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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 08/10/2026

"this policy rests on a conception of philosophy as a discipline conducted by persons, for persons, and as a discipline that aims to cultivate understanding rather than merely the generation of truths" We have an AI policy: www.thebsps.org/auxhyp/bjps-... #philsci #philsky

thebsps.org

BJPS AI Policy | Auxiliary Hypotheses

BJPS Policy on the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) by Contributors, Referees, and Editors

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 05/10/2026

Just accepted: Jeffrey Barrett & Eddy Keming Chen, 'Algorithmic Randomness, Exchangeability, and the Principal Principle' Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. We introduce a framework uniting algorithmic randomness with exchangeable credences to address foundational questions in philosophy of probability and science, showing how the principal principle (PP) can be derived without circularity. The derivation brings together de Finetti's exchangeability, Martin-Lof randomness, Lewis's and Skyrms's chance-credence norms, and statistical constraining laws. Laws that constrain histories to algorithmically random sequences pair with exchangeable credences encoding inductive symmetries. Using the de Finetti representation theorem, the pairing entails the principal principle. We extend the proof to partial exchangeability and provide finite-history bounds that vanish in the infinite limit. The PP emerges as a mathematical consequence of the alignment between nomological constraints and inductive learning. This shows how algorithmic randomness and exchangeability illuminate foundational questions about chance, frequency and rational belief.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 02/10/2026

Just accepted: The Identity of Stem Cell Kinds – Guglielmo Militello, Louis Paré, Eve Gazave & Lucie Laplane Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky #hpbio

ABSTRACT. Although they share a same function and definition, there is a wide diversity across stem cells, reflected by the fact that stem cells are categorized into various types and subtypes. This diversity among stem cells raises a key philosophical question: do stem cells belong to a natural kind? Claims and arguments made by biologists and philosophers, far from converging toward a consensual response, highlight the need for more (interdisciplinary) investigation to advance this question. In response to this challenge, we explore the hypothesis that a phylogenetic approach may offer a productive framework for addressing these conceptual tensions. After describing the strengths and limitations of such a strategy, we discuss how it can advance fields like regenerative medicine and cancer therapies by clarifying stem cell diversity and improving therapeutic strategies.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

Just accepted: The Mismeasure of Pain – Laurenz Casser Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. A persistent claim in the history of modern medicine is that humans differ in their pain sensitivity. While opinions about which groups hurt more have varied over time, emphasis has always been on the sensitivity of people of colour, women and other significant groups. I argue that claims about biosocial differences in sensitivity are not supported by compelling evidence. Specifically, I argue that evidence for systematic differences in prominent measures of sensitivity has been spurious, and even if it was not, such differences still wouldn’t imply a gap in pain sensitivity. This is because the experimental results are equally well explained in terms of differences in response biases—something common measurement methods typically do not (and perhaps could not) control for. While the arguments presented here do not rule out variations, they cast serious doubt on the search for differences in pain sensitivity at the level of race and gender.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 30/09/2026

Just accepted: Model-Based Robustness Analysis as Constraint-Checking – Johannes Nyström Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Model-based robustness analysis assesses whether an ensemble of scientific models converges on an outcome, to support confidence in that outcome. While commonplace in many model-based sciences, the viability of the strategy is contested. In this article, I advance the debate in two steps. I first argue that Schupbach's influential account, based on explanatory elimination, is limited in its ability to support strong confirmation. I then develop a novel account according to which robustness provides confirmation through assessments of the strength of underlying scientific constraints on model building. I also formally analyse the proposed epistemic mechanism in a Bayesian framework. The results show that it can generate both confirmation and disconfirmation under plausible conditions, and reveal what determines its significance. The account therefore provides a general framework for understanding the epistemic significance of robustness analysis in scientific modelling.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

