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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

The 'Hunt for Red October' is a fantastic work of 1980s fiction, but arguably the real story of the work of the CIA and other intelligence partners in tracking the build, trials and deployment of the TYPHOON is a far better spy story than anything Clancy wrote!

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

The TYPHOON was a key platform of concern throughout the late Cold War. The RN conducted OP NICKLEBY in the region, taking photos like this and adding to the intelligence picture. They were quickly paid off after the Cold War, and by 2004 all but one were gone.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

Today this feels like overkill - the 1982 assessment of the shipyard where the hulls were built was classified as TOP SECRET. Today, its possible to obtain reasonable resolution imagery of the same site on google!

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

The challenge facing President Regan was the extent to which he used these exquisite sources to inform the American people of the Soviet arms build up. It revealed a great deal to make his case for SDI, but in doing so would potentially burn this as a source of intelligence.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

IMINT provided real value to the US during this period - the bulk of its understanding of Soviet construction came from overhead platforms. This provided detailed assessment products to inform the front line about the threats they were up against.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

There was a wider reliance on HUMINT to provide internal analysis. For example, in 1984 a particularly sensitive CIA source provided this report, shared with the directors of CIA, DIA and other major agencies. A good example of HUMINT supporting IMINT and OSINT.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

There was wider AUSCANUKUS analysis of the crews and their capabilities. In particular the Soviet reliance on conscripts was the subject of much intelligence debate, drawing on both HUMINT and OSINT sources to assess Soviet capability in this space.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

The movements of each of these hulls was closely tracked by imagery and other national technical assets to understand where they were, what they were doing and the threat they posed. Their role, capability and deployment patterns were closely monitored.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

The US tracked the build progress of these hulls closely. A TOP SECRET 1981 briefing reported on the state of all 5 known hulls, reporting on progress and likely dates of launch. Even if "little is known about the internal hull configuration of the Typhoon", plenty was known!

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

By 1984 construction was continuing at pace, with evidence showing Hull 3 had been launched. This shows reliance on long term observation, noting things like painting of rescue buoys, presence of telephones and other platforms as an I&W that Hull 3 was ready for sea trials.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

By Jun 83, the US confirmed that the Soviet SSNX20 land-based test sites were being dismantled, and based on this and the programme of 16 test launches carried out by Hull 1 meant that the Soviets were happy to bring the missile into service. This was a big step forward.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

By September 1982 analysts were aware that Hull 2 had been rolled out and was being fitted out. They now had to track the progress of both hulls, determining which was where, and how progress into front line service was going.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

In May 1982 the US observed Hull 1 moving to embark missiles. They reported on the activity at the pier, and noted how the loading activity was conducted. The submarine was now being used on trials to support test firings of the SSNX20, but had not entered service.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

Every missile test was tracked, every building in the assembly plants monitored and functions determined. When tests were prepared, US KEYHOLE satellites spotted them and fed the imagery back to analysts. There was a deep understanding of the missile, and its capabilities.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

The SSNX20 SLBM, of which she carried 20 rounds, was of huge interest. The US had been observing its developments for many years, producing detailed analysis on the project history, and understanding its capability and weaknesses.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

The weapons fit of the submarine was of particular interest. The discovery of a weapons loading position on her bows, similar to those of the VICTOR class, suggested she would carry SSN15 and SSNX16 missiles, as well as ICBMs. A significant capability growth.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

From 1980 - 1982 the first TYPHOON continued her fitting out alongside. The hull was minutely scrutinised for design features - for example, certain objects on her stern were the subject of intense speculation -were they technical, or shrouds as a deception, or possibly a new rudder?

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

Significant effort was put into reporting even minor improvements to Soviet naval yards, to understand where investment in infrastructure, berthing and dockyard support could show new ship types entering service. Here is an example of a US intelligence report covering this.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

This for example is an artists impression, based on KEYHOLE satellite imagery, of the likely structure of the internal parts of the reactors that would power the TYPHOON and how they would be placed in the hull.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

Tracking the TYPHOON construction became one of the highest US intelligence priorities. A significant amount of overhead (e.g. Space / SR71) effort was put into tracking the construction, not just of the hull, but her reactors, missiles and shoreside infrastructure.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

In 1975 whispers were emerging of a new Soviet class of SSBN, known as the TYPHOON. While Brezhnev hinted at its existence, the West knew little. In briefings to US Senators, the CIA admitted "we have virtually no information on this"...

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 06/05/2026

"I present you the Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarine Red October" - A line from a superb movie. In reality the CIA knew far more about the Soviet TYPHOON class from the mid 1970s than Clancy could have guessed. Thread on the CIA, Typhoons and spying on the Soviets...

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 11/02/2026

This is where good briefing is critical - how do you ensure a Minister understands their responsibility in a life & death situation, and do so in only 2 sides of A4?

