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Etienne Höra

@etiennehoera.d-64.social
655 followers 482 following 543 posts

EU trade and geoeconomics @ Bertelsmann Stiftung | Grassroots thinktanking and young perspectives on foreign policy @ Polis180 e. V. Views are my own.

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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 14/10/2026
Now, even those firms, sectors and member states, that used to benefit the most from the China business, are losing. Case in point: For the first time, Germany now runs a trade deficit with China on cars. This dynamic paves the way for a tougher EU stance.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 14/10/2026
EU exports to CN are quite concentrated (more than 40% from DE, DE machinery a bit less than a quarter). Chinese competition affected other countries and industries more.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 15/09/2026
I'll be at the WTO Public Forum for the coming days, let me know if you're around! Focussing on plurilaterals, imbalances, esp. when it comes to China, and how the EU can help drive things forward now.
Entrance to WTO HQ
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 04/03/2026
The Chinese industrial ecosystem is transnational, esp in Southeast Asia, and it’s likely that many ‘made with partners’ products will rather be ‘made with China’. Clean tech is the sector to watch here - massive Chinese manufacturing investments abroad. www.netzeropolicylab.com/china-green-...
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 04/03/2026
The catch: Chinese companies increasingly operate outside of China. US tariffs have been a massive incentive, IAA could become another one. Take Vietnam: CN investments have grown for some time, spikes in US-CN trade wars. A lot of it in manufacturing, some moving towards high(er) tech, e. g. solar.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 25/02/2026
Der deutlichste Effekt ist - wenig überraschend - dass die Nachfrage einbricht (durch Zölle und ausgesetzte Förderung). Damit wird der EU-Markt umso wichtiger für diese Produkte, und in der EU der große deutsche Markt. Und: Im letzten US-China-Handelskonflikt haben europäische Exporte profitiert. 1/
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 13/02/2026
On my (of course delayed) way to #MSC2026 - do reach out if you‘re in town!
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/02/2026
Developing countries the EU doesn’t have an FTA with get preferential access to the EU market via the Generalised Scheme of Preferences, the GSP + and Everything but Arms. As these aren’t huge export markets for now, most of the gains are on the import side. If we add these, the map is almost full.
Map of EU preferential trade arrangements (EEA, FTAs, Generalised Scheme of Preferences (plus), Everything but Arms.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/02/2026
With MERCOSUR and India out of the way, and agreements with the US and China unfeasible or undesirable, there simply aren’t so many large economies the EU could still do comprehensive FTAs with. ‘Easy wins’ like Japan and Korea have been done years ago, even if there’s always scope for deepening.
Map of EU trade agreements (EEA, FTAs both concluding and in force)
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/02/2026
We ran the numbers last year w @kiel.institute. The essence won’t have changed much: Even if the EU concluded dozens of new agreements and deepen existing ones, this would only add about 0.6 percent of GDP over five years. Could be a bit more with (even more) generous assumptions, but not a lot.
GDP effects of concluding new EU trade agreements with 26 countries and deepening all of the existing ones to the level of the EU-South Korea agreement. Timeframe is five years.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 21/01/2026
That this isn't a trade conflict also means that the appropriate response isn't defined by trade impact. 10% extra tariffs would cost less than 0.1% of EU GDP (calculations by @julianhi.nz @kiel.institute). A dissuasive EU response would need to escalate beyond that bc the overall stakes are higher.
Short-run production changes 10% extra tariffs would cause in the EU.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/11/2025
Some sectors that are especially hit by US tariffs would benefit more, for example cars/car parts and machinery.
Production effects on selected sectors
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/11/2025
Deepening all of the EU’s existing agreements to the level of its most comprehensive agreements would add a bit more than 0.3 percent to EU GDP over five years. When combining the two scenarios, we’re looking at 0.55 percent.
GDP effects of deepening existing EU trade agreements for EU27
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/11/2025
Colleagues at @kiel.institute ran three scenarios for us with their KITE model: more agreements, deeper agreements and a combination of both. If the EU were to conclude agreements with 26 new partners other than the US and China, this would add ~ 0.3 percent to GDP over five years.
