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The Smart TV in Your LivingRoom Is a Node in the AIScraping Economy
The work at Include Security has us working with AI day in and day out (hacking it, using it, training it, etc).
We’re all aware of the community-level opposition happening against datacenters, aimed at improving AI capabilities, being built recently. What you might not be aware of are the distributed efforts to train AI that could be using the devices inside your home.
In this post, we’re going to explore how the company Bright Data facilitates modern AI models scraping training data from the Internet using its residential proxy network.
Bright Data is a data-collection company that sells access to what it markets as the world’s largest residential proxy network of 400M+ home IP addresses that its customers route web-scraping traffic through. The supply behind that network comes from an SDK: a piece of software embedded in consumer apps that, with the user’s consent, turns their phone or smart TV into one of those exit nodes.
We’ll document what you, the average user, should know about what this company’s SDK does on your systems such as your mobile phone and your smart TV. We’re going to explore how their SDK works, which platforms have shipped it, and why your Internet-connected TV is the ultimate proxy for AI models looking to train on data scraped from the Internet.
### **Why This Matters Now**
AI companies depend on web-scraped content: for pre-training, for retrieval, for agent grounding, for search. But the modern web isn’t scrapeable from a datacenter. Cloudflare, DataDome, HUMAN, among others throttle or block requests from known cloud IPs.
The workaround is residential proxies. A scraping job routed through a Comcast or T-Mobile subscriber’s connection arrives at the target site from an IP that belongs to a paying residential customer. Krebs reported in October 2025 that _“a glut of proxies from Aisuru and other sources is fueling large-scale data harvesting efforts tied to various AI projects.”_ Academic measurement going back to 2019 shows these networks are overwhelmingly misused. The FBI issued a formal advisory earlier this year.
Most of the existing press has focused on the **illegal** residential-proxy supply: botnets (Aisuru, Kimwolf), trojanized apps (HUMAN Security’s PROXYLIB disclosure), pre-infected IoT hardware (Google/Mandiant’s IPIDEA takedown). These are the bad actors.
On the other hand, the legal supply side has received far less scrutiny. Today Bright Data is the largest residential proxy network in the world by its own marketing, advertising “150M+ IPs” sourced via a consent SDK embedded in partner apps. This research documents how that SDK works, which platforms have shipped it, and why the connected-TV is the ultimate residential proxy.
### **Why Connected TV (CTV) is the Ideal Proxy**
Connected TV, a.k.a Smart TV, is a near-perfect residential proxy. Compared to a mobile phone:
**Factor**| **Mobile phone**| **Smart TV / CTV**
---|---|---
Power| Battery most of the day| Always plugged in
Network| WiFi + cellular| Always WiFi, high-speed
Uptime| Intermittent| 24/7 in standby
Bandwidth ceiling| Low (cellular caps)| Effectively unlimited
User attention| Actively used| Often unattended
Consent UI| Text on a phone screen| Text navigated via TV remote arrow keys
Corporate/family oversight| Higher (MDM, mobile EDR)| Virtually none
A TV never hits 1% battery, jumps between WiFi networks or gets locked when the user is asleep. Some partner publishers do disclose the Bright Data relationship in their privacy policies PlayWorks is one example. But privacy-policy disclosure is the wrong control surface for a TV. It is hard to scroll through a legal document navigated by arrow keys on a remote, and the in-app consent dialog, doesn’t convey that a paying Bright Data customer is about to route their scraping traffic through the user’s home internet.
Petflix, a Roku app documented by The Verge, is a representative case. Its opt-in screen reads: _“To enjoy Petflix for free with fewer ads, you are allowing Bright Data to occasionally use your device’s free resources and IP address to download public web data from the internet. Bright Data will only use your IP address for approved business-related use cases. None of your personal information is accessed or collected except your IP address. Period.”_ The Petflix dialog says “occasionally.” The SDK’s publicly queryable config sets `max_bw_monthly_wifi: 200,000,000,000` bytes — a 200 GB default monthly WiFi budget.
