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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 18/03/2026

I see the point as that small average effects of observed moderation are perfectly consistent with 1) issue positions mattering a ton to individual voters, 2) large effects of moderation on some issues, and 3) zero or negative effects on others

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 18/03/2026

I don’t think the absolute value of the point estimates can be taken to the bank, the relative value is the main message. Unclear how you’d aggregate across the estimates to get a total - eg if you added up all the positive point estimates together you’d get ~30 pp for Ds, clearly overestimate

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

Yes, I wouldn't read too much into absolute magnitudes. Main point of the paper is the argument, and the data helps illustrate it. About to be on the road for a couple weeks but will reach out when I get back!

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

More generally, the idea here is to make an argument from first principles about what we should expect from aggregate data given what we know about voters & use survey data to try to show those theoretical dynamics are at play.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

As I flagged, I wouldn't reach much into the candidate-level results this early - the Cuban result is just interesting. Yes I do believe voters care about issue positions and that that is why decades of research find that moderate candidates do better.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

The core finding that moderation improves vote shares isn't survey-based, it's consistent across decades of research including in recent elections.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

P.S. Bonus fun fact — while it’s very early and our data isn’t ideal for assessing 2028 electability, @mcuban.bsky.social ’s performance in the trial heats we did is literally off the charts.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

Paper link here: osf.io/preprints/so... Feedback welcome!

osf.io

OSF

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

It also means moderation on specific issues—particularly issues where a party is out of step with the public—may yield bigger electoral gains. These gains will still be small, though—meaning moderation across *many* issues is likely needed for parties to make a meaningful dent.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

So what does this mean? Studies finding small average returns to moderation provide a lower bound on how many voters vote on issues. E.g., in our simulations, every simulated voter is voting on issues, yet the average effect of moving to the middle can be small, zero, or negative

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

This matters because some argue that cross-pressured survey responses are just measurement error—that these people are really moderates But if so, they should reward moderation across the board They don't. They only reward it on issues where they personally disagree w the party

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

We see this at the individual level too. Voters who agree with a party's standard position on an issue don't reward & may actually penalize candidates who abandon that position. Even voters who look "moderate" overall behave this way on issues where they hold a party's position.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

This is not intuitive if you think voters are at the elite center on every issue / always prefer a position between the parties. But it's exactly what you'd predict if voters are cross-pressured and care about proximity on specific issues.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

More broadly: on issues where a party's position already has majority support, moving to the elite middle yielded negative effects for Republicans (-2.4pp, p<0.001) and a negative (though not significant) effect for Democrats.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

We also find moderation can backfire When Republicans moved to the middle on transgender sports or K-12 teacher accountability—issues where the GOP position is already popular—they lost support. Same story w/ Dems and Social Security Moving to the middle ≠ moving toward voters

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

Thank you @mattyglesias.bsky.social for writing up some of these results in this morning's @nytimes.com ! I agree with his take-aways: www.nytimes.com/2026/03/16/o...

nytimes.com

Opinion | What Democrats Should Relearn From Obama

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

It is notable that these are the issues where each party’s donors are also most out of step with the electorate (Democratic donors too left-wing on social issues; Republican donors too right-wing on economics), per some work I did w @nmalhotra.bsky.social academic.oup.com/poq/article-...

academic.oup.com

What Do Partisan Donors Want?

Abstract. Influential theories indicate concern that campaign donors exert outsized political influence. However, little data have documented what donors a

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

This pattern lines up with where each party is "out of step." The electoral payoff to moving to the center appears biggest on the issues where each party has drifted most from public opinion.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

For Republicans, the biggest gains were on economic issues like healthcare and minimum wage. See Appendix for policy item wording.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

For Democrats, the biggest gains from moving to the middle came on social/cultural issues like affirmative action (+4.5pp) and LGBTQ issues—where the party's standard positions are furthest from the median voter.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

To illustrate this, we ran a conjoint experiment (N=6,000 voter-file-matched registered voters) with hypothetical 2028 presidential candidates. Each candidate had randomized positions on 3 of 29 policy issues—either their party's standard position or an "elite middle" alternative.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

This suggests moderation is *more important* than many argue: a candidate/party will need to moderate on *lots* of issues where its positions aren’t popular in order to win more votes.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

The small average effect of moving to the middle thus isn't evidence voters ignore issues. It's *what you'd expect* if voters care about issues but their preferences don't all sit neatly between the two parties. Small aggregate effects are consistent with lots of issue voting.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

The same can lead the net effects of moderation on an issue to be small: cross-pressured voters who liked you on that issue but preferred the other party on others may flip against you — even if you win over slightly more voters who now prefer you overall

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

This is due to multidimensionality. Moving toward the other party on one issue can cause cross-pressured voters—who liked you on that issue but preferred the other party on others—to flip against you. You win some voters but lose others.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

Here's why those matter If a party's position on an issue is already popular, moving toward the other party means *not* moving towards most voters - & might mean moving *away* from most voters - on that issue "moderation" on that issue won't win many or should actually cost votes

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

We think this interpretation is wrong, for two reasons: 1. "moving to the middle" is usually measured as moving toward the other party -- not toward the median voter. These aren't the same thing. 2. voters aren't one-dimensional. They're cross-pressured across issues.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

The standard story: empirical research finds that candidates whose positions move toward the other party's gain fewer votes than classic theories expect. This has led scholars and pundits to argue voters mostly don't vote on issues -- they vote on party loyalty, identity, vibes.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

New short paper w @jkalla.bsky.social ! Candidates gain from moderation, but less than many theories expect. Many conclude voters must not care about issues. This is wrong. Small *average* effects mask large effects on specific issues & are consistent with widespread issue-based voting 🧵

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Reposted by David Broockman

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 28/11/2025

Writing your students grad school rec letters? Encourage them to also apply for our political science predoc position at UC Berkeley! aprecruit.berkeley.edu/JPF05187

aprecruit.berkeley.edu

Junior or Assistant Specialist - Department of Political Science

University of California, Berkeley is hiring. Apply now!

