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To close with an analogy that I can't help but help myself to as a Japanese-American: by no means does everyone need to be a multi-way player. But most teams probably wouldn't be hurt by having one on their roster. I would appreciate the opportunity to make that case in person!　

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I know: not typical to have 2 JMPs + prepped talks. I consider myself a political economist who crosses subfields, while being able to draw from and contribute to subfield-specific literatures. If you're a department who wants a collaborative colleague who bridges subfields, we could be a good fit!

1/2 JMPs I will have newly out for the poli sci market. Consider this a hard launch! Will have a second JMP too. This one asks why congress rolled back Dodd Frank, causing 3/4 largest bank failures in US history 2023. My answer: local dependency, not instrumental power. Working paper out ~week!

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So: not a Gucci Protest after all! These are German-specific empirics but should have implications broadly, weighs in favor of boundary defense vs theories that unequal opportunity explained by elite prefs. Maybe way to address unequal opportunity is policy reducing marginal insiders' insecurity?

Referendum supporters rewarded Scholz. The SPD won in a landslide in snap election triggered by collapse of Christian Democrat (CDU) + Greens coalition after their reform was blocked. Referendum voters defected from CDU to vote for Scholz/SPD shown in precinct and micro data.

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Qualitative record show electorally-motivated politicians responded. Hamburg's SPD chief & future Hamburg mayor, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz campaigned against reform, despite pressure from co-partisan elites, citing insecure voters' interests. See e.g. taz.de/Hamburgs-SPD-...

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Survey-weighted regressions from election study show parents of school-age kids without academic education themselves were more likely to vote for the referendum. Ideology suggestive explainer for other respondents, but this non-academic background for parents of school-age kids.

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Vote-WLS regressions show precincts in below median income areas vote more for referendum. Precincts in places with low academic sorting, high immigrant shares did on average too. But appendix shows this is from specific extreme precincts (e.g. in industrial area of Billbrook), not across support.

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Synthetic difference-in-differences using data across German states suggest that the reform causally reduced native-born German students sorting to academic schools. Very imprecisely (95% CI [-4.5%, +1.7%]) due to power issues, but appendix discusses why this CI is an overly pessimistic upper bound

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Trends show German families already didn't rely on intermediate schools in Hamburg vs rest of Germany pre-reform, which is why consolidation succeeded. But higher share sort to academic schools in Hamburg. Trends show reform lowered native-born students sorting to academic schools, raised immigrants

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I argue this was boundary defense. Less well-off Germans rely on early sorting, it secures academic access vs immigrants. Used to rely on sorting between intermediate/basic tracks, but no longer in Hamburg pre-reform. This explains why these were consolidated, but early sorting reform failed

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The movement didn't care that reformers consolidated non-academic schools, but did oppose delaying sorting & removing parents' choice. They got their referendum and won resoundingly: 58-42%. Maybe only the rich turned out? But referendum vote in Hamburg (left) doesn't quite match income (right).

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I test this general theory on a specific 2010 referendum against a reform to early age sorting across unequal schools in Hamburg, Germany. In 2009, the "we want to learn" movement organized against this reform. German media called it a "Gucci Protest", casting them as upper-middle class elites

This hurts "marginal outsiders" who would otherwise be upwardly mobile from reform. Whether or marginal insiders' "boundary defense" succeeds depends on secure insiders' pro-reform preferences (efficiency benefits), marginal outsiders' representation, and specific size of the marginal insider group

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I agree, and argue that "marginal insiders" defend policies that allow them to hoard opportunities against reform when they lack alternatives to secure uncertain status. Well-off "secure insiders" don't need to: they buy opportunity access, just like with private alternatives to social policy.

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Previous literature argues that "elite domination" of politics explains inequality. Politicians listen to rich more than poor voters, so policy favors them. Work on opportunity specifically blames upper middle-class "dream hoarders". But Tilly said insecure groups like immigrants "opportunity hoard"

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This is an example of a policy that reinforces what Charles Tilly calls "durable inequalities" -- persistent unequal opportunities between social groups. These pervade rich democracies, not just Germany. Aspirational voters' pressure should reform these (Iversen&Soskice 2019), but they're resilient.

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"As early as age 9" children in Germany are sorted across stratified school tracks. Some to tracks where most go on to universities, others where most don't. Literature suggests this is bad for both equity (immigrant students) and efficiency (worse overall education outcomes). Yet it persists. Why?

