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Politiques économiques à l'épreuve des faits - Éditions Odile Jacob

🗳️ À l’approche des prochains scrutins, nous espérons que ce livre aidera nos lecteurs à mieux comprendre les politiques économiques dans toute leur complexité et à en débattre ! 📍 Il est disponible en librairie et sur le site des @editionsodilejacob.bsky.social : www.odilejacob.fr/catalogue/sc...

odilejacob.fr

La conduite des politiques économiques est un art délicat et exigeant.

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📚 13 chapitres abordent toutes les grandes questions économiques, des leviers de la croissance à la lutte contre les inégalités et le chômage, en passant par l’environnement, l’éducation, la mondialisation et l’Europe.

🔎 Que sait-on des effets des politiques économiques ? Quelles contraintes peuvent entraver leur mise en œuvre ? Nous y répondons dans un ouvrage de 560 pages, dialogue inédit entre chercheurs et praticiens des politiques publiques.

Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 28/08/2026

📘 Très heureux d’annoncer la parution aujourd’hui de notre livre, Les Politiques économiques à l’épreuve des faits ! Fruit de notre collaboration avec Xavier Jaravel, Emmanuel Monnet et Mathieu Peruyero, aux @editionsodilejacob.bsky.social, avec une préface de Philippe Aghion.

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Aux États-Unis déjà, bientôt en France : le règne des oligarques menace la démocratie. Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇

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Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 26/06/2026

On ne peut pas tout traiter en 12 pages :) Mais les chiffres qu'on donne sur la défiance envers différentes institutions sont en effet un argument en faveur d'une plus forte décentralisation.

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Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 12/06/2026

Chaque nouvelle candidature réduit les chances de battre le RN. Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇

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Reposted by Vincent Pons

jeeanews.bsky.social @jeeanews.bsky.social · 20/04/2026

Check out the April 2026 issue (24,2) of @jeeanews.bsky.social Journal of @eeanews.bsky.social Teaching materials available: www.eeassoc.org/teaching-mat... academic.oup.com/jeea/issue

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Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 08/05/2026

Heurs et malheurs de l'IA en politique. Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇

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Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 23/04/2026

Democracy and business are often treated as separate domains. Instead, in a new piece for @mitsmr.bsky.social, Julie Battilana, Lakshmi Ramarajan, Matthew Lee and I argue that business leaders have a rational interest—not just a civic duty—in defending democracy. sloanreview.mit.edu/article/why-...

sloanreview.mit.edu

Why Business Leaders Need to Champion Democracy

Many leaders are unsure about what they can do to oppose the global rise of authoritarianism. Here are four options.

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Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 03/04/2026

Merci @alietteh.bsky.social pour son invitation cette semaine dans "Entendez-vous l'éco" sur @franceculture.fr! 👇 Que peut nous apprendre l’économie sur les élections? Peut-on penser la politique comme un marché? La main invisible y opère-t-elle? 🎧A écouter ici: www.radiofrance.fr/francecultur...

radiofrance.fr

Le marché du vote

Lorsqu'ils votent, les électeurs opèrent des arbitrages et expriment des attentes. Ces déterminants de vote sont au cœur des travaux de l'économiste Vincent Pons.

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Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 30/03/2026

De l'autocratie - et de la résistance - en Amérique. Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇

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Thanks! The effects are smaller in the more recent period:

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This definition allows us to also consider parl elections that do not lead to the designation of the head of government (e.g., in the U.S.). But as part of our ongoing revisions we will consider also an alternative definition where the outcome is one if the party controls the government.

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Full paper on our websites: drive.google.com/file/d/1pMj5...; www.vincentpons.org/global-incum...; vrollet.github.io/files/Incumb... (n/n).

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Finally, the national-level incumbency advantage has generally fallen over the past decades: despite democratic backsliding, incumbents do not seem increasingly entrenched (12/n).

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For instance, in the least democratic countries in our sample, only 56% of elections are followed by another election held on schedule; 17% are followed by a late election or by no election at all (11/n).

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In less democratic settings, the incumbency advantage largely stems from manipulating the fairness and timing of follow-up elections (10/n).

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Indeed, similar incumbency advantages can reflect very different mechanisms. In established democracies, incumbency mainly helps through better performance in follow-up elections that are free and fair (9/n).