**Who Bright Data Names as Partners**
Bright Data exposes a partner manifest endpoint. The endpoint is unauthenticated and anyone can fetch it. Names in the manifest that I was able to identify with high confidence from public sources:
**Partner ID (from config)**| **Entity**| **Scale**
---|---|---
playworks_digital| **PlayWorks Digital Ltd**| 400+ CTV game titles; reach ~250M TV homes via Comcast, Sky, Cox, LG, Samsung, Vizio, Roku
cloudtv| **CloudTV**| Integrated across 125+ TV brands and 15+ OEMs
longvision_media_hong_kong_co_limited| **Longvision Media HK (LongTV)**| 5M OTT users across HK and Malaysia
viber_media_s_r_l| **Viber Media S.à r.l. (Rakuten)**| 250M–820M monthly users of the Viber messenger
supercent_inc| **Supercent** (Korea)| #1 Korean mobile publisher by downloads in 2023
moonfrog_labs_private_limited| **Moonfrog Labs** (Stillfront subsidiary)| ~10M MAU on Teen Patti Gold alone; acquired for $90M
hola_networks| **Hola Networks**| Bright Data’s lineage parent; user base reported in the tens to ~100M+ range at peak per Hola’s own historical marketing
Others (`desoline, free_time, ott_studio, global_microtrading, m_m_media, easystaff_lp`) are present but less identifiable from public sources. `bright_screensavers, bright_videos`, and `brightdata `are Bright Data’s own apps.
A note on what the partner list proves: Being listed in Bright Data’s config means an integration might have existed at some point. It does _not_ by itself prove that a specific publisher’s currently-shipping app(s) includes the SDK in production. For any named publisher, per-app verification is required.
What the partner list _does_ directly prove:
1. Bright Data ships this roster in an **unauthenticated public endpoint**.
2. At least three CTV-focused entities (PlayWorks, CloudTV, Longvision) monetized their user’s devices as residential proxy exit nodes. PlayWorks in particular reports CTV distribution across major TV platforms and ISPs, with reach figures in the hundreds of millions of households per its own marketing materials.
### **How does the Bright Data SDK turn a user’s device into a residential proxy exit node?**
The Bright Data SDK is a publicly documented commercial product, offered to publishers via Bright Data’s SDK integration docs (with a JavaScript variant for web). What follows builds on that public surface with findings from reverse-engineering the shipping iOS framework and instrumenting 30 days of its runtime traffic.
The SDK ships as an iOS framework (brdsdk.framework) inside partner apps. I reverse-engineered the binary and captured 30 days of traffic from a research fleet running the SDK inside a consent-installed partner app.
#### **The Unauthenticated Config**
On every launch the SDK calls:
`GET <https://clientsdk.bright-sdk.com/sdk_config_ios.json>?appid=<bundle>&ver=<sdk-version>&uuid=sdk-ios-<32hex>`
The endpoint is unauthenticated in any meaningful sense. The server gates only on two query parameters `appid `(an app bundle ID, which can be found in the App Store listing of the partner app) and `ver `(the SDK version string). Supply those and any randomly generated UUID, and the server returns the same response a real device gets: feature flags, idle-detection thresholds (battery %, CPU/memory ceilings, WiFi-vs-cellular rules), per-country bandwidth tiers, and the partner manifest I showcased above. Each of these branches is worth examining on its own: the idle rules that decide when your device is eligible to relay, a flag that routes peer traffic around your VPN, a map that stitches your installs across platforms into one identity, and the per-country bandwidth caps.
#### **The Peer Tunnel**
After config fetch, the SDK opens a persistent WebSocket to:
`wss://proxyjs.brdtnet.com:443`
This hostname resolves to AWS Global Accelerator IPs (3.33.193.183, 15.197.193.114 as of this writing). The TLS certificate is `CN=*.luminatinet.com` — the domain for Luminati Networks, Bright Data’s pre-2018 corporate name. The rebrand was publicly announced in 2018. Active SDK infrastructure still runs on the legacy cert, which is a useful detection pivot: the current customer-facing proxy service lives on brightdata.com-branded domains, so any luminatinet.com / brdtnet.com traffic on your network is specifically the peer-tunnel plane, not customer-side Bright Data usage. The server identifies itself as `uWebSockets: 20`.
The peer endpoint requires no authentication to upgrade. The server accepts any TLS-valid WebSocket upgrade and immediately pushes the connecting client an application-layer frame with the client’s public IP echoed back. From there, a handshake unfolds:
1. **Server → client: tunnel_init** establishes the session, returns the client’s public IP.
2. **Server → client: cid_set** the server assigns the client a session-tracking identifier in the format `<IP>-<token>/ls<N>c<M>p443_<IP>_<counter>`. We confirmed this format matches the cid field present in the SDK’s captured telemetry traffic from real devices.
