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Danny Cullenward

@ghgpolicy.org
14K followers 1.7K following 1.8K posts

Forensic climate economist and lawyer • The carbon accounting canary in your climate policy coal mine • ghgpolicy.org

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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 12h
The bill also restricts a reviewing court to look only at the evidence brought by the plaintiff, the administrative record, and the statistical data concerning the last 5 years of permitting outcomes (i.e., what the government must produce per the clause above).
(C) RECORD FOR REVIEW.—The court shall hear a cause of action brought under this paragraph solely on—
(i) the evidence produced by the applicant;
(ii) the administrative record before the agency; and
(iii) any raw statistical data required to be provided under subparagraph (B)(iii).
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 12h
If the litigant makes a prima facie showing using "empirical evidence" per the above clause, then the government is required to produce data looking at the past 5 years of permitting outcomes.
(iii) BURDEN OF EVIDENTIARY PRODUCTION.—
(I) IN GENERAL.—In a cause of action brought under this paragraph, if the applicant produces prima facie evidence of a pattern of disparate treatment under clause (i), the Federal Government shall have the burden to provide to the applicant and the court raw statistical data for the calendar year in which the action is brought and the preceding 5 calendar years showing, with respect to the specific type of covered project at issue—
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 12h
One of the categories of prima facie evidence is given in section 1402(d)(1)(B)(ii)(I)(aa) (ugh yes) — empirical evidence looking at historical rates of permit approval.
(aa) EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE.—Empirical evidence demonstrating a pattern of improper denial or unreasonable delay with respect to the specific type of covered project at issue compared to the previous rate at which other Federal authoriza-tions or permits were delivered for that same specific type of covered project prior to the commencement of the alleged pattern of delayed or denied Federal authorizations or permits.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 12h
The first paragraph [(III)] states what litigants have to claim (a pattern of disparate treatment, including intent), and the second [(ii)] defines the evidentiary basis for making that claim. For those following primary sources, this is all in section 1402(d)(1)(B).
(III) the Federal authorizations or permits were improperly denied or unreasonably delayed due to a pattern of disparate treatment by the Federal Government against the specific type of covered project at issue that occurred after the date of enactment of this Act.
(ii) PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE.—
(I) EVIDENCE.-The following shall be considered by a court as prima facie evidence of a pattern of disparate treatment under clause (i)(III): …
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 12h
The key term "pattern of disparate treatment" is defined in section 1402(b)(3), which requires all three subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). As you suggest, subparagraph (C) requires a kind of intent.
(3) PATTERN OF DISPARATE TREATMENT.—
The term "pattern of disparate treatment" means, with respect to 1 specific type of covered project, an empirically demonstrated statistical pattern that—
(A) shows a substantial increase, compared against the 5 most recent calendar years of empirical data on Federal authorization or permit decisions and delays for that specific type of covered project, in—(C) is the result of an intentional course of action undertaken by the Federal Government to create such a pattern.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 29/09/2026
I don't think self-regulation can be managed without the credible threat of government policy. As @katearonoff.bsky.social writes, it's too easy for companies to walk away from purely voluntary regulation. newrepublic.com/article/2157...
Screenshot of text: "Generally only states can force that kind of change, and the credible threat of regulation is essential for voluntary initiatives like the GHG Protocol. At a time when it’s easier than ever for companies to abandon their climate commitments—and to stop funding green nonprofits—GHG Protocol secretariat staff may be understandably anxious to keep industry on side. Faced with the prospect of these hotly contested accounting methods being drafted into law, well-meaning environmentalists may have to decide between keeping corporate stakeholders engaged and happy, and maintaining scientific integrity."
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 09/06/2026
Looks like the statute caps penalties for non-reporting at $500k per year. California Health and Safety Code § 38532(f)(2)(A) leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNa... This is not legal advice etc.
"The administrative penalties imposed on a reporting entity shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) in a reporting year."
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 08/06/2026
That was all bad enough, but now it appears that the Protocol has effectively delegated the forest carbon accounting rules to a secret, industry-led drafting process. There is nothing more I can do but resign. So I did.
From my resignation letter:

"After manipulating the Board’s decision-making process on forest carbon accounting and withholding the technical working group documents from the public for more than a year, the Protocol is now planning an extended public comment period on issues that have already been delegated to a secret, industry-dominated drafting process.

