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Mohamed Elgohari

@elgohari.com
9 followers 15 following 51 posts

I am a sociologist, policy researcher, and scholar-practitioner whose work bridges critical sociological inquiry with applied policy analysis.

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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 22/09/2026
Rubio, speaking to reporters at a foreign ministers’ meeting in Manila, hadn’t even been asked about the propaganda campaign. That a sitting U.S. secretary of state felt compelled to address a cartoon campaign produced by a small group of individuals... is itself revealing.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 21/09/2026
A small team can produce satire aimed at outsiders and ideological messaging intended to mobilize supporters. This organizational change opens new possibilities for state and non-state actors to reach different audiences at a speed and scale once associated with much larger operations.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 21/09/2026
In this piece, I examine what Rubio is getting wrong. I discuss how generative AI is reshaping propaganda by lowering the institutional and organizational barriers to sustaining sophisticated campaigns. Iran’s AI-generated Lego propaganda illustrates this shift.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 21/09/2026
🧵On July 24, without even being asked about it, Marco Rubio described Iran’s Lego propaganda as “stupid.” Why did Rubio feel compelled to respond? Read full analysis on @foreignpolicy.com: foreignpolicy.com/2026/09/21/i...
foreignpolicy.com
Why Iran’s Lego Clips Are Anything but ‘Stupid’
Marco Rubio should not dismiss this new and highly effective form of propaganda.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 14/09/2026
5/5 These publications are not coordinated. Read together, however, they show why doctrinal vocabulary matters: controlling definitions helps organizations establish authority, classify enemies, and prescribe action. elgohari.com/2026/09/14/w...
elgohari.com
Who Gets to Define the Words
August’s militant propaganda reveals a widening contest over who possesses the authority to define hijra, jihād, political legitimacy, and the boundaries of Islamic rule.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 14/09/2026
4/5 Al-Mersaad, a Taliban-aligned counter-ISKP platform, disputes Islamic State’s authority to define hijra. Its Pashto video presents migration as a historical process of preserving faith and building Islamic society, while accusing IS of distorting the concept.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 14/09/2026
3/5 AQIS links praise of the Prophet, Gaza, and the claim that jihād has become an individual obligation. Its argument does not stop at declaring a duty; it asks what that duty requires and whether scholars and media actors have sufficiently explained it.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 14/09/2026
2/5 ISIS’s al-Nabāʾ editorials use a “conflict of creed” framework to place violence across several countries within a single borderless confrontation, without establishing a common local grievance across those settings.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 14/09/2026
1/5 My latest BFTS issue asks: Who gets to define the words through which militant organizations claim religious and political authority? The August corpus reveals a widening contest over hijra, jihād, obedience, and legitimate Islamic rule. elgohari.com/2026/09/14/w...
elgohari.com
Who Gets to Define the Words
August’s militant propaganda reveals a widening contest over who possesses the authority to define hijra, jihād, political legitimacy, and the boundaries of Islamic rule.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 20/08/2026
Defending my PhD last year allowed me to return to my research on Egyptian Ultras and the politics of sport. I am completing a book chapter on sport securitization that extends my “paradox of legalism” framework—and finding recent scholarship citing the work I first published in 2013.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 17/08/2026
Extremist propaganda can work through the household as much as the battlefield. This #BFTS explainer shows how militant media places grievance and ideological mobilization alongside motherhood, childcare, and ordinary domestic life—making the family part of the recruitment infrastructure.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 12/08/2026
The IEA is trying to rebrand #Afghanistan: from a country defined by war and isolation to a regional “connecting state” built around trade, infrastructure, diplomacy, and regional connectivity. Watch how that narrative is being constructed. Read latest #BFTS analysis: elgohari.com/2026/08/11/o...
