iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 25/09/2026

please stop anthropomorphizing the thing deliberately built to mimic humans.

Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 19/09/2026

My paper "Epistemic Actualism" has been published at Nous. It argues that beliefs and credences do not aim at truth, but rather *actual* truth. And it uses this thesis to defend accuracy-first epistemology from several objections. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/share/author...

onlinelibrary.wiley.com

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 14/08/2026

Simon's responding to comments providing intense scrutiny of *a* paper.

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 12/08/2026

At some point, PhilPapers is just gonna have to accept that I'm a human.

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 03/07/2026

New publication, "Comparativism about Instrumental Value". I started this project back when I was living in Melbourne. V happy that it's finally found a home. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/share/author...

onlinelibrary.wiley.com

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 29/04/2026

This semester, I taught an undergraduate course on Probability and Rational Choice for the first time. My lecture notes are here: jdmitrigallow.com/teaching/par...

jdmitrigallow.com

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 20/03/2026

2) because of thesis 1, we have reasons to mistrust our intuitions about rational choice in certain complex Newcomb-like decisions. 3) even though structured deliberation can lead you to dismiss a rational option, it will never lead you to select an irrational option.

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 20/03/2026

Structured deliberation treats a synchronic decision as if it were diachronic. The paper examines structured deliberation in complex Newcomb-like decisions. It defends 3 theses: 1) if you structure your deliberation, you can dismiss an option, even though it would be a perfectly rational choice...

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 20/03/2026

for instance: divide the menu into the chicken dishes and the steak dishes. First, choose whether to get a chicken dish or a steak dish, and thereafter choose which chicken or steak dish to order. I call this way of deciding what to do "structuring your deliberation"...

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 20/03/2026

I have a new paper forthcoming at Mind, called "Structured Deliberation". It's about a certain way of deliberating about a complex decisions: split the large menu of options up into submenus, choose between submenus, and thereafter choose from the selected submenu... philpapers.org/go.pl?aid=GA...

philpapers.org

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 12/03/2026

*Excellent* new paper from @bweatherson.bsky.social on deference. He shows, among other things, that Kevin Dorst's Total Trust principle comes apart from the Value of Information thesis in infinite probability frames. ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/...

ojs.victoria.ac.nz

View of Deference and Infinite Frames

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 17/06/2025

I don't see the contradiction between "I don't owe you X" and "if you're not an asshole, I'll give you X". It's my policy on Halloween candy, for instance. I don't owe it to anyone, but if they're not an asshole, I'll give them some.

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 14/06/2025

Last semester, I taught a graduate seminar on Bayesian epistemology. Here are my lecture notes: jdmitrigallow.com/teaching/epist25/aitbe.pdf

jdmitrigallow.com

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 07/03/2025

Look, I agree with you, but the strategy for persuading OP has to be "ultimately, insincerity isn't a good strategy". She's never gonna go for "I just say what I think".

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 11/02/2025

Video of a talk I gave at USC's Information Science Institute. It's meant to give an opinionated overview of the developments in the philosophy of causation over the past 30 years. www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rqt...

youtube.com

Causation and Influence in Causal Influence Models

YouTube video by USC Information Sciences Institute

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Reposted by Dmitri Gallow

Ben Waber @bwaber.bsky.social · 11/02/2025

Next was a thought-provoking talk by @dmitrigallow.bsky.social on recent developments in the philosophy of causation at the USC Information Sciences Institute www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rqt... (3/6)

youtube.com

Causation and Influence in Causal Influence Models

YouTube video by USC Information Sciences Institute

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 27/01/2025

This is my favorite song about my home state of Georgia, but since moving to LA, I can't really enjoy it in the same way.

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 19/01/2025

For every cardinal size, a set of things that size could but does not exist

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 12/01/2025

You can supervise any number of grad students, but only a certain number of dissertations. You just need to start encouraging your students to coauthor dissertations.

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 10/01/2025

I reserve "decision" for the situation you are in when you have to select an option and "choice" for the selection you make. I don't think that distinction is there is ordinary English.

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 07/01/2025

I hope that, in the future, we're more focused on the philosophy than the philosophers.

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Reposted by Dmitri Gallow

Brian Weatherson @bweatherson.bsky.social · 06/01/2025

This paper, offering two game-theoretic arguments against Uniqueness in epistemology, is now forthcoming in Erkenntnis. #philsky brian.weatherson.org/quarto/posts...

brian.weatherson.org

Epistemic Permissiveness and Symmetric Games – Brian Weatherson

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 04/01/2025

Jefferson dodges the real question of whether the distance between error and suspension is greater than the distance between suspension and truth

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 04/01/2025

I believe this is just the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox, but Kenny and Snow keep telling me there's more to it that I'm missing

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 04/01/2025

Using the cdf avoids the Bertrand style paradoxes, but won't (1) imply that, for a uniform distribution over (0,1), 1/4 is less likely than 3/4, conditional on their disjunction? For the cdf, F(x) = Prob(X <= x) = x. So, conditional on 1/4 or 3/4, it's 1/4 likely to be 1/4.

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 04/01/2025

...But given the implied distribution over X^2, it's intuitive that the probability of X^2=1/4 is greater than the probably of X^2=9/4, conditional on their disjunction.

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 04/01/2025

... For instance, given a uniform distribution over X (which takes values between 0 and 2) it's intuitive that the probability of X=1/2 is the probability of X=3/2, conditional on their disjunction...

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 04/01/2025

I heard about the argument from Brian Hedden, but when I went looking I couldn't find it in the de Finetti. One reason to worry about the argument: as Wayne Myrvold points out, similar uniformity judgements conditional on prob zero events face Bertrand-style paradoxes...

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 04/01/2025

I have been told that de finetti makes that argument against countable additivity

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Reposted by Dmitri Gallow

Joel David Hamkins @joeldavidhamkins.bsky.social · 31/12/2024

Just submitted the completed manuscript of The Book of Infinity to MIT Press. Hoping for the best! #BookOfInfinity

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 26/12/2024

Putting aside the compositional details, he'll presumably want "I've decided to A" to affect the plan component and "I've decided that p" to affect the world component.

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 26/12/2024

Couldn't you capture this with a Gibbardian semantics? "to believe p" is the set of world plan pairs where the plan includes believing p. "That p" is the set of world plan pairs where the world is such that p. Deciding X is coming to accept X. Then, deciding to believe p isn't deciding that p.

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Dmitri Gallow @dmitrigallow.bsky.social · 26/12/2024

You mean "if they never believed p", right? I can sincerely say "I decided that p" even if I no longer believe that p.

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