I again reiterate my request that the Protocol publish all documents from the forest carbon accounting technical working group, all related complaints and official responses, all pilot testing results evaluating the industry proposal, and any written agreement(s) documenting the Protocol’s working relationship with the ISO that may exist."
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 08/06/2026
I have resigned from the Greenhouse Gas Protocol's Independent Standards Board. The Protocol is openly violating its own rules and has effectively delegated forest carbon accounting standards to a secret, industry-led working group. ghgpolicy.org/s/2026-06-08...
Text too long; see machine-readable PDF at this link: 

https://ghgpolicy.org/s/2026-06-08-Cullenward-resignation.pdfText too long; see machine-readable PDF at this link: 

https://ghgpolicy.org/s/2026-06-08-Cullenward-resignation.pdfText too long; see machine-readable PDF at this link: 

https://ghgpolicy.org/s/2026-06-08-Cullenward-resignation.pdf
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 30/05/2026
Here is his April 29th comment letter on the state's carbon market regulations, which CARB just approved yesterday. He nails the policy and the political details of this dirty deal:
But thanks to oil lobbyists, California will make accessible up to 118 million free pollution passes to industrial polluters. This is the same amount that CARB has stated needs to be taken off the market to meet our 2030 emission reduction goals. If this proposal passes as is, California risks missing our 2030 emission reduction target, which is mandated by legislative statute—all to give more free passes to fossil fuel companies.

Because these corporations get to pollute for free, they won't have to buy as many allowances at the auction. Recent analysis from UC Santa Barbara projects this backdoor giveaway will drain $4 billion in state revenue over the next four years. That means slashing $2.3 billion from the GGRF and cutting the California Climate Credit’s direct electricity rebates by $1.7 billion—a massive 17% cut across the board.

Defunding these programs means some of the world’s richest, dirtiest companies get a discount on their pollution while shifting the financial burden directly onto working families. Nobody is stepping in to cover this $4 billion shortfall. If CARB allows this fund to be gutted, our communities will immediately lose vital funding for:
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 21/03/2026
Hello, from my bodega to yours
So many bottles of hot sauce, where to even begin
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 24/02/2026
So while the Governor's stated purpose for the proposed tax credit is to promote in-state production of SAF, nothing about the details of the proposed tax credit would limit support to in-state producers. ebudget.ca.gov/2026-27/pdf/...
Sustainable Aviation Fuel
The Budget includes a tax credit against diesel excise tax liability to incentivize the in-state production of sustainable aviation fuel, a lower-carbon alternative to petroleum-based jet fuel. This investment advances California's climate and air quality goals by reducing emissions from the aviation sector, one of the most difficult sources to decarbonize, while supporting innovation and private investment in clean transportation fuels.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 24/02/2026
Thankfully, it's just a proposal, and the Legislature can weigh in during budget talks. The nonpartisan Legislative Analyst's Office has a new report out today, which recommends rejecting the Governor's proposed sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) tax credit. lao.ca.gov/Publications...
Recommendation
Reject Proposed Tax Credit. We recommend the Legislature reject the proposed budget trailer legislation establishing a credit against diesel excise tax revenue for sale of SAF in California. The proposal appears to be a relatively expensive approach to reducing GHGs and may not result in the full anticipated environmental benefits. Moreover, the implementation of the proposed tax credit could have negative implications for transportation funding—potentially even larger than those estimated by the administration—and would not be consistent with the spirit of voter‑approved restrictions on the use of diesel tax revenues.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 22/01/2026
Just donated $100. Did it via ACH so I guess the transaction may take a bit and so the total isn't listed.
Not entirely satisfactory email evidence of my $100 donation BUT IT'S ALL I GOT because the ACH network is stuck in the stone age and thank you for reading
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 18/11/2025
Hey @shastingssimon.bsky.social I saw the most Canadian sign when I visited you in Calgary back in 2023
A sign on a restaurant in Calgary that was closed for renovations that hits the Canadian linguistic trifecta (please, thanks, and sorry) all in service of one single message.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 03/10/2025
yeah I'm pretty sure Standard Oil developed this site like 100 years ago, well before the CCC even existed here is our friend wikipedia with a visual
ye old-timey photo of the Standard Oil refinery in El Segundo, c1920 and perched on the otherwise-picturesque bluffs of southern California, care of the wonder of contemporary civilization that is Wikipedia 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Segundo,_California#/media/File:StandardOil1920.jpg
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 07/08/2025
That’s a fine-lookin bike there, mon ami
1940s Dave checkin’ out 2020s Dave
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 15/04/2025
Also it reminds us that it is equally impossible to dismiss as it is to defend Toto
Ray from Achewood dancing to Toto’s Africa. That’s it. That’s the gag.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 12/03/2025
Are you still working for Newsom? Or merely interested in future business?
"Tim [Wayne] has worked on hundreds of campaigns for clients like Gavin Newsom, … "
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 07/01/2025
Specifically, the definition of a "qualified" state under the final 45V rules is based on a set of criteria about the features of a state's cap-and-trade program. The definition requires a price ceiling of at least $90 USD per tCO2e (2025 USD). California has that today, but only through 2030.
Under Section 1.45V-4(d)(2)(iv)(G), a qualifying cap-and-trade program is one that: 

