iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Reposted by Casey McQuillan

Washington Center for Equitable Growth @equitablegrowth.bsky.social · 20/05/2026

New research from @caseymcquillan.bsky.social and Brendan Moore sheds light on the administrative, informational, and structural barriers that keep eligible workers from receiving unemployment insurance and explains how those gaps influence labor market dynamics.

equitablegrowth.org

Barriers to Benefits: Unemployment Insurance Take-Up and Labor Market Effects

Research finds that efforts to destigmatize unemployment insurance could increase program take-up among eligible workers at a cost-effective price.

001

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 24/04/2026

This is obviously wrong, but I'd like to point out that his example of going from $100 to $600 is also not a 600% increase

2322

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 22/04/2026

I’m excited to share that I’ll be joining the Economics Department at Stockholm University as an Assistant Professor, following a postdoc at Brown University’s Economics Department and Watson School!

061

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

Read the full paper here: static1.squarespace.com/static/5db66...

static1.squarespace.com

000

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

Lastly, we develop and estimate a job search model to quantify these frictions. We find that the letters reduce fixed learning costs by $584 (18%) while work-search requirements cost claimants ~$200/week but raise job offer arrival rates by 3%.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

Surprisingly, inducing more workers to claim UI did not prolong unemployment. If anything, it modestly improved re-employment. We argue this is bc work-search requirements screen out those unwilling to verify their search while accelerating job finding among those who comply.

110

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

010

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

The de-stigmatization message further increased take‑up, but primarily for high‑wage workers. In a separate survey, we show that this message successfully reframes UI as an earned benefit rather than a means-tested assistance program.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

The letters also increased rejection rates, though. We find that complier applicants have much higher rejection rates than Always Takers (68% vs 36%), largely because they do not meet work‑search requirements or fail to respond, rather than because of underlying eligibility.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

We find that the informational letters increased the application rate by 1.4pp (83%⬆️relative to control) and benefit receipt by 0.4pp (42%⬆️), with the largest effects concentrated among low-wage workers.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

All workers in the treatment group received a letter with generic information about the program, who qualifies, and how to apply. We also test two additional treatment arms that add language to reduce the stigma of claiming benefits or to set expectations about job‑finding.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

We construct our experimental sample by identifying "potential job losses" in near real time. These workers were stably employed in prior quarters, experienced a sudden drop in hours in the most recent quarter, and then received our letter ~5 weeks after that quarter ended.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

To do so, we implement a large-scale field experiment among 50,000 recently unemployed workers in WA State by mailing letters to potential claimants with information about UI benefits, and then tracking the impact on take-up and job search.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

Only about half of eligible US workers claim UI, leaving thousands on the table at a time when they need it most. This paper explores what keeps them from claiming, who responds when frictions are reduced, and how higher take-up may affect job search

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

Main Results: 1️⃣ Informational letters increased applications and benefit receipt, esp for low-wage workers 2️⃣ Higher rejection rates indicate reduced learning costs rather than improved beliefs about eligibility 3️⃣ Positive (but modest) effects of the letters on re-employment

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

I want to quickly note that this is Brendan's job market paper, and one of our three co-authored papers that explore the causes and consequences of incomplete UI take-up.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 17/03/2026

🚨🚨🚨 NEW WORKING PAPER 🚨🚨🚨 "Barriers to Benefits: Unemployment Insurance Take-Up and Labor Market Effects (with Brendan Moore) ➡️ We ran a large-scale field experiment among 50k likely eligible workers to study the role of information frictions in the incomplete take-up of UI

131

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 09/12/2025

A thread with more details here bsky.app/profile/case...

110

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 09/12/2025

Making the case for expanding UI eligibility to more workers, based on our recent working paper with @equitablegrowth.bsky.social

132

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

See below for the full paper, my website with more research, and my email for comments/questions! 📝: casey-mcquillan.github.io/files/McQuil... 💻: casey-mcquillan.github.io 📧: caseycm@princeton.edu

casey-mcquillan.github.io

010

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

One takeaway is that raising benefit levels is more expensive than you'd think, but the broader lesson is that incomplete and endogenous take-up is a first-order concern for the optimal design of social insurance.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

Also, recall our earlier paper estimated the MVPF for expanding UI access to low-income workers, which suggested this would be a much, much more cost-effective policy. bsky.app/profile/case...

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

Existing estimates of the MVPF don’t account for this take-up response, and so they overstate the cost-effectiveness of raising benefits. If this is the measure we use to decide where to put tax dollars, this difference meaningfully shifts policy priorities.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

Combining theory and empirics, we quantify the policy implications. Accounting for endogenous take-up: - Lowers the optimal benefit level by 27% ($633➡️$451) - Reduces the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) by 29 percent (0.90➡️0.66)

110

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

Optimal policy depends on total benefit payments, whether from higher take-up or longer claims. We already knew that the duration elasticity enters the optimal policy condition, but the insight from this paper is that the take-up elasticity belongs there as well

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

We develop a model with worker-specific hassle costs, which explains both incomplete take-up and why take-up rises with benefits. We then derive optimal policy in three cases: (1) no behavioral responses, (2) endogenous search only; and (3) endogenous search and take-up

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

As a benchmark, we consider what happens if we only look at the duration response: a 10% increase in weekly benefit extends avg claim duration by 1.6%. This means the take-up response drives more than two-thirds of the effect on benefit payments, tripling the fiscal externality.

