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Eye on Transcaucasia @scaucasus.bsky.social · 14h

Family Disputes Suicide Account After Inmate Is Found Dead in Rustavi Prison #Civil #Georgia

Family Disputes Suicide Account After Inmate Is Found Dead in Rustavi Prison

Iakob Guledani, an inmate at Rustavi’s Penitentiary Facility No. 17, was found dead, TV Pirveli reported on October 4, citing a relative. While the Special Penitentiary Service said Guledani had died by suicide after being found hanging in a cell toilet, his family disputed this account. The inmate’s aunt, Valida Guledani, told TV Pirveli that the family was notified of his death on October 2. She said she did not believe he had taken his own life, noting that he had spent about three and a half years in prison and that his sentence was due to end in a few months. The aunt also said that his body reportedly showed signs of violence. Shortly after TV Pirveli’s report, the Special Penitentiary Service released a statement saying that “convict I. G. was found hanging in the toilet in the morning by a cellmate.” The agency said it had “immediately notified” the Kvemo Kartli Regional Prosecutor’s Office, and an investigation was launched. “It should be noted that the convict had been held in Penitentiary Facility No. 17 since 2023 (sentence end date: 2028), where he was serving his sentence in a 20-person cell. On the day of the death as well, since the incident occurred in the morning hours, his cellmates were present in the cell,” the statement said. It added that “the penitentiary service is actively cooperating with the investigative body, and all relevant materials related to the case have already been provided to the investigation.” Guledani’s aunt said she believed there were signs of violence on his body. “I don’t know what the experts established and what they didn’t, but he would never have killed himself; he has also traces of violence, I think,” she said. “He was in prison for three and a half years and didn’t kill himself, and now, when he was due to get out in 2-3 months, he would kill himself?” The case follows a separate controversy last week, when a Rustavi No.6 prison inmate, Giorgi Davitadze, alleged sexual assault by prison guards in a de-escalation cell. Authorities “categorically” denied the allegations and released footage in an attempt to support their account, while the Public Defender said it found “no evidence” of ill-treatment in the video recordings. However, critics did not find the agency’s use of the footage convincing, calling for the recordings to be studied in more detail. Davitadze’s family also disputed the officials’ account and demanded the full release of the recordings, including audio, which they said showed violence against him. They also called for the resignation of prison chief Shota Trapaidze. Also Read: * 20/05/2026 – Georgia Has Fourth-Highest Prison Population Rate in Council of Europe’s 2025 Report * 18/02/2026 – CoE Committee for Prevention of Torture Publishes Report on Georgia * 17/06/2025 – Abuse Allegations as Man Dies After Police Custody * 05/05/2025 – Man Dies in Hospital After Alleged Abuse in Prison

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Eye on Transcaucasia @scaucasus.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

Shio III Receives Moscow Patriarchate Delegation, Discusses ‘Troubled Regions’, Relations Between Countries #Civil #Georgia

Shio III Receives Moscow Patriarchate Delegation, Discusses ‘Troubled Regions’, Relations Between Countries