"(G) Generally ensures that the cap on greenhouse gas emissions cannot be exceeded for less than $90 per metric ton of CO2e, adjusted for inflation from 2025 dollars using at a minimum the most recently available twelve-month value of the CPI-U, as published by the BLS."
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 07/01/2025
Using US EPA emissions data, we estimated that the maximum production of conventional hydrogen that could be qualify for 45V with methane offsets is about 35 million tpa — triple the DOE 2030 goal for clean H2. With the safeguards in the final rule, it should be less than 2 million tpa.
Bar chart showing the maximum conventional hydrogen that could qualify for the 45V tax credit using methane offsets, assuming blending. About 35 million tpa could be produced, primarily from fugitive fossil methane emissions but also from landfills, manure, and wastewater. Bar chart showing the maximum conventional hydrogen that could qualify for the 45V tax credit using methane offsets, based on the safeguards in the final regulation. No blending is allowed. About 2 million tpa could be produced from landfills, manure, coal mine methane, and wastewater, although many of the non-manure sources may be ineligible in practice. Manure sources would support a maximum of just 0.6 million tpa.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 18/12/2024
anyway, ladies and gentlepersons of the internet, I give you the officially independent views of the state carbon market adviser who also happens to be the California State Director for the Environmental Defense Fund a nonprofit environmental organization that uses science to make a difference
The Environmental Defense Fund's "About us" page: 

"Guided by science and economics, and committed to climate justice, we work in the places, on the projects and with the people that can make the biggest difference."
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 18/12/2024
never mind that it means Dr. Randazzo has a PhD, happens to be super smart, and also co-authored the paper in question with the lead scientist of the Environmental Defense Fund (Steve Hamburg, a proper old white dude™); she is just a "postdoctoral researcher"
Screenshot of paper title and summary info:

Improved assessment of baseline and additionality for forest carbon crediting

Nina A. Randazzo, Doria R. Gordon, Steven P. Hamburg
First published: 08 February 2023 
https://doi.org/10.1002/eap.2817

Handling Editor: Mingkai Jiang

Funding information: Bezos Earth FundScreenshot of abstract (available at link above) with this passage highlighted: 

"Our findings strengthen the results of recent research suggesting common practice bias and adverse selection. At several sites, even after controlling for private ownership, 100% of the initial carbon stocks could be explained by ecological variables. This result means that improved management did not preserve or increase carbon stocks above what was typical, suggesting that no carbon offsets should have been issued for these sites.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 02/12/2024
Hmm, looks like the journalist swapped biodiesel and renewable diesel in her statement there. I pointed her to this EIA summary, which shows how California RD consumption significantly exceeds national production levels through 2021. www.eia.gov/todayinenerg...
Figuring showing the rapid increase in renewable diesel consumption driven almost entirely by California, which consumption reaching nearly 30 million barrels per year in 2021. US production in 2021 was substantially smaller at over 20 million barrels, primarily from states other than California. Source https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=57180
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 22/11/2024
to do battle with @nature.com.web.brid.gy, one imagines
Screen shot of @nature.com.web.brid.gy

Reading "Nature is the foremost international weekly scientific journal in the world and is the flagship journal for Nature Portfolio. It publishes the finest ..."
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 30/10/2024
I can't stress enough that a yes vote would put at risk the state's broader climate policy agenda, all for the purpose of sending money mostly to out-of-state projects that don't deliver the climate benefits they promise on paper. kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/research/pub...
With a vote on the proposed LFCS regulations scheduled a few days after the presidential election in November 2024, California’s climate regulator is looking to finalize the future of the LCFS program in advance of upcoming discussions about the potential reform and extension of the state’s economy-wide cap-and-trade program.

