iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 26/06/2026

According to the New Scientist, Ukraine conducted a test of autonomous lethal drones to target Russian soldiers in 2024. While the reporting should be taken with a pinch of salt, it highlights some LOAC questions that merit attention. Brief comments here: geopolemic.substack.com/p/autonomous...

geopolemic.substack.com

Autonomous Lethal Drones / Autonóm, halálos drónok

Testing the Law of Armed Conflict? / A fegyveres konfliktusok jogának határmezsgyéjén? (A. Sari)

121

Reposted by Aurel Sari

Mark Lattimer @mglattimer.bsky.social · 12/06/2026

“…industry is not bound to ensure that its products are compliant with the law of armed conflict. … This could present the Ministry of Defence with an unpalatable choice between redesigning these systems at considerable expense or deploying them at the risk of non-compliance.”

032

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 12/06/2026

Just published: 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐌𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐔𝐬𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐀𝐈 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐋𝐚𝐰 𝐨𝐟 𝐀𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐝 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐟𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐭: 𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐑𝐨𝐥𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐲? ⁣ Read the full paper here: doi.org/10.1080/1470....

doi.org

The military use of AI and the law of armed conflict: what role for government and industry?

The UK has committed itself to the responsible adoption of AI technologies for military use. While the Ministry of Defence has published detailed guidance on the ethical dimension of military AI, s...

032

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 22/04/2026

that’s exactly how I like my croissant, starbucks: toasted into oblivion 🙄

000

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 22/04/2026

That’s a scimitar, no? I thought you swing those things…

130

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 12/03/2026

Thanks Kevin, have seen Ken’s post, but not had a chance to read yet.

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 12/03/2026

Where? I’m reading the wrong blogs it seems (or perhaps the right ones?).

110

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 11/03/2026

I flesh this out a bit more here, p 237 onwards: academic.oup.com/jcsl/article...

academic.oup.com

000

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 11/03/2026

API and which are of an insufficiently discriminate nature, striking civilians and military objectives without distinction.

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 11/03/2026

Art 35(3) and Art 56 are usually mentioned. I think Art 57(2)(a)(ii) is on that list, because it requires weapons to be chosen that have a less harmful effect if doing so is feasible. Failure to do so amounts to an attack employing means that have effects which are not limited as required by

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 11/03/2026

I should have formulated my words more carefully: I don’t have any special insight into the facts, so I’m just relying on what is in the public domain. It may well be wrong and incomplete. On the law, Art 51(4)(c) doesn’t list what the limits “required by this Protocol” are. Proportionality,

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 11/03/2026

harm) and therefore, in my view, the customary equivalent of Art 51(4)(c) API (use of means the effects of which cannot be limited as required by API/custom). Still an indiscriminate attack, but for a different reason.

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 11/03/2026

is the cluster warhead. Cluster munitions are area weapons, designed to achieve lethal effects over a wider area. While the delivery may be precise, the lethal radius is too big. The rule implicated is the customary equivalent of Art 57(2)(a)(ii) API (choice of means to minimize incidental harm

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 11/03/2026

type, somewhere between tens to low hundreds of meters. Not high precision, but accurate enough, depending on type, for hitting large objects with a reasonable likelihood of success. This makes them capable of being directed against military objectives, at least sufficiently large ones. The issue

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 11/03/2026

A slightly different take. The cluster munitions used by Iran are missiles equipped with cluster warheads, as only they have the necessary range among Iranian cluster munitions to hit Israel. A quick search suggests that the accuracy (circular error probable) of these missiles is, depending on

100

Reposted by Aurel Sari

Verfassungsblog @verfassungsblog.de · 09/03/2026

Did the law of armed conflict apply to the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader? AUREL SARI (@aurelsari.com) responds to a text we published last week and argues that the law of armed conflict applies from the very first act of violence in an armed conflict. verfassungsblog.de/killing-kham...

Quote: “Whether or not the law of armed conflict applied to Khamenei’s killing is not some technicality that risks diverting our attention from the ‘real’ issues. On the contrary, it has great practical and normative significance.”

083

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 09/03/2026

Early visitors this morning at Streatham Campus at @exeter.ac.uk

161

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 09/03/2026

Provided it did involve killing or injury (capture not being part of the customary rule), the use of the ambulances would be perfidious. The ICRC Customary Study suggests that medical units enjoy protection even if not marked with the protective emblem.

020

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 08/03/2026

The logo of the Islamic Health Organization is not a protected emblem. I’m not sure what the Israeli position is on whether the rules on the improper use of enemy uniforms apply in NIACs, but the DoD Law of War Manual does not expressly recognise such a rule (unless I’ve missed it).

200

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 07/03/2026

Please do share if you get a copy, I'd be interested in your thoughts.

150

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 06/03/2026

Compelling analysis. Prof Weller seems to assume that Gulf countries have not provided operational support to the US, but I think that assumption is questionable, adding another layer of complexity, as discussed www.justsecurity.org/133231/unite...

justsecurity.org

The United Kingdom’s Use of Force Against Iran: Walking a Legal Tightrope?

