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A genuinely productive negotiating process will be a complicated and protracted one. But if Trump doesn’t have the patience for that kind of process, or if Putin is able to maneuver him into impatience, Europe will have to push back. /END

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The Trump-led process is predicated on the notion that security can be had without accountability. That may be true for America across the ocean, so that is doubtful. If Europeans are to own their own security, however, they will have to draw their own conclusions. /10

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Meanwhile, even as everyone is talking about security guarantees and “land swaps”, note what we’re not talking about: reparations, accountability for war, crimes, and dealing with the fact that Russia is bent on military dominion in its neighborhood. /9

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Europe and Ukraine will also need to decide what genuine security looks like. They will not trust assurances from Moscow, and they may be learning that they can’t trust assurances from Washington either. /8

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A cease-fire or any other agreement, whether it involves a land swap or not, requires scrupulous attention to detail. In other words, it requires someone other than the current American top team to do the negotiating. But that’s only half the problem. /7

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There is no inherent reason why a cease-fire cannot be reached in Ukraine, and Trump may be even deserves some credit for creating a process that brings that forward. But if Europe wants a cease-fire that delivers genuine security, it may have to run the process from here. /6

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If Zelenskyy and his European allies all go home and leave the ball in the Trump/Putin side of the court, the best outcome they can hope for is more confusion. /5

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Trump has once again shown himself to be malleable, putting some kind of security guarantees, and even a return to discussion of a cease-fire back on the table. Who knows what will happen when he gets off the phone with Putin later today. /4

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The apocalyptic scenario—another blowup in the Oval Office—was avoided, and that’s good. But the second worst possible outcome was that the European leaders who accompany Zelenskyy would breathe a sigh of relief, and I’m afraid that may be what we’re seeing. /3

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First things first: if we’ve learned anything thus far, it’s that we should give it 12-18 hours before drawing conclusions about anything involving Trump and Putin. Not that that will stop anybody. Thus, my way too early take is that … I’m nervous. /2

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Sam Greene @samagreene.bsky.social · 16/08/2025

For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built. A quick thread /1

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Most of us had assumed, I think, that the Anchorage summit ended early because the sides couldn’t agree on much. Turns out Putin just decided to quit while he was ahead. The ball is now in Europe’s court.

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Sam Greene @samagreene.bsky.social · 16/08/2025

Ok, so this tweet didn’t age well. The piece did, though: “Reversing this trajectory will require … a commitment to the near-term reduction of European dependence on US decision-making, while simultaneously building credible deterrence against Moscow.”

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Sam Greene @samagreene.bsky.social · 16/08/2025

As expected, Trump and Putin leave Anchorage adrift. As I wrote Thursday for @cepa.org, the question now is as it has long been: can Europe take charge? cepa.org/article/unmo...

cepa.org

Unmoored in Anchorage: Europe’s Dangerous Game

Europe has done everything possible to align itself with the US administration. That has avoided difficult decisions, but comes at a risk.

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Sam Greene @samagreene.bsky.social · 14/08/2025

Maybe — just maybe — we could accept that Labour have done the analysis and know what they’re doing?

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Because nothing will ever seem like enough.

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Unmoored in Anchorage: Europe’s Dangerous Game

"The risk is not that Europe overreaches, but that it undershoots. Europe will never have all the resources it needs to assure itself of victory. Failing to go to diplomatic war with the army it has, however, assures it of defeat." My two cents ahead of Anchorage for @cepa.org

cepa.org

Europe has done everything possible to align itself with the US administration. That has avoided difficult decisions, but comes at a risk.

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Yeah, but if she recognizes that she’s not going to out-Jenrick Jenrick, then there’s little to be gained. Just as there’s little profit in Jenrick trying to out-Farage Farage.

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Far be it for me to defend Badenoch, but did anybody consider that maybe she didn't want to meet Vance? What's the upside for her?

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Security for Ukraine and Europe depends on the two coming together to insulate themselves from Washington and construct deterrence against Moscow. The talks that really matter, then, aren’t the ones in Alaska next week. They’re the ones in Europe, right now. /END

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Ukraine is thus caught between two fatal delusions. The first is America’s delusion that Russia will provide security for Ukraine. It can’t and won’t. The second is Europe’s delusion that its security must run through America. Not anymore. /3

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Europe had a choice: it could fight for a seat at the US-Russia table and thereby create agency for itself and Ukraine, or it could create another table entirely. Europe has consistently chosen the former. Hence, here we are. /2

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As things stand, Ukraine and Europe are on the verge of being confronted with exactly the kind of Faustian deal they feared would emerge back in February. The fact that Europe hasn’t moved to block such a deal in the past six months is a failure of leadership and diplomacy. /1

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In sum, this research does not show that rates of conscientiousness are falling. It shows that people are less likely to think of themselves as particularly conscientious in comparison to others. And that may matter, but not necessarily in the way this article suggests.

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Measuring *actual* personality traits requires laboratory or extended observational research. Surveys can approximate (as my own do), but they’re too a flimsy peg on which to hang an argument like this.

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But that’s just the first problem with this piece. The bigger issue is that surveys like this don’t actually measure shifts in latent personality traits. They measure shifts in how people understand themselves in the context of others — and that context is always shifting.

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The troubling decline in conscientiousness

Ugh. Personality traits are set in very early childhood and don’t change much over time. Asking people to become “more conscientious” in the way the science understands it is like asking me to stop being bald. Any attempt would be entirely artificial. on.ft.com/46Najk8

on.ft.com

A critical life skill is fading out — and especially fast among young adults

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The real takeaway is this, then: Ukrainians are extremely sensitive to the context of this war, and their thoughts on how to end it appear to track what they take to be the most effective way of maintaining security and sovereignty. /END

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But to suggest that these data reflect a "collapse" in Ukrainian morale would be a misinterpretation built on a basic misunderstanding of what polls actually measure: not deeply held convictions, but situational answers to over-simplified questions in an awkward context. /7

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The availability of a deal, of course, isn't the only context that matters. Attrition, mounting casualties, and the inconsistency of American support matter, too. In 2023, the idea that the US would abandon Ukraine seemed unimaginable. In 2025, it seems almost inevitable. /6

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To put it another way, question isn't really about whether Ukrainians want to negotiate or fight. It's about whether Ukrainians think a deal is possible. In 2023, for good reasons, they didn't. In 2025, for equally good reasons, they do. /5

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While a genuine deal is still ephemeral, Ukrainians are aware that one may emerge, and potentially one that would allow them to rebuild their defenses. That fundamentally different context means it's a fundamentally different question. /4

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In 2023, Ukraine's summer offensive had failed, and Russia was again confident of victory. Moscow wasn't interested in a ceasefire The only negotiated settlement available was capitulation. In 2025, things are different -- and the data reflect that difference. /3

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On the face of it, this survey shows about 2/3 of Ukrainians saying they think Ukraine should negotiate an end to the war ASAP, with the remainder thinking it should fight on. Two years ago, the numbers were reversed. But that doesn't mean what the headline says it means. /2

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