This sequencing has important implications for the ambition of the cap-and-trade program, which is likely to be politically constrained by consumer price impacts that are directly affected by the LCFS program, as well as for who stands to benefit from state climate finance. By updating the LCFS program ahead of the cap-and-trade program, the state climate regulator is effectively privileging the LCFS program’s beneficiaries—primarily biofuel producers—above the current and potential future beneficiaries of state funding collected from auctioning allowances in the cap-and-trade program.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 25/10/2024
Here's what I wrote about that problem in my report for the Kleinman Center for Energy Policy.
"With a vote on the proposed LFCS regulations scheduled a few days after the presidential election in November 2024, California’s climate regulator is looking to finalize the future of the LCFS program in advance of upcoming discussions about the potential reform and extension of the state’s economy-wide cap-and-trade program.

This sequencing has important implications for the ambition of the cap-and-trade program, which is likely to be politically constrained by consumer price impacts that are directly affected by the LCFS program, as well as for who stands to benefit from state climate finance. By updating the LCFS program ahead of the cap-and-trade program, the state climate regulator is effectively privileging the LCFS program’s beneficiaries—primarily biofuel producers—above the current and potential future beneficiaries of state funding collected from auctioning allowances in the cap-and-trade program."
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 25/10/2024
Like if your PR pitch is "this is a market that gives money to good things" I sure would like to know how many billions of dollars a year you think California drivers should pay for crop-based biofuels and dairy manure accounting tricks.
Quote from CARB Board Chair Liane Randolph: the Low Carbon Fuel Standard “is one of California’s most significant and most effective climate programs. It’s a market program that comes with a mandate to fuel producers to reduce their carbon intensity over time.”
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 17/10/2024
Okay but if Sublime sells the "clean" rights to a different buyer, then the physical delivery should be advertised as "generic" not "clean" How is a plaque that says "clean" anything other than fundamentally misleading?
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 09/10/2024
Nothing says "brave tortured hero" quite like: 1. Disparaging one of the few non-predatory open access academic journals in energy/climate 2. Writing an industry-funded study on a topic that is relevant to the industry's financial interests to rehabilitate your scientific credentials
Brown submitted his second wildfire study to Nature earlier this year, acknowledging last year’s incident in his submission only to be turned down. Other prestigious journals, including Science, The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, and Science Advances, didn’t want it either, Brown said. Currently, the paper is in peer-review at Environmental Research Letters, which Brown describes as “not a high-impact journal but a decent outlet.” 

He’s waiting to hear back.Patrick Brown's latest preprint, with a co-author from the utility PG&EThe funding and conflicts of interest disclosure statement, which is too long to quote here but is available on page 32 of the preprint here: https://eartharxiv.org/repository/view/6745/
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 03/10/2024
Paragraph 12 of the indictment sure is a doozy! And this isn't an aberration in the industry — it's standard practice.
"12. Between 2021 and 2023, the primary way CQC obtained VCUs was through its Cookstove Projects registered with Issuer-1. KENNETH NEWCOMBE, the defendant, was on the Board of Directors of Issuer-1 and, ni or about 2020, he proposed that Issuer-1 adopt a new methodology for calculating emission reductions from cookstove-related projects (the "Cookstove Methodology"). NEWCOMBE was in favor of the Cookstove Methodology because he believed ti would allow CQC to generate more VCUs than existing methodologies."
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 03/10/2024
He sure was involved in a lot of different entities in the carbon market industry over the years, wasn't he? Apologies that his bio uses the term "intrapraneur," which may be a trigger for those of us who work for a living. (From his archived board bio.)
"Before coming to the United States, he was CEO of the Papua New Guinea Power Utility and Founding Head of Energy Planning for PNG. As an intrapreneur in the World Bank, Ken led the World Banks pilot phase of the Global Environment Facility which established the basis for one billion a year permanent GEF to support the incremental costs of aligning investment decisions with externalities of global environmental change and pioneered the investment portfolio of the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol to phase our ozone-depleting substances. He established the Forest Market Transformation Initiative which led to the launch of the leading NGO Forest Trends and its Ecosystem Marketplace and the successful Global Alliance for Forest Conservation and Sustainable use with the World Wildlife Fund."
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 27/09/2024
Welcome to campaign season 2024, in which my crypto questions remain unanswered
In which I seek information about how to invest in the bitcoinsIn which I express my concerns about inflation and do my own research
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 24/09/2024
it's a bad strategy for outreach to normies, agreed, and also an essential topic for those of us who work on this professionally, including me and Josh also this
Quote from a book: "Realism about the scale of the challenge is often discouraged in climate policy circles because it is easy to confuse with pessimism."
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 04/09/2024
Yes, yes I know.
Three Spiders-man pointing at one another; but which one is the REAL Spiderman?
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 28/08/2024
¿Porque no los dos?
Article 2 of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which reads: "Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;"
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 17/07/2024
It's so bad! @gwagner.com and I made the same comparison in an oped last year. www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/202...
Block quote of text from Washington Post oped linked in post, comparing hydrogen subsidy lock-in risks to the environmental and fiscal disaster that is US ethanol policy.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 02/07/2024
This is one of the more craven things I've heard a prominent climate researcher voice out loud. And it's hard not to notice this pivot in connection with the growing interest in solar radiation management among wealthy tech elites, i.e. the kinds of people who are now funding this work.
Among those options for managing climate risk, the ethical, technical, environmental, and governance questions that accompany solar radiation management are unique. “Because solar geoengineering and carbon removal have little in common, we will have a better chance to craft sensible policy if we treat them separately,” Keith wrote.