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 11/08/2026
5/5 The July material shows why “jihadist propaganda” should not be treated as a single ideological category. These are competing projects of governance, recruitment, legitimacy, and authority. #BFTS #Jihadism #MilitantPropaganda
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 11/08/2026
4/5 JNIM, meanwhile, used successive statements to build a narrative of expanding military coordination in Mali and Burkina Faso. Other publications targeted women and veteran fighters, showing how militant mobilization also operates through family life and intergenerational networks.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 11/08/2026
3/5 The Taliban’s al-Ṣumūd makes the opposite case: Afghanistan is now a sovereign state pursuing infrastructure, diplomacy, investment, and regional connectivity while maintaining Islamic rule. For ISIS, those same instruments of statecraft are signs of ideological betrayal.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 11/08/2026
2/5 Across five issues of al-Nabāʾ, ISIS moved from condemning Syria’s parliament and foreign relations to morale maintenance, recruitment, martyrdom, and spiritual discipline. Read together, the issues form a sustained argument rather than five isolated editorials.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 11/08/2026
New BFTS: One Government or an Apostate Militia? 1/5 The Taliban presents itself as a functioning Islamic state. ISIS calls the same government apostate. July’s propaganda reveals a deeper struggle over who gets to define legitimate Islamic political authority. elgohari.com/2026/08/11/o...
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 10/07/2026
Meanwhile al-Shabāb ties Somalia to Jerusalem, and the Taliban leans into rights language ISIS explicitly rejects as "apostasy." Four groups, one month, radically different visions of legitimacy and violence. Read the full breakdown: elgohari.com/2026/07/09/f...
elgohari.com
From “Authority Is the Message” to Africa as Center of Gravity
A month of primary-source jihadist propaganda shows ISIS quietly trading its governance claims for a new story centered on Africa — and folding a dated, specific call to violence into a broader cam…
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 10/07/2026
New BFTS: June's jihadist propaganda cycle shows ISIS quietly rewriting its own story — pivoting to Africa as its "center of gravity" while slipping in a dated call for lone-actor attacks during the World Cup. Read the full breakdown: elgohari.com/2026/07/09/f...
elgohari.com
From “Authority Is the Message” to Africa as Center of Gravity
A month of primary-source jihadist propaganda shows ISIS quietly trading its governance claims for a new story centered on Africa — and folding a dated, specific call to violence into a broader cam…
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 12/05/2026
April’s militant propaganda cycle tells a story of governance, not only violence. BFTS April’s issue reveals three different models of legitimacy. Read the full analysis: elgohari.com/2026/05/01/a...
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 04/05/2026
6/ The larger lesson: militant propaganda in April does not merely describe violence. It tries to shape how audiences interpret suffering, authority, enemy power, and legitimate action. That is why attack counts alone miss the deeper contest.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 04/05/2026
5/ ISIS’s April al-Nabāʾ issues also elevate Africa from an operational theater to a moral argument. Nigeria, Congo, the Sahel, and Mozambique become proof, in ISIS’s framing, that Muslim solidarity is selective and shaped by trends.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 04/05/2026
4/ The ISKP–Taliban confrontation is especially important. The Taliban claim sovereign Islamic legitimacy. ISKP tries to destroy that claim by framing the Taliban as an apostate proxy of global unbelief. This is a direct competition over the same audience.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 04/05/2026
3/ Three models stand out. The Islamic Emirate presents governance as statehood. al-Shabāb presents governance as insurgent administration. ISIS and ISKP present authority through doctrinal purity, takfīr, violence, and divine-law enforcement.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 04/05/2026
2/ ISIS, ISKP, al-Shabāb, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan all used propaganda to answer the same question: Who gets to govern, punish, provide, adjudicate, and define legitimate Muslim political action?
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 04/05/2026
1/ I published a new BFTS post on the April 2026 militant propaganda cycle. The core argument: this month’s materials were less about spectacular violence than about authority. elgohari.com/2026/05/01/a...
elgohari.com
Authority Is the Message, What April’s Militant Propaganda Reveals
A cross-group reading of April 2026 militant propaganda shows ISIS, ISKP, al-Shabāb, and the Taliban competing less over spectacular violence than over authority: who can govern, punish, provide, a…
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 13/04/2026
5/ One pattern stood out across the whole set: Gaza remained the central emotional and legitimating reference point, even for groups whose immediate operational concerns lay elsewhere.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 13/04/2026
4/ Other groups responded differently. AQAP split between Arabic ecosystem-building and English-language external incitement. AQIS combined Pakistan-focused delegitimation with ideological conditioning. The Islamic Emirate foregrounded sovereignty, law, and competence.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 13/04/2026
3/ Islamic State’s al-Nabāʾ editorials were the clearest example. Across four issues, they moved from: geopolitical sorting, to authority purification, to operational continuity, to an explicit claim that revelation, not analysis, should determine judgment.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 13/04/2026
2/ The central point is that this was not just a month of reaction. It was a month of interpretation. Across the corpus, groups were trying to tell supporters how to understand war, authority, sectarian boundaries, and political change.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 13/04/2026
1/ I published a new BFTS analysis: “What Jihadist Groups Said When Iran’s War Came Home.” elgohari.com/2026/04/12/w... It examines how jihadist and militant groups processed March 2026: the reported death of ʿAlī Khāmanaʾī, the war involving against Iran, and the continuing war in Gaza.
