iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Reposted by George Barros

Tatarigami @tatarigami.bsky.social · 12/10/2025

Our exclusive report on Russia’s tank production is out. Using internal files and state contracts, we show production plans for the next decade and current output. A short thread will follow soon, but for now, you can read the report frontelligence.substack.com/p/exclusive-inside-russias-20262036

frontelligence.substack.com

Exclusive: Inside Russia’s 2026–2036 Tank Fleet Modernization and Buildup Plans

In the spring and summer of 2025, as part of our own operation, our team obtained exclusive documents that provide new insight into Russia’s tank-production plans and confirm the existence of a little...

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 07/10/2025

Russia launches 500+ Shahed drones at Ukraine every few days. If Ukraine had tomahawk missiles, Ukraine could destroy the factory in Tatarstan that has the capacity to produce 2,700 of them monthly.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 04/07/2025

Current Trump Administration policy is not working. Putin is emboldened. He will not stop unless we stop him.

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Reposted by George Barros

Anne Applebaum @anneapplebaum.wsocial.eu · 12/06/2025

"Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory" understandingwar.org/backgrounder...

understandingwar.org

Institute for the Study of War

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on June 10 that the United States intends to reduce its budget for the purchase of weapons for Ukraine in 2026.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 04/06/2025

Maxar collected images of before / after damage to Russian aircraft as a result of Operation Spiderweb. This is not a comprehensive view of the damage. Cloud cover obscured several of the other Russian airbases that were reportedly also struck by drones. 📷 @Maxar

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 01/06/2025

Ukraine demonstrated that it can cause strategic effects using FPV drones. Small UAS are not confined to the tactical level of warfare. Tremendous operation.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 24/04/2025

There are things the US can do to *make* Vladimir stop. Putin has vulnerabilities we are either overlooking or choosing not to leverage. Putin is banking on the US letting Russia off the hook despite Russia's own precarious position

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Reposted by George Barros

Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 17/04/2025

The Kremlin falsely framed Ukraine's extension of martial law & continue mobilization through August as an effort to inhibit the peace process. The Kremlin, however, failed to acknowledge that Russia also has been intensifying its recruitment campaign to continue its war.🧵

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Reposted by George Barros

Karolina Hird @karolinahird.bsky.social · 17/04/2025

1/ Today's occupation update focuses heavily on Russia's efforts to deport Ukrainian children and teens to Russia and expose them to Russification programs. I discuss how programs such as "University Shifts" and "Cultural Map 4+85" are just a small part of a much larger ecosystem ⬇️

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Reposted by George Barros

Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 16/04/2025

Thrilled to share that @cnn.com cited my analysis on the news surrounding a popular Russian commander - Major General Ivan Popov - who attempted to weaponize his popularity & Russian information space to resist his removal from command in July 2023. www.cnn.com/2025/04/15/e... A quick 🧵on Popov:

cnn.com

Russian general ousted after criticizing military top brass to return to battle – in charge of notorious unit of ex-convicts | CNN

One of Russia’s most outspoken generals, sacked and detained after a withering attack on the Defense Ministry two years ago, is returning to the front, according to his lawyer.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 04/04/2025

Interesting footage of Russian forces' tactical training to defeat FPV drone threats using shotguns. Russian sport skeet shooters are helping instruct Russian soldiers learn how to hit fast-moving targets with shotguns.

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Reposted by George Barros

Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

Putin is likely afraid of having over 700,000 Russian veterans return to Russia in the event of demobilization out of fear that veteran groups could threaten the stability of his regime upon their return. Putin launched a deliberate campaign to suppress veteran civil societies.🧵

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 21/03/2025

Satellite imagery collected on March 21 shows damage from Ukrainian strikes on storage facilities at Russia’s Engels airbase. An ammunition & weapons storage area on the airbase's NE edge was damaged. Destroyed buildings & storage bunkers with craters are visible. Image Maxar Technologies

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 15/03/2025

Waiting for Moscow to offer one (1) concession.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 14/03/2025

Available evidence from the battlefield does not indicate any Russian encirclements of Ukrainian forces at scale, and certainly not by the thousands.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 13/03/2025

You're falling for Kremlin language and mind games if you think Putin's statement means he accepted the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire deal. Putin actually rejected the terms of President Trump's proposal and is now trying to change the proposal's substance.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 12/03/2025

The Kremlin is not responding enthusiastically to the US-Ukraine proposal for a 30-day ceasefire.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 10/03/2025

The temporal correlation between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine and the start of Russia's collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk salient is noteworthy.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 08/03/2025

Russia, not Ukraine, is the obstacle to peace. This is evident in the data. Russia has intensified its drone/missile strike campaign against Ukraine after President Trump was inaugurated. Ukraine has offered many concessions to start peace processes. Russia has offered zero.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 05/03/2025

Russia is the obstacle to peace in Ukraine. Not Ukraine. The proper strategy should be to erode Russia's leverage and grant Ukraine leverage until peace talks. Not the other way around.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 05/03/2025

Terrible decision. Cutting intel sharing will grant Russian forces enhanced protection at the operational level. Russian battlefield gains have been dropping since late 2024, but this stands to help Russia rebuild lost momentum.