3. **Server → client: status_get** the server polls the device for its idle state, battery, network type, and available bandwidth. The device responds with a continuous telemetry feed: `idle, wifi_connected, mobile_connected, mobile_type` (LTE/5G), `roaming, battery_level, using_battery, screen_on, on_call, cpu_usage, mem_usage, raw_bw, bw, ipv6_supported, appid` (the host app), `sdk_version, platform`, and the assigned `cid`. This is a continuous feed of physical-device state to a third party, delivered via a consent dialog whose text is chosen by the host app publisher.
4. **Handshake complete.** Once the device reports favorable status, the server’s job-matching layer is free to push `cmd_tun` frames: individual scraping-job instructions that the SDK executes as HTTP requests against third-party sites, using the user’s residential IP as the source.
Every frame on the WebSocket is plain JSON with a fixed envelope:
`{"type": "ipc_call"|"ipc_post"|"ipc_result"|"ipc_error",
"cmd": <command>, "cookie": <correlation-id>,
"err_code": 0, "msg": { ...payload... }}`
The full command vocabulary extracted from the binary and verified on the wire:
**Direction**| **cmd**| **Purpose**
---|---|---
Server → Client| tunnel_init| Open session, echo public IP
Server → Client| cid_set| Assign session identifier
Server → Client| status_get| Poll device idle/battery/bandwidth
Server → Client| cmd_tun / tun| Dispatch a scraping job
Server → Client| dns| Request DNS resolution of a target
Server → Client| consent| Request consent state
Client → Server| status_send| Periodic heartbeat with device state
Client → Server| tun_report / tun_ack / tun_fin| Relay-job lifecycle responses
Client → Server| tunnel_init_decline| Decline a session
Client → Server| logs| Ship diagnostic logs to server
There’s no message signing, HMAC, client certificate or device attestation. Only the TLS layer and the server’s IP-reputation filter gating which peers actually receive jobs. For readers familiar with commercial malware protocol design: this is substantially less secure than typical C2.
#### **When the SDK considers you “idle”**
The config ships an explicit rulebook for when the device is eligible to relay someone else’s traffic:
`"idle_metrics": {
"ignore_screen_on": true, // relay even with the screen on
"ignore_on_call": true, // relay while the user is on a phone call
"max_bw_ratio": 1,
"min_battery": 0.2,
"wifi_on_battery": true,
"min_battery_wifi": 0.2,
"max_cpu_usage": 70,
"max_mem_usage": 90,
"mem_screen_off": true,
"idle_timeout": 30,
"not_idle_timeout": 10
}`
The ignore_screen_on and ignore_on_call flags are notable: “idle” does not mean the user is away from the device. It means the device’s CPU, memory, and battery are within the SDK’s thresholds. A user on a phone call, actively reading the screen, is considered idle for relay purposes.
#### **Cross-Platform Identity Linkage**
The config also ships a dual_pairing map:
``**"dual_pairing":** {
"ios_com.brd.earnapp": ["win_earnapp.com", "mac_com.earnapp"]
}``
That’s a server-side map tying a user’s iOS, Windows, and macOS installations of the same brand into one entity. It’s cross-platform identity stitching documented inside a public config file.One more forward-looking field: http3_enabled: true. The SDK is already shipping the flag for QUIC-based peer transport. A future version may move the peer tunnel from TCP/443 to UDP/443, which would break any defender relying on TCP connection tracking to detect the WebSocket.
#### **The Inspection Bypass**
The SDK’s config ships a flag “use_netifs”: true. That flag triggers code in the SDK binary that constructs its NWConnection with a specific required interface: `en0 `(WiFi) or `pdp_ip0 `(cellular), rather than using the system default route.
**On iOS, this bypasses any configured VPN’s tun0 interface entirely.** The peer tunnel does not cross a user-configured VPN, even when the rest of the app’s HTTPS traffic does.
We observed this empirically. My research setup includes transparent TLS interception. It captured every HTTPS call the SDK made, except the peer tunnel to proxyjs.brdtnet.com:443, even though port 443 is explicitly redirected to the inspector. The bypass uses Apple’s documented NWParameters.requiredInterface API.