An assessment of the United Kingdom's ability to maintain a legal line between defensive versus offensive operations against Iran.

010

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 05/03/2026

Let’s hope someone has checked in with the Cypriot authorities to see how they feel about the duties of neutral States…

010

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 05/03/2026

My thoughts on the legal basis and justification for the UK’s military operations against Iran. It’s complicated…

012

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 05/03/2026

Why are the States concerned not involved in an armed conflict?

000

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 04/03/2026

application of the rules governing the use of force to Iran raises some genuinely difficult and partly unsettled doctrinal questions. It's with that in mind that I made my initial comment, not to score points or to offend. I apologized because I meant it, otherwise I would not have.

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 04/03/2026

I do regret having made my comment now, as I did not intend to cause any offence. I apologised twice for any misunderstanding on my part and I'll do so a third time: I'm sorry if I misread your post. I thought it made some very good points about the state of the international legal order. The

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 04/03/2026

can do is to offer my apologies again for any misunderstanding on my part.

000

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 04/03/2026

civilian infrastructure is a legitimate military target for Iran from a jus ad bellum point of view. The aggression/self-defence questions revolve not just around "those" States that are totally unconcerned with the US-Israeli attacks, but also those that facilitate those attacks. Anyway, all I

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 04/03/2026

What led to the misunderstanding is that you wrote "those not concerned with the American and Israeli attacks". Kuwait, for example, is "concerned" with the US attack in the sense that it allows its territory to be used by the US for attacks against Iran. But that does not mean that Kuwaiti

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 04/03/2026

I read that paragraph to count Iranian attacks on US bases in the region among the “reckless” ones - apologies if I misunderstood.

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 04/03/2026

not retaliation, but covered by self-defence.

000

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 04/03/2026

Good post on some of the perennial questions of the rule of law in an anarchical international system. One comment on Iran’s targeting: much of it is aimed at US installations and assets in the region which are almost certainly making an operational contribution to the US attack. These strikes are

200

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 04/03/2026

Are there any analyses you'd recommend for China's response to this? Would assume China has a major interest in keeping Iran in the fight.

110

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 04/03/2026

Have you seen any legal argument for the targeting of the Iranian political leadership?

010

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 03/03/2026

Though deciding on the combined title would have been tough. The Law of the Religious Use of Military Force? The Use of Religious Military Force? Or perhaps the Law of the Military Use of Religious Force?

010

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 03/03/2026

“…outside an armed conflict”?

010

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 02/03/2026

I think the advice does recognise implicitly that Iran has a right of self-defence by limiting the UK’s response to what it calls unlawful attacks by Iran against certain regional allies.

e.g.by

000

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 02/03/2026

destroy Iranian missiles “at source” is a response limited strictly to Iranian uses of force that exceed the boundaries of lawful self-defence.

000

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 02/03/2026

opens it up to a lawful forcible response. That is legally correct, but an almost impossible line to walk in practice. E.g. Iran’s right of self-defence covers attacks against the air base at Al-Udeid, despite being located in Qatar. It is difficult to see how allowing the US to use UK bases to

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 02/03/2026

Lord Wolfson’s analysis starts strong in point 1, but breaks down by point 2. More importantly, the UK’s position appears to be based on the implicit recognition that Iran has a right of self-defence, but that Iran also uses force that exceeds the limits of lawful self-defence, which in turn

100

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 01/03/2026

“Law” is the other clue.

160

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 01/03/2026

Most likely, partly also because of the 2003 “second resolution” precedent. That said, the UK cannot support unlawful attacks on Iran consistently with its own obligations nor oppose Iran’s lawful self-defence. Not sure what room that leaves for US use of UK bases.

030

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 01/03/2026

or as uses of force exceeding the bounds of lawful self-defence?

110

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 01/03/2026

seem, prima facie, that the necessity and proportionality requirements are met. Other strikes appear to be aimed at non-military targets. Assuming these were intentional (rather than targeting mistakes), would you characterize them as unlawful reprisals running in parallel with lawful self-defence

110

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 01/03/2026

Given that Iran is the victim of an ongoing armed attack, it has the right of self-defence, subject to necessity, proportionality etc. Many of the Iranian missile strikes have been aimed at US military bases in the region. Where these are involved in the attack on Iran, such as Al Udeid, it would

120

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 01/03/2026

Correct, but the service personnel themselves are military objectives. Assuming the apartments are not, targeting those combatants is still permissible, subject to precautions, including proportionality.

110

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 01/03/2026

Angenommen, dass die humanitäre Intervention überhaupt im Völkerrecht existiert, sind ihre Voraussetzungen genauso wenig erfüllt wie die der Selbstverteidigung. Relevanter als der Bethlehem‑Aufsatz ist die offizielle Stellungnahme der britischen Regierung: www.gov.uk/government/p....

gov.uk

Syria action – UK government legal position

040

Aurel Sari @aurelsari.com · 01/03/2026

Hostilities in the 2003 invasion of Iraq opened with an attempted decapitation strike against Saddam Hussein.

151