iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

Yes, I wouldn't read too much into absolute magnitudes. Main point of the paper is the argument, and the data helps illustrate it. About to be on the road for a couple weeks but will reach out when I get back!

120

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

P.S. Bonus fun fact — while it’s very early and our data isn’t ideal for assessing 2028 electability, @mcuban.bsky.social ’s performance in the trial heats we did is literally off the charts.

17303

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

This matters because some argue that cross-pressured survey responses are just measurement error—that these people are really moderates But if so, they should reward moderation across the board They don't. They only reward it on issues where they personally disagree w the party

170

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

We see this at the individual level too. Voters who agree with a party's standard position on an issue don't reward & may actually penalize candidates who abandon that position. Even voters who look "moderate" overall behave this way on issues where they hold a party's position.

170

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

More broadly: on issues where a party's position already has majority support, moving to the elite middle yielded negative effects for Republicans (-2.4pp, p<0.001) and a negative (though not significant) effect for Democrats.

170

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

This pattern lines up with where each party is "out of step." The electoral payoff to moving to the center appears biggest on the issues where each party has drifted most from public opinion.

170

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

For Republicans, the biggest gains were on economic issues like healthcare and minimum wage. See Appendix for policy item wording.

180

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

For Democrats, the biggest gains from moving to the middle came on social/cultural issues like affirmative action (+4.5pp) and LGBTQ issues—where the party's standard positions are furthest from the median voter.

180

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

To illustrate this, we ran a conjoint experiment (N=6,000 voter-file-matched registered voters) with hypothetical 2028 presidential candidates. Each candidate had randomized positions on 3 of 29 policy issues—either their party's standard position or an "elite middle" alternative.

270

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

The same can lead the net effects of moderation on an issue to be small: cross-pressured voters who liked you on that issue but preferred the other party on others may flip against you — even if you win over slightly more voters who now prefer you overall

1111

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

Here's why those matter If a party's position on an issue is already popular, moving toward the other party means *not* moving towards most voters - & might mean moving *away* from most voters - on that issue "moderation" on that issue won't win many or should actually cost votes

1184

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 16/03/2026

New short paper w @jkalla.bsky.social ! Candidates gain from moderation, but less than many theories expect. Many conclude voters must not care about issues. This is wrong. Small *average* effects mask large effects on specific issues & are consistent with widespread issue-based voting 🧵

310435

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

To provide a different kind of causal leverage, we also tested this with video. Watching a short clip that framed modern "boxy" architecture as ugly reduced support for upzoning. Aesthetic complaints create opposition to supply-side reforms.

240

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

These are the building designs we used in the second experiment. NB: I used to live in building (b), and it passed SF's design review. Voters hate it and don't want to approve housing like it! Maybe our design review processes should be better.

2101

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

In a second vignette, we showed respondents images of buildings. The results also confirm that both visual appeal and fit in context powerfully drive support for housing, and seemingly far more than affordability concerns.

140

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

We then ran an experiment varying attributes of a proposed building: taxes, parking, and the architect's design reputation. Result 1: The aesthetic quality of the project was a massive driver of support--outweighing concerns about parking or tax revenue. Result 2...

160

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

Is "aesthetics" just a pretext for excluding lower-income residents? We tested this by comparing support for apartments vs. similarly sized office buildings. If it was about residents, people should prefer offices. But they oppose offices even more. Physical structure matters.

1121

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

How much does "ugliness" actually matter compared to other concerns? A lot. We surveyed voters on various objections to housing. As Figure 3 shows, the belief that "Cities look nicer when they have fewer tall apartment buildings" is a top predictor of opposition.

1100

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

We found widespread support for 5-story apartments along commercial corridors (where they fit), but sharp opposition in single-family neighborhoods (where they clash). Even people who live in dense areas support density more where they live than elsewhere!

170

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

As motivation, look at this puzzle Existing theories predict homeowners in dense areas should be the biggest opponents of more density in already-dense areas--it's their backyard! But homeowners on corridors are actually *most* supportive of AB 2011-style upzoning of corridors!

3111

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

NEW PAPER w/ @cselmendorf.bsky.social & @jkalla.bsky.social: An under-appreciated reason why voters oppose dense new housing, especially in less-dense neighborhoods: they think it looks ugly and want to prevent that, even in other neighborhoods. Some of what we think is NIMBYism might not be!

3511123

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 27/05/2025

Some caveats: This is observational data from 27 districts in 2024. Voters might care about other things like compromise or ideology that we didn't study. For issue voting, projection is a threat to causal inference–but we discuss why that’s unlikely to explain our findings.

151

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 27/05/2025

Parties face a dilemma. Nominating moderates in close districts helps win—but most voters infer that candidates hold the party’s typical positions. To win some seats, a party needs a *nationwide* moderate reputation. But groups & others might not want to build it (e.g., by moderates in safe seats).

1102

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 27/05/2025

FINDING #3: Evidence that groups contribute to polarization. Group endorsements have major influence. Voters who learn about them are ~15 pp more likely to vote for endorsed candidates. This effect is driven by endorsements from liked groups—negative cues barely register.