Georgian Orthodox Church Patriarch Shio III received a delegation from the Moscow Patriarchate, with the sides discussing “troubled regions” and relations between the two countries, the Georgian Patriarchate’s Public Relations Service reported on September 30. “During the meeting, the parties discussed relations between the two countries,” the Patriarchate said. “Attention was paid to the situation in the troubled regions and on what could be done to find ways of enabling the Georgian Orthodox Church to establish relations with the local parish,” it added, apparently referring to Georgia’s Russia-occupied regions of Tskhinvali/South Ossetia and Abkhazia, without mentioning the occupation or the names of the regions. The sides also exchanged what the statement described as “symbolic gifts,” while the delegation congratulated Shio III on his enthronement and personally passed congratulations from Moscow’s Patriarch Kirill, according to the statement. The Russian delegation included Metropolitan Anthony (Sevryuk) of Volokolamsk, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations; Archpriest Nikolay Balashov, adviser to the Patriarch of Moscow; Archpriest Igor Yakimchuk, deputy chairman of the Department for External Church Relations; Priest Nikolay Vasin, assistant to the department’s chairman; and Vladimir Alexandrov, the Moscow Patriarchate’s representative in Georgia. On the Georgian side, the meeting was attended by Metropolitan Theodore of Akhaltsikhe and Tao-Klarjeti; Metropolitan Gerasime of Zugdidi and Tsaishi; Metropolitan Andria of Gori and Ateni; Bishop Vakhtang of Nikortsminda; Protopresbyter Giorgi Zviadadze; Archpriest Mikael Botkoveli, secretary to the Catholicos-Patriarch; and Archpriest Andria Jagmaidze, head of the Patriarchate’s Public Relations Service. Shio III was enthroned as Patriarch of Georgia on May 12, a day after his election, succeeding the late Ilia II, who died at the age of 93 in March after nearly half a century at the helm of the Georgian Orthodox Church. The visit comes amid continued scrutiny of Shio III’s past connections with Russia, including through his clerical and academic background. He served in senior church positions in Georgia and at a Georgian parish in Moscow, studied remotely at the Moscow Theological Seminary, and completed a doctorate at Moscow’s St. Tikhon’s Orthodox University in 2015. Moscow also showed interest in the Georgian Church’s succession process following Ilia II’s death. But in the months after Ilia II’s death, Shio III has not shown any particular leanings towards Moscow, with the representatives from the Russian church remaining largely in the background during Ilia II’s funeral and Shio III’s enthronement, while representatives of Western Orthodox churches, including Constantinople Patriarch Bartholomew, received more prominence. Shio III has yet to visit Moscow since his enthronement. Reports have indicated that he is preparing for a visit to Constantinople Patriarch Bartholomew in Istanbul, and has also discussed the visit with guests from the Constantinople Patriarchate. Georgian Orthodox Church maintained regular contacts with the Moscow Patriarchate even after Tbilisi cut diplomatic ties with Moscow following 2008 war and Russia’s recognition of Georgia’s occupied territories as independent states. Ilia II visited Moscow six times after the war, with his last visit taking place in November 2016. The Moscow Patriarchate has formally continued to recognize Georgia’s Russia-occupied regions as falling within the canonical jurisdiction of the Georgian Orthodox Church. Still, Russian Orthodox clergy have operated in both regions, and Russian military chaplains have also served at bases in the occupied territories, while Georgian clergy have had little or no access to the territories. Also read: * 12/06/2026 – Five Ambassadors Meet Patriarch Shio III * 01/06/2026 – U.S. State Department Representatives Conclude Georgia Visit, Issue Statements

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Eye on Transcaucasia @scaucasus.bsky.social · 30/09/2026

Garibashvili Recounts His Accomplishments in Office, Questions Those of Successors in New Jail Letter #Civil #Georgia

Garibashvili Recounts His Accomplishments in Office, Questions Those of Successors in New Jail Letter