GDP effects of concluding agreements with new partners
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/11/2025
New policy brief with Thieß Petersen @bst-europe.bsky.social : More and deeper EU trade agreements would only bring moderate growth effects - around 0.6 percent of EU GDP in five years, even under very optimistic assumptions (more in some sectors). Why this matters and what to do now: 🧵
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 28/09/2025
The EU's intervention in the 2022 Moldovan energy crisis can be seen clearly in our data, although the EU had surpassed Russia as an energy supplier to Moldova in most years except 2021. However, the gas crisis earlier this year shows that big challenges remain.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 28/09/2025
The EU is extremely strong on the financial and investment side in Moldova, with an index score of 99 out of 100 and a steep upwards trend since 2010.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 28/09/2025
EU-Moldova interconnectivity across trade, investment and economic policy is by far the strongest, and Russia's overall footprint in the country has been declining between 2010 and 2023.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 25/09/2025
3/ Even before the start of the second Trump administration, the US has been withdrawing economically from the EU’s neighbourhood. Russia’s interconnectivity has declined, especially in most parts of Eastern Europe since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, but remains high in some countries.
GEOII scores for EU and Russia in Eastern Europe compared.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 25/09/2025
2/ However, patterns vary within and between the regions. For instance, China is very present in Serbia and Montenegro, much less so in Albania. Sector-wise, China is rapidly catching up in investment and high-tech trade.
EU GEOII scores in Western Balkans, Türkiye, Eastern neighbours, Southern neighbours, 2010-2023GEOII Scores for EU and China in the Western Balkans compared
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 25/09/2025
1/ EU remains the most interconnected actor across the board, in all sub-regions (Western Balkans, Eastern Partnership, Southern Neighbourhood, Türkiye) and across all sub-indices.
Index scores 2010-2023
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 25/09/2025
Everyone talks about #geoeconomics, we’re mapping it: Together with colleagues @bst-europe.bsky.social @wiiw.ac.at, ECIPE, we created the Geoeconomic Interconnectivity Index, measuring the EU's trade, finance and policy footprint in its neighbourhood, compared to China, Russia & US. Main findings 🧵
Geoeconomic competition: EU remains most important partner in its neighbourhood, but its rivals are catching up. By Bertelsmann Stiftung, ECIPE, wiiw.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 06/05/2025
1/ Tariffs are the same for all member states, but the impact is not. 🇮🇪 is particularly impacted, but also 🇧🇪🇩🇪🇳🇱 (and their suppliers). Sector-wise, watch out for anything that is easily replaced, price-sensitive and politically sensitive, e. g. food, alcohol, consumer goods.
EU trade with the US
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 16/04/2025
Next big thing in the Chinese car saga? The pattern for hybrids looks really similar to what we‘ve seen in EVs, massive ramp-up of capacities, market saturation, export boom. To watch.
Sales data for plug-in hybrids in China https://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/en/blog/themen/batterie-update/elektroauto-verkaeufe-2024-china-vormarsch-stagnation-europa.htmlSales data for battery electric vehicles in China https://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/en/blog/themen/batterie-update/elektroauto-verkaeufe-2024-china-vormarsch-stagnation-europa.html
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/04/2025
8/ jetzt ist es raus - „discounted reciprocal tariffs“, 20% auf Importe aus der EU, basierend auf angeblichen 39%, die die EU erhebt - das sind ausgedachte Zahlen.
Trump hält eine Tabelle mit den neue Zollraten hoch.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/04/2025
6/ Das sagen erste Berechnungen über die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen - wohl keine deutliche Verbesserung der US-Handelsbilanz, dafür BIP-Verluste in der Größenordnung 0,1-0,3 Prozent. www.piie.com/blogs/realti...
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/04/2025
5/ Um das einzuordnen: Vergleichbare Zölle hatten die USA zuletzt zur Zeit der Großen Depression - bekanntlich mit keinem guten Ergebnis. budgetlab.yale.edu/research/fis...