If you missed this year's BSPS annual conference, fear not! By the power of technology, we bring you Eleanor Knox's keynote talk, 'The Scale (and Context) Relativity of Spacetime Structure' youtu.be/pAQVXHcZXiY #philsci #philsky

youtu.be

Eleanor Knox, 'The Scale (and Context) Relativity of Spacetime Structure'

Keynote address delivered in July 2026 at the annual conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science #philsci

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 17/09/2026

From the new issue: A Pluralist Perspective on Shape Constancy – E J Green Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. The ability to perceive the shapes of things as enduring through changes in how they stimulate our sense organs is vital to our sense of stability in the world. But what sort of capacity is shape constancy and how is it reflected in perceptual experience? I defend a pluralist account of shape constancy: there are multiple kinds of shape constancy centred on geometrical properties at various levels of abstraction, and properties at these levels feature in the content of perceptual experience, governing patterns of apparent shape similarity. I propose that the varieties of shape constancy are subserved by the syntactic complexity of perceptual shape representations. By assigning discrete constituents to various abstract shape parameters, these representations attune us to the preservation of certain abstract shape properties through changes in more determinate shape properties. Finally, I draw broader lessons concerning the nature and function of perceptual constancy.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 16/09/2026

From the latest issue: Causation and the Conservation of Energy in General Relativity – Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez, James Read & Andrés Páez Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Consensus has it that conserved quantity theories of causation—whereby causation is analysed in terms of the exchange of conserved quantities (for example, energy)—face damning problems. In particular, it is often claimed that in general relativity there simply are no conservation laws for (say) total stress-energy. If this is correct, it is difficult to see how conserved quantity theories of causation could survive. Here, we resist the consensus and defend conserved quantity theories from this conclusion, at least when focusing on the apparent problems posed by general relativity. We argue that this approach to causation can be defended in general relativity once we appreciate the availability of approximate symmetries in generic general relativistic spacetimes and the role of modelling and idealization. Given this, conserved quantity theories of causation stand or fall on other grounds.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 15/09/2026

From the new issue: The Informational Profile of Valence: The Metasemantic Argument for Imperativism – Manolo Martínez & Luca Barlassina Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 14/09/2026

From the new issue: Interpretative Models and the Biological Significance of Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection – Zhixiang Cheng Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. This article addresses the ongoing controversy over the biological significance of Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection. The differences and commonality between the modern and traditional interpretations of the theorem are presented. I argue that both the traditional and modern assessments are implicitly guided by a bipartite, ‘laws of nature–world’ framework, which has constituted a hindrance to properly appreciating the biological significance of the theorem. Instead of approaching it as if it were a standalone empirical law of nature, we had better adopt a tripartite, ‘theory–model–world’ framework and consider the theorem as a product of a special kind of ideal ‘interpretative model’. By doing so, and by comparing the corresponding interpretative model with two other ones of different kinds, we could reach a better characterization of the significance of the theorem.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 11/09/2026

From the new issue: The Many Problems of Spacetime Emergence in Quantum Gravity – Rasmus Jaksland & Kian Salimkhani Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. We argue that what is discussed in philosophy under the umbrella of spacetime emergence in fact consists of a plethora of different problems. We advocate casting such debates in terms of the emergent spatiotemporal aspects, as already happens in physics. We then argue against three ways to reject our call for specificity: the many distinct philosophical problems relating to the emergence of the various spatiotemporal aspects do not suggest any singular, overarching, or exceptional problem of spacetime emergence. We also discuss how the objections are reflected by five conceptions of spacetime and we observe that different spatiotemporal aspects are emergent in the different quantum gravity approaches, whereby investigating emergence in quantum gravity collectively is problematic. Finally, we illustrate how conducting the investigation at the level of specific spatiotemporal aspects aids philosophical inquiry.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 10/09/2026

