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Reposted by @perfandersson.bsky.social

British Journal of Political Science @bjpols.bsky.social · 30/09/2026

From July 2026 - Democratic Satisfaction and the Public Sphere - cup.org/4yP5gv2 "This article identifies three features of national public spheres – pluralism, information, and respect..." - @agustingoenaga.bsky.social #OpenAccess

BJPolS abstract of a study discussing public theories of democracy and satisfaction, focusing on pluralism, information, and respect in 175 countries from 2000 to 2020.

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 21/05/2026

PS: The paper analyzes data through 2012. The version on the site now extends to 2024 (Govrev v3). 📊 www.perfandersson.com/data.html 📘 Codebook v3: www.perfandersson.com/uploads/1/2/...

perfandersson.com

Data

The Financing the State: Government Tax Revenue from 1800 to 2024 dataset (with Thomas Brambor) provides information on the size and composition of government tax revenue from 31 countries between...

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 21/05/2026

📄 Paper: doi.org/10.1017/S147... 📊 Data: www.perfandersson.com/data.html 🔍 Explore: www.perfandersson.com/tax-explorer... Your conclusions are only as good as the data you base them on.

doi.org

Financing the state: Government tax revenue from 1800 to 2012 | European Journal of Political Research | Cambridge Core

Financing the state: Government tax revenue from 1800 to 2012

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 21/05/2026

This isn't a wholesale rejection of the framework — agricultural elites do remain largely untaxed, consistent with BDR. But the income-tax part of the story looks different with the new data.

Line chart comparing average direct tax share of total central tax revenue across 31 countries from 1800 to 2012, using two data sources: BDR (Beramendi, Dincecco & Rogers 2019) and Govrev. Govrev covers the full period and shows a gradual rise. BDR starts around 1870, runs lower than Govrev for most of the 20th century, then jumps sharply upward in 1965 when their source switches from Mitchell to OECD general-government data.

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 21/05/2026

With more detailed data, a different pattern emerges. Elite competition is associated with less income tax and more excise revenue. The capitalist elite appears to have shifted the burden onto the urban working class — not onto themselves.

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 21/05/2026

The paper uses Govrev to revisit Beramendi, Dincecco & Rogers (2019) on elite competition and taxation. Their argument: where capitalist and agricultural elites competed, capitalists ended up taxing themselves through the income tax.

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 21/05/2026

Big credit to Thomas Brambor, with whom I built the dataset. He isn't responsible for the analysis in the paper — but the data is a joint effort. 📊 Dataset: www.perfandersson.com/data.html 🔍 Tax explorer: www.perfandersson.com/tax-explorer...

perfandersson.com

Data

The Financing the State: Government Tax Revenue from 1800 to 2024 dataset (with Thomas Brambor) provides information on the size and composition of government tax revenue from 31 countries between...

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 21/05/2026

Govrev separates income, property, excises, customs, and broad-based consumption taxes. That matters: lumping land taxes (which hit agricultural elites) with income taxes (which hit capitalists) under "direct taxes" hides opposing political dynamics.

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 21/05/2026

Historical tax data has real problems. Most sources cover only Western Europe, only totals (not composition), or only recent decades. And many lean on Mitchell's International Historical Statistics — where Danish direct + indirect tax shares sum to over 150% in the 1980s.

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 21/05/2026

31 countries. 1800–2012. Tax revenue, broken down by type: income, property, customs, excises, consumption. New paper out in @ejprjournal.bsky.social introducing the Govrev dataset. 🧵

Line chart showing tax revenue as a share of GDP and income tax share for Europe and Latin America from 1850 to roughly 2010. All four series start near zero. European tax/GDP rises steeply after 1940 to around 45%, while Latin American tax/GDP grows more slowly to around 15%. Income tax shares follow similar regional patterns. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and the United States excluded.

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 20/04/2026

Under high inequality without redistribution, richer players were punished more. Redistribution wipes this out (Fig 3, C→D). Inequality aversion seems to kick in at high inequality — and redistribution redirects punishment away from the rich toward defection. Out now in @PLOSOne

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 20/04/2026

SVO-measured inequality aversion did not predict punishment. Neither inequality nor redistribution shifted total punishment. The clean fairness-driven story — equality-lovers punish more, redistribution satisfies them — doesn't survive our confirmatory tests.

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 20/04/2026

In a pre-registered study w/ @mtestori.bsky.social & @sergioloiacono.bsky.social, we employed a 2×2 between-subjects design. Groups of 4 played a one-shot Public Goods Game + punishment stage. We varied (a) endowment inequality and (b) whether redistribution was applied before punishment.

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perfandersson.bsky.social @perfandersson.bsky.social · 20/04/2026

Scheidel's "Great Leveler" argued equality has historically come from violence. Can peaceful redistribution do the same? In our lab experiment, redistribution doesn't reduce punishment — it shifts it from 'punish the rich' to 'punish free-riders.' 🧵 journals.plos.org/plosone/arti...

journals.plos.org

Inequality aversion and prosocial punishment: Evidence from a one-shot public goods game

The willingness to engage in costly punishment of free riders (prosocial punishment) is crucial to foster group cooperation and understand public goods provision. While prosocial punishment is common ...

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Reposted by @perfandersson.bsky.social

European Journal of Political Research @ejprjournal.bsky.social · 03/04/2026

🆕 Financing the state Per F. Andersson introduces the Government Revenue Dataset, which provides information on central government revenues in 31 countries in Europe from 1800 to 2012 to reanalyse the relationship between elite competition + taxation.

buff.ly

Financing the state: Government tax revenue from 1800 to 2012 | European Journal of Political Research | Cambridge Core

Financing the state: Government tax revenue from 1800 to 2012

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