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Christian Mott

@cjmott.bsky.social
1K followers 1.4K following 2.3K posts

Studying punishment, criminal law, moral psychology, & experimental jurisprudence. christianmott.com

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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 02/08/2026
One of the research scientists at OpenAI who announced the ten solutions this week said they had tried the Astra model on all the Millennium Prize problems without success, so far.
Xcancel pot from Noam Brown (@polynoamial) saying:

And yes we did try other major problems without success. Sadly no Millennium Prize problems (yet).

But also, we didn't spend a lot on each problem. It's possible to push test-time compute much further.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 30/06/2026
The latter.
First paragraph of Kavanaugh's concurrence in the judgment in Trump v. Barbara.

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part.
Executive Order No. 14160 establishes new exceptions to
birthright citizenship for children born to foreign citizens
unlawfully or temporarily in the country. 90 Fed. Reg. 8449
(2025). The Court today holds that the Order violates the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. I respectfully
disagree with the Court’s constitutional holding. In my
view, the Executive Order does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. But the Order does contravene a federal
statute, 8 U. S. C. §1401(a). Congress could—consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment—amend §1401(a) or
otherwise enact new legislation establishing exceptions to
birthright citizenship for children born to foreign citizens
unlawfully or temporarily in the country. But Congress has
not yet done so.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 17/06/2026
Did he get Hormuz? Isn't Iran committing to "no charge" for passage through the strait for just 60 days? Or do you read the agreement to act "in line with international law" as implying a commitment to free passage going forward?
Text of paragraph 5 of the Iran-US MOU with the starred text highlighted:

"Upon the signing of this M.O.U., the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its **best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa.** The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz."
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 17/06/2026
What do you think is going on here?
Paragraph 11 of the MOU text, as posted by CNN, with "excuse me" highlighted:

"11 — The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MOU. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during negotiations. Such funds, whether obtaining the original account or transfer, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designed by the Central Bank, excuse me, ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorizations accordingly."
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 05/06/2026
Got an 82-0 today with four active players (and Kareem)!
82-0 roster of Josh Giddey, James Harden, Giannis Antetokounmpo, Domanatas Sabonis, and kareem Abdul-Jabbar.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 03/06/2026
My only 82-0 so far...
82-0.com roster projected to go 82-0:
PG: Oscar Robertson (SAC, 1960s)
SG: Clem Haskins (CHI, 1970s)
SF: Luka Doncic (LAL, 2020s)
PF: Elvin Hayes (HOU, 1970s)
C: Alonzo Mourning (CHA, 1990s)
010
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 30/05/2026
Now I want to know what happens when you put humans with and without spleens in a dark room and ask them to guess which way is north.
Passage from the Science paper linked in the parent post.

"We previously reported that splenic red pulp macrophages in mice and humans are intrinsically superparamagnetic (25). This is due to their function of degrading damaged or aged erythrocytes, which results in the liberation of iron from hemoglobin; this iron is stored within these macrophages as ferritin, a protein complex that sequesters iron in nontoxic form (26, 27)."
010
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 23/05/2026
And any Treasury official who "directly or indirectly [was] concerned or interested in carrying on the business of trade or commerce" committed a "high misdemeanor," punished by a permanent bar on "holding any office under the United States." There was even a bounty for anyone who reported it!
Text of the eighth section of the Act of September 2, 1789, that created the Treasury Department:

And be it further enacted. That no person appointed to any office instituted by this act shall directly or indirectly be concerned or interested in carrying on the business of trade or commerce, or be owner in whole or in part of any sea-vessel, or purchase by himself or another in trust for him any public lands or other public property, or be concerned in the purchase or disposal of any public securities of any State or of the United States, or take or apply to his own use any emolument or gain for negotiating any business in the said Department other than what shall be allowed by law; and if any person shall offend against any of the prohibitions of this act ie shall be deemed guilty of thigh misdemeanor and forfeit to the United States the penalty of $3,000, and shall upon conviction be removed from office and forever thereafter incapable of holding any office under the United States: Provided. That if any other person than a public prosecutor shall give information of any such offense upon which a prosecution and conviction shall be had one half the aforesaid penalty of $3,000, when recovered, shall be for the use of the person giving such information.
020
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 23/05/2026
If anyone wants a sense of how much less serious the US is about punishing public corruption now than it was in the past, the February 20, 1792 law creating the Post Office made any postal worker who fraudulently received *incorrect postage* "incapable of holding any office under the United States."
Section 11 of the February 20, 1792, Act to establish the Post Office and Post Roads within the United States.

"Sec. 11. And be it further enacted, That, if any Deputy Postmaster, or other person authorized by the Postmaster General, to receive the postages of letters, shall fraudulently demand or receive any... [continued in next image]rate of postage, or any gratuity or reward, other than is provided by this act for the postage of letters or packets, on conviction thereof, he shall forfeit for every such offence, one hundred dollars, and shall be rendered incapable of holding any office under the United States.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 23/05/2026
The text in this original statute differs somewhat from the revised text in the 1874 Revised Statutes. E.g., the original language makes it more clear that the disqualification is not automatic but follows only after a conviction.
Secs. 2 and 3 of the Act of July 17, 1862, "An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for other Purposes.":

Sec. 2: Sec . 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall hereafter incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid or comfort thereto, or shall engage in, or give aid and comfort to, any such existing rebellion or insurrection, and be convicted thereof, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by the liberation of all his slaves, if any he have; or by both of said punishments, at the discretion of the court.

