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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 16/10/2026

The September 2026 release of the Financial Accounts of the U.S. now integrates private credit. The charts show $2.6 trillion in assets across private credit vehicles & $1.5 trillion in loans to U.S. businesses. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/...

The graphic contains two stacked bar charts displayed side by side:

Left Chart:
• Title: "Total Financial Assets of Private Credit Vehicles"
• Y-axis: Billions of dollars (scale 0-2500)
• X-axis: Years from 2013 to 2025
• Shows annual data with stacked bars in six colors representing different lender types

Right Chart:
• Title: "Private Credit Loans to U.S. Businesses, by Lender Type"
• Y-axis: Billions of dollars (scale 0-1600)
• X-axis: Years from 2013 to 2025
• Shows annual data with stacked bars in six colors representing the same lender types

Legend (applies to both charts):
• Internal and Tender Offer Funds (white/light)
• Foreign Middle-Market CLOs (gray)
• Domestic Middle-Market CLOs (light blue/teal)
• BDCs (blue)
• Foreign PD Funds (purple)
• Domestic PD Funds (dark blue/navy)

Notes: Both charts indicate "Data as of Q4 each year"

Source: September 11, 2026 release of the Z.1 Financial Accounts of the United States and SEC Form PF

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 13/10/2026

ICYMI New #FEDSNote: Heterogeneity in the Marginal Propensity to Consume among U.S. Households: www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note...

Figure 3. Mean allocation by income and wealth group. Chart shows mean allocation across income/wealth percentiles.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 09/10/2026

New #FEDSNote finds at least 15% of families are unable to lean on relatives and friends for financial or caregiving support: www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note...

Figure 2. Participation in Informal Financial/Caregiving (F/CG) Support Networks by Wealth Decile. Chart shows stark wealth divide in family/caregiving support.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 09/10/2026

New #FEDSNote says I don't know about you, but my MPC is 0.22: www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note...

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 02/10/2026

Recessions are largely goods phenomena, with services making much smaller contributions to the business cycle. And overall goods GDP has been stable at around 1/4th of total GDP over the past couple decades. (2/2) www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note...

Figure 2. Goods production drives the business cycle

Figure 6. Goods GDP has grown faster than goods-industry value added

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 02/10/2026

A declining role of goods production in the U.S. economy has long been a topic of intense policy and research focus. But goods production remains more important than narrow measures might suggest. (1/2) www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note...

Figure 1. Measures showing declining importance of goods production

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 30/09/2026

Manufacturers are increasingly seeking workers with AI-related skills. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... #EconSky

Figure 4. Types of AI Skills Required in Manufacturing Postings

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 28/09/2026

The motor vehicle industry suffered severe production disruptions during 2021 and 2022 due to semiconductor shortages, but the automakers adopted some strategies to contain those losses. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... #EconSky

Figure 1. The Trajectory of Light Vehicle Production Through the Chip Shortage

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 28/09/2026

Similar tariff shock, opposite composition shifts: Japan -> import mix tilted towards higher-priced models South Korea -> mix tilted towards lower-priced models. While unit values fell sharply, composition is only a small part of the story. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note...

Figure 4. Variable- and Fixed-Composition Average Prices

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 21/09/2026

How much can forecast panels tell us about perceived monetary policy rules? Letting the data choose how observations are pooled yields much less evidence of time-varying policy responses relative to previous approaches. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds... #FEDSPaper

This line chart displays Activity Coefficient γ (gamma) from 1985 through 2025, comparing two estimation methods. The conventional estimate appears as a black solid line, while the optimal pooling estimate is shown as a red dashed line. The y-axis ranges from -0.25 to 1.75. Key finding: The conventional estimate reached its highest point around 2005, peaking at approximately 1.75. Both estimation methods exhibit significant volatility throughout the 40-year period, with values typically fluctuating between 0 and 1.0. The optimal pooling estimate generally appears smoother and tracks somewhat below the conventional estimate. By 2025, both estimates show lower values, ranging between approximately 0.1 and 0.5.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 04/09/2026