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The contrast with the subnational evidence is striking. At the subnational level, incumbency advantage is strongest in richer and more democratic settings. At the national level, it is large in both the most democratic and the least democratic countries (8/n).

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This average effect hides major regional differences. The national incumbency advantage is large in Western Europe/North America (+26pp) and Africa (+42pp) but muted or negative in Latin America and Asia/Oceania (7/n).

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On average, winning a national election raises the probability of still being in power after the scheduled end of term by 10pp on average, but this effect is short-lived (6/n).

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The national incumbency advantage hasn’t been studied so far. It may differ from existing subnational estimates because national incumbents have additional levers to stay in power: they may alter the timing, fairness and results of the follow-up elections (5/n).

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We then turn to national elections worldwide since 1945 and use a close-election RDD to estimate the incumbency advantage at the national level, which we define as the effect of winning on the probability of still being in power beyond the scheduled end of term (4/n).

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We start with a meta-analysis of subnational incumbency estimates from 58 studies covering 29 countries. A clear pattern emerges: the subnational incumbency advantage is larger in richer, less corrupt, and more democratic settings (3/n).

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We ask a simple question: once a party or candidate narrowly wins national office, how much does that increase its chances of remaining in power later on? We use all presidential and parliamentary elections held worldwide since 1945 to respond (2/n).

Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 12/03/2026

Very happy to share our new paper on “The Global Incumbency Advantage”! 👇👇 We provide the first estimates of the incumbency advantage at the national level for all elections worldwide since 1945. with Raphaël Descamps, Ben Marx and @vincent-rollet.bsky.social. Short 🧵 below (1/n).

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Comment en finir avec la démocratie des cheveux gris? A l'approche des municipales, notre tribune dans @liberation.fr propose 4 leviers pour réduire l'abstention, notamment des jeunes. 👇👇 Focus @caeeco.bsky.social associé: cae-eco.fr/les-absents-... Avec Jean Beuve et Etienne Fize.

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Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 10/03/2026

joint with Jake Brown, Enrico Cantoni, @ryanenos.bsky.social, and Emilie Sartre

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Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 10/03/2026

What explains the rise in geographic partisan segregation in the U.S.? While most studies focus on residential mobility, generational change and Democrats leaving their party explain a much larger share of that trend. See our @voxeu.org column 👇👇 and our paper: www.vincentpons.org/partisan-seg...

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Reposted by Vincent Pons

Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 25/02/2026

Faut-il vraiment ouvrir une guerre commerciale avec la Chine? Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇

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Vincent Pons @vinpons.bsky.social · 25/02/2026

Faut-il vraiment ouvrir une guerre commerciale avec la Chine? Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇

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d/ understanding why voter turnout has declined in many countries in recent decades even though barriers to voting have generally come down. One explanation is a weakening sense of civic duty, calling for research on the reasons explaining the erosion of the civic norm and possible remedies (16/n).

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b/ studying how voting procedures are implemented in practice and the effects of election administration quality on voter turnout c/ investigating how being an active voter affects other individual outcomes, such as accepting election outcomes or seeking political information (15/n)

Finally, we highlighting questions for future research: a/ measuring the effects of election rules that have not changed much over time and that tend to vary at the national level—such as holding elections on Tuesdays in the United States (14/n)

These rules operate mostly through benefits, for instance by affecting the number and types of candidates as well as electoral competitiveness. As a result, they can be just as crucial for political participation as voting procedures (13/n).

Fourth, we examine the turnout effect of rules that, before the election, govern redistricting, primaries, candidacy requirements, and campaigns, as well as the effect of rules that determine how the votes cast map onto a set of election winners (e.g., plurality voting versus PR) (12/n).

We also discuss the (exaggerated) tension between combating voter fraud and facilitating voter participation and review cross-country evidence on the large effects of compulsory voting (11/n).

Convenience voting laws still require voters to go over some hurdles, perhaps explaining why they increase participation less than same-day registration or automatic registration (10/n).

Voter registration barriers—which occur before the election, when the stakes are not salient—have particularly large effects. The act of voting itself is generally less costly, particularly when people can choose between alternative ways to vote (9/n).

Third, we use this framework to analyze which voting procedures matter most for voter turnout. Voting procedures create obstacles so they primarily affect the cost of participation (8/n).