Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 14/10/2026Now, even those firms, sectors and member states, that used to benefit the most from the China business, are losing. Case in point: For the first time, Germany now runs a trade deficit with China on cars. This dynamic paves the way for a tougher EU stance. 100 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 14/10/2026EU exports to CN are quite concentrated (more than 40% from DE, DE machinery a bit less than a quarter). Chinese competition affected other countries and industries more. 100 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 15/09/2026I'll be at the WTO Public Forum for the coming days, let me know if you're around! Focussing on plurilaterals, imbalances, esp. when it comes to China, and how the EU can help drive things forward now. 010 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 04/03/2026The Chinese industrial ecosystem is transnational, esp in Southeast Asia, and it’s likely that many ‘made with partners’ products will rather be ‘made with China’. Clean tech is the sector to watch here - massive Chinese manufacturing investments abroad. www.netzeropolicylab.com/china-green-... 131 3
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 04/03/2026The catch: Chinese companies increasingly operate outside of China. US tariffs have been a massive incentive, IAA could become another one. Take Vietnam: CN investments have grown for some time, spikes in US-CN trade wars. A lot of it in manufacturing, some moving towards high(er) tech, e. g. solar. 120 2
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 25/02/2026Der deutlichste Effekt ist - wenig überraschend - dass die Nachfrage einbricht (durch Zölle und ausgesetzte Förderung). Damit wird der EU-Markt umso wichtiger für diese Produkte, und in der EU der große deutsche Markt. Und: Im letzten US-China-Handelskonflikt haben europäische Exporte profitiert. 1/ 100 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 13/02/2026On my (of course delayed) way to #MSC2026 - do reach out if you‘re in town! 110 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/02/2026Developing countries the EU doesn’t have an FTA with get preferential access to the EU market via the Generalised Scheme of Preferences, the GSP + and Everything but Arms. As these aren’t huge export markets for now, most of the gains are on the import side. If we add these, the map is almost full. 140 4
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/02/2026With MERCOSUR and India out of the way, and agreements with the US and China unfeasible or undesirable, there simply aren’t so many large economies the EU could still do comprehensive FTAs with. ‘Easy wins’ like Japan and Korea have been done years ago, even if there’s always scope for deepening. 150 5
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/02/2026We ran the numbers last year w @kiel.institute. The essence won’t have changed much: Even if the EU concluded dozens of new agreements and deepen existing ones, this would only add about 0.6 percent of GDP over five years. Could be a bit more with (even more) generous assumptions, but not a lot. 161 6
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 21/01/2026That this isn't a trade conflict also means that the appropriate response isn't defined by trade impact. 10% extra tariffs would cost less than 0.1% of EU GDP (calculations by @julianhi.nz @kiel.institute). A dissuasive EU response would need to escalate beyond that bc the overall stakes are higher. 062 6
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/11/2025Some sectors that are especially hit by US tariffs would benefit more, for example cars/car parts and machinery. 100 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/11/2025Deepening all of the EU’s existing agreements to the level of its most comprehensive agreements would add a bit more than 0.3 percent to EU GDP over five years. When combining the two scenarios, we’re looking at 0.55 percent. 100 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/11/2025Colleagues at @kiel.institute ran three scenarios for us with their KITE model: more agreements, deeper agreements and a combination of both. If the EU were to conclude agreements with 26 new partners other than the US and China, this would add ~ 0.3 percent to GDP over five years. 110 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/11/2025New policy brief with Thieß Petersen @bst-europe.bsky.social : More and deeper EU trade agreements would only bring moderate growth effects - around 0.6 percent of EU GDP in five years, even under very optimistic assumptions (more in some sectors). Why this matters and what to do now: 🧵 173 7
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 28/09/2025The EU's intervention in the 2022 Moldovan energy crisis can be seen clearly in our data, although the EU had surpassed Russia as an energy supplier to Moldova in most years except 2021. However, the gas crisis earlier this year shows that big challenges remain. 110 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 28/09/2025The EU is extremely strong on the financial and investment side in Moldova, with an index score of 99 out of 100 and a steep upwards trend since 2010. 120 2
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 28/09/2025EU-Moldova interconnectivity across trade, investment and economic policy is by far the strongest, and Russia's overall footprint in the country has been declining between 2010 and 2023. 110 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 25/09/20253/ Even before the start of the second Trump administration, the US has been withdrawing economically from the EU’s neighbourhood. Russia’s interconnectivity has declined, especially in most parts of Eastern Europe since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, but remains high in some countries. 131 3