This #IFDPPaper shows that when firms serve foreign markets through overseas affiliates, currency depreciation can raise income earned abroad without generating a comparable domestic production boom. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp... #EconSky

Figure 7: Foreign-Market Organization and Exchange-Rate Transmission

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 04/09/2026

A new #FEDSNote digs deeper into the popular comparison of world gold reserves and foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasuries. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... #EconSky

Figure 3. Modified World Gold Reserves and Foreign Holdings of Treasuries (Excludes U.S., Germany, France, Italy, IMF)

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 06/08/2026

When firms endogenously choose how far ahead to plan, large shocks may make them look further into the future, changing inflation dynamics and generating time-varying uncertainty. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds... #FEDSPaper

Empirical and model-based measures of inflation uncertainty.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 03/08/2026

ICYMI: We show that borrowing more against the same collateral raises spreads faster and faster. Uncertainty shocks steepen that relationship, devastating leveraged borrowers. Credit surface steepness ranks credit conditions and economic uncertainty. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds...

Figure 1: Uncertainty Shocks and Credit Surfaces

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 31/07/2026

New #FEDSPaper: We show that borrowing more against the same collateral raises spreads faster and faster. Uncertainty shocks steepen that relationship, devastating leveraged borrowers. Credit surface steepness ranks credit conditions and economic uncertainty. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds...

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 13/07/2026

Watch live tomorrow at 12:30 p.m. ET: “Next-Gen Financial Inclusion” conference Learn more: www.federalreserve.gov/conferences/... www.federalreserve.gov www.youtube.com/federalreserve

"Next-Gen Financial Inclusion. Watch Live: July 14, 2026 12:30 p.m. ET. Hosted by the Federal Reserve Board"

The Federal Reserve seal appears in the bottom right corner of the image.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 05/06/2026

ICYMI Alternative scenarios often proved more accurate than the baseline forecast. New #FEDSPaper catalogs 1,265 'what-if' exercises from 1968-2020, tracking how Fed staff prepared for demand shocks, supply disruptions, and financial crises. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds...

Figure 4: Alternative Scenarios Presented to the FOMC by Risk Category, 1968-2020.]

Alt text: Figure 4 reveals how the Federal Reserve's risk assessment evolved over five decades (1968-2020). This visualization tracks six risk categories presented to the FOMC, showing a remarkable increase in scenario planning after 2000. External/Global Risks received the most consistent coverage, while categories like Public Expectations emerged more prominently in recent decades. The varying intensity shows when multiple scenarios were considered simultaneously, reflecting the Fed's increasingly sophisticated approach to economic uncertainty.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 02/06/2026

The pace of change in the federal funds rate helps predict future changes. #FEDSPaper: www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds... #EconSky

Figure 2: One-Quarter-Ahead Federal Funds Rate Adjustment Predictions for Estimated Rules

Line chart showing quarterly Federal Funds Rate changes from 1987-2025. Y-axis (-1.5 to 1.5 percentage points) displays Federal Funds Rate (black), Inertial Rule (pink), and Double-inertial Rule (green). The Federal Funds Rate shows major downward spikes (1990, 2000, 2008, 2020) and upward spikes (1988, 1994, 2022). Prediction rules follow similar patterns with smaller fluctuations. By 2025:Q3, all measures show values near -0.4 percentage points.