elgohari.com
What Jihadist Groups Said When Iran’s War Came Home
What militant propaganda in March 2026 reveals about ISIS, AQAP, AQIS, Iran, Gaza, and the wider jihadist media ecosystem.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 12/03/2026
3- Four structural patterns across the corpus: (1) opportunistic absorption of Western crises, (2) weaponization of humanitarian suffering, (3) intensifying al-Qa'ida/ISIS rivalry for doctrinal authority, (4) Ramadan media surge.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 12/03/2026
2- AQAP's Epstein essay is a case study in "frame bridging" — absorbing a mainstream Western political scandal and redelivering it as evidence of a civilizational war only the jihadist vanguard saw coming. Sophisticated. Agile. Designed to reach beyond the base.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 12/03/2026
1- Five organizations, four languages, various documents. No coordination. Some are rivals. Yet the same frame runs through all of it: the world is under occupation. And the occupier has been unmasked. #BulletinFromTheShadows #Counterterrorism #JihadistPropaganda #SecurityStudies #BFTS
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 12/03/2026
AQAP used the Epstein files as a recruitment tool. Al-Shabab wrote civilian death counts like legal indictments. The Taliban issued a military communiqué claiming 55 Pakistani soldiers killed. February's jihadist propaganda — new issue of BFTS. 🧵 elgohari.com/2026/03/11/t...
elgohari.com
The World as Epstein’s Island, Jihadist Propaganda in February
This month’s militant media didn’t recycle old grievances. It read the same news cycle you did, and turned it into a recruitment pitch.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 10/03/2026
5/ ISIS didn't need to kill Khāmenīʾī. The conditions his death created may be enough. Full analysis elgohari.com/2026/03/09/t... #ISIS #Iran #Israel #Gulf #Normalization #ISKP #MENA
elgohari.com
The Assassination ISIS Didn’t Need to Commit
ISIS played no role in the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader. However, the group is systematically converting it into a recruitment script, a mobilization call, and a strategic windfall.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 10/03/2026
4/ Iran is now managing a succession crisis, military conflict, mass protests, and economic collapse simultaneously. That is the textbook environment for jihadist recruitment and attack. #ISIS #Iran #Israel #Gulf #Normalization #ISKP #MENA
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 10/03/2026
3/ On minorities: ISKP's Persian-language statement is addressed directly to Balūch, Arab Sunnīs in Khūzistān, and Afghan Sunnī residents in Iran. Millions of people. Precarious legal status. Real grievances. Documented ISKP networks on the border.#ISIS #Iran #Israel #Gulf
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 10/03/2026
2/ This is ISIS trying to close off political space. Don't align with the Iranian missile. Don't align with the Crusader aircraft. Only one option remains — and ISIS is offering it. #ISIS #Iran #Israel #Gulf #Normalization #ISKP #MENA
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 10/03/2026
1/ ISIS's al-Nabāʾ No. 537 warns that Iranian strikes on Gulf states will push Gulf publics toward normalizing with Israel. The group frames this as theological betrayal — and intends to exploit the backlash. #ISIS #Iran #Israel #Gulf #Normalization #ISKP #MENA
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 10/03/2026
The ISIS response to Khāmenīʾī's killing isn't just about Iran. It's about Israel, the Gulf, and Sunnī minorities inside Persia.🧵 #ISIS #Iran #Israel #Gulf #Normalization #ISKP #MENA elgohari.com/2026/03/09/t...