From the latest issue: Geometric Pooling: A User’s Guide – Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Much of our information comes to us indirectly, in the form of conclusions others have drawn from evidence they gathered. When we hear these conclusions, how can we modify our own opinions so as to gain the benefit of their evidence? In this article, we study the method known as geometric pooling. We begin by raising objections to a recent argument in support of this method, and then turn to what we take to be better arguments in its favour; finally, we consider a further argument that appeals to the utility of geometric pooling in social settings, and we use our results from earlier in the article to suggest an amendment.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 09/09/2026

From the new issue: Pain: Modularity and Cognitive Constitution – Błażej Skrzypulec Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Discussions concerning the modularity of the pain system have been focused on questions regarding the cognitive penetrability of pain mechanisms. It has been claimed that phenomena such as placebo analgesia demonstrate that the pain system is cognitively penetrated; therefore, it is not encapsulated from central cognition. However, important arguments have been formulated that aim to show that cognitive penetrability does not in fact entail a lack of modularity of the pain system. This article offers an alternative way to reject the modularity of the pain system, which is independent from, but consistent with, the presence of cognitive penetration. I propose that given current knowledge regarding the functioning and the structure of the pain system, there are good reasons to accept that certain central cognitive mechanisms are part of the pain system. I argue that such a ‘cognitive constitution’ of the pain system entails that the pain system is not modular.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 08/09/2026

From the latest issue: Fixing Stochastic Dominance – Jeffrey Sanford Russell Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Decision theorists widely accept a stochastic dominance principle: roughly, if a risky prospect, A, is at least as probable as another prospect, B, to result in something at least as good, then A is at least as good as B. Recently, philosophers have applied this principle even in contexts where the values of possible outcomes do not have the structure of the real numbers: this includes cases of incommensurable values and cases of infinite values. But in these contexts the usual formulation of stochastic dominance is wrong. We show this with several counterexamples. Still, the motivating idea behind stochastic dominance is a good one: it is supposed to provide a way of applying dominance reasoning in the stochastic context of probability distributions. We give two new formulations of stochastic dominance that are more faithful to this guiding idea, and prove that they are equivalent.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

More new stuff! Infinite Scale Scepticism: Probing the Epistemology of the Limit of Infinite Degrees of Freedom and Hilbert Space Non-uniqueness – James D Fraser Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. I consider two types of argument for thinking we have strong grounds to believe that the actual world is an infinite quantum system: indispensability arguments, appealing to the role unitarily inequivalent Hilbert space representations play in accounting for physical phenomena like spontaneous symmetry breaking; and extrapolation arguments, which support the physical significance of the limit of infinite degrees of freedom by pointing to infinite volume cosmological models. Neither strategy is conclusive, leaving the relevance of novel features of infinite quantum systems to real-world physics murky. I then discuss how to motivate foundational work on infinite quantum systems that don’t turn on the representational veracity of these features, noting that for the question of the epistemological status of unitarily inequivalent Hilbert space representations, sources of non-uniqueness besides the limit of infinite degrees of freedom must be considered.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 04/09/2026

From the latest issue: Varying Evidential Standards as a Matter of Justice – Ahmad Elabbar Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Setting evidential standards is a core practice of scientific assessment for policy. Philosophers generally agree that the justification of evidential standards must appeal to non-epistemic values but not whether the balance of non-epistemic reasons favours varying those standards or maintaining a fixed high standard. I adjudicate this debate by developing a novel argument from justice, drawing on the IPCC’s assessment of climate impacts as a case study. I argue that in assessments marked by background evidential inequality, maintaining fixed high evidential standards results in an unequal distribution of epistemic power among stakeholders, producing a powerful assessment for the data-rich (a high rate of findings) and a weak assessment for the data-poor (a low rate of findings). Where such inequalities of epistemic power disadvantage those in data-poor regions with respect to fundamental interests, we have decisive reasons of justice to vary evidential standards.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 03/09/2026