Note: This figure displays predicted adjustments to federal funds rate (1987:Q1-2025:Q3) for single/double-inertial specifications in Section 2. Black line shows realized changes to quarterly averages of effective federal funds rate. Rules estimated over 'Post-1987' sample using Tobit regressions. Predictions use realized values of πt, ut, ut, relevant lagged values, π=2, and parameters from Table 1. Source: FRED.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 29/05/2026

Alternative scenarios often proved more accurate than the baseline forecast. New #FEDSPaper catalogs 1,265 'what-if' exercises from 1968-2020, tracking how Fed staff prepared for demand shocks, supply disruptions, and financial crises. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds... #FedResearch

Figure 4 reveals how the Federal Reserve's risk assessment evolved over five decades (1968-2020). This visualization tracks six risk categories presented to the FOMC, showing a remarkable increase in scenario planning after 2000. External/Global Risks received the most consistent coverage, while categories like Public Expectations emerged more prominently in recent decades. The varying intensity shows when multiple scenarios were considered simultaneously, reflecting the Fed's increasingly sophisticated approach to economic uncertainty.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 22/05/2026

Net sentiment of the Fed's press conference correlates with future policy to a greater extent than other communications. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds... #EconSky

Figure 4: Net sentiment scores at the paragraph level and the target federal funds rate.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 13/05/2026

Nearly half of Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) users said that they bought clothing or accessories with the product. One in five used the product to pay for groceries or food delivery.

Horizontal bar chart showing BNPL purchase categories: clothing/accessories leads at 49%, followed by electronics at 32%, and furniture/appliances at 26%.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 13/05/2026

In 2025, 16% of people used Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) in the prior 12 months, up from 15% in 2024 and 10% in 2021 when the survey first asked about BNPL.

Line graph showing BNPL usage rose from 10% in 2021 to 16% in 2025, while late payments among users increased from 15% to 26%.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 13/05/2026

Two in ten adults reported that they experienced financial fraud or scams involving their money, with 16% reporting fraud related to their credit card and 8% reporting another type of financial fraud.

Grouped bar chart showing financial fraud rates in 2024 and 2025: any fraud at 21% and 20%, credit card fraud at 17% and 16%, other fraud at 8% in both years.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 13/05/2026

In 2025, 43% of workers with a graduate degree used AI in the prior month, compared with 10% of workers with a high school degree or less. Workers under age 30 were less likely to have used generative AI than workers ages 30 to 59.

Data table showing AI usage and attitudes by education, age, and disability status. Graduate degree holders show highest usage at 43%, while those 60+ show lowest at 13%.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 13/05/2026

44% of workers agreed that generative AI saves time. Workers who used generative AI were much more likely to agree that it has benefits and that having AI available will improve their career.

Horizontal bar chart comparing AI perceptions between all workers and AI users, showing 44% of all workers and 81% of AI users believe it saves time.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 13/05/2026

SHED data show that 7% of all adults were laid off in 2025, up from 6% in 2024. The share of all adults who left a job voluntarily was 8% in 2025, down from 9% in 2024.

Line graph showing job application, hiring, and separation trends from 2017-2025, with job applications stable around 21-23% and voluntary departures declining from 11% to 8%.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 17/04/2026

Consumers' inflation expectations closely tracked actual inflation before, during, and after the Covid-19 pandemic. This #FEDSNote explores consumers' wage and income growth expectations, which remained stable during this time despite surging wages: www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note...

Line chart showing expected inflation (purple line) and expected wage growth (green line) from 2014 to 2025 as probability-weighted mean forecasts. Expected inflation begins around 4.5% in 2014, gradually declines to approximately 3% by 2016-2017, and remains relatively stable around 3-3.5% through 2019. A vertical gray bar marks 2020. After 2020, expected inflation surges dramatically, rising from under 4% to peak near 8% in 2022, then declining to around 5% by 2025. Expected wage growth remains relatively stable throughout, fluctuating between 2.5-3.5% from 2014-2020, briefly dipping in 2020, then rising to 3.5% in 2021-2022, and remaining around 3-3.5% through 2025. The chart demonstrates the significant divergence between inflation and wage growth expectations during the post-2020 period.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 16/04/2026

ICYMI: The authors estimate that the tariffs implemented through November of 2025 can explain the entirety of excess inflation in the core goods category and contributed to a 0.8 percent boost in core PCE prices through February 2026. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... #FEDSNote