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Daniel T. Roberts @danieltroberts.com · 30/08/2025

New Working Paper! Why do policies that reinforce unequal opportunities persist? Some blame elites. I argue less secure families defend these "boundaries" against reform and call this "boundary defense". I test this on a 2010 referendum against school reform in Hamburg. Link: osf.io/preprints/soc...

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Whether you are a new or old follower, hello! A quick announcement -- I'll post a new working paper by the end of the weekend on "Boundary Defense". Abstract below, SocArXiv link soon to come. 1 of 2 projects whose WP release coincides with being on the poli sci market. Consider this a soft-launch!

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Reposted by Daniel T. Roberts

Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki @mierkezat.bsky.social · 28/08/2025

I’m very excited to share that my paper “Cleavage theory meets civil society: A framework and research agenda” with @eborbath.bsky.social & Swen Hutter has now been published online in ‪@wepsocial.bsky.social‬ (w/ open access funding thanks to @wzb.bsky.social‬!) www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

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Daniel T. Roberts @danieltroberts.com · 29/07/2025

I'll present on the politics of Dodd-Frank rollback today at @cape-team.bsky.social Annual Conference in a great panel on "Business and Civil Society" together with Jane Sumner & Andrew Kerner, @alanyan.bsky.social, and @jaeyeonkim.bsky.social. Hope to see you there, Working Paper out in ~ a month!

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Reposted by Daniel T. Roberts

Consortium on the American Political Economy (CAPE) @cape-team.bsky.social · 09/07/2025

Join us for the 5th Research Conference on the American Political Economy, July 28-30 on zoom, 12-2:30pm ET, to discuss cutting-edge APE research! Register here: yale.zoom.us/meeting/regi... or check out the program (www.americanpoliticaleconomy.org/events/annua...) featuring@adambonica.bsky.social

yale.zoom.us

Welcome! You are invited to join a meeting: 2025 APE Annual Research Conference. After registering, you will receive a confirmation email about joining the meeting.

The 2025 APE Annual Research Conference will be held on Zoom from July 28 to 30 (Monday to Wednesday) from 12:00 to 2:30 pm ET each day.

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Just musings, but have thought that 2024 Trump campaign (or at least its big money tech backers) had a perception of doing such "ends against the middle" type politics vs a self-satisfied mid-class elite in its messaging. If anyone has empirical ideas for a paper on theme dm me?

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So, super-rich tech elite find themselves with unexpected political bed-fellows: precisely those most threatened by e.g. AI automation of clerical work, H1B visa competition. May provide opportunities for Dems, not trafficking in racism, but shared/solidaristic growth politics.

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Ironically I think this is the same political "type error" albeit with a different policy package of Biden admin, which thought "re-industrialize" policy platform could politically "buy off" an (anachronistic) export working class w/ industrial policy/relations/keeping tariffs.

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For these types, influx of competing skilled is very high stakes & materially threatening, while ironically might benefit from labor price deflation of immigration status quo as consumers. Super-elites like Musk/Ramaswamy misunderstand their coalition + political economy involved

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Also, accept/cheer on welfare retrenchment bc growing capacity to self-insure thru (hoarded) homes/credit/educ and moving up tax scale. Helps makes sense of why Trump's messaging *symbolically* gestures towards re-industrialization, but in practice e.g. tax cuts, "defend suburbs"

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This has been happening a long-time. Former working class whites move to suburbs to secure home equity + college for kids during white flight. Anxiety amid de-industrialization for them, feedbacking with existing racist attitudes, were central to Nixon/Reagan homeowner coalition.

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In a world where MAGA voters are industrial/construction etc working class and aspire same for their children, this policy package/coalition might work. Problem is that there are few such jobs left, and high propensity MAGA types are (or for kids aspiring) marginal tech skilled

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Stolper-Samuelson type logic but with intra-labor differentiation: Ends vs Middle. Might even have positive consumption/growth effects for not in tech. Not a problem too for elite competitively skilled. Problem: class positions are often aspirational and inter-generational.

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Shifting immigration policy to massively restrict/remove immigrants with less technical skills, while massively opening up immigration from those with more technical skills, should *in theory* bind technical hiring capital owners and less tech skilled (domestic citizen) labor.

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What we're seeing in the intra-MAGA coalition brouhaha (besides the surface ethno-racial animus), is the the top of a self-perceived "ends against the middle" coalition trying to assert itself and realizing that its coalition-mates are actually among the insecure middle (thread)

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