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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 03/09/2026

It’s all fun and games until Sebastian changes the rules and requires Airborne Assault to roll an natural 20 on a pair of D6s

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 19/08/2026

I’m very excited to be teaching the Game Theory as part of this awesome Virginia Tech course and awesome graduate certificate in wargaming. Huge thanks to @ctreese2.bsky.social and the entire team at VT SPIA

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 21/07/2026

The whole program is going to be awesome... and because of his crippling inability to say "no," I have a feeling like we might have @sebastianbae.bsky.social pop in for a guest designer panel or two.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 30/05/2026

Nice… got my shipping notification yesterday. Can’t wait.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

There is a missing data problem here which makes deterrence claims non-falsifiable without cracking into adversaries' internal deliberations.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

The argument that the military alone or even chiefly to blame for the strategic failures lets those who DO hold the real responsibility off the hook, all while distracting attention by bringing up the militaries tactical prowess.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

So enough of the strawman argument trying to make it out that I am saying that the military is blameless. That's not what I've claimed here or ever. Any look into my bio (which we now all know you've done) would show that I've been directly critical of many military decisions.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

"Would it have been possible to perceive and mend this error by a scheme for the War from a purely military point of view? Impossible." (B. 8. Ch 6, trans Kegan) : meaning a faulty policy cannot be fixed by a clever military.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

"it [policy] must accommodate itself to the nature of the means, and though changes in these means may involve modification in the political objective." (Book 1, Chap 1, tran JJ Grahm) meaning that when a military strategy (means) cannot achieve the political goal, goal must be modified.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

"If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war." (Book 8, ch 6, trans H&P) = no military means can achieve mismatched political goals.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

Wow. So you're saying that policy-strategy match isn't a constant drumbeat in On War? "Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse." Book 8, Chap 6 (trans. H&P)

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

I don't disagree. But I do disagree with the framing of the article which blames the military for failing to obtain unobtainable ends, while waving the red herring of tactical prowess overhead to distract from civilian culpability.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

Trying to say the Army is responsible for translating tactical success into political goals, when the policy aims and ways/means chosen by the politicians are mismatched, shows a selective/non-reading reading of Clausewitz.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

I pointed out that the author quoted Clausewitz to advance his point and it was a poorly chosen, trite quote.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

GOFO failing afterwards are theirs and deserve that blame. But that is not the framing of the original article, nor the argument that I'm making.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

This is becoming unfruitful and I do not appreciate you trying to make this a personal attack. GEN Shinseki was dismissed precisely because he provided impartial assessments to Congress in open testimony. He was summarily dismissed precisely for that.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

And they deserve that portion of the blame. But that most certainly is not the framing or major thrust of the article I'm responding to.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

The article frames the debate as the military is unable to translate tactical success into strategic victory, which is akin to judging an elephant for its ability to climb trees.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

I SAY AGAIN, if there evidence of GOFOs skewing the narrative, misrepresenting facts, etc. they are to blame for THAT. But the decision to employ military force, in the cases I mentioned, was made by civilian officials who were warned by their uniformed advisors, and dismissed them.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

Trying to say that its the Army fault for not solving non-military problem and poking at their tactical success to underscore it, is a bad faith argument in the extreme. And a NATO ambassador knows that, but decided on that framing anyway.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

That first order blame rests primarily on the civilians, who were informed of the risks (by GEN Shinseki and others) but made the choice nonetheless.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

And throughout OEF particularly, GOFOs were all too comfortable looking at the war through rosey glasses, and we can blame them for skewing the narrative. But the article pulls the opposite extreme, blaming the military for failure in fundamentally non-military problems.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

If you have evidence that officers were derelict in their duty to do so, it'll make a great book. But the pattern I'm showing here is one of GOFOs presenting that evidence and being dismissed, not one where they failed their duty.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

The BULK of the responsibility does not mean sole responsibility. The first order question is who decided. A secondary (but important) question then must be asked of the military. Did the appropriate officers neglect their duty to provide impartial, "best" military advice.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

Except it isn’t. The constraints placed on the conduct of this war by the political leadership, for political reasons, are not constraints that could ever, under any circumstances, produce the strategic victory sought. And exactly one entity defines those. And it isn’t CENTCOM.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