Figure 4. Tariff effects on core PCE prices. This stacked bar chart shows the cumulative effect of tariff waves from February 2025 to June 2026 on core PCE prices. The y-axis shows percentage effects from 0 to 0.9%. Different colored segments represent various tariff waves (Feb, Mar, Apr, Aug, Nov 2025). Black dots indicate total effects, which increase from nearly 0% in February 2025 to approximately 0.9% by June 2026. The forecast region (shaded blue) assumes no additional tariff changes beyond those in table 1 and no additional pass-through seven months after implementation. Note: Black dots show total tariff effects, summing across positive and negative tariff wave contributions. The forecast region, shaded in blue, assumes no additional tariff changes beyond those in table 1 and no additional tariff pass-through seven months after a tariff change. Key identifies in order from top to bottom. Source: Authors' calculations using data from the BEA, BLS, Census, the Executive Office, the Federal Registrar, and Customs and Border Protection.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 09/04/2026

The authors estimate that the tariffs implemented through November of 2025 can explain the entirety of excess inflation in the core goods category and contributed to a 0.8 percent boost in core PCE prices through February 2026. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... #FEDSNote

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 09/04/2026

ICYMI: Labor force growth could be near-zero starting this year, due to weak population growth and declining labor force participation. Such weak growth is unprecedented in the United States’ recent history. This has significant economic implications: (1/2) www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note...

Image of Figure 1. Potential labor force growth and its components. This is a combination chart showing annual data from 1960 to 2030. The y-axis measures annual rate in percent, ranging from -1 to 3 percent. The chart displays three variables: "Potential labor force growth" shown as a red line (measured in percent change), "Population change contribution" shown as gray bars (measured in percentage points), and "Potential LFPR change contribution" shown as blue bars (measured in percentage points). The potential labor force growth peaked in the early 1970s at about 2.8 percent, gradually declined to around 1.5 percent in the 1990s, and further decreased to about 0.5-0.7 percent by the 2010s. The population change contribution (gray bars) remains positive throughout the entire period but gradually decreases over time. The potential LFPR change contribution (blue bars) was positive from the 1960s through the 1980s, turned negative around 2000, and has remained mostly negative since then. A vertical dashed line marks the year 2026, where potential labor force growth is projected to be approximately 0.5 percent.

Figure 2. Breakeven pace of employment growth This is a line chart showing monthly data from 1960 to 2030, with the y-axis measuring monthly change in thousands, ranging from -100 to 300 thousand. The chart displays "Breakeven employment growth" as a black line, surrounded by a gray shaded area representing the "90-percent confidence interval." The breakeven employment growth line fluctuates between approximately 50 and 200 thousand throughout most of the historical period, generally trending downward after the 1980s. The confidence interval typically spans about 100 thousand above and below the main line. A horizontal line at zero marks the breakeven point. Near the end of the series, there is a vertical dashed line labeled "2026" indicating a projection point, with the breakeven employment growth appearing to decline toward zero by 2026.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 09/04/2026

ICYMI: Firms commonly face multiple tight credit constraints. This prevents expansion after monetary easing but amplifies the response to tightening, explaining the well-documented asymmetry in monetary policy transmission. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds... #FEDSPaper #EconSky

$Distribution of the Number of Tight Financial Constraints. This is a bar chart showing the distribution of the number of tight financial constraints across firms from 1990 to 2020. The x-axis displays the number of constraints from 0 to 8, while the y-axis shows the fraction of firms, ranging from 0 to approximately 0.3. The highest fraction (approximately 0.3) is observed for firms with 1 tight constraint, followed by firms with 2 constraints (approximately 0.28) and firms with 0 constraints (approximately 0.19). The fraction decreases as the number of constraints increases, with approximately 0.13 for 3 constraints, 0.05 for 4 constraints, and 0.02 for 5 constraints. Very few firms (less than 0.01) have 6 constraints, and apparently none have 7 or 8 constraints.$