2142

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 27/05/2025

This creates a problem for primary voters: party cues are useless in primaries where everyone's the same party. So primary voters stay confused about who's closest to them, even as they learn what candidates of their party stand for.

191

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 27/05/2025

We found evidence that voters learn about candidates partly by learning national party reputations: a) voters somehow learn just as much about no-name candidates, & b) voters are 3x more likely to learn "stereotypical" positions (like Dems supporting healthcare) than unusual ones

1112

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 27/05/2025

When primary AND general voters learn a candidate agrees with them on an issue, they're ~14 percentage points more likely to vote for that candidate. In generals, this includes when the closest candidate is an outpartisan–party loyalty isn’t everything.

1112

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 27/05/2025

FINDING #1: General election voters know MORE about candidate positions than primary voters. By election day, general election voters correctly identify 40% of candidate positions vs just 22% for primary voters.

2194

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 27/05/2025

This gives us a ton of unique data. We measure knowledge & learning of 122 candidate issue positions in the 2024 Congressional primaries and 269 candidate issue positions in the 2024 Congressional generals.

161

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 27/05/2025

Conventional wisdom blames: • Primary voters who closely follow politics & prefer extremists • General election voters who are too ignorant of candidate positions—or too “intoxicated” by party loyalty—to vote for moderates over extremists But our data tells a different story…

191

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 27/05/2025

🚨NEW PAPER: Why are Members of Congress so extreme? We conducted a 4-wave panel of thousands of voters in 27 districts during last year’s primary AND general elections to trace polarization’s roots The results challenge conventional wisdom… and suggest lessons for parties🧵👇

58224

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 02/12/2024

4. Consistent with that, we find some effects on attitudes towards work: people who get the transfer seem to value work *more*. There's a few potential explanations, including that people answering our survey sought to distance themselves from perception they would misuse the $.

1151

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 02/12/2024

3. Does getting a big cash transfer make ppl more supportive of... cash transfers? Liberal policy in general? Surprising answer: no! Political dispositions are hard to change! E.g., in interviews, some who received the transfer said they thought *others* would misuse it.

2358

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 02/12/2024

2. We find evidence consistent with "mood misattribution": recipients feel (a bit) warmer towards other racial groups, their own racial groups, & even governor of their state (& maybe both political parties). But no fx on dispositions like authoritarianism or trust in democracy.

1110

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 02/12/2024

Those null findings contrast with studies finding gov't-sponsored transfers mobilize, consistent with interpretations that it matters where people think $ is coming from when they experience income shocks. Our participants were (correctly) aware that this $ was not from gov't.

1121

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 02/12/2024

1. Resource theories of political participation would expect big increases in turnout & participation: participants had more $ and free time. But we find nulls on participation, knowledge, etc. & can rule out observational association.

1133

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 02/12/2024

🚨 NEW PAPER: When low-income Americans get $1,000/month for 3 years, what happens to their political views & behavior? The OpenResearch Unconditional income Study reveals surprising findings about the effects of income on politics... 🧵

1120570

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 20/11/2024

How did Fox News persuade? I think the most interesting result is that Fox News viewers agreed with our view of one mechanism: partisan TV filters out coverage bad for its side, leaving viewers in an echo chamber of facts that are only good for its side.

1104

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 20/11/2024

This led to meaningful changes in areas that each network covered extensively, including views on the BLM protests and views towards Trump. Although, contrary to maximalist accounts, didn't change views that the networks didn't cover extensively.

120

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 20/11/2024

We found that watching CNN instead of Fox meaningfully changed many viewers' beliefs -- they were willing to learn facts unflattering to their side on CNN (and didn't learn the things Fox would have told them during that time).

120

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 20/11/2024

Our experiment was conducted in late summer 2020, when CNN and Fox covered very different things....

120

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 20/11/2024

In our experiment, we recruited extremely conservative Fox News viewers to watch CNN instead for a month. This is the exact audience existing research argues isn't persuaded by partisan TV because it simply cannot be persuaded. But we find it can...

130

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 20/11/2024

3. Last, do partisan TV viewers get competing messages? Eg, do Fox viewers also watch lots of MSNBC, balancing it out? Largely no -- people almost always stick to one network. These findings suggest partisan TV viewers could be persuaded.

130

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 20/11/2024

We find clear evidence of "selective exposure" -- people gravitate towards media that agrees with them. BUT, partisan TV's audience isn't all extreme--weak partisans & Independents watch it, and their opinions aren't hugely different. There's room for them to be persuaded.

130

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 20/11/2024

We rely on a few unique data sources: Nielsen data tied to the voter file, smart TV data, cable box data, and TV diaries. They all point towards the same conclusions: 1. Partisan media's audience is sizable. No, most people don't want a lot of partisan TV -- but many do!

151

David Broockman @dbroockman.bsky.social · 20/11/2024

With Fox News hosts nominated for the cabinet, I wanted to share takeaways from two recently-accepted papers w @jkalla.bsky.social on partisan TV. There's been much skepticism that partisan TV actually affects public opinion. Our findings rebut that skepticism: partisan media matters! 🧵

25324