More from the new issue: A Hierarchy of Spacetime Symmetries: Holes to Heraclitus – JB Manchak & Thomas Barrett Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. We present a hierarchy of symmetry conditions within the context of general relativity. The weakest condition captures a sense in which spacetime is free of symmetry ‘holes’ of a certain type. All standard models of general relativity satisfy the condition but we show that violations can occur if the Hausdorff assumption is dropped. On the other extreme, the strongest condition of the hierarchy is satisfied whenever a model is completely devoid of symmetries. In these ‘Heraclitus’ spacetimes, no pair of distinct points can be mapped (even locally) into one another. We prove that such spacetimes exist. We also show a sense in which Heraclitus spacetimes are completely determined by their local properties. We close with a brief comment on the prospect of using the symmetries of a spacetime as a guide to how much ‘structure’ it possesses.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 02/09/2026

From the new issue: Understanding Structural Representations – Marc Artiga Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. The notion of structural representation has recently been suggested to play two key dialectical roles: on the one hand, against eliminativist challenges it is supposed to capture some cognitive processes in which a representionalist explanation can earn its keep. On the other, against liberal views it vindicates a concept of representation that avoids the problem of trivialization. A first goal of this article is to show that the notion of structural representation can be understood in different ways. Second, I will argue that on any interpretation it is unclear this concept can play the theoretical role attributed to it in the recent literature.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 01/09/2026

This issue’s Editors’ Choice paper: Between Scientific and Empathetic Understanding: The Case of Auditory Verbal Hallucination – Shivam Patel Abstract in alt text or read it for free here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. A common but overlooked form of explanation in psychiatry is what I label ‘empathetic explanation’. Empathetic explanations invoke empathetic variables, which, in addition to providing an explanation of the target phenomenon, also afford an empathetic understanding of it. Focusing on the case of auditory verbal hallucination, I argue that empathetic explanation fails to provide an adequate account of the phenomenon, perniciously shapes empirical research, and confuses empathetic understanding with scientific understanding. I close by providing a general condition on the legitimate application of empathetic explanation.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 31/08/2026

New issue out now, and it's fifty shade of #philsci! Contains hierarchies, dominance and pain! Also degrees of freedom, matters of justice, understanding, hallucination, holes and Heraclitus! Get it while it's hot! (Spiciness not guaranteed.) www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/bjps/cur... #philsky

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 20/08/2026

Just accepted: Memory as a Generative Source of Understanding – Jocelyn Yuxing Wang Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. What is the epistemic role of memory? I depart from two kinds of views. The first type that I reject is the traditional ‘storehouse’ view that memory merely functions to preserve previously acquired information, such as information acquired through perception. Memory, I argue, plays a more active role. The second type holds that memory generates new epistemic values in addition to preserving information, but narrowly focuses on memory’s epistemic generativity with respect to justification. I propose, in addition to generating justification, memory also improves our understanding of previously encoded contents. I use empirical evidence about the role of memory consolidation, a process that has been overlooked by most of the philosophy literature, and argue that through several different mechanisms, including pattern extraction and integration of piecemeal information, the consolidation process enhances some of the important cognitive abilities constituting understanding.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 18/08/2026

Just accepted: A Problem of ‘Relevance' – Feraz Azhar Abstract in alt text or read the paper here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. In assessing support for a hypothesis, we must decide what evidence to include. The requirement of total evidence (RTE) demands we include our total relevant evidence. But what fixes relevance? Existing work on RTE does not explicitly address this, nor develop it in a way that is sensitive and readily applicable to the practice of modern-day science. I address these challenges. In particular, I introduce and critically analyse a version of RTE that makes precise two conditions for evidence to count as 'relevant' ('admissibility' and 'non-redundancy') in a way that renders RTE readily applicable to scientific models understood from a practical, modern viewpoint. I dub this the 'effective turn': scientific models are analysed in light of their limited regimes of applicability. I also provide a contrast with implementations of RTE in more general settings, where model-relative guardrails may be absent and the problem of what fixes relevance is correspondingly thornier.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 30/07/2026

