Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 22/12/2025…clearly that process began earlier and was driven by other factors (collapse of JCPOA revival talks?). 6/6 000
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 22/12/20253. This also calls into question the idea that “the walls closing in” in late 2024 was a big driver for Iran seeking shortcuts to a bomb. It might have spurred that research again/gave it more urgency, but if this 2023 data point is true…5/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 22/12/20252. Similarly, if you have explicit intelligence Iran is considering making a crude bomb without needing to go to 90+ (which is how this Wapost article reads), this puts Iranian threats to revise its doctrine in 2024 in a different (more credible) light. 4/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 22/12/20251. The concern over the buildup of Iran’s 60% stockpile during this time, already warranted, would be even more so if there was explicit intelligence Iran was considering shoving that material into a crude device. 3/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 22/12/2025One can imagine a version of events that bridges both of these claims, but if the 2023 data point is true, a few implications. 2/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 22/12/2025One of the more interesting bits in this article is the claim that intelligence first emerged in early 2023 that Iran was exploring a faster pathway to a crude nuclear device. Previous reports pegged that development in late 2024/early 2025. 1/ www.washingtonpost.com/national-sec...washingtonpost.comKilling the ‘brain trust’: How Israel targeted Iran’s nuclear scientistsA Washington Post-PBS Frontline investigation reveals new details about Israel’s Operation Narnia, targeting Iran’s nuclear scientists during the 12-day war. 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 15/04/2025Told Francois Murphy that "a strike by the United States could probably cause more damage than an Israeli strike, but in either case you're talking about buying time and there's a real risk that it drives Iran toward rather than away from a bomb.” www.reuters.com/world/middle...reuters.comWould military strikes kill Iran's nuclear programme? Probably notThe recent U.S. deployment of B-2 bombers, the only planes able to launch the most powerful bunker-busting bombs, to within range of Iran is a potent signal to Tehran of what could happen to its nuclear programme if no deal is reached to rein it in. 060
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 14/04/2025Lots of focus on what the U.S. end goal should be as part of nuclear talks with Iran. Fair. But Witkoff needs to staff up, and fast. These talks are highly technical and he’s going to need both nuclear and sanctions experts. Doing otherwise is courting disaster. 3306
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 13/04/2025Sec Wright: “We’ve not reached the details on an agreement, but it certainly looks like there is a pathway to do that…The issue is control of sensitive technology. Are there solutions to that that involve enrichment here in Saudi Arabia? Yes.” www.nytimes.com/2025/04/13/w...nytimes.comU.S. Revives Talks With Saudi Arabia on Transfer of Nuclear TechnologyEnergy Secretary Chris Wright said he sees a “pathway” to a deal that would allow the kingdom to develop a commercial nuclear power industry and potentially enrich uranium. 021
Reposted by Eric BrewerNuclear Threat Initiative @nti.org · 11/04/2025“You can remove centrifuges, but you can't remove that knowledge... Even if you remove those machines and dilute and cap the material, Iran is starting from a much more advanced place today than it was in 2015," says NTI's @ebrewer.bsky.social ⤵️al-monitor.comHow Iran’s nuclear gains complicate Trump's desire for a 'stronger' dealPresident Trump says he's seeking an Iranian nuclear deal stronger than the one he trashed in his first term. But with Iran's nuclear program more advanced than ever before, is that even possible? 012
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 12/04/2025Quoted: “There is growing doubt among allies and partners about whether the United States will meet its defense commitments when the chips are down…But there are a lot of other systemic factors driving countries to talk about developing nuclear weapons.” www.politico.com/news/magazin...politico.comTrump May Be Triggering the Fastest Nuclear Weapons Race Since the Cold WarThe threat of U.S. withdrawal has prompted countries around the world — from Germany to South Korea — to talk about building their own nuclear arsenals. 010
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 10/04/2025As I predicted last week. www.axios.com/2025/04/10/i...axios.comScoop: Iran wants to explore interim nuclear deal in talks with U.S., sources sayPresident Trump has set a two-month deadline for negotiations with Iran on a new nuclear deal. 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 10/04/2025For example: Bar certain inspectors (which Iran has already done), or bar/any all inspections, which would be a major provocation? Similarly, moving materials to a secure location could be done with IAEA monitoring (not good) or without (really, really bad). 000
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 10/04/2025Advisor to the Supreme Leader 👇 The conditions (“continuation of external threats and being in a state of military attack”) are pretty ambiguous and leave a lot of room for flexibility, as do the threatened consequences. 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 09/04/2025Sanctioning Iranian entities involved in enrichment ahead of U.S.-Iran talks certainly seems like a signal to Tehran that Washington has no intention of accepting that enrichment program under any agreement. home.treasury.gov/news/press-r...home.treasury.govTreasury Imposes Sanctions on Enablers of Iran’s Nuclear ProgramWASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating five entities and one individual based in Iran for their support to key entities that manage... 011