elgohari.com
The Assassination ISIS Didn’t Need to Commit
ISIS played no role in the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader. However, the group is systematically converting it into a recruitment script, a mobilization call, and a strategic windfall.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 09/03/2026
ISIS released two propaganda texts within days of Khāmenīʾī's assassination. The group isn't claiming credit for the killing. it's claiming the killing proves it was right all along. That's a more dangerous argument. elgohari.com/2026/03/09/t... #ISIS #Iran #JihadiPropaganda #MENA #SecurityStudies
elgohari.com
The Assassination ISIS Didn’t Need to Commit
ISIS played no role in the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader. However, the group is systematically converting it into a recruitment script, a mobilization call, and a strategic windfall.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 10/12/2025
November’s jihadist propaganda offers a coherent roadmap. These groups recast democracy as a rival religion, shift the center of gravity toward Africa, and stitch Sudan, Mali, Gaza, Yemen, and Afghanistan into one continuous narrative. elgohari.com/2025/12/09/j... #JihadistPropaganda #MENA #Africa
elgohari.com
Jihadist Propaganda in November: Harder Creeds and Shifting Fronts
Jihadist media in November 2025 tightened doctrine against democracy, shifted the centre of gravity toward African battlefields, and stitched Sudan, Mali, Gaza, Yemen, and Afghanistan into a single…
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 02/12/2025
New in @foreignaffairs.com: I discuss how Palestinian opinion shifted since Oct 7—rally, correction, re-pluralization—and what a felt cease-fire plus Palestinian-led governance could change next. www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/...
foreignaffairs.com
Are Palestinians Ready to Shed Hamas?
How other factions might gain ground.
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Reposted by Mohamed Elgohari
Foreign Affairs @foreignaffairs.com · 01/12/2025
Read @elgohari.com on the arc of Palestinian public opinion before, during, and after the war in Gaza:
foreignaffairs.com
Are Palestinians Ready to Shed Hamas?
How other factions might gain ground.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 20/11/2025
Jihadist outlets are turning Sudan into a hinge between three countries: 🇪🇬 Egypt 🇱🇾 Libya 🇦🇪 UAE AQAP and ISIS use the same conflict to blame one, mobilize another, and bypass borders altogether. The article walks through how. Link 👉 elgohari.com/2025/11/16/s...
elgohari.com
Sudan in Transnational Jihadist Storytelling
As Sudan’s war deepens and al-Fāshir becomes shorthand for unchecked atrocity, AQAP and the Islamic State are working to recast the conflict as a “forgotten wound” and an “open arena” for jihad.…
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 17/11/2025
Published a new analysis on how AQAP and ISIS are narrating the Sudan war with Egypt, Libya, and the UAE in mind. Read: elgohari.com/2025/11/16/s... #Sudan #Egypt #Libya #UAE #JihadistPropaganda #MENA #SecurityStudies #Counterterrorism
elgohari.com
Sudan in Transnational Jihadist Storytelling
As Sudan’s war deepens and al-Fāshir becomes shorthand for unchecked atrocity, AQAP and the Islamic State are working to recast the conflict as a “forgotten wound” and an “open arena” for jihad.…
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 03/11/2025
No Gray Zone in Khorasan Fresh analysis of ISKP’s The Divided Tents of Disbelief and Islam. The publication sorts the world into two camps, brands rivals apostate, and sets conditions for escalation. I map the doctrine, audience strategy, and indicators to track next. elgohari.com/2025/11/03/n...
elgohari.com
No Gray Zone in Khorasan
ISKP resurrects a hard binary—īmān vs. kufr—to delegitimize the Taliban, sort communities, and lower barriers to violence.
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 27/10/2025
Patience, Signs, and Small Wars elgohari.com/2025/10/27/p...
elgohari.com
Patience, Signs, and Small Wars
Al-Nabāʾ 518 frames patience as doctrine and repetition as strategy, stitching dispersed, low-cost operations into a campaign of attrition; the messaging prioritizes convoy interdiction, mobility t…
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Mohamed Elgohari @elgohari.com · 20/10/2025
New analysis: al-Nabāʾ 517 — doctrine over diplomacy This week’s issue frames the Sharm al-Shaykh ceasefire track as collaboration and ties a portable veto on “peace” to dispersed, low-cost violence. Full analysis: elgohari.com/2025/10/20/p...
elgohari.com
Peace as Betrayal, Endurance as Strategy
Al-Nabāʾ 517 pairs a veto on diplomacy with an Africa-led operations rhythm and Syrian attrition, reframing “peace infrastructure” as a target and complicating paths to expand Gulf normalization.…
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