Sec . 3. And be it further enacted, That every person guilty of either of the offences described in this act shall be forever incapable and disqualified to hold any office under the United States.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 23/05/2026
Enacted in 1862, per the 1874 Revised Statutes (which is where the screenshot below is from). Trying to find the full text of the act of July 17, 1862.
Prohibition on inciting etc. rebellions or insurrections appearing at sec. 5334 of the 1874 Revised Statutes. Cites an Act of July 17, 1862 as its source.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 21/05/2026
Testimony on PL 87-187 from a DOJ representative strongly corroborates this possibility: Settlements in federal court were entered as judgments; "compromise settlements" were for places DOJ didn't want to concede jurisdiction. Transcript excerpts from the 1960 House Judiciary hearing attached.
Excerpt from the testimony of George S. Leonard, first assistant of DOJ Civil Division, before the House Judiciary Committee on June 21, 1960, on questioning by Cyril Brickfield, committee counsel.

Mr. Brickfield: I have just one question on the compromise subject, Mr. Leonard, in this bill: You are just authorized to make a settlement in the amount of $100,000, is that correct --

Mr. Leonard: Oh no -- we are make comprimises [sic] now, in the millions, sir.

Mr. Brickfield: But if you do that you have to come to Congress for a special Act, do you now?

Mr. Leonard: No -- no. Not at all.

Mr. [Ronald V.] Libenati: No.

Mr. Leonard: As a matter of fact I have a tort settlement on my desk for well over---

Mr. Brickfield: No, I am not talking about tort settlements; I am talking about this, not the Federal Tort Claims Act--

Mr. Leonard: You see, it is entered as a compromise consent judgment--

Mr. Brickfield: All right. It is entered as a judgment.


Mr. Leonard: And then it is handled by means of the Deficiency Appropriation Bill procedure; in fifty years, there has never been any denial of payment of a judgment--

Mr. Brickfield: Well I noticed in this here that it says "compromise settlement."

Mr. Leonard: Well, you see we can't enter a consent judgment -- that would be a concession of the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Mr. [Jack] Brooks: That's right. This is the basic legislation -- he doesn't concede their jurisdiction.

Mr. Leonard: You could authorize consent to another jurisdiction but you see we would be encouraging thousands of additional cases once we did anything that departed from this procedure.

Mr. Brooks: That's it. They would be filing thousands of similar cases --

Mr. Brickfield: Yes.

Mr. Brooks: -- if they entered judgment in a foreign court; it has to be done this way with the deficiency appropriation.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 21/05/2026
Another possibility is that federal district courts would reliably enter judgment upon request in cases the federal government settled, so payment of those settlements was authorized by the first paragraph of 2414 prior to the 1961 amendment. (Prior language attached.)
The 1948 text of 28 USC 2414:

Payment of final judgments rendered by a district court against the
United States shall be made on settlements by the General Accounting
Office.

Whenever the Attorney General determines that no appeal shall be
taken from a judgment against the United States or that no further review will be sought from a decision affirming the same, he shall so certify and the judgment shall be deemed final.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 21/05/2026
The last paragraph of 2414 was added by PL 87-187 in 1961. The House and Senate Reports contain a letter from AG RFK, the relevant paragraphs of which suggest that this new paragraph was primarily added to allow payment of settlements in cases from foreign and state courts. (See excerpt attached.)
Excerpt from House Report No. 428, 87th Congress, 1st Sess., p. 3.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 19/05/2026
There's some tension between that paragraph and the highlighted portion of the paragraph below. I think it means that Trump can still get money from the Fund. Do you read it differently?
Paragraph III.B of the Trump settlement with highlighting on the second clause of the first sentence:

In exchange for the relief provided in this Settlement Agreement, and except as provided herein (e.g., the claims process described below), Plaintiffs hereby RELEASE, WAIVE, ACQUIT, and FOREVER DISCHARGE Defendants and the United States from, and are
hereby FOREVER BARRED and PRECLUDED from prosecuting or pursuing, any and all claims, charges, counterclaims, causes of action, appeals, or requests for any relief, including injunctive, monetary, damages, tax payments, debt relief, costs, attorney's fees, expenses, and/or interest, that-as of the Effective Date-have been or could have been asserted by Plaintiffs in the Case or the Pending Agency Claims, by reason of, with respect to, in connection with, or which arise out of, matters in the Case or the Pending Agency Claims.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 29/04/2026
Here the Court says that if people of a certain race mostly choose to affiliate with one party -- e.g., because that party has a stronger commitment to racial equality -- a court must ignore that fact when deciding whether a gerrymander affects their ability to elect candidates of their choice.
Passage from slip op. 30 of Callais:

2. Second and Third Gingles Preconditions

To satisfy the second and third preconditions—politically
cohesive voting by the minority and racial-bloc voting by
the majority—the plaintiffs must provide an analysis that
controls for party affiliation. In other words, they must
show that voters engage in racial bloc voting that cannot be
explained by partisan affiliation. This is, once again, critical for “disentangl[ing] race and politics.” Alexander, 602
U. S., at 6.

