide Cipullo, Tommaso Colussi, Domenico Rossignoli and I are excited to open the call for the 2nd UniCatt Political Economy workshop! We have 2 great keynotes: Alessandra Casella and David Yanagizawa-Drott. Send us your papers (theory or empirics) and let us meet in Milano on December 18.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 30/07/2025
And it's finally out! Once again, thanks to my amazing coauthor @matteogamalerio.bsky.social, the editor, the referees, and all those who helped in this journey.
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 10/07/2025
When? From 7th October 2025, every other Tuesday. Why? To get feedback on your work (incl. early stages projects. Both theory and empirics) and chat with other political economists in the Milan area. For more details, here is the call. Looking forward to meeting you in Milano!
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 10/07/2025
🚨Davide Cipullo, Tommaso Colussi, Domenico Rossignoli and I are happy to share the call for the 25/26 Political Economy – Work in progress seminars. Tuesday, 5-6 pm, Universita’ Cattolica. Open to anyone doing political economy! Link: docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1F... #econsky #poliscisky
docs.google.com
Political Economy WIP - 2025/26
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Reposted by Federico Trombetta
Economic Inquiry @ei-sky.bsky.social · 27/06/2025
Does digital competition hurt truthful reporting? Economists @ayushpan.bsky.social l & @icotrombetta.bsky.social construct a theoretical model to provide insights. For breaking news, speed can reduce accuracy, while for investigative work, reputation drives careful reporting. tinyurl.com/mryp99zr
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 29/05/2025
Yes, but it's evolving... We are planning to send you the next iteration for comments, at some point during the summer. But there is a public version available: giovannainvernizzi.com/wp-content/u...
giovannainvernizzi.com
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 29/05/2025
Excited to announce the 2025 UniCatt Political Economy lecture! Shanker Satyanath (NYU) will present "Social Clubs and the Creation of a National Elite". 📍Tuesday 3rd June, 5pm, Università Cattolica (room G.253).
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Federico Trombetta @icotrombetta.bsky.social · 29/05/2025
I've heard there is a great conference in NY on Friday & Saturday... Full program here: sites.google.com/nyu.edu/lse-...
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Reposted by Federico Trombetta
Clément de Chaisemartin @cdechaisemartin.bsky.social · 18/04/2025
Just posted updated version of our DID textbook! We now have drafts of all chapters, including the one on general designs! Now you can tell your friends still on X that they are DID-outdated :-) Happy easter for those of you that celebrate it. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....
papers.ssrn.com
Credible Answers to Hard Questions: Differences-in-Differences for Natural Experiments
This book introduces applied researchers to modern Differences-in-Differences (DID) methods, that they can use to obtain credible answers to hard causal inferen
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Reposted by Federico Trombetta
Bård Harstad @bardharstad.bsky.social · 08/04/2025
After being an editor for 6.5 years (4 REStud; 2.5 JEEA), I have accumulated a few suggestions that can help you avoid unnecessary rejections.
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