110

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

Our results suggest that a 10% increase in weekly benefit would increase take-up by 4.7%, which drives a 6.2% increase in the number of benefit payments

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

To identify the causal effect, we use a regression kink design (RKD) that exploits non-linearities in the benefits schedule. The intuition is that a kink in benefits should create a kink in the outcome, and we can estimate the effect by comparing the size of these kinks.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

We construct a sample of likely-eligible workers using employer-employee matched data, and then match this sample with admin records of claims and benefit payments to determine whether if a worker received benefits and the duration of their claim.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

After a job separation, a worker needs to file an initial claim, and then a ``waiting week’’ claim that will not be paid out, and then another claim the following week that can result in payment. We track workers from their job separation through these steps.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

We typically think about UI in terms of an insurance-incentive tradeoff: more generous benefits better insure workers against job loss, but also reduce the incentive to find re-employment. But this overlooks that more generous UI may mean more workers take up in the first place!

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

When take-up is incomplete, it becomes a potential margin through which workers respond to policy. In fact, one-third of non-claimants cited either benefit levels or hassle costs as a reason for not taking up UI.

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

UI supports workers after they lose their job and while they look for re-employment. The standard models of UI assume perfect take-up and begin their analysis at benefit receipt. And this is despite the fact that only half of eligible workers claim benefits in the US!

110

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

Three main findings: 1️⃣ 10% increase in weekly benefit ➡️ 4.7% increase in take-up. 2️⃣ This take-up response triples the fiscal externality, versus when we only consider the duration response. 3️⃣ Endogenous take-up lowers the optimal benefit level by 29%.

110

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

🚨🚨🚨 MY JOB MARKET PAPER 🚨🚨🚨 "Incomplete and Endogenous Take-Up of Unemployment Insurance Benefits" (with Brendan Moore) ➡️ We study how the generosity of UI benefits affects take-up and the implications for optimal policy.

142

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

See below for the full paper, my website with even more research, and my email! 📝: casey-mcquillan.github.io/files/McQuil... 💻: casey-mcquillan.github.io 📧: caseycm@princeton.edu

casey-mcquillan.github.io

000

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

100

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

Also, recall our earlier paper estimated the MVPF for expanding UI access to low-income workers, which suggested this would be a much, much more cost-effective policy. Different policies may affect take-up very differently. bsky.app/profile/case...

100

Reposted by Casey McQuillan

Princeton Economics @princetonecon.bsky.social · 06/11/2025

Casey McQuillan’s job market paper studies how unemployment insurance (UI) generosity affects take-up and optimal policy design. esd.wa.gov/media/pdf/42...

Casey McQuillan: Incomplete and Endogenous Take-Up of Unemployment Insurance. Areas: Labor Economics and Public Finance. Letter Writers: Ilyana Kuziemko (advisor), Dave Lee (advisor), Owen Zidar.

165

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 15/08/2025

Another caveat: There are lots of workers in state and local government who were laid off as the direct result of DOGE cuts as well. I don't think people realize how much of the state and local government is actually federally funded

010

Reposted by Casey McQuillan

Nominal News (Pawel Langer) @nominalnews.com · 11/08/2025

Programs like unemployment insurance, are rarely mentioned as positive-sum (unlike, say trade). But research by Casey McQuillan (@caseymcquillan.bsky.social) and Brendan Moore shows how UI generates value by allowing job-seekers to find better job matches nominalnews.substack.com/p/unemployme...

nominalnews.substack.com

More than a Safety Net – Value Created by Unemployment Benefits

Welfare programs, like unemployment insurance, are rarely mentioned as policies that are positive-sum.

021

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 16/07/2025

Thanks Anna! I appreciate the kind words!

000

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 16/07/2025

The full paper can be found here: casey-mcquillan.github.io/files/McQuil...

casey-mcquillan.github.io

061

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 16/07/2025

Lastly, we use the Marginal Value of Public Funds (MVPF) framework to compare the value of expanding UI eligibility against raising benefit levels or extending benefit duration. We find lowering the eligibility threshold is the most cost-effective UI policy studied to date.

150

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 16/07/2025

Additionally, we show workers living near unemployment offices see larger gains from UI receipt. This suggests that access to re-employment services provided by these offices may explain why UI receipt led to a more productive job search.

131

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 16/07/2025

Three findings lead us to attribute the increases in hours/earnings to workers finding better jobs: (i) gains are driven by the next employer after job loss (ii) more stable employment (fewer employers overall) (iii) higher hourly wages

131

Casey McQuillan @caseymcquillan.bsky.social · 16/07/2025

When we look at earnings, we see a similar pattern. The effect on earnings is even more persistent in the quarters following job loss. UI recipients earn $~15k more than non-recipients over the two years following job loss. (50%⬆️)

151