The facts of Gingles afford a good example of how a §2
plaintiff can properly meet these preconditions. There, as
discussed, black and white voters had dramatically different voting patterns within the Democratic party. 478 U. S.,
at 59. This type of intra-party racial-bloc voting pattern
helps to demonstrate that the minority plaintiffs have “less
opportunity” than their majority counterparts because of
race, not just because of partisan affiliation. 52 U. S. C.
§10301(b). By contrast, simply pointing to inter-party racial polarization proves nothing, because “‘a jurisdiction
may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering,
even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats happen
to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious
of that fact.’” Alexander, 602 U. S., at 9 (quoting Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541, 551 (1999)).
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 22/02/2026
@dividedargument.bsky.social was discussing the source of the phrase "no, no, a thousand times no," which appears in footnote 6 of the Chief's opinion in Learning Resources. One potential source is Flaubert's Madame Bovary, published in 1856. See the last line of part II, chapter 12.
The top of page 276 of the Folio Classique edition of Madame Bovary. The last paragraph reads:

-- Et, d'ailleurs, les embarras, la dépense... Ah! non, non, mille fois non! cela eût été trop bête!
141
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 30/01/2026
This reporting is quite disturbing. If it's true, it is easy to imagine how any strikes could spiral into a boots-on-the-ground invasion.
Text from the Dropsite article: 

In a recent interview, Dr. Foad Izadi, a professor at the University of Tehran, told Drop Site that in the past “a number of high-ranking military officials … made the decision to inform the United States when they were attacking the U.S. bases.”

“The idea was basically trying to ride out the Trump administration, not to confront him in a serious manner, respond to him, but respond in a very limited style so they don’t start a huge war with the United States,” he said. “This was their decision. And they were killed in June,” during the 12-day bombing campaign unleashed against Iran by the U.S. and Israel.

Izadi said that the new leadership of the military in Iran has determined that the previous policy failed to deter U.S. and Israeli aggression. “The number that I hear is the goal is to get at least 500 American soldiers. The casualties that they need to have if Iran is attacked again is at least 500,” Izadi said. “I think the Iranian government, the Iranian military has decided to respond quite harshly this time because you cannot have a country when that country is threatened to be attacked militarily every other week.”
272
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 27/01/2026
There's also a statute that allows civil actions against any person for violations of rights secured by the federal constitution, "whether or not acting under color of law." Could be a test case for the view that the FTCA exception for constitutional violations isn't limited to Bivens actions.
Text of sec. 4682 of the Maine Civil Rights Act:

Interference with rights; private actions.  A person whose exercise or enjoyment of the rights secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States or of the rights secured by the Constitution of Maine or the laws of the State has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, may institute and prosecute in that person's own name and on that person's own behalf a civil action for legal or equitable relief whenever any person, whether or not acting under color of law:  
A. Violates section 4684‑B; or   [PL 2023, c. 287, §2 (NEW).]
B. Intentionally interferes or attempts to intentionally interfere with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of those secured rights by:  
(1) Physical force or violence against a person;  
(2) Damage or destruction of property or trespass on property;  
(3) Threatening physical force or violence against a person;  
(4) Threatening damage or destruction of property or trespass on property; or  
(5) Engaging in any conduct that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress or to fear death or bodily injury to that person or to a close relation. For purposes of this subparagraph, "close relation" and "emotional distress" have the same meanings as in Title 17‑A, section 210‑A, subsection 2, paragraph B and paragraph D, respectively.
260
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 25/01/2026
Would be interested to read some more reporting about this part of the declaration.
Paragraphs 15-17 of a declaration by an unnamed witness to the murder of Alex Pretti:

15. The video I recorded of what happened accurately depicts the events leading up to the agents shooting [Pretti] and several minutes afterwards. The video is attached as Exhibit I.
16. I have read the statement from DHS about what happened and it is wrong. The man did not approach the agents with a gun. He approached them with a camera. He was just trying to help a woman get up and they took him to the ground.
17. I feel afraid. Only hours have passed since they shot a man right in front [of] me and I don't feel like I can go home because I heard agents were looking for me. I don't know what the agents will do when they find me. I do know that they're not telling the truth about what happened. I've heard that other witnesses might have been arrested and taken to the Whipple Building.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 14/01/2026
Created the below in ggplot2, just using geom_line and geom_point, after reshaping long using pivot_longer, so each row is id on person#-stint#. Happy to send code if helpful.
Example graph
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 19/12/2025
Directly violates Epstein Files Transparency Act, Section 2(b).
Text of Epstein Files Transparency Act Section 2(b)-(c):

(b) Prohibited Grounds for Withholding.—
(1) No record shall be withheld, delayed, or redacted on the basis of embarrassment, reputational harm, or political sensitivity, including to any government official, public figure, or foreign dignitary.

