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Eric Min

@ericmin.bsky.social
203 followers 21 following 58 posts

Associate professor of political science at UCLA (by way of Kansas, NYU, and Stanford). I use a computer to learn things about war and diplomacy.

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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 13/04/2026
I am happy to say that our article, “Racial Inequality in War,” is now officially published in the @apsrjournal.bsky.social. I made a detailed post about this piece months ago. Please take a look at that… and ideally, the full article. We’re very proud of it.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
Our article highlights a nuanced form of discrimination that balanced racism with the exigencies of winning a war. In the case of WWI, White commanders—and the society that they reflected—stripped marginalized Americans of a valuable tool to pursue equality.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
Dying in combat is awful, yet this type of "heroic" sacrifice has historically been a way that marginalized communities have made political gains in the fight for equality. In WWI, many Black soldiers died in hospitals and after the war had ended—conditions not seen as valorous.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
Our theory lays the groundwork for a broader argument (which we hope to develop further) about how identity plays a part in shaping who dies in war, and in what conditions the answer to that question might change. We also show that such discrimination has implications on military effectiveness.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
Third, Black units received far worse support than White units. Black soldiers died of non-combat causes at higher rates than White soldiers, even holding fixed levels of combat exposure in a variety of different ways.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
Notably, Black combat units' fatality rates only outpaced White combats units' rates once the armistice was signed and returns to combat effectiveness became close to zero. After November 1918, Black combat units suffered 50% more deaths than White combat units.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
The Meuse-Argonne offensive in September 1918 illustrates the effects of race on commanders' decision-making. When both White and Black units failed in a shared mission, only the Black unit was assessed as incompetent and taken out of future operations.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
Second, White commanders tended to send White units to the frontlines while keeping Black soldiers back. The average White combat unit suffered four times as many causalties as the average Black combat unit.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
We hypothesize and find three patterns. First, Black soldiers were disproportionately assigned to support, rather than combat, roles. Black Americans represented 10% of the overall population but only made up 5% of combat positions.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
At the same time, the U.S. was mired in bitter racial politics, ranging from lynchings to the surge of "scientific racism" to the Jim Crow legal regime to segregation in the military. This segregation allows us to cleanly see the effects of race on assignments and deaths.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
We test this argument using U.S. infantry fatality records from WWI. When the U.S. entered the war on the Western Front, the "modern system" of fighting that had developed over the years required complicated maneuvers that had high returns to combat effectiveness.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
In assignments with low returns to combat effectiveness, commanders will be more likely to use—and let die—units perceived to be less capable. When assignments have high returns, commanders will rely on—and expect more deaths from—units with high perceived returns.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
Due to both systemic and structural inequality that objectively shortchanged Black citizens' education and health, as well as subjective discriminatory attitudes at the individual level, we expect White commanders to perceive Black soldiers as being low in combat effectiveness.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
We lay out a theory that highlights two key factors: commanders' perceptions of soldiers' combat effectiveness, and returns to combat effectiveness (that is, the change in likelihood of success depending on whether the unit involved is high or low in combat effectiveness).
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
Many anecdotes suggest that soldiers from marginalized groups were used as "cannon fodder" during wars. Yet many other anecdotes suggest that commanders kept those soldiers away from the frontlines. Which is correct? We argue that both are true, in specific circumstances.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 06/10/2025
Forthcoming in @apsrjournal.bsky.social with Connor Huff and Robert Schub: Converting and analyzing over 40,000 U.S. infantry fatalities from World War I, we examine how race and racism influenced who bore the costs of conflict. www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
cambridge.org
Racial Inequality in War | American Political Science Review | Cambridge Core
Racial Inequality in War
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Reposted by Eric Min
Julia Payson @jpayson.bsky.social · 11/09/2025
Hey #PoliSci folks and @apsa.bsky.social attendees! As placement director, I'm excited to let you know about some of our excellent UCLA job candidates on the market this year. Please take a look and share widley. #psjminfo
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 14/08/2025
Thanks a lot, Jenna!