Have we got a bunch of numbers for you! That's right, it's a pile of stats concerning submissions, authors, referees, and the journal itself. And, for the dedicated reader, there's our annual report to get your teeth into. (TL;DR: the numbers are good again this year.) #philsci #philsky

thebsps.org

BJPS Stats 2025 | Auxiliary Hypotheses

Acceptance rates, time to decisions, and more

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Finn Thwaite @finnthwaite.bsky.social · 23/07/2026

It was a great talk, as always. Lots to think about! Many thanks for making these keynotes publicly available

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 23/07/2026

Al Wilson introduces the second keynote of #BSPS2026: Eleanor Knox, ‘The Scale and Context-Relativity of Spacetime Structure’ #philsci #philsky

A man and a woman stand in front of a PowerPoint presentation

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 22/07/2026

You might think this is cringe but only if you’ve never had serious and gifted copy editors

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Ellen Clarke @ellenclarke.bsky.social · 22/07/2026

Danny Davis on Procedural Objectivity and the aims of conservation

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Ellen Clarke @ellenclarke.bsky.social · 22/07/2026

Symposium on “Good enough” science with Stephen John, Katherine Furman, Hanna Hilligardt, Matthias Frisch and Torbjorn Gundersen

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Ellen Clarke @ellenclarke.bsky.social · 22/07/2026

Keynote Tarja Knuuttila Revisiting Artefactualism

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Ellen Clarke @ellenclarke.bsky.social · 21/07/2026

@thebsps.bsky.social BSPS Leeds 2026 is go! Opening with a presidential address by Robin Hendry ‘Metaphysics & Science: A call for History’ sites.google.com/view/bsps202...

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 22/07/2026

The first keynote of #BSPS2026 comes from Tarja Knuuttila, ‘Revisiting Artefactualism: The Model-Target coupling Displaced’ #philsci #philsky

A woman stands in front of a PowerPoint, which displays the title of her talk

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 22/07/2026

If you are at #BSPS2026, join us this afternoon for our Ask the Editors session (dogs not included, alas)...

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 21/07/2026

And our glorious leader Robin Hendry takes to the lectern to deliver his address, ‘Metaphysics and Science: A Call for History’ #bsps2026 #philsci #philsky

Robin Hendry wearing a blue shirt and gesticulating in the approved academic manner. He looks happy enough.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 21/07/2026

Ex-president James Ladyman introduces current president Robin Hendry, who will deliver the BSPS Presidential Address #bsps2026 #philsci #philsky

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 21/07/2026

Before things kick off officially at #BSPS2026, Adrian Currie explains the attack on philosophy (among others) happening at Exeter (among others). Rousing speech followed by big applause #DefendExeterUni

A man stands with his hand on the face in front on a PowerPoint slide calling for people to defend Exeter University

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 16/07/2026

If you are at the #BSPS2026 conference next week, join us for our ask the editors’ session, and learn the one weird trick to getting published* *write good (Pictured: Behind the scenes at BJPS Towers with Matilda from marketing and our newest intern, Archie)

One back and white dog and one white and brown dog sit on a couch, with a sign reading ‘ask me anything’ between them

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 09/07/2026

If you can't join us at our annual conference, you can at least watch the keynotes, which will be both livestreamed (link below) and later posted on our YouTube channel. Abstract for the first talk in alt text and link to livestream here: teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-joi... #philsci #philsky

Presidential address
Robin Hendry
Metaphysics and Science: A Call for History

4pm, Tuesday 21 July (UK time)