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Reposted by George Barros

Jessica Berlin @berlinbridge.bsky.social · 03/03/2025

For the 58th time in two weeks: Europe, stop freaking out over every crazy thing Trump says. He will keep saying crazy things every day, and he changes his mind constantly. Focus on what YOU are going to do to advance Ukrainian victory and undermine Russia.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 01/03/2025

Interesting things are happening in Toretsk.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 26/02/2025

Belarus has ratified an agreement that will allow Russia to build military bases / installations in Belarus, permanently expanding Russia's forward presence on NATO's Eastern flank. Not surprising. I've been forecasting such a development for years. tass.ru/mezhdunarodn...

tass.ru

В Минске ратифицировали договор, позволяющий РФ создавать военные объекты

Документ, в частности, также предусматривает размещение воинских формирований России в Белоруссии

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 25/02/2025

Since minerals in Ukraine have become relevant for the policy debate, our interactive control of terrain map of Ukraine now includes Ukrainian minerals. Clicking on a mineral tells the user what it is. storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7...

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 24/02/2025

Block aid, argue that aid doesn't matter, blame all issues on Ukrianian underperformance vs Western lag and under-resourcing, etc.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 24/02/2025

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 23/02/2025

Any peace deal starting from the basis of the 2022 Istanbul protocols must be a non-starter.

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Reposted by George Barros

Institute for the Study of War @thestudyofwar.bsky.social · 23/02/2025

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.🧵 (1/9)

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 22/02/2025

Product of necessity. Share with those who need it.

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Reposted by George Barros

Institute for the Study of War @thestudyofwar.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

NEW | Russia's Weakness Offers Leverage: The US can use the enormous challenges RUS will face in 2025 as leverage to secure critical concessions in ongoing negotiations to end the war by continuing & even expanding military support to UKR. 1/8 Special Report: isw.pub/RussiaWeakness

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

Interested readers can study the full SIGINT findings in the appendix of my recent paper, “Russia’s Quiet Conquest: Belarus.” bsky.app/profile/thes...

x.com

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

The observed signals data is a supporting indicator that increases the confidence of ISW’s assessment that Belarusian forces assisted Russia’s major training surge in late 2022 following Russia’s September 2022 partial mobilization.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

The observation of an increase in mobile device activity at training grounds where Russian trainees were reportedly training, and during the time frame in which Russian trainees were reportedly training, prior to deployment to border crossings with Ukraine is significant.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

Several of the mobile devices observed at Belarusian training grounds in late 2022 were previously observed in Russia and were later tracked to have moved towards Russian border crossings and military staging areas around Ukraine in April 2023.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

The data also tracks with observed decreased activity between June 2023 and July 2023 as satellite imagery documented the dismantling of tents on the three training grounds.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

The data indicates a steady increase in activity at all 3 training grounds between JAN 2023 and MAY 2023 and aligns with open-source reporting on a significant increase of Russian personnel in BY in SEP 2022, followed by a reduction of Russian personnel in BY around MAY 2023.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

Mobile device location data indicates an increase in activity at all three training grounds between August 2022 and October 2022. Activity levels at the three training grounds endured a slight decrease in November 2022 before almost doubling in December 2022.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

SIGINT. Mobile device GPS location signal data analyzed by commercial data provider Anomaly Six observed an increase in mobile device activity at the Belarusian Obuz Lesnovsky, Lepel, and Repischcha training grounds between August 2022 and December 2022.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

in Brest, Belarus, (Belarus’ principal combined arms training ground) including at least one brigade’s worth of equipment observed at the training ground on November 20, 2022. Satellite imagery would later confirm that these would be dismantled by mid-2023.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

IMINT. Imagery analysis documented the establishment of field tents in Belarus at major training grounds in Belarus. Satellite imagery collected in November 2022 detected an increase of Russian equipment, particularly main battle tanks, at the Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Ground...

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

Public communications. We collated all the public communications about the number of Russian troops in Belarus. These come from US / NATO officials’ statements, Ukrainian officials’ statements, and assessments provided by the (unfortunately now-defunct) Hajun Project. Graphed:

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

ISW used an all-source approach to assessing Russia’s use of Belarusian training capacity. This included open-source information from public communications, commercially available SIGINT, and IMINT, to assess Russia’s use of Belarusian training grounds.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

Russia will very likely use Belarus’ training capacity to help the Russian military reconstitute, just as the Russian military leverage Belarus to facilitate a training surge in late 2022 – mid 2023.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

The auxiliary training capacity that Belarusian forces can provide the Russian military is likely a strategic accelerant for Russian force generation and will help the Kremlin achieve its desired force reconstitution and growth faster than Russia could by itself.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

Russia’s training capacity is limited and is a key limiting factor for the volume and rate at which the Russian military can regenerate its losses in Ukraine and generate planned new forces part of Russia’s long-term force restructuring postured against NATO.

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George Barros @georgewbarros.bsky.social · 19/02/2025

Training Ground Belarus. The Western intelligence must include Belarus’ training capacity in its assessment of Russian force generation capabilities. The Russian military has leveraged & likely will continue to leverage the Belarusian military as trainers for new Russian forces.

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