Lower Prices in the Short Term, But Higher Prices Later

Tying Law Emerged from Antitrust Concerns About Innovation Overreach

This populist movement is disconnected from actual people

Per Se Illegality is Not the Right Cure for Underenforced Antitrust Laws

The Antitrust Policy Focus on Industry Structure has a Long but Agitated History

Preliminary Thoughts on Private Standard Setting for Artificial Intelligence Tools

A Structuralist Rival in Antitrust Merger Analysis?

The 1963 Supreme Court case United States v. Philadelphia National Bank established a "structural pr...

Simply grouping differentiated products together creates overly broad markets

A More Accurate Measure That Is Inconsistent With the “Brown Shoe Factors”

The 1963 Supreme Court case United States v. Philadelphia National Bank established a "structural pr...

The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Guidance on Market Definition Should be Overruled

<p><span>Cartel management services are intermediaries that coordinate competitors’ pricing through centralized software. Our comparative analysis of US and EU

<p>The antitrust courts have been increasingly reluctant to award structural remedies – i.e., “breakups” – in cases finding unlawful monopolization.  This

What is Market Power and Why is it Important?

A complete database of legal scholarship cited by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Covering all aspects of Antitrust Law, including its substance, procedures, and goals. Click to read The Monopoly Problem, a Substack publication with hundreds of subscribers.

Technostress Should Not Distort Antitrust Policy

The Department of Transportation Must Look at a Joint Venture’s Overall Effects

Should there be an Efficiency “Defense” to Merger Challenges?

Is it justified? Is it Too Much?

Antitrust actions against dominant firms, particularly in big tech, have led to vociferous calls for “break up” remedies.  The federal antitrust enforcemen

The Meaning and Limits of the Kodak doctrine

Monopoly Breakups Rarely Work, Especially in Digital Markets

The Philadelphia Bank Presumption

Merger Law has a TMI Problem. Simplifying Rules Essential

And a Circuit Split; Is Supreme Court Review Likely?

Antitrust Law’s Agreement Requirement and the Role of Human Actors

Why Do Firms Integrate Vertically, and When Does it Harm Competition?

The revived American Innovation Choice Online Act singles out a handful of Big Tech giants for unique, antitrust-like restrictions, but without the standard methodological rationale of antitrust analy...

This is not over, but the state AGs have reason to be hopeful.

Free to download

Can it be Fixed, or is Repeal the Best Solution?

Part 2 in a series on the Robinson-Patman Act

A Prehistory of the Robinson-Patman Act

What Trump v. Slaughter Says About Independent Regulatory Agencies

Answer: It Depends on What You Expect Antitrust to Accomplish

Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School; frequent contributor on antitrust law and legal and business history.

Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School; frequent contributor on antitrust law and legal and business history.

Concentration is Relevant When it Leads to Higher Prices, Lower Output, or Limits on Quality or Innovation

A preoccupation since the Progressive Era

<p>The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976  (HSR) required pre-merger notification and review of certain proposed acquisitions.  The statute changed the tim

Tech giants including Meta, Google, and Apple are facing increasing popular resentment and losing more and more major court battles. Yet their profits and power look about as secure as ever.

Brandeis Wrote Two Rule of Reason Decisions; the Second One is Better But Ignored

How Can Amazon Make Merchants Compete for its Buy Box?

Robert Bork vs. the Supreme Court

<p><span>Most economic progress comes from disruptive firms that offer some new thing, benefiting their customers, workers, and suppliers but often harming riva