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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 2h

Defense Feedback and Global-Game Selection: Yaroslav Yosifov

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 3h

An Explicit Solution for the Two-Bidder All-Pay Auction with Arbitrary Type Distributions: Yijia Ding

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 4h

Enforcing Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Team Production: Theory and Experiments: Wanjun Zheng

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 5h

Pareto-Improving Pricing: Why 3 Is Better Than 2: Piotr Dworczak

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 6h

Nonparametric Identification of First-Price Auction with Unobserved Competition: A Density Discontinuity Framework: Yao Luo

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 8h

The Robustness of Sequential Implementation under Information Perturbations: Stephen Morris

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 9h

Contracting for Information: Heterogeneous Costs and Investment Opportunities: Han Wang

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 10h

The Exact Welfare Guarantee of Fixed-Price Bilateral Trade: Huanxi Zhang

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 14h

Randomizing in Search Ad Auctions to Extract Revenue from Runaway Winners: Simon van Tartwijk

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 15h

Strategy-proof choice on strictly convex frontiers: Pengbo Wang

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 16h

Fractional Assignment with $\ell_1$ Preferences: Yu Yokoi

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 17h

Minimally rational reallocation of objects: M. Bumin Yenmez

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 17h

Strategic Disclosure of Action Space in Principal-Agent Contracts: Ningyuan Li

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 18h

Strategy-Proof Set-Valued Choice on Single-Dipped Domains: Ojasvi Khare

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 20h

Mechanism Design for Ad-Supported Platforms: Byung-Cheol Kim

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 21h

Social welfare and price discovery in double auction markets: Teemu Pennanen

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 23h

Credible AUctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort: Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 23h

Pair rationality and top trading cycles on single-peaked and single-dipped domains: M. Bumin Yenmez

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 05/10/2026

Singleton-Attainability and Transparent Access in Matching: Szilvia P\'apai

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 05/10/2026

School Choice Problems with Priority Adjustments: Yasunori Okumura

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 05/10/2026

The Limits of Rank-Dependent Priorities in School Choice: Masato Eguchi

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 05/10/2026

Priority Blockers: Welfare and Incentives in Matching under General Constraints: M. Bumin Yenmez

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 05/10/2026

Stable Improvement Cycle Mechanism Versus Efficiency-adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism beyond Weak Priority Orders: Yasunori Okumura

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Coalitional Stability in a Class of Social Interactions Games: Weber, Shlomo

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Approximating Optimal Welfare in Complementary Allocation under Decentralized Information: Meryem Essaidi

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Market creation without market authority: Ex-ante evidence from European emissions trading: Rausch, Sebastian

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Dynamic Pooling and Regional Participation in Deceased-Donor Organ Allocation: Genta Okada

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Coalition strategy-proof anonymous binary social choice in a countably infinite society: Surekha Rao

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Buying a Station or Relaxing a Constraint? Spectrum Repacking and Dirac's Conjecture: Alex Chan

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Certifying Priority in Evidence-Based Allocation: Gunhaeng Lee

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Delegating Authorization to Misaligned Agents: Coalitional Alignment and Safe Control: Sikata Bela Sengupta

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Correlated Signals, Precision Paradox, and Design of Official Disclosures: Zhenjiang Qin

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

On testing the incentive compatibility of single-parameter allocation mechanisms: William Pires

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 28/09/2026

Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility at the Boundary of Genericity: Semin Kim

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 28/09/2026

Optimal Fixed-Terms Contracts under One-Sided Enforcement and Persistent Adverse Selection: Aggey Semenov

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 28/09/2026

Suppression of the Dual Scheme in the Spanish PIT: Progressivity, Redistribution and Dynamics: Carmelo Rodríguez Ã lvarez

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 28/09/2026

The cost of fairness in electricity markets: Linnenbrink, Daniel

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 28/09/2026

Entry and Bidding Behavior in Surplus-Extracting Auctions: An Experiment: Nobuyuki Hanaki

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 28/09/2026

Singleton-Attainability and Transparent Access in Matching: Szilvia Pápai

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NEP-DES: Economic Design @repec-nep-des.bsky.social · 28/09/2026

The Costs and Benefits of Mediocrity: Endogenous Auction Design in Procurement: Andrea Tulli

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