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 14/08/2025
Thanks a lot, Anton!
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 14/08/2025
Thank you very much!
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 14/08/2025
Thanks so much, Aidan!
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 14/08/2025
I am so happy to say that I have officially been promoted to Associate Professor! I was 13 when I first felt the (admittedly uninformed) desire to be a professor. I sincerely thank each person who played any part in helping me reach this wonderful milestone between then and now.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 12/08/2025
If you are interested in learning more about the causes and consequences of negotiations during war over the last two centuries, take a look at my book, Words of War: Negotiation as a Tool of Conflict, from @cornellupress.bsky.social. www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501...
cornellpress.cornell.edu
Words of War by Eric Min | Hardcover | Cornell University Press
In Words of War, Eric Min pulls back the curtain on when, why, and how belligerents negotiate while fighting. Of all interstate conflicts across the last two centuries, two-thirds have ended through.....
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 12/08/2025
Finally, no deal can overcome one key fact: Imposed peaces tend to collapse. Neither Russia nor Ukraine wants to end the war as things stand, and no deal made now has any long-term promise of being obeyed or enforced. The Alaska talks are, at best, a major net negative. (9/9)
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 12/08/2025
The Trump-Kim nuclear summits in the first term are a strong reminder of how abrupt top-level meetings are primarily theater, offer parties political legitimacy, and produce vague agreements that parties interpret as they see fit. (8/9)
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 12/08/2025
Even if Trump and Putin announce a settlement, two major issues remain. The first is that the terms would be flimsy. Robust diplomatic agreements are products of intense bottom-up bargaining where leaders meet to finalize a negotiation—not start or produce it. (7/9)
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 12/08/2025
Third, the US's diplomatic reputation will crater further. By inviting Putin to US soil, Trump affords Putin's cause and efforts tremendous legitimacy. By excluding Zelenskyy and European parties, Trump hurts the US's relations with allies far beyond this war. (6/9)
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 12/08/2025
Second, Putin and Trump may get more political cover to further harm Ukraine. By feigning interest in peace, both leaders can claim to be the reasonable party if talks fail, and then justify continuing the war (Putin) or pulling support for Ukraine (Trump). (5/9)
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 12/08/2025
First, fighting may get more intense. Belligerents who are not ready to settle often instead often ramp up hostilities before talks to maximize pressure. They also use the time during talks to regroup themselves for more intense fighting once talks fail. (4/9)
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 12/08/2025
It is much easier for a belligerent to extract side effects when negotiations are led by third parties that are eager to try to end a conflict. This is the exact situation in this Alaska meeting. There are at least three side effects to these talks, none of which are good. (3/9)
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 12/08/2025
We often think negotiations are only defined by whether they create agreements. But talks also have "side effects"—that is, consequences of talking that are unrelated or even harmful to settlement. And realizing those side effects are often the belligerents' main objectives. (2/9)
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 12/08/2025
The upcoming Trump-Putin talks in Alaska have essentially no chance of ending the Russia-Ukraine war. Simply "failing" to end the war would be the relatively good scenario. There are far deeper consequences to these talks that could reshape the conflict and US diplomacy for the worse. (1/9)
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 22/05/2025
Next Wednesday, May 28, at 1 PM ET, I will be part of the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation's "Knowledge Against Violence" series, discussing my book, "Words of War: Negotiations as a Tool of Conflict." The event is virtual. Event and registration information here: www.hfg.org/conversation...
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 01/05/2025
Next Wednesday at 12:30 PM PT, I will be presenting my book, "Words of War," at UCLA's Burkle Center with @maggietheprof.bsky.social serving as moderator. The event is both in-person and on Zoom, so please attend if you're free and interested. More info: www.international.ucla.edu/burkle/event...
international.ucla.edu
Words of War: Negotiation as a Tool of Conflict
Eric Min, Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 09/04/2025
Thank you so much!