Relationship between Number of Financial Constraints and Responsiveness to Easing and Tightening Shocks. This is a line graph showing the relationship between the number of financial constraints (x-axis, ranging from 0 to 8) and the predicted effect of monetary policy on external financing (y-axis, ranging from approximately -15 to 10). The chart displays two series with confidence intervals shown as vertical error bars: "Contractionary Shock" (red line with red error bars) and "Accommodative Shock" (blue line with blue diamonds and blue error bars). As the number of constraints increases from 0 to 8, the contractionary shock effect becomes increasingly negative, declining from around -4 to -10. Conversely, the accommodative shock effect becomes increasingly positive, rising from around -3 to approximately +3. The confidence intervals (error bars) for both series widen as the number of constraints increases, indicating greater uncertainty in the estimates at higher constraint levels.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 02/04/2026

Breakeven job growth (the pace needed to maintain a steady unemployment rate) near-zero. Could make negative job growth almost as likely as positive job growth in any given month. 2: Any growth in potential GDP must come from productivity growth. (2/2) www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note...

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 02/04/2026

Labor force growth could be near-zero starting this year, due to weak population growth and declining labor force participation. Such weak growth is unprecedented in the United States’ recent history. This has significant economic implications: (1/2) www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note...

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 02/04/2026

Firms commonly face multiple tight credit constraints. This prevents expansion after monetary easing but amplifies the response to tightening, explaining the well-documented asymmetry in monetary policy transmission. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds... #FEDSPaper #EconSky

$Image of Figure 2: Distribution of the Number of Tight Financial Constraints. This is a bar chart showing the distribution of the number of tight financial constraints across firms from 1990 to 2020. The x-axis displays the number of constraints from 0 to 8, while the y-axis shows the fraction of firms, ranging from 0 to approximately 0.3. The highest fraction (approximately 0.3) is observed for firms with 1 tight constraint, followed by firms with 2 constraints (approximately 0.28) and firms with 0 constraints (approximately 0.19). The fraction decreases as the number of constraints increases, with approximately 0.13 for 3 constraints, 0.05 for 4 constraints, and 0.02 for 5 constraints. Very few firms (less than 0.01) have 6 constraints, and apparently none have 7 or 8 constraints.$

Image of Figure 6: Relationship between Number of Financial Constraints and Responsiveness to Easing and Tightening Shocks. This is a line graph showing the relationship between the number of financial constraints (x-axis, ranging from 0 to 8) and the predicted effect of monetary policy on external financing (y-axis, ranging from approximately -15 to 10). The chart displays two series with confidence intervals shown as vertical error bars: "Contractionary Shock" (red line with red error bars) and "Accommodative Shock" (blue line with blue diamonds and blue error bars). As the number of constraints increases from 0 to 8, the contractionary shock effect becomes increasingly negative, declining from around -4 to -10. Conversely, the accommodative shock effect becomes increasingly positive, rising from around -3 to approximately +3. The confidence intervals (error bars) for both series widen as the number of constraints increases, indicating greater uncertainty in the estimates at higher constraint levels.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 20/03/2026

New #IFDPPaper: "Risk in a Data-Rich Model" by Dario Caldara, Haroon Mumtaz & Molin Zhong shows that asymmetric tail risk is pervasive across the U.S. economy and document where and why risk lives in the economy: www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp...

Figure 2: Aggregate Risk Indices: Growth, Inflation, and Financial Conditions

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 06/03/2026

This #FEDSNote shows that price pressures developed gradually in 2025 rather than showing up as a one-time price spike and tariff effects have been greatest for goods imported from China with 8.5% year-over-year price increase by December 2025. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note...

Figure 4. Price changes in 2025 by country of origin

This is a bar chart showing monthly 12-month percent changes in the country-specific Numerator Fisher Price Indices for January through December 2025. The y-axis shows percent values ranging from approximately -1 to 8.5 percent. The chart displays five variables: USA (blue bars), Canada (green bars), Mexico (yellow bars), China (purple bars), and Others (orange bars).