Jailed former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili has issued a new lengthy letter looking back at his 2021-2024 tenure, crediting his government with rescuing the country from a political and economic crisis, reopening the economy, “refusing COVID dictatorship,” and securing EU candidate status “without bowing head to anyone.” In the September 29 letter, published on Garibashvili’s social media, he also highlighted social reforms and government programs, claimed his administration had “politically nullified the entire radical opposition,” took credit for ensuring “uncompromising and firm protection of our country’s national interests despite pressure” amid Russia’s war on Ukraine, and claimed having averted destabilization and what he described as a “revolutionary” plot led by also jailed ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili. Recalling that almost three years have passed since he left office in January 2024, Garibashvili asked the public: “Has the situation in the country improved or worsened in the direction of domestic or foreign policy?” The statement comes as part of a series of allegations Garibashvili has made in recent weeks about a group within the Georgian Dream government pressuring him to confess to a corruption-related crime as a guarantee of keeping him out of politics. Following his initial allegations, Garibashvili, who is currently serving a five-year sentence after pleading guilty to a serious money laundering offence, was also charged with bribery, a corruption-related offence. While in his first statement, Garibashvili mentioned a “letter” – allegedly containing pressure – sent to him “on the instruction” of Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, his later statements indicated Mamuka Mdinaradze as sending the letter. Mdinaradze, who had held a number of high-level positions in the GD government over the past year, announced his resignation and departure from politics on August 27, some nine days after Garibashvili first mentioned his name. One of Ivanishvili’s closest aides before entering politics, Garibashvili served as Georgian prime minister twice, from 2013 to 2015 and again from 2021 to 2024. Statement in Detail Garibashvili began his letter by recalling the situation he inherited when he returned as prime minister in February 2021, following then-PM Giorgi Gakharia’s resignation. “The country was in an acute political crisis, with the COVID pandemic (a vaccine shortage), a locked-down country, a closed economy, a minus six-percent economic decline, and a nine-percent budget deficit,” Garibashvili wrote, adding that “government debt relative to GDP exceeded 60%, and the lari exchange rate had risen to the 3.3-3.4 mark. Everything had come to a standstill, and the country was effectively facing the threat of ‘default.'” He went on to criticize Gakharia, saying that he “abandoned a country and a team in such a crisis when he committed a sudden betrayal and resigned.” “The government was on the verge of collapse, the ruling party was demoralized, the team was confused, and the party’s rating at that time had fallen to 35–37%. I took over such a collapsed government on February 18, 2021,” he said. Immediately after his appointment, Garibashvili said the government “restored balance in the shortest possible time, strengthened the team, and stabilized the situation,” emphasizing that his team “took bold, effective, and, at that time, risky steps: we opened the country, brought in three types of vaccines, refused COVID dictatorship, and I declared full freedom to our people regarding vaccination.” In parallel, he said, “we opened the closed economy and gave a strong push to business and economic development.” Garibashvili recalled that the government back then, “began implementing new initiatives across the whole country: large infrastructure projects, a regional renewal program, and we launched work in every municipality.” “In the same year, we confidently won the local elections. We overcame the 43% threshold and got 47%,” he said, apparently referring to the threshold set under the EU-brokered April 19 agreement, which included Georgian Dream’s commitment to hold early parliamentary elections if it received less than 43% of the proportional vote in the 2021 local elections. * 17/09/2021 – Explainer | Georgia’s 2021 Locals – Why They Matter “We avoided destabilization and an attempt to organize a revolution with Saakashvili’s participation, put every destructive force in its place, and ended the political crisis. And finally, we closed both 2021 and 2022 with unprecedented double-digit economic growth,” he continued. Garibashvili claimed that the country’s economy “grew fastest during my three-year rule,” arguing that in three years, “the economy grew by thirty billion lari,” and the team managed to control inflation, as it came down “below the target level, and in certain periods, was even below 1%.” * 08/01/2024 – Georgia’s Annual Inflation at 0.4% in December 2023 “As a result, the pressure on prices was lifted,” he said. “For example, with the opening of the Turkish market and the introduction of reference prices on medicines, drug prices dropped instantly, falling by 30–40% on average, and as a result, in two years we saved our country’s population 400 million lari,” Garibashvili added, noting that before that, “medicines were sold with markups of 100–300%, and no effective control existed.” Garibashvili said the government brought the budget deficit down from “9% to 2.8%” and “stabilized the lari exchange rate within the range of 2.6–2.7.” “In three years, we sharply reduced government debt from 60% to 38%,” he added. He further credited his government with reducing unemployment and poverty to “a historic minimum,” creating tens of thousands of jobs and increasing the salaries of police officers, soldiers and special-service employees by 40-50%, alongside increases in pensions and the salaries of teachers and doctors. Garibashvili further claimed that “Georgia was in first place in terms of economic growth rate among EU member and candidate countries,” while ranking third in terms of low inflation and tenth in terms of government debt. Turning to Russia’s war against Ukraine, Garibashvili said that from the very first days of the war, “despite the most difficult pressure, we firmly and uncompromisingly defended our country’s national interests, avoided destabilization and the real danger of war.” * 25/02/2022 – Georgia Won’t Join Russia Sanctions, PM Says “In parallel with the rapid development taking place inside the country, we were conducting an active foreign policy.” According to Garibashvili, “in three years, we carried out 25 foreign visits. We submitted the application for membership in the European Union. We signed new strategic agreements and free trade agreements.” He recalled his “successful visits” to “China, Brussels, European capitals, America, the countries of the Middle East and the Gulf, Israel and Jordan (with the blessing of His Holiness Ilia II, after three hundred years Georgia returned to the Holy Land).” “We strengthened friendly and strategic relations in the region,” Garibashvili continued. “Recently, the first mediation between Azerbaijan and Armenia was carried out precisely with my participation. Also, for the first time, a meeting of the prime ministers of all three countries was held in Tbilisi.” Garibashvili returned to Georgia’s EU candidate status issue, saying it was achieved through the “uncompromising protection of our country’s national interests.” “Without bowing my head to anyone, either inside or outside the country, only through the uncompromising defense of our country’s national interests and the joint efforts of our team, in December 2023 we received EU candidate status,” he said. “With the achieved results and, most importantly, by democratic methods, we politically nullified the entire radical opposition; we left no one with anything to say or talk about,” Garibashvili claimed, adding that the approval rating of his government’s work in January 2023 stood at 60%, “as was the party’s rating.” “With these results, I left the post of prime minister at the end of January 2024,” he said. “Almost three years have passed since then, and I want to ask the people: has the situation in the country improved or worsened — in the direction of domestic or foreign policy?!” Garibashvili concluded. Also Read: * 03/09/2026 – Garibashvili, Opposition Figures to Be Questioned Over Remarks on Commentator’s Death * 02/09/2026 – Garibashvili Speaks of ‘Unanswered Questions’ Over ‘Suicides’ Under ‘Kobakhidze-Mdinaradze Rule’ * 20/08/2026 – Garibashvili Accuses GD Government of Setting Trap, Says He Buried Pain Out of Loyalty to Ivanishvili