ABSTRACT. Scientists and philosophers down the ages have argued that there should be no overlap between science and metaphysics. Others have claimed, to the contrary, that science needs a foundation that only metaphysics can provide. I would challenge both these lines of thought, but the first is the main target of this talk.
Consider the following claims, which are widely accepted:
(1) The Universe was created in a great explosion whose effects remain visible;
(2) Biological species are the product of a chancy process involving mutation and natural selection;
(3) What happens in our minds is the outcome of neural processes.
Not only are these all metaphysical (in a broad sense): scientific research is also relevant to them, even if they aren’t simple to decide.
If we understand metaphysics broadly to be concerned with general and abstract questions of existence and reality, science is clearly concerned with metaphysics. But how good is science at answering metaphysical questions like these, and under what conditions? I address that question historically, by looking at two well-known failures (causal determinism and Newtonian mechanics; a claimed refutation of vitalism); and some important but neglected successes (the achievements of 19th-century chemistry).
I conclude by arguing that metaphysical claims can be supported by science if they have had an active, intimate and indispensable heuristic and conceptual role in the development of science. Otherwise, it’s too soon to tell.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 09/07/2026

Last, but most definitely not least, Eleanor Knox delivers her keynote talk, 'The Scale and Context-Relativity of Spacetime Structure', at 11.30am, Thursday 23 July (UK time) Abstract in alt text and livestream link here: teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-joi... #philsci #philsky #bsps2026

BSPS Keynote
11.30am, Thursday 23 July (UK time)

Eleanor Knox,
'The Scale and Context-Relativity of Spacetime Structure'

ABSTRACT. Many theories of quantum gravity appear to imply that the spacetime of general relativity will be effective or emergent. This talk explores the consequences of such a view, and argues that, on any plausible account on which general relativistic spacetime emerges, other relativistic and non-relativistic spacetime structures will emerge in relevant contexts and at relevant scales. This has surprising and under-appreciated consequences—for example, that, at certain scales, binary black holes live in Newtonian spacetime.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 09/07/2026

Next up will Tarja Knuuttila, 'Revisiting Artefactualism: The Model-Target Coupling Displaced' Abstract in alt text and livestream link here: teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-joi... #philsci #philsky #bsps2026

BSPS Keynote
11.30am, Wednesday 22 July (UK time)

Tarja Knuuttila,
'Revisiting Artefactualism: The Model–Target Coupling Displaced'

ABSTRACT. Models are epistemic artefacts, constructed and put to many uses, including understanding, prediction, data mining, and design. In many cases, the key to their epistemic value is erotetic: they are built to address pending theoretical or empirical questions, and that is where their epistemic value lies, not in a model’s correspondence to a determinable real-world target system. I defend this thesis and dispel a double bind in the account’s recent reception. It has been claimed, on the one hand, that the artefactual account is covertly representational and, on the other hand, that as a non-representational account, it cannot supply the content that property attribution and model-world comparison require. These charges pull in opposite directions and cannot both land. The artefactual account does attribute content to models, located in the interpreted representational modes and media used in their construction, but does not assume that the epistemic value of models is due to the representational relationship between model and target. Artefactualism stays neutral between different theories of representation, though closer to deflationary, inferentialist accounts. No longer organised around the model-target relation as its unit of analysis, the account clarifies the use of cross-domain model templates, the modal reach of modelling, and models without determinable targets, such as large language models and synthetic models.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 09/07/2026

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 09/07/2026

From the new issue: Distal Content in Informational Teleosemantics: Challenges from Colour Constancy and Colour Chemistry – Lance Balthazar Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. In general, visual experiences represent determinately. And visual experiences, generally, represent properties of distal objects like their colour, shape, and size, but they do not, generally, represent properties of proximal states like that of incoming light or the retina. By making perceptual constancies central to perceptual representation, Schulte extends Neander’s causal–informational teleosemantic theory in order to accommodate these facts. However, by appealing to the psychophysics and chemistry of how light-related properties interact to produce stimulation to the visual system and how the visual system processes such input to produce experiences, I argue that Schulte’s theory fails to accommodate the facts of distality and determinacy.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 07/07/2026