(c) Permitted Withholdings.—
(1) The Attorney general may withhold or redact the segregable portions of records that—
(A) contain personally identifiable information of victims or victims’ personal and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(B) depict or contain child sexual abuse materials (CSAM) as defined under 18 U.S.C. 2256 and prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 2252–2252A;
(C) would jeopardize an active federal investigation or ongoing prosecution, provided that such withholding is narrowly tailored and temporary;
(D) depict or contain images of death, physical abuse, or injury of any person; or
(E) contain information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.
(2) All redactions must be accompanied by a written justification published in the Federal Register and submitted to Congress.
(3) To the extent that any covered information would otherwise be redacted or withheld as classified information under this section, the Attorney General shall declassify that classified information to the maximum extent possible.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 18/12/2025
Going back to 2017 in that data, here are some graphs. First is the number of 1Ls who identify as Black by school by year. In this data, there is a clear drop at two schools (Harvard and Georgetown) in 2024. Second is overall percentage of Black 1Ls at all 14 schools over this time frame.
Graph of number of Black 1Ls by school by year for 14 schools Prof. Kerr tabulated. There is a noticeable drop in the number at Harvard and Georgetown in 2024.Graph of the percentage of 1Ls who are Black at the 14 schools Prof. Kerr identified from 2017 to 2025. Shows an upward trend until 2023 then a sharp drop.
210
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 08/09/2025
Per this February 2020 NYT story on signed Trump memorabilia, Trump has two different signatures.
NYT Excerpt from February 2020 story:

"Steve Grad, principal authenticator for Beckett, keeps a file of Mr. Trump’s signature going back to the 1980s for comparison. He said that Mr. Trump had two: one that resembles 'a seismogram reading after an earthquake,' and another that is more legible."
46910
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 06/08/2025
Probably the guidance in the image, which appears at the linked BOP document at p. 51 of the pdf: www.bop.gov/policy/progs... Maxwell's offenses of conviction fall into category (6), per this: www.bop.gov/policy/progs... Maxwell is now in a Minimum security facility, which is lower than Low.
BOP guidance on Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification, passage from p. 51.

Sex Offender. A male or female inmate whose behavior
in the current term of confinement or prior history
includes one or more of the following elements will be
housed in at least a Low security level institution,
unless the PSF has been waived. A conviction is not
required for application of this PSF if the
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), or other
official documentation, clearly indicates the
following behavior occurred in the current term of
confinement or prior criminal history. If the case was
dismissed or nolle prosequi, application of this PSF
cannot be entered.
120
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 30/07/2025
Seems like JD Vance should have some words with John Roberts.
Passage from Rucho v. Common Cause, slip op. at 16:

Partisan gerrymandering claims invariably sound in a desire for proportional representation. As Justice O’Connor put it, such claims are based on “a conviction that the greater the departure from proportionality, the more suspect an apportionment plan becomes.” Ibid. “Our cases, however, clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be.” Id., at 130 (plurality opinion). See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 75–76 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representation
as an imperative of political organization.”).
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 26/07/2025
Couldn't this fall into the the newly passed double jeopardy exception at CPL 40.51(4) or (5)? (Seems like it would depend on whether there's potential civil or criminal liability for anything Maxwell knows, which seems possible given the possibility of future statute of limitations extension laws.)
CPL 40.51 says that double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecution of someone federally convicted if that person was pardoned and

4. the president who granted such reprieve, pardon or other form of
clemency to such person (a) was thereby aided in avoiding potential
prosecution or conviction; (b) knowingly obtained a benefit from such
offense; or (c) knowingly obtained a tangible, material benefit from or
on behalf of such person; or

5. such person possessed or possesses information material to the
determination of any criminal or civil investigation, enforcement action
or prosecution of the president granting such reprieve, pardon or other
form of clemency, or of one or more persons described in subdivision
one, two or three of this section.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 27/06/2025
Take also this argument. SCOTUS only feels "forced" to resolve those "significant and difficult" questions of law on the shadow docket because it refuses to apply its normal stay factors to government stay petitions. If they did, they wouldn't always need to reach the merits.
Passage from pp. 20-21 of the majority opinion in Trump v. CASA:

"When a district court issues a universal injunction, thereby halting the enforcement of federal policy the Government says that it has little recourse but to proceed to the court of appeals for an emergency stay. The loser int he court of appeals will then seek a stay from this Court. This process forces courts to resolve significant and difficult questions of law on a highly expedited basis and without full briefing." (citations omitted)
100
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 21/06/2025
If what Matt says is true, it will just make people on the left want to make every union more like @uaw.org.
UAW Region 9A graphic reading:

Fill out your ballot
1. Zohran Mamdani
2. Brad Lander
3. Zellnor Myrie
4. Adrienne Adams
5. Michael Blake

and 

Don't rank Cuomo!
010
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 20/06/2025
First, the court says the "through the governor" language could not require the governor's consent because another section of title 10 requires the governor's consent more explicitly. The problem? 10 USC 12301 was enacted in 1952. The "through to governor" language was enacted in 1908.
Section from p. 32 of the Ninth Circuit order in Newsom v. Trump:

"First, the text of § 12406 does not give governors any veto power over the President’s federalization decision. The omission of an express consent requirement is telling, as Congress provided governors with veto power in another section of Title 10. See 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) ('However, a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor or other appropriate authority of the State concerned.' (emphasis added))."
185
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 16/06/2025
The opinion ends with this puzzling paragraph, which appears to argue that religious discrimination falls outside Title VI entirely... and infers that the President must therefore have some unspecified other authority, outside Title VI, to withdraw funding from schools for religious discrimination.
Passage from AAUP v. DOJ, ECF 148 at 29-30.