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Eye on Transcaucasia @scaucasus.bsky.social · 28/09/2026

Former Convict Detained Over Murder of Russian Tourist in Occupied Abkhazia #Civil #Georgia

Former Convict Detained Over Murder of Russian Tourist in Occupied Abkhazia

Edgar Abukhba, a resident of Gudauta in Russian-occupied Abkhazia, who was reportedly previously been convicted of raping a Russian tourist and whose release had drawn Moscow’s concerns in 2024, has been detained over the suspected murder of Amina Bikbova, a Russian tourist, the region’s de facto “Interior Ministry” said on September 27. According to the “ministry,” the suspect, 25, confessed to strangling the woman following an argument while alone with her in a rented apartment. Bikbova’s disappearance was announced a day earlier, after her relatives contacted local law enforcement agencies, saying they had been unable to reach her for three days. The de facto ministry said that following the killing, Abukhba attempted to conceal the crime and drown Bikbova’s body, but ultimately hid it in bushes after failing to do so. Reports in Russian media pointed out that the suspect’s identity matches that of a person convicted of assaulting and raping another Russian tourist in 2019. According to Abkhaz media reports, in 2019, while still a minor, he allegedly led the victim to “a burned complex of government buildings,” where he hit her on the head with his fists and stones “and with particular cruelty, raped her and committed other acts of a sexual nature.” In 2021, Abukhba was sentenced to nine years in a maximum-security penal colony. Abukhba was reportedly released in 2024 after serving 4.5 years. The Russian Foreign Ministry said at the time that it was “extremely surprised” that his sentence had been reduced by Abkhazia’s de facto “supreme court,” arguing that the “high-profile case suggests a lenient approach to crimes” and sentences in the region. “It is clear that this creates risks for the security of the large number of foreign guests who visit the Abkhazian resorts every year, and we feel compelled to warn our compatriots about this,” the Russian MFA said in a February 16, 2024 statement. Also Read: * 25/09/2026 – Sokhumi, Tskhinvali, Moscow Digest – September 18-24, 2026 * 06/09/2026 – Man Detained in Sokhumi Over Alleged Remarks on ‘Georgian Genocide’ * 09/02/2026 – Russia Detains Abkhaz Diaspora Representative Amid Passport Controversy