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Reposted by David Broockman

Martin Saveski @msaveski.bsky.social · 01/12/2025

New paper in Science: In a platform-independent field experiment, we show that reranking content expressing antidemocratic attitudes and partisan animosity in social media feeds alters affective polarization. 🧵

Today, social media platforms hold the sole power to study the effects of feed-ranking algorithms. We developed a platform-independent method that reranks participants’ feeds in real time and used this method to conduct a preregistered 10-day field experiment with 1256 participants on X during the 2024 US presidential campaign. Our experiment used a large language model to rerank posts that expressed antidemocratic attitudes and partisan animosity (AAPA). Decreasing or increasing AAPA exposure shifted out-party partisan animosity by more than 2 points on a 100-point feeling thermometer, with no detectable differences across party lines, providing causal evidence that exposure to AAPA content alters affective polarization. This work establishes a method to study feed algorithms without requiring platform cooperation, enabling independent evaluation of ranking interventions in naturalistic settings.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 28/11/2025

Writing your students grad school rec letters? Encourage them to also apply for our political science predoc position at UC Berkeley! aprecruit.berkeley.edu/JPF05187

aprecruit.berkeley.edu

Junior or Assistant Specialist - Department of Political Science

University of California, Berkeley is hiring. Apply now!

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Reposted by David Broockman

Stephen Jacob Smith @stephenjacobsmith.com · 27/11/2025

Still thinking about this article. It’s always been a sore spot in YIMBY circles that so many progressive foundations pour money into NIMBYism, and I’m glad it’s finally being aired in public. Keep talking about it. www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/philant...

insidephilanthropy.com

Philanthropy Needs to Pick a Side on the Housing Construction Debate

Despite California’s severe housing shortage, foundations are still funding on the wrong side of the housing fight there, guest author Ned Resnikoff writes.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

You can read the full paper here: osf.io/kz4m8 We look forward to hearing everyone's feedback!

osf.io

OSF

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

We don't claim homeowner self-interest or NIMBYism don't matter. But our findings suggest that "fear of an ugly America" is an underrated driver of the housing crisis and could contribute to what has been called NIMBYism. Addressing it could unlock new support for more housing.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

Second, this explains why "missing middle" housing or upzoning commercial strips is often more politically feasible than general upzoning. It respects the voter's desire for visual congruence—putting taller buildings where they "look right."

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

What are the potential policy implications? First, design matters. If the YIMBY movement wants to build broad coalitions, it cannot ignore aesthetics. Policies that ensure better design or "fitting in" (like form-based codes) might reduce political friction.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

To provide a different kind of causal leverage, we also tested this with video. Watching a short clip that framed modern "boxy" architecture as ugly reduced support for upzoning. Aesthetic complaints create opposition to supply-side reforms.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

These judgments are *sociotropic*. Voters didn't just oppose ugly buildings on their own block; they opposed policies that would allow "ugly" buildings anywhere. Just as people support redistribution for the "greater good" they support aesthetic regulation for the "greater good"

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

These are the building designs we used in the second experiment. NB: I used to live in building (b), and it passed SF's design review. Voters hate it and don't want to approve housing like it! Maybe our design review processes should be better.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

In a second vignette, we showed respondents images of buildings. The results also confirm that both visual appeal and fit in context powerfully drive support for housing, and seemingly far more than affordability concerns.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

The drop in support from the project being "on your block" is half the size of it being in a non-dense vs. already-dense area elsewhere Perhaps part of why single family homeowners oppose local density isn't NIMBYism, but a widely shared view density should go in already-dense areas

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

We then ran an experiment varying attributes of a proposed building: taxes, parking, and the architect's design reputation. Result 1: The aesthetic quality of the project was a massive driver of support--outweighing concerns about parking or tax revenue. Result 2...

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

Is "aesthetics" just a pretext for excluding lower-income residents? We tested this by comparing support for apartments vs. similarly sized office buildings. If it was about residents, people should prefer offices. But they oppose offices even more. Physical structure matters.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

How much does "ugliness" actually matter compared to other concerns? A lot. We surveyed voters on various objections to housing. As Figure 3 shows, the belief that "Cities look nicer when they have fewer tall apartment buildings" is a top predictor of opposition.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

This may explain the political success of "commercial corridor" upzoning policies (like CA's AB 2011). It's not just about avoiding NIMBY homeowners; it's that voters view density as aesthetically appropriate in already-dense areas, regardless of where they personally live.

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

We found widespread support for 5-story apartments along commercial corridors (where they fit), but sharp opposition in single-family neighborhoods (where they clash). Even people who live in dense areas support density more where they live than elsewhere!

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

We think two things are going on here: 1. People self-select into neighborhoods that match their aesthetic tastes. If you live in density, you likely have a "taste" for it. 2. Voters prefer development that "fits in" with the existing built environment....

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David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

As motivation, look at this puzzle Existing theories predict homeowners in dense areas should be the biggest opponents of more density in already-dense areas--it's their backyard! But homeowners on corridors are actually *most* supportive of AB 2011-style upzoning of corridors!

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