"[A]ll of Plaintiffs' arguments that Defendants violated the APA (and the separation of powers) by failing to comply with procedural requirements for cutting funding pursuant to Title VI simply presuppose that Title VI is the exclusive vehicle by which the Executive Branch may withdraw financial support for an institution that allows religious discrimination.

"The Court urges Plaintiffs, and the amici who decry Defendants' alleged failure to follow Title VI to the letter, to review the text of that statute. Title VI does not mention religion. As such, it strikes the Court as unlikely that Title VI is the sole and exclusive 'legal tool[]' available to a President who instructs executive agencies to prioritize 'combat[ting] anti-Semitism . . . on university and college campuses.'" (citations omitted)
100
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 16/06/2025
Surprisingly, the injury-in-fact analysis is even worse. This paragraph finds that all the grant terminations at Columbia can be fully covered by Columbia's endowment, private donations, and tuition payments, despite there being no evidence that's true and plenty of evidence to the contrary.
Passage from p. 24 of AAUP v. DOJ, ECF 148 at 24-25:

"Turning to representational standing, Plaintiffs fail to establish that any injuries their members may have suffered are fairly traceable to Defendants. As noted above, the Court does find that some of Plaintiffs [sic] members used federal grants to Columbia for their academic work. The loss of professional opportunities or income may certainly constitute an injury in some cases. However, here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that it makes a difference to their members whether the funding for their research and salaries comes from American taxpayers, non-party Columbia's multi-billion-dollar endowment, the largess of Columbia's donors, or the eye-popping tuition bills paid by Columbia students, including the Jewish students who apparently paid for the privilege of being threatened with violence on their way to class." (citations omitted)
320
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 14/06/2025
Unfortunately, now I can't think about it without also thinking about Justice Gorsuch's considerably less elegant rewrite in 303 Creative.
Passage from Justice Gorsuch's opinion for the Court in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 21-476, slip op. at 7 (June 30, 2023):

"For all these reasons '[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,' West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), it is the principle that the government may not interfere with 'an uninhibited marketplace of ideas,' McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014)."
010
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 11/06/2025
Instead, DOJ argues that its position follows from the plain meaning of "though." DOJ also makes a policy argument: It would have been bad if 10 USC 12406 allowed a governor to veto a President's order because then Governor Faubus could have vetoed President Eisenhower's order during Little Rock.
Passage from p. 18 of DOJ's filing.

In short, Section 12406 affords no veto to Governor Newsom over the President's decision to call forth the guard, just as it afforded no veto to Governor Faubus when President Eisenhower last invoked the predecessor to Section 12406 to ensure that the enforcement of federal law was not obstructed.
200
Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 11/06/2025
In 1911, the Army Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Wood, made the same point, arguing that the 1903 and 1908 Militia Acts had restricted the President's power over the militia (which he thought was bad). There may be arguments why this historical interpretation was wrong; DOJ doesn't offer any.
Excerpt from a hearing transcript of the Committee on Militia, House of Representatives, February 9, 1911, pp. 12-13.

Mr. LLOYD. What do you think of the constitutional authority of Congress passing a law allowing the War Department to call these men in the service directly from the militia without the authority of the governor of the State, without calling on the governor of the State first?

Gen. WOOD. The President will call on the governor for troops, but in case the governor fails to respond he can then call upon the troops themselves. They must come. They can not evade the call on the ground that it has not come through the governor of the State, or on any other ground. The present militia law, known as the "Dick law," provides that the militia can only be called by a call issued through the governor of the State. This seems to be a dangerous limitation of the powers of the Chief Executive, and might lead to embarrassment. The old militia law was better: The President could call every man of arms-bearing age; he could call everybody who was sound and within the age limit, who was not exempted by law.

The CHAIRMAN. Without reference to what the governor would do?

Gen. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. LLOYD. He did not call you as a militiaman, though did he?

Gen. WOOD. He was called as part of the militia.

Capt. HAGOOD. Yes: He had the right to call everybody directly up to the time of the Dick law in 1903. Up to that time there was no provision as to calling the governor: it was only a matter of courtesy that that was done.

Gen. WOOD. We now have no direct way of reaching the men, and the present conditions would lead to confusion. We know that in New England and other States farther south, on account of wars bearing unpopular, governors have not always responded when calls were made by the President....Excerpt from the Congressional Record, February 28, 1911, p. 3701. Passage from a memorandum submitted by Maj. Gen. Wood, the Chief of Staff of the Army.

"The militia organized under the old laws and the National Guard of today, however, are very different; so different, in fact, that it may not be considered altogether fair to class them together. But the improvement goes only so far as the defects in the old laws have been remedied, and the two are identically the same so far as the defects in the old laws have not been remedied. 

