iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Reposted by Wilhelmus Janus

itwasgg.bsky.social @itwasgg.bsky.social · 03/06/2026

This is just what GOPniks always have been doing: See the russian term and practice of "vranyo" that they've adopted...

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Sir Thinksalot @sirthinksalot.bsky.social · 10/10/2026

I suspect such questions of IQ and Fantasticism among the generals rests upon the false assumption that Putin's generals are warfighters like Zelensky's generals; whereas Putin's generals are courtiers first, political survivors second, clients of oligarchs third, and warfighters a distant fourth.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

63/ …the cumulative effect should become apparent quickly. The economics and consequences of a "data centre war" are entirely different — and, at first glance, Russia appears ill-prepared for them." /end Source: t.me/artjockey/3450

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

62/ "A single Ukrainian strike did not — and could not — collapse the entire Runet or even seriously disrupt Yandex’s operations; however, if this marks the start of a systematic campaign of strikes even half as successful as those targeting oil refineries and depots,…

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

61/ "Russia, conversely, initiated this escalation without fully considering the consequences, leaving itself potentially highly vulnerable with no quick fix available.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

60/ "For years, Ukraine has consistently built "digital resilience" rather than "digital sovereignty" by migrating its infrastructure — critical and otherwise — to locations where it cannot be destroyed; we are now seeing the effectiveness of this strategy in practice.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

59/ "The main question now isn't even about who inflicts more damage in terms of destroyed equipment or lost infrastructure capacity. What matters is how prepared both sides of the conflict are for scenarios involving strikes on data centres.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

58/ "One wonders if Putin and Gerasimov will think to open a map of Russian nuclear plants beforehand and figure out how to protect the Rostov, Kursk, Balakovo, and Novovoronezh plants from retaliatory strikes.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

57/ "I wonder what comes next? Will Russia start attacking Ukrainian nuclear power plants?

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

56/ "A brilliant geostrategist, a master of 5D chess, who couldn't foresee the consequences more than a single day ahead.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

55/ "He couldn't inflict any significant damage that way — everything had been moved to foreign cloud services back in 2022 (services Putin and his generals likely don't even understand) — but in doing so, he gave Ukraine a free hand.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

54/ "I suspect the Russian president is listening to generals who are either completely out of touch with reality or simply dim-witted; they advised him to attack Ukrainian data centres — a move that made no sense from the start.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

53/ …when Kyiv had no means to retaliate; however, initiating such an escalation in 2026 — when Ukrainian drones are torching oil refineries beyond the Urals, 3,000 km from the border – is sheer madness.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

52/ "Putin also still fails to grasp that Ukraine’s capabilities have changed drastically, and that a war against a real enemy is not an exercise against a hypothetical adversary. Strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure might have made sense in 2022–2024,…

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

51/ "In Putin’s world, the strikes "didn't cause serious damage – just 1% of GDP" – yet in the real world, a loss of 1% of GDP is massive.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

50/ "We saw this with the strikes on oil refineries: in Putin’s world, "only 10% of repairs remain," whereas in reality, the state is paying out record fuel price stabilisation subsidies for imports.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

49/ …he makes decisions without consulting or listening to anyone, living in his own cozy bubble.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

48/ "I believe Putin may have committed his second-biggest blunder since the invasion of Ukraine. He has literally started throwing stones inside a glass house without realizing how fragile that house is. The very system he built prevents him from grasping this;…

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

47/ "The issue is therefore extremely serious — far more so than the strikes on Wildberries, which result in economic damage but do not threaten the functioning of the state itself.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

46/ "If the "Runet" or major cloud providers like Yandex were to go down, countless enterprises and government services would collapse with them; tax collection would cease, financial transactions would halt, and so on.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

45/ "It is crucial to understand that data centres are not merely about consumer internet access. Modern states and businesses rely on the network for their operations.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

44/ "Consequently, state regulation of the rack market — and even "server rationing" — is not a joke, but a distinct possibility.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

43/ "Beyond the existing shortage, I suspect a scramble for available infrastructure began as early as yesterday morning; companies are likely snapping up available racks "just in case," aiming to create backups for at least their critical services.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

42/ "One can conclude, then, that there is very little reserve capacity in Russia; a company like Yandex cannot simply rent idle data centre space from IXcellerate, as there isn't that much free infrastructure on the market.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

41/ "At the aforementioned DCAwards, it was reported that only 500–600 server racks are available at any given time in the Moscow region; everything else is occupied.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

40/ "▪️ Just a few days ago, Kommersant published an article on data centres reporting that demand continues to rise even as the pace of new capacity deployment slows. CNews presents the following chart:

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

39/ "▪️ In late 2025, CNews reported on a market downturn, noting that the rate of new facility commissioning had dropped threefold;

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

38/ "▪️ In 2025, the website of the industry-specific DCAwards published a report stating that the infrastructure deficit in Moscow and St. Petersburg had reached a critical level, with data centre occupancy at 99%;

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

37/ …for workload migration and distribution. This is the case, for instance, in the warehouse market: a surplus was built up prior to the war, and supply currently outstrips demand. However, the situation here is completely different:

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

36/ "It seems Ukraine could cripple Yandex’s operations by destroying more than half of its existing infrastructure. It might appear that Russian data centres have been built at a breakneck pace in recent years and that sufficient backup capacity exists…

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

35/ "Yandex appears to face the greatest risk right now; of its top five data centres, only one is located outside Moscow proper (in Mytishchi), while the others include the Sasovo facility (which is already out of operation), two phases in Vladimir, and the Kaluga site. bsky.app/profile/maks...

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

34/ "▪️ Yandex in Kaluga – capacity exceeding 49 MW; ▪️ Yandex in Vladimir; ▪️ Rostelecom’s data centre in Udomlya – 4,000 racks.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

33/ "Nevertheless, there are easier targets available to Ukraine for now: ▪️ Sberbank’s data centre in Balakovo, Saratov Region — 26 MW at launch and over 3,000 racks; one of the largest projects currently under construction in Russia;

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

32/ "Consequently, it would be difficult for Ukraine to inflict truly critical damage right now, although successful attacks on the Kapotnya oil refinery and Wildberries warehouses demonstrate that facilities in the Russian capital are not invulnerable.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

31/ "According to DC Market Insights, the capital accounts for 55 of the 100 data centres tracked, representing 70% of the total capacity.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

30/ "There is some good news, however — or at least factors that might stave off disaster for Russia for the time being: the majority of data centres are located in Moscow, protected by an air defence umbrella.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

29/ "That incident was caused by a power outage, but it immediately raised the question: "What would happen if a Ukrainian missile or drone struck the site?"

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

28/ "In August, we witnessed an outage – unrelated to the war – at the MMTS-9 exchange point, which also houses the infrastructure for MSK-IX, one of Russia's key internet exchange points. At that time, "half of RuNet went down" briefly.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

27/ "The third problem stems partly from the second and involves a high degree of centralization. This is driven partly by historical and geographical factors, and partly by the state's desire to control the entire internet "for the sake of security."

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

26/ "China might have the capacity, but that would require legislative changes to allow key services and registries to be moved there.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

25/ "Due to restrictions imposed by Federal Laws No. 152-FZ and No. 187-FZ, it is virtually impossible to replicate Russian IT infrastructure in places like Belarus or Kazakhstan – though, in any case, the necessary capacity simply isn't there.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

24/ "In its pursuit of a "sovereign internet," the government has effectively blocked Russian companies from using infrastructure even in friendly nations, while "unfriendly" countries have blocked access via sanctions anyway.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

23/ "The contrast is stark: a single data centre – not even the largest one targeted – is bigger than half of Ukraine’s top facilities combined. The second issue is the so-called "Cheburnet" (a sovereign, isolated Russian internet).

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

22/ "And this is far from the largest data centre; according to public data, the country’s largest is IXcellerate MOS5, featuring 5,000 racks and a power consumption of 64 megawatts.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

21/ …serious, widespread disruption. The damage from such attacks is primarily measured by the cost of the destroyed equipment, which remains relatively low due to the absence of massive data centres.

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

20/ "The combination of these factors makes both the Ukrainian network and its IT infrastructure highly resilient to attacks. Russian drones might destroy equipment and cause temporary outages for specific services or providers, but they are unlikely to cause…

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

19/ …to achieve data transmission speeds in the tens of gigabits. This is a viable option that could potentially restore connectivity – even for entire regions – in the event of major disruptions to the Ukrainian network."

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

18/ "While certain network segments or individual providers might go offline, they can be restored relatively quickly – as we have seen following previous attacks. Furthermore, Ukraine has access to Starlink, including enterprise-grade solutions that cluster terminals together…

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

17/ "A third factor – difficult to verify independently but supported by expert opinion – is that the Ukrainian network is generally highly decentralised. There are no single major network hubs, an attack on which could bring down the "Ukrainian Internet."

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ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

16/ "The former has a capacity of 4 megawatts and houses 400 racks, while the latter has a capacity of approximately 3 megawatts and 360 racks; keep these figures in mind, along with the fact that these were among the country's largest facilities.

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