Strategic misalignment between policy ends and chosen ways/means, however, is evergreen from the tundra to the desert.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

bsky.app/profile/stra... While our force is definitely suitable for a maneuver campaign through Europe, it is not pigeon-holed there. We do fine work (tactically, operationally) in many other environments, and have proven adaptable to every one.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

I'm certainly no Cold War historian, so I cannot speak to force design decision from 1985. However, I have been a part of total army analysis more recently and the Army, spends a great deal of intellectual energy on many varied scenarios to inform force design.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

My favorite move is always to restrict budgets. I find foreign students almost never default to "do more" as their strategy. Sorry, you don't get more. And if your idea of strategic thought can be described by a Kylo Ren meme, it's bad.

static.klipy.com

Star Demands More!

ALT: Star Demands More!

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

I don't think it's porous... if you mean that the line is blurred. The military conceives it as stark and (to the author's point) it starts the war's beginning. Politicians decide on war, and the military executes. It's a deeply held (and deeply dumb) idea. And it's Sam Huntington's fault.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

But GEN Shinseki did. And was then dismissed. So the message was sent. The civilian principals have the right to be wrong, and they were.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

I'd challenge this. The largest drivers of "axe-grinding," particularly in the run up to the Iraq War (OIF), were all civilian political appointees. In this case there was public push-back and dismissal of uniformed officers. Does not seem like GOs are in the axe-grinding business.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

Instead of this screed, the author could have written the SAME article and pointed to - not the Army, or "Washington" nebulously - but to elected officials or the US populace that misunderstands the utility of force. They have the right to be wrong (tm), and therefore the bulk of responsibility.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

The real answer is: The US fails strategically PRECISELY because we have an overwhelmingly powerful military, and that makes military solutions seem like an EASY answer to complex problems. It's an enticing, shiny button, and without advisors empowered to push back, it's very tempting.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

Also, "it’s no surprise the most powerful army in human history can’t win the wars it starts." Please point to the uniformed officer who is entrusted with the decision to start a war? (*is he in the room with us now?*) Despite a laying out all the reasons, he never stumbles upon the real answer.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

If Carl could have defined war in one pithy sentence, WHAT EXACTLY DO YOU THINK THE OTHER 700+ PAGES WERE ABOUT?!?! I have a special hate-fire that I keep stoked for this particular class of people.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

Dr. Daalder is one of SO DAMN MANY who've been assigned Clausewitz, pretended to read Clausewitz, quotes Clausewitz, but APPARENTLY ONLY INTERNALIZED A SINGLE PARAGRAPH HEADING FROM BOOK ONE CHAPTER ONE AND THEN DECIDED THAT'S THE WHOLE G-D THING.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 27/05/2026

Many others have already dunked on this extreme poor op-ed from someone who should know better... So let me pile on.

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Reposted by Paul M Kearney

Sebastian Bae @sebastianbae.bsky.social · 18/05/2026

My "Littoral Commander Baltic" #wargame is featured in Yaah! magazine! What a delightful surprise. 😁

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Reposted by Paul M Kearney

Military Writers Guild @milwritersguild.bsky.social · 18/05/2026

🚨 The Professor Richard H. Kohn Fellowship: Fully funded opportunity for 3 military & veteran writers •One‑week intensive retreat for writers to turn operational experience into policy‑shaping work. • Focused writing time • Expert coaching • Peer review • Support publishing

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 16/05/2026

Been real close to “unanticipated spine surgery” a few too many times as a paratrooper… never as a strategist! Hope you heal quickly.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 07/05/2026

Innovate faster* and break things** *faster ≠ smarter or better outcome ** things = the people actually doing the work

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

Many thanks to my committee members and the many mentors, peers, and friends who've reviewed earlier drafts. On to the dissertation completion and defense.

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Paul M Kearney @strategerist.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

Academia is a wonderfully strange place where you might hear, "this is a great piece of research that will make a big splash," and "it's just that I think it's all wrong," as one, unbroken sentence. Anyway, I've survived my prelim defense and am now ABD.

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