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Network Strategies of Secondary States in the Asia-Pacific: Evidence from Joint Military Exercises, 1970–2024
How do secondary states in the Asia-Pacific enhance their security and strategic autonomy in a networked strategic environment? Conventional studies of balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging often adopt linear frameworks that position secondary states along a spectrum of alignment—whether with the United States, China, or somewhere in between. Yet such approaches overlook how secondary states manage networked interdependence—conditions that both enable and constrain their security and autonomy—by abstracting them from the broader relational structures in which they are embedded. Drawing on the network power perspective, I argue that secondary states actively cultivate and manage security ties to improve their positional standing within regional cooperation networks to reduce vulnerability to coercion and expand relational leverage and access to information and resources. The study identifies 3 key network strategies: (1) vertical diversification with great powers, (2) horizontal diversification with peer secondary states, and (3) bridging disconnected or weakly connected states. Using a unique dataset of Asia-Pacific joint military exercises (JMEs) from 1970 to 2024, constructed for this study and analyzed through network analysis and descriptive statistics, the findings show that over the past 2 decades, U.S. allies and partners—including those with maritime disputes with China—have expanded JMEs with Beijing while maintaining cooperation with Washington and regional peers. These patterns reveal that secondary states strive to move away from the network's periphery and a shift from a hub-and-spokes system to a more decentralized, networked regional security architecture characterized by reduced structural asymmetry.