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/04/2025
Gearing up for another round of US #tariffs on ’liberation day‘. I wonder why all of these fall on the same day this year, must be a coincidence…
Three cartoon characters with the caption ’allow us to introduce ourselves‘ and the labels ’massive (import) tax hike day‘, ’wrecking the economy day‘ and ’nobody knows anything day‘.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/03/2025
3/ Verbraucher*innen zahlen drauf - wenn sie das denn tun: Importe sind im Kleinwagen- und im Luxussegment besonders relevant. Wer Kleinwagen fährt, kann sich das teurere US-Modell nicht unbedingt leisten - und wer heute Lamborghini fährt, kauft nicht des Geldes wegen morgen einen Ford Mustang.
Share of imports to the US across different categories of vehicles. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/ecwp_2024-02-c.pdf
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/03/2025
1/ An sich fördern Zölle die einheimische Produktion, indem sie Importe teurer machen - so weit, so gut. Die USA importieren eine Menge Autos (und viele Luxusautos aus Deutschland). Eine Studie von 2024 berechnet für 25% Zölle fast 75% weniger Importe und 5% mehr Profit in der US-Produktion.
Market share by country of origin.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 26/03/2025
3/ Dabei macht China zunehmend wichtigen EU-Industrien Konkurrenz (Auto, Pharma, Maschinenbau). China importiert gleichzeitig immer weniger. Dazu @sandertordoir.bsky.social und Brad Setser in diesem Papier: www.cer.eu/publications...:
Graph describing Chinese imports aircraft, cars and machinery over time
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 21/03/2025
Census has this handy list - three EU countries on there, I‘m guessing we‘ll see France as well for digital taxation and general annoyance - am I missing anyone?
List of top 15 trade partners with which the US has a deficit in trade in goods: China, Switzerland, Mexico, Ireland, Vietnam, Canada, Taiwan, Germany, Japan, South Korea, India, Thailand, Italy, Malaysia, Australia. https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/topyr.html
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 11/02/2025
EU unity often is a problem on issues like these. Not in this case: If nothing happens, tariffs on a range of US goods come back on 1 April. (Behind the cryptic code numbers in the regulation you find things like motorcycles, whisky and blue jeans). Another legacy from the Trump 1.0 tariff saga:
tariffs under EU Implementing Regulation 2018/724
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 11/02/2025
Another day in Tariffland - what can the EU do in reaction to US steel and aluminium tariffs? 🧵 #eusky
Statement by President von der Leyen on announced US tariffs
Brussels, 11 February 2025
I deeply regret the US decision to impose tariffs on European steel and aluminum exports.
Tariffs are taxes - bad for business, worse for consumers.
Unjustified tariffs on the EU will not go unanswered—they will trigger firm and proportionate
countermeasures.
The EU will act to safeguard its economic interests. We will protect our workers, businesses and
consumers.
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 10/02/2025
From the EU perspective: US is the most important export market, ~ 20% of EU steel and iron exports go there, ~ 21% for DE (2023 numbers). Bad timing for an industry struggling with energy costs and decarbonisation – but not new:
Eurostat graph showing EU's main trade partners for steel and iron
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 10/02/2025
Who will be hit by those tariffs? US census data shows: ~ 33% of 2024 steel imports came from Canada and Mexico, ~10% from EU (6 from DE), around 9% from Brazil and Korea, 2.5 from China.
US census data on steel trade
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 10/02/2025
Unlawful? Economically counterproductive? Yes – and now? The Trump administration just announced 25% tariffs on all steel & aluminium imports. What’s the strategy behind this, and how will it impact Europe? Quick background 🧵together with @brandonbohrn.bsky.social 👇 #EUsky #econsky
statement by the European Commission on potential imposition of US tariffs on EU steel and aluminium
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Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 26/11/2024
It‘s finally here in print! Short 🧵 on my chapter about the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Book „The performance of regionalism in the Global South - A multi-level analysis“
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