"The principal defects in the old militia laws were as follows:

"1. Divided responsibility between the Federal Government and the States: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas have, through their governors, refused to turn out the militia when called upon by the President to do so. Other States have greatly interfered with the Federal Government in its use of militia either by raising objections and obstacles or by forcing the service of troops not desired.

"The modern existing law instead of remedying this defect has intensified it. The old law did not require the President to consult the governors with reference to turning out the militia. He could issue the call direct. As a matter of courtesy, the call was made through the governors. But now it is required by law. There is no way for the Federal Government to coerce the governors, and if any governor should refuse or fail to transmit it to the militia of his State it is easy to see that the whole matter could be thrown into confusion...."
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 11/06/2025
During the House debate over the 1908 Militia Act, an opponent of the bill, Rep. Parker, argued against the bill, in part, on the grounds that the "through the governor" language *would* give the governor a veto over a presidential order to a state militia.
Excerpt from the May 25, 1908 Congressional Record, p. 6942:

Part of a statement from Representative Parker, of New Jersey:

"Now, Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on the Militia years ago we refused to bring up that law for revision for fear that by some mistake or amendment this power should be taken away from the President.

"This bill, strange to say, without intending to do so, does take away that power; for in the first section, after saying that all males of a certain age belong to the militia, the bill divides them into two classes, the organized militia and the reserve militia, and with a proviso that the provisions of this act shall apply only to the militia organized as a land force. As a result the subsequent section 4, in which the authority for calling out the militia is reenacted, only applies to the organized militia, and the power of the President over every able-bodied citizen is taken away by this act. I consider that to be a matter that goes back to all questions of finance.

"The old law of 1795 gave the President direct authority over every citizen of this land, and in this bill, in the section which provides that in case of rebellion or invasion, or threatened invasion, the President may issue a call, it is not provided that he may call out every able-bodied man, through their officers, but it provides that he may issue his orders for that purpose through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may deem proper. Why, we remember a time, at the beginning of the civil war, when some of the governors did not desire to have the militia called out, but we got our militia from West Virginia, and eastern Tennessee and Kentucky by the orders of the President direct."
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 11/06/2025
10 USC 12406 is a recodification of 10 USC secs. 3500 (Army NG) and 8500 (Air NG), which were themselves codifications of the 1903 Militia Act (the "Dick Act"), as amended by the 1908 Militia Act. The 1908 Militia Act added the "through the governor" language to this statute.
1908 Militia Act text from 35 Stat. 400:

"Sec. 3. That section four of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

'Sec. 4. That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, or the President is unable with the regular forces at his command to execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth such number of the militia of the State or of the States or Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders for that purpose, through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may think proper."
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 11/06/2025
DOJ has filed its opposition to Newsom's motion for a TRO in the National Guard case. They argue that the "through the governor" language in 10 USC 12406 does not allow the governor to veto a President's order to a state NG. Historical evidence about the law's original meaning trends the other way.
Passage from p. 17 of DOJ's opposition to the motion for a TRO in Newsom v. Trump.

3. Section 12406 does not require a governor's consent or input.

Defendants also acted lawfully in the processes they used to federalize Guardsmen. Section 12406's first sentence establishes the President's unilateral authority to federalize Guardsmen. Again, it reads: "[T]he President may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State . . . ." The next sentence adds that "[o]rders for these purposes shall be issued through the governors of the States." 10 U.S.C. sec. 12406. The statute is thus clear that the orders are issued by the President, and they are conveyed through State officials. Nothing in the statute entitles a Governor to veto or impede a valid presidential order.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 11/06/2025
Maj. Gen. Wood submitted a memo, in connection with debate over a 1911 bill, that made similar points about his understanding of the role of the governor under the Dick law (that is, the 1903 Militia Act as amended by the 1908 Militia Act). Suggests the governor's role is not merely "ministerial."
Excerpt from the Congressional Record, February 28, 1911, p. 3701. Passage from a memorandum submitted by Maj. Gen. Dick, the Chief of Staff of the Army.

"The militia organized under the old laws and the National Guard of today, however, are very different; so different, in fact, that it may not be considered altogether fair to class them together. But the improvement goes only so far as the defects in the old laws have been remedied, and the two are identically the same so far as the defects in the old laws have not been remedied. 

"The principal defects in the old militia laws were as follows:

"1. Divided responsibility between the Federal Government and the States: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas have, through their governors, refused to turn out the militia when called upon by the President to do so. Other States have greatly interfered with the Federal Government in its use of militia either by raising objections and obstacles or by forcing hte service of troops not desired.

"The modern existing law instead of remedying this defect has intensified it. The old law did not require the President to consult the governors with reference to turning out the militia. He could issue the call direct. As a matter of courtesy, the call was made through the governors. But now it is required by law. There is no way for the Federal Government to coerce the governors, and if any governor should refuse or fail to transmit it to the militia of his State it is easy to see that the whole matter could be thrown into confusion...."
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 11/06/2025
Here's some interesting subsequent history, from a 1911 hearing by the House Committee on Militia, in which Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, at the time the Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the interpretation that the 1908 Act required the cooperation of the governor to call up the militia.
Excerpt from a hearing transcript of the Committee on Militia, House of Representatives, February 9, 1911, pp. 12-13.