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Eye on Transcaucasia @scaucasus.bsky.social · 27/09/2026

Who’s Who in Georgian Party Politics? A Guide to the Party Landscape in 2026 #Civil #Georgia

Who’s Who in Georgian Party Politics? A Guide to the Party Landscape in 2026

Georgia’s party system is unusually difficult to map. More than 200 parties are formally registered, although many are inactive, while new parties, movements, and electoral alliances appear frequently. Parties split, rebrand, or cooperate for a single election and then separate again. For the outside observers, the formal party list therefore says little about which actors actually matter and how they relate to one another. --- Author: Sandro Tabatadze, Assistant Professor, Tbilisi State University, Georgia --- For much of the period after 2012, Georgian politics was organised around two poles: Georgian Dream–Democratic Georgia (GD), in power since 2012, and the United National Movement (UNM), which governed from 2004 to 2012 and then became the principal opposition force. That structure still matters, but it no longer captures the landscape as a whole. Many current parties emerged through splits from either GD or the UNM. While some continue to gravitate back toward one of these two poles, especially ahead of elections, others are becoming increasingly alienated from them. And then, there are forces that deliberately present themselves as alternatives to both. Ideology alone is therefore a poor guide. Organisational origin, leadership networks and attitudes toward former and current ruling parties often explain behaviour better than conventional left–right labels. Foreign-policy orientation is another major dividing line, particularly the contrast between Euro-Atlantic integration and neutrality or openly Eurosceptic positions. A third dimension has become more important since the disputed 2024 parliamentary election: institutional strategy. Most opposition parties rejected the results and refused to take up their mandates; some also boycotted the 2025 local elections, while others returned to electoral competition. Parliamentary representation alone is therefore no longer a reliable guide to political relevance. How this guide classifies parties This guide primarily focuses on political genealogy, but uses two more criteria, including foreign-policy orientation and current institutional strategy. Genealogy and foreign-policy position provide the main structure; participation in or boycott of elections and representative institutions helps distinguish parties within the same broader camp. While some forces and movements, including the Federalists, Girchi/Party of Free People, Girchi-More Freedom, Movement for Social Democracy, and Eurosceptic parties, maintain a strong ideological focus, such forces are yet to reach a share that would allow for an ideology-based classification of the entire political spectrum. The categories are analytical rather than formal coalition labels: actors placed in the same group do not necessarily cooperate or share identical programmes. The guide covers 22 relatively visible political actors and divides them into five groups: * The ruling and ruling-aligned camp * The pro-European opposition originating from the ruling party * Pro-European parties emerging from the former ruling party and its splits * Pro-European “third force” opposition * The Eurosceptic opposition --- 1. The Ruling and Ruling-Aligned Camp The ruling camp is centred on Georgian Dream (GD). Founded in 2012 by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, now the party’s honorary chairman, GD came to power at the head of a broad opposition coalition. Over time, coalition government gave way to single-party rule. The party’s initial big-tent and broadly pro-Western profile has also changed substantially. GD still formally presents European integration as a national objective, but increasingly frames relations with EU institutions and Western partners through sovereignty, external interference and conspiracy narratives, including references to a “Global War Party” or “Deep State”. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze currently chairs the party. Three formally separate actors are best understood as part of the wider ruling-aligned space. People’s Power was founded in 2022 by MPs who formally left GD while continuing to support its parliamentary majority. Its members later ran again on the GD list in the 2024 parliamentary election. After the election, they once more separated from the majority and presented themselves as part of a “healthy opposition”. Sozar Subari chairs the group. The European Socialists were founded in 2021 under Fridon Injia. They had run on the conservative Alliance of Patriots (AoP) party list in the 2020 elections but entered parliament after distancing themselves from the AoP’s boycott. The party did not contest the 2024 parliamentary election independently, but three MPs elected on the GD list later left the ruling faction and re-established a parliamentary group under the European Socialists name. The group, led by Ilia Injia, has likewise been presented as part of the “healthy opposition”. United Neutral Georgia is a newer and somewhat different case. The movement emerged in 2024 and held its founding congress as a political party in December 2025. It advocates permanent neutrality and rejects Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Formally, it is not part of GD and at times criticises the government for remaining attached to what it calls “Euro-illusions”. In practice, however, its discourse has repeatedly echoed and amplified core GD narratives about the pro-EU opposition, Western interference and national sovereignty, while several founders have prior links to the ruling party or its political orbit. The party is led by Vato Shakarishvili. These parties are not organisationally identical: GD governs; People’s Power and the European Socialists are parliamentary offshoots closely tied to it, while United Neutral Georgia operates outside parliament on a more radical anti-EU flank. Their inclusion in the same group reflects political alignment rather than organisational ties. 2. The Pro-European Opposition Originating from the Ruling Camp Gakharia—For Georgia (FG) is the only major active opposition party to have emerged directly from GD. It was founded in 2021 after Giorgi Gakharia resigned as prime minister and broke with the ruling party. Before the split, Gakharia had been one of GD’s most prominent figures, serving as interior minister and then prime minister from 2019 to 2021. FG presents itself as a pro-European force and accuses GD of abandoning Georgia’s Western trajectory. It rejected the official results of the 2024 parliamentary election and initially joined the parliamentary boycott without renouncing its mandates. The party later contested the 2025 local elections and ended the boycott, becoming the only opposition force elected in the 2024 disputed vote to enter parliament. Gakharia has remained in Germany since June 2025 amid mounting legal and political pressure and was charged in absentia in two criminal cases in November 2025. 3. Pro-European Parties Emerging From Former Ruling Party and Its Splits The third and largest group centres on the United National Movement (UNM) and pro-European parties that emerged directly or indirectly from its political and organisational networks. Within this wider political genealogy, however, the parties now occupy very different positions: some continue to cooperate closely with the UNM, while others have developed more autonomous political identities. The UNM was founded in 2001 under Mikheil Saakashvili, who became president after the 2003 Rose Revolution and is currently imprisoned in Georgia. The party governed from 2004 to 2012 and remained the principal pro-Western opposition force for much of the following decade. Disputes over leadership, internal decision-making and electoral strategy subsequently produced several major splits. In the 2024 disputed parliamentary election, the UNM was the principal force in the Unity—National Movement coalition, but the second-best-performing opposition force per official results. Two important parties emerged directly from earlier UNM divisions but eventually returned to electoral cooperation with it. Strategy Aghmashenebeli (initially called New Georgia), a centrist and pro-European party led by Giorgi Vashadze, was founded in 2016 after Vashadze left the UNM. European Georgia – Movement for Liberty, a liberal and pro-European party currently led by Gigi Tsereteli, was formed by senior UNM figures in 2017 and initially sought to distance itself from Saakashvili’s leadership. Both joined the UNM-led coalition in 2024. New Political Centre—Girchi also emerged from the UNM split but followed a different path. Founded in 2015 by Zurab Japaridze and several other former UNM MPs, it developed a right-libertarian and broadly pro-Western profile. After Japaridze left in 2020, Girchi, now led by Iago Khvichia and recently renamed the Party of Free People, increasingly distanced itself from both the UNM and the wider opposition mainstream. It supports Georgia’s Western