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 08/04/2025A third question: Will maximum pressure continue while diplomacy is underway? I suspect yes, but North Korea under Trump 1.0 offers a counterexample. 3/3 000
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 08/04/2025Sticking with the latter would be a recipe for a short negotiation. Another big Q is whether the Trump admin sees this as more of a temperature-taking session or plans to lay out early redlines and/or put something more substantive on the table (my guess is temp-taking). 2/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 08/04/2025Far more important than whether US-Iran talks are direct or indirect is how the Trump admin approaches these first meetings. Does it frame its goal as making sure Iran can’t produce a nuclear weapon? Or that Iran needs to dismantle its entire nuclear infrastructure? 1/ 110
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025So, in order of likelihood, I think we see 3 next, and if that doesn’t work, then back to 2. I think 1 is very unlikely, and remain skeptical or 4. You now have my very public predictions based on current info. I’ll revise as warranted! 12/12 1312
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025I think this remains a risky option, and is thus unlikely unless Iran determines the US and/or Israel is determined to strike and there’s no way to prevent it (and even then, I think it’s still more likely Iran weathers the strike and uses it as justification to leave the NPT and weaponize). 11/ 1241
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025Option 4: Cross the nuclear threshold (or come really damn close). The goal would be to establish a reliable deterrent, thus preventing a strike, and strengthen Iran’s negotiation position vis-a-vis the US. Like option 1, this is a “hard exit” from the current dilemma. 10/ 3291
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025Like #2, it’s unclear whether Israel could talk the US out of it and/or would decide to strike on its own. That said, I think this is probably Iran’s preferred option assuming the status quo can’t last, and the one we’re most likely to see it try in the coming months. 9/ 1281
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025The goal would be to avoid a strike, let snapback expire, retain the key elements of the nuclear program, and keep options open for diplomacy in the future. Iran might also think it can lean on Russia and China (who also don’t want snapback or a strike) to convince the US this is a good option. 8/ 1301
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025Option 3: Try and sell Trump on something short of his maximum demands as a first step (like a JPOA) while promising to continue negotiations to reach a broader/bigger deal. 7/ 1311
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025If/when snapback happens, Iran might moderate its response (eg no 90%) to avoid said strike. The wildcard here is Israel, which Iran will have a much harder time deterring with this strategy. 6/ 1311
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025This is kind of where Iran is at now, though it is exploring Option 3 (below), and I suspect that’s where it might pivot to next as things heat up. 5/ 1331
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025Option 2: Don’t make a deal, keep the nuclear program more or less on cruise control, and call Trump’s bluff. This would be betting that Trump cares more about avoiding a war than he does solving the nuclear problem. 4/ 1391
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025I think this is the least likely option, and Khamenei would accept a military strike on Iran’s program over this outcome (and if that happens, use that as justification to leave the NPT and develop weapons). 3/ 1352
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025Option 1: Give in to the maximalist version of Trump’s demands (abandon the nuclear program, and perhaps other policies of concern) in exchange for significant sanctions relief. 2/ 1312
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 02/04/2025Tensions between Iran and the US are heating up. The US is flowing more forces into the region as both sides exchange threats. Direct talks appear unlikely for now, and time for a deal is short. How might Khamenei manage what is likely to be a perilous ~6 months? I see four options. 1/ 2827978
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 28/03/2025For more on the Task Force: www.nti.org/news/announc...nti.orgAnnouncing New Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation and U.S. National SecurityThe Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and NTI are co-chairing a new bipartisan task force comprised of over... 000
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 28/03/2025Excited to see this panel at Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Conference - “Back to the Future? Nuclear Proliferation Risks in an Era of Uncertainty,” featuring the 3 co-chairs (and 1 member) of the NTI-CEIP-Belfer Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation and US Nat Sec. carnegieendowment.org/events/2024/...carnegieendowment.org2025 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy ConferenceFor over 35 years, experts, officials, executives, journalists, and students from across the globe have come together to debate—and explore solutions for—the most pressing challenges in nuclear nonpro... 111