The data reveals a pattern of increasing price changes throughout the year, particularly for China and the Others category. In January and February, most countries show modest changes between -0.5 and 1 percent, with some negative values. From March through July, price changes generally remain below 2.5 percent across all countries. Starting in August, China's price changes accelerate significantly, reaching approximately 5.7 percent, then continue climbing to peak at about 8.3 percent in December. The Others category follows a similar but less dramatic upward trend, reaching about 5.3 percent by December. USA, Canada, and Mexico maintain more moderate price changes throughout the year, typically staying below 2.5 percent.

Note: 12-month percent changes in the country-specific Numerator Fisher Price Indices for January through December 2025. The key identifies bars in order from left to right. Source: Matched Numerator Panel Data and Label Insight Data, authors' calculations.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 16/01/2026

New #FEDSNote: More Credit, More Debt: New Evidence on Automated Credit Decisions: www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... #EconSky

Figure 1. Credit limits over time, by credit score

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 14/01/2026

A new #FEDSNote discusses the tradeoffs involved in the size and dynamics of central bank balance sheets: www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... #EconSky

Figure 1. The balance-sheet trilemma visualized

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 22/12/2025

New #FEDSPaper: A bottom-up framework for estimating real-time data center investment. The approach matches recent NIPA data center investment and provides a transparent way to forecast the boom---and its uncertainty---over the short and medium run: www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds...

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 04/11/2025

The authors show reasons might include soft demand (orders), insufficient labor supply, and lags in the production process (average period of production or APP). (3/3) www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... #FEDSNote

Figure 5. Utilization growth and import protection by average production period

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 04/11/2025

But looking across industries, this spare capacity is not particularly concentrated in industries gaining new tariff protection. In 2025 so far, capacity utilization has not risen more in industries receiving more new import protection. (2/3) www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... #FEDSNote

Figure 2. Spare capacity and import protection

Figure 3. Recent utilization growth and new import protection

Figure 4. Reasons for operating below capacity versus new import protection

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 04/11/2025

ICYMI: Capacity utilization in manufacturing has been subdued, suggesting potential for tariffs to boost production in existing factories. (1/3) www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... #FEDSNote

Figure 1. Capacity utilization has been subdued

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 31/10/2025

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 31/10/2025

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 31/10/2025

Capacity utilization in manufacturing has been subdued, suggesting potential for tariffs to boost production in existing factories. (1/3) www.federalreserve.gov/econres/note... #FEDSNote #EconSky

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 20/10/2025

Watch live tomorrow at 9:00 a.m. ET: Payments Innovation Conference:  www.youtube.com/federalreserve   Learn more: www.federalreserve.gov/conferences/...

Image of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Copy: "Payments Innovation Conference. Watch Live: October 21, 2025, 9:00 a.m. ET. Hosted by the Federal Reserve Board”

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 17/10/2025

Save the date 10/21: Payments Innovation Conference. Watch live at 9:00 a.m. ET: www.youtube.com/federalreserve Learn more: www.federalreserve.gov/conferences/...

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 15/10/2025

New #IFDPPaper shows that lower retail inventories raise price margins, and incorporating inventories into the Phillips curve greatly improves its fit—capturing both the 2009–2011 missing disinflation and the COVID-era surge. www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp...

Figure 2: Model Fit compares Canonical vs. Stock-based NKPC models' fit to actual inflation data.

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 08/10/2025

Watch live tomorrow at 8:30 a.m. ET: Community Bank Conference: www.youtube.com/federalreserve Learn more: www.federalreserve.gov/conferences/...

Image of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Copy: "Community Bank Conference. Watch Live: October 9, 2025, 8:30 a.m. ET. Hosted by the Federal Reserve Board”

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FedResearch @fedresearch.federalreserve.gov · 03/10/2025

Save the date 10/9: Community Bank Conference. Watch live at 8:30 a.m. ET: www.youtube.com/federalreserve  Learn more: www.federalreserve.gov/conferences/...

Community Bank Conference. Watch live: October 9, 2025 8:30 a.m. ET Hosted by the Federal Reserve Board

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