Mr. LLOYD. What do you think of the constitutional authority of Congress passing a law allowing the War Department to call these men in the service directly from the militia without the authority of the governor of the State, without calling on the governor of the State first?

Gen. WOOD. The President will call on the governor for troops, but in case the governor fails to respond he can then call upon the troops themselves. They must come. They can not evade the call on the ground that it has not come through the governor of the State, or on any other ground. The present militia law, known as the "Dick law," provides that the militia can only be called by a call issued through the governor of the State. This seems to be a dangerous limitation of the powers of the Chief Executive, and might lead to embarrassment. The old militia law was better: The President could call every man of arms-bearing age; he could call everybody who was sound and within the age limit, who was not exempted by law.

The CHAIRMAN. Without reference to what the governor would do?

Gen. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. LLOYD. He did not call you as a militiaman, though did he?

Gen. WOOD. He was called as part of the militia.

Capt. HAGOOD. Yes: He had the right to call everybody directly up to the time of the Dick law in 1903. Up to that time there was no provision as to calling the governor: it was only a matter of courtesy that that was done.

Gen. WOOD. We now have no direct way of reaching the men, and the present conditions would lead to confusion. We know that in New England and other States farther south, on account of wars bearing unpopular, governors have not always responded when calls were made by the President....Excerpt from a hearing transcript of the Committee on Militia, House of Representatives, February 9, 1911, p. 14.

Mr. LLOYD. That is the point I make, that the militia must be called through the governor. Therefore, I question the propriety of putting in this law that the War Department may call them independent of the governor.

Capt. HAGOOD. The old act of 1795, which stood through all the intermediate wars, which authorized the President to make the call direct to any officer or enlisted man of the militia, was specifically repealed by the Dick law, and it was prescribed the call must be made through the governor. During the War of 1812, during the Mexican War, and during the Civil War the call could be made direct, and where the governors of some States--for instance, Pennsylvania--refused to issue the call, the question was brought up and went through the courts. The members of the militia of the State of Pennsylvania were court-martialed, and it was held by the courts that they could be court-martialed. But the Dick law has repealed that and makes it go through the governor.
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 09/06/2025
One person (after Rep. Parker) who read this statute to require that presidential orders to a state NG go via the governor, who could veto, is Sen. Herman Talmadge, who in 1958 relied on this understanding to argue that this statute could not have allowed Eisenhower's use of the NG in Little Rock.
Excerpt from the Congressional Record, August 18, 1958, p. 18230:

"Even in cases where the President is within his authority to call forth the militia to enforce the 'laws of the United States,' the law expressly provides that orders federalizing National Guard units 'shall be issued through the governors of the States.'

"This is made plain in section 3500 of title 10 of the United States Code [the prior codification of 10 USC 12406], from which I quote: [Quoting the language of 10 USC 3500, which is materially identical to 10 USC 12406].

"None of the three conditions set forth in this section was met in the Little Rock case. There was no danger of invasion, there was no rebellion or danger of rebellion."Excerpt from the Congressional Record, August 18, 1958, p. 18231:

"There was no pretense that the President was unable to execute the laws of the United States 'with the regular forces' of the Nation.

"And even those factors to the contrary notwithstanding, the orders bringing the National Guard of Arkansas into Federal service wer enot issued through the Governor of that State as is required by code section 3500 above stated.

"The President not only violated the provisions o that statute by his failure or refusal to act through the Governor of the State but he also violated another act of Congress which forbids the use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus."
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 08/06/2025
Though one of the bill's opponents, Mr. Parker, opposed it on the grounds it was taking away the President's power to command the militia directly. He assumed this new law would require the cooperation of a state's governor.
Excerpt from the May 25, 1908 Congressional Record, p. 6942:

Part of a statement from Representative Parker, of New Jersey:

"Now, Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on the Militia years ago we refused to bring up that law for revision for fear that by some mistake or amendment this power should be taken away from the President.

"This bill, strange to say, without intending to do so, does take away that power; for in the first section, after saying that all males of a certain age belong to the militia, the bill divides them into two classes, the organized militia and the reserve militia, and with a proviso that the provisions of this act shall apply only to the militia organized as a land force. As a result the subsequent section 4, in which the authority for calling out the militia is reenacted, only applies to the organized militia, and the power of the President over every able-bodied citizen is taken away by this act. I consider that to be a matter that goes back to all questions of finance.