From the new issue: Contours of Vision: Towards a Compositional Semantics of Perception – Kevin J Lande Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Mental capacities for perceiving, remembering, thinking, and planning involve the processing of structured mental representations. A compositional semantics of such representations would explain how the content of any given representation is determined by the contents of its constituents and their mode of combination. While many have argued that semantic theories of mental representations would have broad value for understanding the mind, there have been few attempts to develop such theories in a systematic and empirically constrained way. This article contributes to that end by developing a semantics for a ‘fragment’ of our mental representational system: the visual system’s representations of the bounding contours of objects. At least three distinct kinds of composition are involved in such representations: ‘concatenation’, ‘feature composition’, and ‘contour composition’. I sketch the constraints on and semantics of each of these. This account has three principal payoffs. First, it models a working framework for compositionally ascribing structure and content to perceptual representations, while highlighting core kinds of evidence that bear on such ascriptions. Second, it shows how a compositional semantics of perception can be compatible with holistic, or Gestalt, phenomena, which are often taken to show that the whole percept is other than the sum of its parts. Finally, the account illuminates the format of a key type of perceptual representation, bringing out the ways in which contour representations exhibit domain-specific form of the sort that is typical of structured icons such as diagrams and maps, in contrast to typical discursive representations of logic and language.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 27/06/2026

Want an intro to the big ideas in the issue’s Editors’ Choice article? We have a short read for that! Getting to Basecamp with Everettian Quantum Mechanics, by Jake Khawaja #philsci #philsky

thebsps.org

Getting to Basecamp with Everettian Quantum Mechanics | Jake Khawaja | BJPS Short Reads

Can Everett justify the quantum-mechanical probabilities?

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 27/06/2026

Want an intro to the big ideas in the issue’s Editors’ Choice article? We have a short read for that! Getting to Basecamp with Everettian Quantum Mechanics, by Jake Khawaja #philsci #philsky

thebsps.org

Getting to Basecamp with Everettian Quantum Mechanics | Jake Khawaja | BJPS Short Reads

Can Everett justify the quantum-mechanical probabilities?

001

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 26/06/2026

From the new issue: Charting the Territories of Epistemic Concepts in the Practice of Science: A Text-Mining Approach – Christophe Malaterre & Martin Léonard Abstract in the alt text ot read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Much attention in philosophy of science has been devoted to explicating highly prized concepts such as explanation, theory, or model, among many others, resulting in a plurality of nuanced philosophical accounts (for example, the deductive-nomological account, the causal account, the unification account, and the mechanistic account of explanation). The rationale for this enterprise is to be found in the central epistemic roles that such concepts are taken to play in science. But do these concepts actually play such significant roles? In this article, we investigate the actual usage of epistemic concepts in the practice of science by analysing terminological occurrence patterns in scientific publications. Narrowing down the study to six major epistemic concepts (theory, model, mechanism, explanation, understanding, and prediction), we use text-mining methods to quantify actual terminological usage and relationships in a corpus of 73,771 full-text scientific articles of the biological and medical sciences (from the BioMed Central database). The resulting terminological cartographies partly validate select philosophical intuitions, but also suggest notable differences between philosophical reconstructions and the actual roles that epistemic concepts appear to be playing in the scientific discourse. We also investigate the incidence of disciplinary context.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 25/06/2026

More new stuff: Mechanistic Explanations and Teleological Functions – Andrew Rubner Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/... #philsci #philsky #hpbio

ABSTRACT. This article defines and defends a notion of teleological function that is fit to figure in explanations concerning how organic systems, and the items that compose them, are able to perform certain activities, such as surviving and reproducing or pumping blood. According to this notion, a teleological function of an item (such as the heart) is a typical way that items of that type contribute to some containing system’s ability to do some activity. An account of what it is for an item to contribute to a containing system’s ability to perform an activity is provided. I argue that the view acquires its normative status in virtue of the fact that it obeys a function–accident distinction and obeys a function–dysfunction distinction; that the view is ahistorical; and, that its ahistoricity provides it with an advantage over one of its main competitors.

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