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 11/02/2026

This matters because it reminds us how much responsibility Ministers carry, and how finite their briefing and awareness is. Had a CT incident occurred the next day, this is all they'd have known going into COBR about their role.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 11/02/2026

And that was it - two pages in a much longer brief setting out to Ministers their new responsibility to authorise an SAS assault in the UK. Short and to the point, it provided a high level overview, but no tactical details on what would happen - it was a very strategic brief.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 11/02/2026

Wider plans existed to deploy troops to Heathrow and Gatwick airports under OP TRUSTEE and BLACK DIAMOND. Both would have used regular troops and were tested routinely to understand the exercise and skills needed.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 11/02/2026

The role of the SBS was to respond to incidents on Oil Platforms (OP OILSAFE) and onboard ships (OP ORCADES). They could be used for THROWER "if the situation demands their special skills". This showed a clear split between SAS & SBS in terms of operational roles.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 11/02/2026

If an incident occurred overseas, OP THROWER would happen. The Foreign Sec would chair COBR and authorise an SAS assault, while a Junior Minister would deploy to the country to manage the incident. THROWER was tested by the SAS in Cyprus in 1979, 1981 and 1983.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 11/02/2026

Ministers were advised that MINSTREL was regularly exercised and tested. It was fully implemented during the Iranian Embassy siege in 1980, and SAS deployed during a hijack in Stansted in 1982. GASTRIC had not been implemented by 1983.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 11/02/2026

The Home Secretary would lead a MINSTREL response in COBR, and the NI Secretary would lead GASTRIC from the NI Ops Room in Belfast. Responses were Police led "until Ministers authorise an assault by the SAS as the only way of resolving an incident".

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 11/02/2026

Ministers were told that there was a permanent SAS team ready to conduct CT Operations in the UK. On the mainland this was known as OP MINSTREL, while in NI, it was OP GASTRIC.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 11/02/2026

It is June 1983, you have just been elected to Parliament and appointed a Minister in the MOD. Your staff provide you with an induction briefing pack, including a section on Counter Terrorism. This is the actual brief Ministers had on the role of the SAS & SBS in CT operations.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 08/02/2026

I'll see if I get time to post it here - I basically repeat the same content, but its time consuming to cross post to both, hence irregular posts here as X has vastly more reach and impact than this account does.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

Within a short time U2 flights, Satellites and other assets would improve the ability to glean imagery, report ship movements and spot ships in refit. Less than 25 years later US files show they had huge understanding of every stage of construction about Soviet SSBNs.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

The rest of the report is classified, but its a great reminder of how HUMINT reporting providing invaluable building block intelligence in the early days of the Cold War. We will never know who risked it all to make these notes and debrief them to the CIA, but we owe them.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

The sketch therefore is a vital note showing what an asset could recall. Its a helpful diagram that would have verbally confirmed to analysts the type of ships likely to be in harbour, reconfirming known ORBATS and potentially helping give new information out on the submarine.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

The report also noted that the amount of activity seemed unusual, but provided helpful descriptions of the vessels, their appearance, paint scheme and so on. This sort of information was impossible to glean from SIGINT.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

The dates are redacted, but it also provides timely advice on ship movements (or lack of), which could be used to infer information on the readiness of ships for operations. Notable too were comments on the SVERDLOV - her name has been redacted for reasons unknown!

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

Other information commented on ships in refit, helping note about unusual features. This could be used to corroborate other reports, and also advise on new features or refit activity. This was again invaluable for naval analysts looking at the Baltic fleet.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

This is helpful as it confirms ship locations, and also the presence of older capital ships. "October Revolution" dated back to 1915, had fought in WW2 (where she was awarded the Order of the Red Banner) and was then awaiting disposal.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

The report then states ships seen in Krondstadt harbour, near Leningrad. This included cruisers, and the ancient Gangut class battleship "October Revolution" as well as submarines in the basin.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

Thankfully Western intelligence had a range of different sources to report information. In this case, a CIA source, probably onboard a ship in the Baltic reported in early 1955 seeing three cruisers on a Westerly course near Norway.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

Of particular concerns was the Sverdlov class cruiser. Well armed with 6" guns and a global range, it was a potent threat to NATO reinforcement convoys and merchant shipping in the Atlantic.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

After the Cold War began, travel into the Soviet Union became challenging. The Baltic was, in parts, a closed lake. With limited aerial imagery available, it was hard to get good coverage of what the Soviet Navy was up to in the Baltic area.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 20/01/2026

This may look like a child's drawing of warships, but in fact it is a SECRET 1955 CIA HUMINT report on Soviet naval vessels in the Baltic. PSL thread analysing a forgotten report to show value of Cold War HUMINT sources for analysis and intelligence.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 18/01/2026

I tend to not post very often on Bluesky as I find a lot of people here are rather prickly. I'm going to give it another go and try cross posting some of my X threads, and host them here too, and see what the response is like though.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 18/01/2026

Overall this visit was a huge success, opening the doors to cooperation at a crucial time in the bilateral links between the two navies. Sadly these links were not to endure. Makarov retired in 1992 - today a Russian warship bears his name.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 18/01/2026

Despite this 1SL was careful to sound suitably apologetic for his behaviour, signing off in the manner of a chastened junior officer!

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 18/01/2026

It was noted that a short visit to an RN submarine by a submarine Admiral went down very well indeed. The mood music changed on the visit and resulted in the offer to visit any Soviet submarine - an incredible opportunity.

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Sir Humphrey @pinstripedline.bsky.social · 18/01/2026

He went on to note that USN seniors were now visiting Soviet submarines, so this was not unusual. Additionally the visit occurred due to a programme gap when Makarov suggested not giving his speech again (to the delight of the RN!).

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