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 25/09/20252/ However, patterns vary within and between the regions. For instance, China is very present in Serbia and Montenegro, much less so in Albania. Sector-wise, China is rapidly catching up in investment and high-tech trade. 130 3
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 25/09/20251/ EU remains the most interconnected actor across the board, in all sub-regions (Western Balkans, Eastern Partnership, Southern Neighbourhood, Türkiye) and across all sub-indices. 120 2
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 25/09/2025Everyone talks about #geoeconomics, we’re mapping it: Together with colleagues @bst-europe.bsky.social @wiiw.ac.at, ECIPE, we created the Geoeconomic Interconnectivity Index, measuring the EU's trade, finance and policy footprint in its neighbourhood, compared to China, Russia & US. Main findings 🧵 174 7
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 06/05/20251/ Tariffs are the same for all member states, but the impact is not. 🇮🇪 is particularly impacted, but also 🇧🇪🇩🇪🇳🇱 (and their suppliers). Sector-wise, watch out for anything that is easily replaced, price-sensitive and politically sensitive, e. g. food, alcohol, consumer goods. 110 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 16/04/2025Next big thing in the Chinese car saga? The pattern for hybrids looks really similar to what we‘ve seen in EVs, massive ramp-up of capacities, market saturation, export boom. To watch. 022 2
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/04/20258/ jetzt ist es raus - „discounted reciprocal tariffs“, 20% auf Importe aus der EU, basierend auf angeblichen 39%, die die EU erhebt - das sind ausgedachte Zahlen. 010 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/04/20256/ Das sagen erste Berechnungen über die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen - wohl keine deutliche Verbesserung der US-Handelsbilanz, dafür BIP-Verluste in der Größenordnung 0,1-0,3 Prozent. www.piie.com/blogs/realti... 110 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/04/20255/ Um das einzuordnen: Vergleichbare Zölle hatten die USA zuletzt zur Zeit der Großen Depression - bekanntlich mit keinem guten Ergebnis. budgetlab.yale.edu/research/fis... 110 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 02/04/2025Gearing up for another round of US #tariffs on ’liberation day‘. I wonder why all of these fall on the same day this year, must be a coincidence… 011 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/03/20253/ Verbraucher*innen zahlen drauf - wenn sie das denn tun: Importe sind im Kleinwagen- und im Luxussegment besonders relevant. Wer Kleinwagen fährt, kann sich das teurere US-Modell nicht unbedingt leisten - und wer heute Lamborghini fährt, kauft nicht des Geldes wegen morgen einen Ford Mustang. 100 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 27/03/20251/ An sich fördern Zölle die einheimische Produktion, indem sie Importe teurer machen - so weit, so gut. Die USA importieren eine Menge Autos (und viele Luxusautos aus Deutschland). Eine Studie von 2024 berechnet für 25% Zölle fast 75% weniger Importe und 5% mehr Profit in der US-Produktion. 100 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 26/03/20253/ Dabei macht China zunehmend wichtigen EU-Industrien Konkurrenz (Auto, Pharma, Maschinenbau). China importiert gleichzeitig immer weniger. Dazu @sandertordoir.bsky.social und Brad Setser in diesem Papier: www.cer.eu/publications...: 130 3
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 21/03/2025Census has this handy list - three EU countries on there, I‘m guessing we‘ll see France as well for digital taxation and general annoyance - am I missing anyone? 010 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 11/02/2025EU unity often is a problem on issues like these. Not in this case: If nothing happens, tariffs on a range of US goods come back on 1 April. (Behind the cryptic code numbers in the regulation you find things like motorcycles, whisky and blue jeans). Another legacy from the Trump 1.0 tariff saga: 100 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 11/02/2025Another day in Tariffland - what can the EU do in reaction to US steel and aluminium tariffs? 🧵 #eusky 100 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 10/02/2025From the EU perspective: US is the most important export market, ~ 20% of EU steel and iron exports go there, ~ 21% for DE (2023 numbers). Bad timing for an industry struggling with energy costs and decarbonisation – but not new: 101 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 10/02/2025Who will be hit by those tariffs? US census data shows: ~ 33% of 2024 steel imports came from Canada and Mexico, ~10% from EU (6 from DE), around 9% from Brazil and Korea, 2.5 from China. 100 1
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 10/02/2025Unlawful? Economically counterproductive? Yes – and now? The Trump administration just announced 25% tariffs on all steel & aluminium imports. What’s the strategy behind this, and how will it impact Europe? Quick background 🧵together with @brandonbohrn.bsky.social 👇 #EUsky #econsky 4199 19
Etienne Höra @etiennehoera.d-64.social · 26/11/2024It‘s finally here in print! Short 🧵 on my chapter about the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 150 5