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 07/04/2025
I was lucky enough to have Miranda Melcher at the @newbooksnetwork.bsky.social interview me about my book, "Words of War: Negotiation as a Tool of Conflict." If you're interested in hearing about the book's origins, argument, and applications, please take a listen. newbooksnetwork.com/words-of-war
newbooksnetwork.com
Eric Min, "Words of War: Negotiation as a Tool of Conflict" (Cornell UP, 2025) - New Books Network
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 27/03/2025
The Henry Frank Guggenheim Foundation was kind enough to help write this piece on how my research on wartime negotiations can apply to ongoing diplomatic efforts involving the Russia-Ukraine war. I am deeply appreciative of the Foundation’s support of this work. www.hfg.org/insights/in-...
hfg.org
In Ukraine and Elsewhere, Is Third-Party Diplomacy Helpful in Ending Wars? - HFG
As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year, the role of outside countries in restoring peace has taken on heightened urgency. Historically, third-party countries have been willing to sp...
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 04/03/2025
My book, “Words of War: Negotiation as a Tool of Conflict,” is both on display at the @cornellupress.bsky.social booth at ISA 2025 and is also available to read for free as an ebook over the next month! Please take a look in whatever form you prefer.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 24/02/2025
If the overall argument interests you, please take a look at my new book, "Words of War: Negotiations as a Tool of Conflict," which is published as part of Cornell's Studies in Security Affairs series. www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501...
cornellpress.cornell.edu
Words of War by Eric Min | Hardcover | Cornell University Press
In Words of War, Eric Min pulls back the curtain on when, why, and how belligerents negotiate while fighting. Of all interstate conflicts across the last two centuries, two-thirds have ended through.....
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 24/02/2025
On the third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I wrote a brief piece for @ucigcc.bsky.social on the potential perils of diplomacy in the ongoing war—both in general and in the context of recent initiatives by the Trump administration. ucigcc.org/blog/could-a...
ucigcc.org
Could a U.S. Peace Initiative Backfire in Ukraine? - IGCC
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 21/02/2025
Thank you very much, Harold!
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 21/02/2025
Thank you so much! I hope you find it worth your time.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 19/02/2025
If this thread interested you and you would like to see more, you can use this QR code and discount code to get the book at a discounted price. Thanks for reading—both this post and hopefully the whole book!
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 19/02/2025
Rather than thinking that it "cannot hurt" to promote diplomacy during war, or that we should just "give war a chance," my theory offers guidance about when and how diplomacy can be used to help settle wars—or when it can be exploited by belligerents to potentially win them.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 19/02/2025
On the scholarly front, my book challenges the bargaining model of war's view of diplomacy as mere cheap talk. On the policy front, I offer insights on third-party involvement in wars and highlight difficult tradeoffs in using diplomacy to create short- versus longer-term peace.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 19/02/2025
The third empirical approach involves using computational text analysis and machine learning tools to study the 1950-53 Korean War. Looking at daily military operations reports and full transcripts of armistice talks, I show how my theory explains fine-grained intra-war behavior.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 19/02/2025
Studies of the 1849 War of the Roman Republic, 1995 Cenepa Valley War, and 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War demonstrate how belligerents use insincere negotiations to buy time to militarily regroup and divert political blame for engaging in hostilities.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 19/02/2025
The second empirical approach is case studies. I analyze battlefield activity and diplomatic activity in five wars. A comparison of the 1897 Greco-Turkish War and the 1974 Turco-Cypriot War shows how diplomatic pressure affects negotiation in two wars involving the same states.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 19/02/2025
I substantiate my argument using three different empirical approaches. The first involves statistical analysis of two new datasets that track battlefield activity and negotiations at the daily level for 92 interstate wars between 1823 and 2003.
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Eric Min @ericmin.bsky.social · 19/02/2025
Put together, sincere negotiations are most likely when external diplomatic pressures are low and the battlefield has revealed a clear trend favoring one side. Insincere negotiations are most likely when external pressures are high and the battlefield offers unclear information.
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