It’s worth emphasizing that the SDK uses **two independent inspection bypasses** , one per plane:
* **Control plane** (config fetch, telemetry pings): built on CFNetwork’s CFHTTPMessage primitives rather than URLSession/NSURLConnection. This defeats URLSessionlevel instrumentation (swizzling, network extensions, URLProtocol subclasses) commonly used in mobile app-sec tooling, while still respecting the system proxy and so remaining visible to TLS-intercepting researchers.
* **Data plane** (peer tunnel): built on NWConnection with requiredInterface set to the physical interface. This is what defeats VPNs and ensures the scraping is executed from a residential IP.
Both choices are legitimate Apple APIs. The combination is the interesting artifact: the data plane is invisible to VPN-based inspection _and_ the control plane is invisible to URLSession-based hooks. Researchers who rely on either single technique see only half the SDK’s behavior.
For enterprise security teams running MDM, corporate-VPN-based traffic inspection, or home-router parental controls: the most sensitive channel this SDK operates is designed to go around your visibility layer.
### **The geography tiers**
The config ships per-country bandwidth thresholds. Four countries get explicit non-default policies:
**Country**| **Min battery to relay**| **Daily cap**| **Monthly cap**
---|---|---|---
**Uzbekistan**| **1%**| 1 GB| 30 GB
**Oman**| **1%**| 1 GB| 30 GB
Qatar| 20%| 40 MB| 250 MB
UAE| 20%| 40 MB| 250 MB
default (worldwide)| 20%| 50 MB| 500 MB
Looking at the config, Uzbekistan and Oman devices are permitted to relay down to **1% battery** , with daily caps 20× the default and monthly caps 60× the default. Qatar and UAE devices are throttled _below_ default. We can only speculate as to why the tiers are drawn this way. One reading is deliberate market segmentation, relaxing limits where grid power is stable and throttling where mobile data is expensive. The default-worldwide allowance still permits **500 MB of someone else’s traffic per month** over the user’s home internet.
### **Testing Setup and Methodology**
Three data sources:
1. **Thirty days of TLS-inspecting proxy captures** from iOS device running consent-installed partner apps (including XYO COIN, which embeds the Bright SDK).
2. **Static analysis of the SDK binary** (brdsdk.framework, version 1.532.120, iOS arm64).
All specific Bright Data hostnames, cert fingerprints, and TLS infrastructure described are publicly observable by anyone making the same requests. No session-specific identifying data from either the research fleet or the research client appears in this document.
### **Timeline**
* **May 11, 2026** – Email notice sent to privacy@brightdata.com notifying their team about the release of this blog post. No response to the notification has been received at the time of this article’s publishing.
### **Defense Approaches**
The traffic leaves clear fingerprints at the network boundary, and the SDK leaves identifiable symbols in the app binary. The approaches below let you detect and block the peer tunnel — at the network level or on the device itself. Three approaches, ordered by ease of deployment:
**Approach 1: DNS block** (trivial, effective for network-routed devices):
proxyjs.brdtnet.com
proxyjs.luminatinet.com
proxyjs.bright-sdk.com
clientsdk.bright-sdk.com
clientsdk.brdtnet.com
Blocking proxyjs.* kills the peer tunnel without affecting any customer who legitimately uses Bright Data’s customer-facing proxy service on a different domain.
**Approach 2: TLS SNI filtering:** Drop or alert on TLS handshakes where server_name matches *.brdtnet.com, *.luminatinet.com, or *.luminati.io. Works at the network boundary without TLS inspection.
**Approach 3: TLS certificate fingerprint:**
* .brdtnet.com → SHA256 313ce4ec7d5a51e5…
* .luminatinet.com → SHA256 5028612e625befea…
Stable until Sectigo cert rotation (current certs valid through mid-2026).
**The use_netifs caveat:** All three layers only work on traffic that crosses your network boundary. The SDK’s use_netifs binding means that on iOS, when the device is on cellular, peer traffic bypasses corporate WiFi entirely. For managed fleets, the complementary control is MDM-based app binary scanning: search installed apps for the Swift symbols BrdWebSocketFacade and BrdNetwork.DNSResolver, and prohibit apps containing them on corporate-issued devices.
For household users concerned about a specific smart TV or mobile app: block the hostnames above at your router’s DNS settings (Pi-hole, NextDNS, Cloudflare Gateway, your ISP’s equivalent).
—
This blog post was written in partnership with our guest author and independent security researcher Buchodi.
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