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 26/03/2025Quite the line here in the Annual Threat Assessment: “Iranian leaders recognize the country is at one of its most fragile points since the Iran-Iraq War” 001
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 25/03/2025Although largely overshadowed by the Signal debacle in today’s hearing, the IC’s Annual Threat Assessment is worth reading. Interesting info in particular on Iran’s strategic situation in the region, Russia/Ukraine, and Russia-Iran-China-DPRK collab. www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/d...dni.gov 031
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 24/03/2025Vague is probably a better description than inconsistent. He routinely focuses on the simple notion that Iran can’t have a nuclear weapon. Not clear what that means in practice. 000
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 23/03/2025I think the seemingly different takes by Waltz and Witkoff over the goals of U.S. Iran policy stem at least in part from the fact that Trump himself has been inconsistent on this issue. www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/mik...cbsnews.comTranscript: National Security Adviser Mike Waltz "Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan," March 23, 2025The following is the transcript of an interview with National Security Adviser Mike Waltz that aired on "Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan" on March 23, 2025. 000
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 12/03/2025Pleased to share my thoughts with Patrick Tucker for his piece on the growing risk of proliferation by U.S. allies, including some of the challenges and risks they would face in actually developing nuclear weapons. www.defenseone.com/threats/2025...defenseone.comExperts fear cascade of nuclear proliferation as Trump shakes alliancesU.S. allies contemplate the once-unthinkable: building their own nuclear arsenals. 010
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025In short, even though Russia may have some sway with Iran and may be slightly more motivated to use it, Russian and Iranian interests still align in ways that could easily—and perhaps even likely—produce a bad outcome for U.S. interests. 12/12 000
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025A no formal deal/no snapback scenario is also not a bad outcome from Iran’s perspective. UN resolutions (and snapback) expire, its nuclear file is normalized, and Iran keeps its options open for a bomb or a deal. 11/ 110
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025I could see, for example, a Russian argument to the U.S. that there’s a chance of a deal with more time and therefore the U.S. should oppose snapback, which would otherwise kill all prospects for a deal and lead Iran to build the bomb and/or war. 10/ 110
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025For example, a deescalatory understanding (a la the Biden admin) may be enough. Or a series of small steps such as Iran shipping out 60%. Or even the improved prospects of a deal. 9/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025It’s not clear whether avoiding those outcomes would require a formal deal, because we don’t know what Trump is prepared to accept. 8/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025Third—and perhaps most important—Russia has a strong interest not necessarily in getting Iran to agree to a deal per se, but rather convincing the U.S. not to support snapback (and to convince Europe not to do it) and avoiding a U.S. or U.S./Israeli military strike. 7 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025But I’m skeptical Russia would take steps such as pressuring Iran at the IAEA BoG or using other sources of leverage it has with Iran. Russia’s potential mediation role has also gotten a cold reception in Tehran so far, suggesting Iran is deeply skeptical of Russian motives.6/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025Second, it’s not clear whether Russia can, or will, nudge the Iranians in a positive direction, as they did in lead up to the JCPOA. Russia saying “hey, Trump is interested in a deal, you should talk” is one thing. As is trying to talk Iran down a 90% or NPT-withdrawal ledge. 5/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025Similarly, Russia’s role in helping to implement a deal, for example, by receiving excess Iranian enriched uranium, would also presumably be back on the table. 4/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025For example, if there’s an end to hostilities in Ukraine, then presumably issues like Iran’s transfers to Russia of missiles and drones that are being used in that war (a big deal for the Biden admin) are less salient. 3/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025First, if—and I emphasize, IF—the US-Russia relationship keeps moving in this direction, it would probably reduces some barriers to a deal. These were never showstoppers in my view, but nor are they meaningless. 2/ 100
Eric Brewer @ebrewer.bsky.social · 07/03/2025With the U.S. tilt toward Russia (and away from Europe) and reports of Russia acting as an intermediary between the U.S. and Iran, what are the implications for nuclear talks and a new deal with Tehran? A few thoughts. 1/ www.bloomberg.com/news/article...bloomberg.comPutin Agrees to Help Trump Broker Nuclear Talks With IranRussia agreed to assist US President Donald Trump’s administration in communicating with Iran on issues including the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program and its support for regional anti-US proxies, a... 171