integration but is more critical of EU institutions and regulations than most other parties in this group. Girchi contested both the 2024 parliamentary and 2025 local elections independently. Ahead of the 2024 parliamentary election, three newer parties from different branches of this wider political genealogy came together in the Coalition for Change: Girchi—More Freedom, a pro-European right-wing libertarian party led by Zurab Japaridze, was established in 2020 after his split from the Girchi. Droa, a pro-European liberal party with an activist-oriented profile led by Elene Khoshtaria, was founded in 2021 after Khoshtaria left European Georgia. Ahali, a pro-European, centre-right liberal party co-led by Nika Melia, a former UNM chairman, and Nika Gvaramia, was founded in 2024. The Federalists emerged from a further split within European Georgia later in 2024. The pro-European liberal party was founded by Giga Bokeria, Tamar Chergoleishvili, and their supporters after they left European Georgia following an internal dispute. Because the party was established after the electoral registration deadline, it did not participate in the 2024 parliamentary election. These political parties therefore share a common political genealogy, but today range from close UNM partners to increasingly autonomous opposition actors. 4. Pro-European ‘Third-Force’ Opposition The fourth group comprises pro-European parties and movements that position themselves outside both GD and the UNM-linked political space. They are often described as part of a “third-force” opposition, although they do not form a single bloc and differ in ideology, leadership, and electoral strategy. The Georgian Labour Party was founded in 1995 and remains led by Shalva Natelashvili. A left-populist and broadly pro-European party, it predates both GD and the UNM and has remained organisationally independent of both. It contested the 2024 parliamentary election independently and boycotted the 2025 local elections, but has lately remained largely in the shadows. Lelo for Georgia (Lelo) was founded in 2019 by Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze and developed as a centrist, pro-European alternative to both GD and the UNM. Led by Khazaradze, it became the main force in the Strong Georgia coalition in the 2024 parliamentary election. The party refused to enter parliament after the election but participated in the 2025 local elections and formed a temporary electoral collaboration with Gakharia-For Georgia, but the alliance was later dissolved. Citizens was founded in 2020 by currently jailed Aleksandre Elisashvili as a small, pro-European party independent of both major political camps. It joined Strong Georgia in 2024 and remained with it for the 2025 local elections. For the People, a centre-left and pro-European party founded in 2021 and led by Anna Dolidze, also joined Strong Georgia in 2024. Although Dolidze had previously served as deputy defence minister under a GD government, the party did not emerge as a GD splinter. It left Strong Georgia in 2025 and boycotted the local elections, and has remained largely passive since. Freedom Square was established in 2024 by Levan Tsutskiridze and figures from civil society and academia. The pro-European movement joined Strong Georgia for the parliamentary election, became an independent political party in 2025, then left the coalition and boycotted the local elections. Two newer actors have also entered this third-force space, but are yet to secure registration as a political party: The Movement for Social Democracy, founded in February 2025, is a left-wing and pro-European political movement focused on social justice and economic inequality. It emerged from the protest movement, is led collectively, and is expected to launch as a political party in the coming months. Georgia First (Jer Sakartvelo), founded by Viktor Kipiani, a former lawyer of GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, held its founding congress in June 2026. The party describes itself as a “pragmatic right” force, supports Georgia’s European and NATO integration, and has criticised GD’s increasingly confrontational approach towards the West. It has reported problems with securing official registration recently. All these actors therefore occupy a shared “third-force” space rather than a unified political camp, combining a broadly pro-European orientation with distinct ideological profiles and political strategies. 