"The old law of 1795 gave the President direct authority over every citizen of this land, and in this bill, in the section which provides that in case of rebellion or invasion, or threatened invasion, the President may issue a call, it is not provided that he may call out every able-bodied man, through their officers, but it provides that he may issue his orders for that purpose through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may deem proper. Why, we remember a time, at the beginning of the civil war, when some of the governors did not desire to have the militia called out, but we got our militia from West Virginia, and eastern Tennessee and Kentucky by the orders of the President direct."
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 08/06/2025
During the House debate after the Senate amendments (on May 25, 1908), a House supporter of the act argued that the President's authority over the militia under this bill was intended to match the (broad) constitutional grant. He misstates the constitutional text in a potentially revealing way.
Excerpt from p. 6943 of the Congressional Record for May 1908. The text reads:

"Mr. FLOYD. My time is so limited that I regret I can not. There is one other question, and that is the constitutional question. A great argument is made against this bill by gentlemen who claim it enlarges the power of the President. I want to express my views on that question. The Constitution, as I understand it, provides that the President of the United States, through the governors of the several States, in time of war may call out the militia of the different States to repeal invasion, suppress insurrection, or to execute the laws of the United States. It is not within the power of this committee, it is not within the power of Congress to tkae from or add to that constitutional provision. That is a provision of the Constitution of the United States and lodges that power in the President of the United States, and ti is not within our power to add to or take from it, and we do not undertake to do that and do not understand we are doing that by this provision of the bill. [Applause.]
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 08/06/2025
The passage providing that orders go through governors was specifically added by the Committee on Military Affairs. The Congressional Record on May 21, 1908 notes the amendment but doesn't say why it was added. We'll see if the Committee on Military Affairs report is available somewhere...
Passage from the Congressional Record for May 21, 1908, p. 6661:

Efficiency of the Militia.
Mr. HEMENWAY. I desire to call up the bill (S. 4316) to further amend the act entitled "An act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes," approved January 21, 1903.
There being no objection, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Military Affairs with amendments.
The VICE-PRESIDENT. The bill has been read. The amendments will be stated.
The first amendment of the Committe on Military Affairs was, on page 4, after line 15, to insert 'through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which..."
Continuation of passage from the Congressional Record for May 21, 1908, p. 6661:

State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, so as to read:

[here is the same text as in my prior post of Sec. 3 of the 1908 Militia Act]
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 08/06/2025
The relevant passage of the 1908 Militia Act appears in the attached screenshot.
1908 Militia Act text from 35 Stat. 400:

"Sec. 3. That section four of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

'Sec. 4. That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, or the President is unable with the regular forces at his command to execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth such number of the militia of the State or of the States or Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders for that purpose, through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may think proper."
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 06/06/2025
Not on Courtlistener yet, but here's the PACER entry. There's also a PI hearing scheduled for 6/16.
PACER docket entries from Harvard v. DHS. They read:

06/05/2025	59 	Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ORDER entered granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (KF) (Entered: 06/05/2025)

06/05/2025	60 	ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Hearing.Preliminary Injunction Hearing set for 6/16/2025 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 (In person only) before Judge Allison D. Burroughs. (KF) (Entered: 06/05/2025)
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 04/06/2025
by subjecting them to visa revocation, arrest, detention, deportation, or any other adverse immigration action. AAUP had to seek this order from the judge because the government wouldn't agree not to retaliate against witnesses.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Declaration of Noam Biale filed in AAUP v. Rubio. They read:

4. On June 3, 2025, we held a meet-and-confer call with Defendants in which we again raised the proposed Non-Retaliation Order. On that call, Defendants’ counsel advised that they could not agree to the proposed Non-Retaliation Order because their client agencies did not want to be bound by an agreement preventing them from taking action against individuals whose identities they did not know yet.

5. I clarified that the proposed Non-Retaliation Order was structured principally as an agreement not to take adverse actions against Plaintiffs’ witnesses because they were witnesses in this federal case, which we had not imagined would be difficult for the government to agree to. Defendants’ counsel reiterated that the agencies were “not comfortable” with such a proposal and advised us to “go ahead and ask the judge to rule on it.”
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 04/06/2025
Another element of this story that may or may not be relevant is that Columbia is currently undergoing an accreditation review. Unlike last time (in 2016), MSCHE staff recently requested several broad categories of supplemental information.
Screenshot from the MSCHE website listing for Columbia University.

Entry for May 16, 2025 under "Accreditation Actions": 

"Staff acted on behalf of the Commission to request a supplemental information report, due May 30, 2025, that provides additional information on Standard II: Ethics and Integrity; Standard IV: Support of the Student Experience; Standard VI: Planning, Resources, and Institutional Improvement; and Standard VII: Governance, Leadership, and Administration. To note that the evaluation visit has occurred and will be acted upon by the Commission at the June 2025 meeting."
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 21/05/2025
Reminds me of this question from June 2024. Not sure what is going on over at the Harvard Harris poll...
Page from Harris poll results in June 2024 to question: "Should Israel move forward with operations in Rafah to finish the war with Hamas, doing its best to avoid civilian casualties even though there will be casualties, or should it back off now and allow Hamas to continue running Gaza?"
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Christian Mott @cjmott.bsky.social · 02/05/2025
This is right. Trump v. United States made clear that the question whether a President's action falls within his "conclusive and preclusive" constitutional authority is independent of any Congressional enactment on the subject -- even one that specifically mentions the President.
Trump v. United States, pp. 8-9, "Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine, the President's actions on subjects within his 'conclusive and preclusive' constitutional authority. It follows that an Act of Congress -- either a specific one targeted at the President or a generally applicable one -- may not criminalize the President's actions within his exclusive constitutional power. Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution that examines such Presidential actions. We thus conclude that the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority."
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