Keith is now in charge of a program that not only, in a sense, lumps the two technologies together, but also throws in a few others for good measure. “I do feel there’s some level of crow eating because I spent a lot of time arguing how totally separate they are—I’ve even done that in congressional testimony. Now I’m running something that does both,” Keith said. “A lot of people I respect have been lumping them forever. And so sometimes you have to listen to people.”

https://thebulletin.org/2024/06/the-university-of-chicago-new-climate-initiative/
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 21/06/2024
The story includes a great animation walking through how life cycle analysis methods get abused to concentrate the low overall percentage of recycled content into single products, in order to justify marketing a higher percentage of recycled content than they deserve. Here's a screenshot.
Figure showing how units of recycled content are transferred between co-products of plastic pyrolysis to assign all of the recycled content to individual products in order to facilitate marketing statements about their percentage of recycled plastic content.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 19/06/2024
I am begging academic economists, please consider what happens when you combust the "sustainable aviation fuel" in a plane. Offsets don't reduce net emissions, and giving innovation tax credits to incumbent fossil fuel companies for commercially mature activities is economically inefficient.
Quote from end of this story: https://www.alleghenyfront.org/cnx-plan-to-turn-mine-gas-into-jet-fuel-a-win-win-or-carbon-accounting-gimmick/
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 02/06/2024
It turns out I do? But just mine so far as I can find.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 29/05/2024
Wim also notes an influential study from Gregg Marland, who teamed up with Dyson in the 1970s to promote the notion of the biosphere compensating for fossil CO2 emissions. Fun fact: Marland recently worked with/for the offset company NCX, selling 1-year forest harvest delays as carbon offsets.
Screen shot of the title of a book chapter from Dyson and Marland, don't ask me how I found it, I have no idea, either. 

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31822016268419&view=1up&seq=2&skin=2021
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 29/05/2024
And yes, some of the earliest carbon removal analysis was literally Freeman Dyson imagining how trees could compensate for fossil CO2 emissions. So the next time you accuse me of being a one trick pony, please know it's an old trick.
Screen shot of the title of Dyson (1976), https://doi.org/10.1016/0360-5442(77)90033-0
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 25/05/2024
Unless …
Broken glasses scene from the Twilight Zone’s Time Enough At Last
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 22/05/2024
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 22/05/2024
Here's the language we're talking about, for others who are curious to see the details.
"It is unlawful for a person to market, make available or offer for sale, or sell a voluntary carbon offset without explicitly marketing the voluntary carbon offset as not being physically equivalent to the climate impact of carbon dioxide emissions, unless it is reasonably expected [to have a durability of at least 1000 years]."
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 22/05/2024
Good news: SB 1036 cleared the California Senate! The unofficial tally is 27-5, which is a veto-proof majority. The official vote will close later tonight and could be different. The bill now heads to the Assembly.
Unofficial vote for SB 1036, with 27 yes votes, 5 no votes, and 8 members not voting at this time.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 21/05/2024
"Oh, I could give you an answer — but the only ones who would understand it would be you and me."
A still frame of the famous Simpsons monorail episode, in which Lisa asks con man Lyle Lanley why Springfield should build a mass transit system in a small town with a centralized population.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 10/04/2024
Thanks! A 15-year eligibility window is … not good. Also there's this, which lowers the bar substantially for very large users. An outcome where someone who buys 50% clean gets the same label as someone who buys 7% clean is hard to justify.
A table showing the minimum share of electricity procurement that must be clean to earn a green power label from EPA, starting with a 50% requirement for the smallest entities and falling to just 7% for the largest entities.
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Danny Cullenward @ghgpolicy.org · 20/03/2024
For sure, that’s a big concern. We noted that in the piece here.
“Unfortunately, it doesn’t include impacts from hydrogen, which itself is an indirect greenhouse gas that contributed to global warming.”
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