5. The Eurosceptic Opposition The fifth group comprises anti-liberal, sovereigntist, and Eurosceptic parties. Despite earlier allegations and perceptions that they closely cooperated with the ruling Georgian Dream party, they currently position themselves against both GD and the pro-European opposition, often presenting themselves as the only genuinely patriotic alternative. The Alliance of Patriots of Georgia was founded in 2012 by Irma Inashvili and Davit Tarkhan-Mouravi. A national-conservative and neutralist party, it advocates military neutrality, rejects NATO membership, and supports direct dialogue with Russia. Although historically associated with strong anti-Western rhetoric, its position has become somewhat less categorical in recent years, particularly towards European integration. In 2024, the party ran on a joint electoral list with figures from the then-deregistered Conservative Movement – Alt-Info, but failed to cross the five-per-cent threshold. It contested the 2025 local elections independently. Conservatives for Georgia was registered in April 2025 as the successor to the Conservative Movement-Alt-Info, founded in 2021. Chaired by Giorgi Kardava, with Zurab Makharadze among its principal public figures, the party remains explicitly anti-Western, anti-liberal and pro-Russian, advocating closer relations with Russia and portraying liberal Western values as a threat to Georgian national identity and traditional social norms. The group rose to notoriety for leading 2021 homophobic pogroms in Tbilisi. After running with the Alliance of Patriots in 2024, it contested the 2025 local elections independently. The two parties therefore occupy a distinct Eurosceptic opposition space, but differ in both the degree of their anti-Western positioning and their current organisational strategies. Party cluster Political Party Key Leader(s)/ Principal Figure(s) 2024 parliamentary official election results (CEC; turnout: 60.20%) 2025 official local election result (CEC; turnout: 40.93%) The Ruling and Ruling-Aligned Camp Georgian Dream Bidzina Ivanishvili; Irakli Kobakhidze 53.93% 81.73% People’s Power Sozar Subari No separate electoral list No separate electoral list European Socialists Fridon Injia; Ilia Injia No separate electoral list No separate electoral list United Neutral Georgia Vato Shakarishvili Not yet established Not yet established The Pro-European Opposition Originating from the Ruling Camp Gakharia – For Georgia Giorgi Gakharia 7.78% 3.68% Pro-European Parties Emerging From Former Ruling Party and Its Splits United National Movement Mikheil Saakashvili Unity—National Movement (coalition-wide) 10.17% Boycotted Strategy Aghmashenebeli Giorgi Vashadze European Georgia Gigi Tsereteli Ahali Nika Melia; Nika Gvaramia Coalition for Change (coalition-wide) 11.03% Girchi—More Freedom Zurab Japaridze Droa Elene Khoshtaria The Federalists Giga Bokeria; Tamar Chergoleishvili Did not participate New Political Centre—Girchi Iago Khvichia 3% 2.91% The pro-European “third-force” opposition The Georgian Labour Party Shalva Natelashvili 0.73% Boycotted Lelo for Georgia Mamuka Khazaradze; Badri Japaridze Strong Georgia (coalition- wide) 8.81% Strong Georgia (coalition-wide) 6.74% Citizens Alexander Elisashvili For the People Anna Dolidze Boycotted Freedom Square Levan Tsutskiridze Boycotted Movement for Social Democracy (yet to secure registration) Collective leadership Not yet established Not yet established Georgia First/Jer Sakartvelo (yet to secure registration) Viktor Kipiani Not yet established Not yet established The Eurosceptic opposition The Alliance of Patriots of Georgia Irma Inashvili; Davit Tarkhan-Mouravi Alliance of Patriots of Georgia’s joint list 2.44% 0.81% Conservatives for Georgia Zurab Makharadze; Konstantine Morgoshia; Giorgi Kardava 2.61% What the Map Shows in 2026 Taken together, the five groups show a party system that is neither a simple GD–UNM duopoly nor a conventional left–right competition. GD remains the only consolidated political pole, surrounded by several ruling-aligned actors, while the opposition is deeply fragmented among a pro-European force originating from GD, a broad UNM political genealogy, a diverse pro-European “third-force” space, as well as a smaller Eurosceptic opposition. Within the pro-European opposition, the main dividing lines are increasingly political origin, leadership, mutual trust and institutional strategy rather than foreign-policy orientation. Parties differ over cooperation with UNM-linked forces and, since 2024, over whether to participate in elections and representative institutions or maintain a boycott. The five groups should therefore be read as a map of political origins and current positioning, rather than as fixed electoral blocs.