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Ryan Greenblatt

@ryangreenblatt.bsky.social
54 followers 1 following 18 posts

Chief scientist at Redwood Research (www.redwoodresearch.org), focused on technical AI safety research to reduce risks from rogue AIs

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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 03/11/2025
Anthropic hasn't made clear intermediate predictions, so I make up a proposed timeline with powerful AI in March 2027 that Anthropic might endorse. Then we can see which predictions are closer to correct.
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 03/11/2025
Earlier predictions (before powerful AI) help (partially) adjudicate who was right and allow for updating before it's too late. Sometimes this isn't possible (predictions roughly agree until too late), but my predictions aren't consistent with powerful AI by early 2027!
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 03/11/2025
Anthropic has (relatively) official AGI timelines: powerful AI by early 2027. I think this prediction is unlikely to come true and I explain why in a new post. I also give a proposed timeline with powerful AI in early 2027 so we can (hopefully) update before it is too late.
lesswrong.com
What's up with Anthropic predicting AGI by early 2027? — LessWrong
As far as I'm aware, Anthropic is the only AI company with official AGI timelines[1]: they expect AGI by early 2027. In their recommendations (from M…
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 22/10/2025
Dario has recently been claiming that his prediction of AIs writing 90% of code in 3-6 months has come true. I'm skeptical, though I agree that AIs are writing a high fraction of code at Anthropic.
blog.redwoodresearch.org
Is 90% of code at Anthropic being written by AIs?
I'm skeptical that Dario's prediction of AIs writing 90% of code in 3-6 months has come true
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 16/10/2025
Studying actual scheming AIs might be difficult (as they don't want to be studied!). Can we instead just study AIs trained to exhibit misaligned/scheming behavior? I discuss how promising this is and how we might do this in a new post: www.lesswrong.com/posts/v6K3hn...
lesswrong.com
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 10/10/2025
I include more details in the footnotes here: www.lesswrong.com/posts/FG54eu...
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 10/10/2025
If companies are strongly opposed because this would leak too much IP, they could instead disclose this information to some number of non-conflicted third parties (e.g. METR) who could then publicly share their conclusions. 7/
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 10/10/2025
Given that the situation is complicated, ideally AI companies would publicly disclose enough information that other actors can come to their own conclusion about how worried they should be about CoT obfuscation. 6/
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 10/10/2025
The situation is also just generally complicated because things like "what SFT/prompting initialization do you use for your CoT" could have big effects on obfuscation and aren't exactly well described as applying optimization pressure to CoT. 5/
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 10/10/2025
It's worth noting that some versions of training against CoT might be totally fine (as in, they don't incentivize obfuscation of misaligned reasoning) and that some particular approach for training against CoT could be worth it even if it does cause problems. 4/
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 10/10/2025
I think we should try to create an incentive gradient that pushes AI companies to disclose information even if that information makes them look bad, so we should make companies feel some heat for not disclosing important information like whether they are training against CoT. 3/
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 10/10/2025
It's striking that Anthropic says nothing given their system card is very thorough and includes a section on "Reasoning faithfulness" (kudos to them for providing so much other info!). Naively, this is evidence they are training against CoT and didn't want to disclose this. 2/
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 10/10/2025
Anthropic, GDM, and xAI say nothing about whether they train against Chain-of-Thought (CoT) while OpenAI claims they don't. AI companies should be transparent about whether (and how) they train against CoT. While OpenAI is doing better, all AI companies should say more. 1/
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 10/10/2025
Studying coherent scheming in AIs seems tricky, but there might be a feedback loop where we make schemers to study by iterating against detection methods and then improve detectors using these schemers. Iteration could start on weak AIs and transfer to stronger AIs.
blog.redwoodresearch.org
Iterated Development and Study of Schemers (IDSS)
A strategy for handling scheming
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 08/10/2025
Side question: what about the "shut it all down" plan proposed by (e.g.) MIRI? I think this probably requires substantially more political will than Plan A and seems worse than a well-implemented version of Plan A. I say more here: www.lesswrong.com/posts/E8n93n...
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 08/10/2025
What we should do to mitigate misalignment risk depends a lot on the level of buy-in/political will (from AI companies, US government, and China). I've found it helpful to separate this out into Plan A/B/C/D and to plan for these situations somewhat separately. I say more in a new post:
blog.redwoodresearch.org
Plans A, B, C, and D for misalignment risk
Different plans for different levels of political will
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 07/10/2025
I now think very short AGI timelines are less likely. I updated due to GPT-5 being slightly below trend and not seeing fast progress in 2025. At the start of 2025, I thought full automation of AI R&D before 2029 was ~25% likely, now I think it's only ~15% likely.
blog.redwoodresearch.org
My AGI timeline updates from GPT-5 (and 2025 so far)
AGI before 2029 now seems substantially less likely
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Ryan Greenblatt @ryangreenblatt.bsky.social · 07/10/2025
I'm now on bluesky. You can see my X/twitter account here: x.com/RyanPGreenbl.... I post about AGI timelines, takeoff, and misalignment risk. My bluesky account will cross post my posts from X/twitter starting with some of my historical posts that people might be interested in.
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