Sign in

Danny Moore

@moore.bsky.social
6.5K followers 284 following 258 posts

Cyber-warfare | PhD from KCL | Author of 'Offensive Cyber Operations' | Security @ Meta

PostsRepliesMedia
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 10/02/2025
I'm sorry but that's the most unhinged paragraph I ever read
110
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 12/01/2025
The Google reviews for the GCHQ Bude location are amazing
030
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 02/01/2025
Stop this, media. Be better. He did this specifically to bait all of you to write the exact headlines you then handed him.
0130
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 24/02/2024
Russian cyber units supposedly investing in battlefield equipment exploitation and sending staff closer to front lines. 1) This should be extremely obvious for a global "top tier" military years into a war of this scale, so this is not particularly impressive.
143
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 23/11/2023
Me asking my wife to explain her Black Friday purchases
Israeli officer standing in front of a fridge packed with explosives and detonators
011
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 18/10/2023
Twitter gets almost everything wrong, and for me has become an unimaginably toxic river of misinfo and hate. But I do like Community Notes. Despite it being imperfect, it's often quite powerful.
A picture of a tweet from Al Jazeera English, blaming Israel for the strike aginst the al-Ahli Hospital. The tweet is refuted by a Community Note explaining that the rocket originated from Israel.
070
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 12/10/2023
I just can't.
A Jerusalem Post headline confirming atrocities committed against babies by Hamas
02714
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 07/10/2023
Soulless, gutless vulture, reveling in the horror of civilian atrocities; all to gloat.
1327
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 27/09/2023
This is literally the most obvious, straightforward use of AI imaginable. I'm mostly just disappointed they haven't done it yet. The China call-out and the implied alarmism are equally pointless.
010
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 18/09/2023
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news...
Milk carton with a picture of an F-35 reading "HAVE YOU SEEN THIS PLANE?"
010
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 15/09/2023
Someone made a children's book called "Stuxy the Worm"
An image of a LinkedIn post describing a new children's book just published named "Stuxy the Worm", intended to teach children about cybersecurity.
041
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 01/07/2023
Silver lining
031
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 01/07/2023
Electronic Warfare can be a medium to deliver intrusion or cyber effects in closed/bespoke environments. Cyber can suppress or enable EW. The point being - our limited perspective shouldn’t preclude us from considering the full scope of operational activities.
100
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 01/07/2023
The 3rd claim is that electronic warfare & offensive cyber are siblings. Though unlike malware-based IT/OT-targeting ops they are often invisible to us, EW & Cyber have a shared ancestry, and are often owned at the tactical level by the same forces.
100
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 01/07/2023
I had not predicted overall Russian performance in warfare. Cyber cannot save you from failures elsewhere. But I had remarked that Russian operations - though technically highly capable - often fail to stick the landing for entirely avoidable reasons. That materialized often in RU v UKR.
100
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 01/07/2023
The 2nd claim is that capabilities do not equate success. Success means consistent operational discipline, ability to achieve objectives, and economy of force. Despite visible effects by Russia, it often botches its ops at some stage. It under-delivers, over-extends, or gets discovered too soon.
100
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 01/07/2023
Most Russia v Ukraine activities are not good examples of joint ops. They demonstrate a high-level alignment of tasking, and to a lesser degree, targets. Viasat is an outlier; an effect well-timed to facilitate early-stage warfare.  Russia is more mature than most, but it’s not a badge of honor.
110
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 01/07/2023
The 1st claim is that joint offensive cyber is hard to do well. It requires a lot of up-front investment, joint training, aligned strategy, and decision makers at all levels who would know how to use it well.  The fact that an attack coincided with other military activities is not by itself enough.
100
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 01/07/2023
I wanted to revisit three claims I made in the book, considering it’s been an eventful year. But beyond that, I wanted to address one major question - can we, despite limited visibility, make responsible assessments on offensive cyber?
110
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 21/06/2023
If CTI marketing charts were honest: Most Prevalent Threat Actor Countries* Behind Nation-State** Activity*** Q1 2023 * Collection focused on West-targeting adversaries ** State-executed activities only *** Activity that Trellix observed or was publicly disclosed
040
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 12/06/2023
L-and I cannot stress this enough-MAO
020
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 05/06/2023
We live in the craziest timeline, example 9,310
130
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 05/06/2023
I struggle with these takes. I get what Jake is going for here, but flattening all of "cyber" to a single [explosive] label kills possibility of discussion, and directly contributes to the extreme polarization we have in the field. As always, it's never so binary.
100
Danny Moore @moore.bsky.social · 02/06/2023
It wasn't even a real simulation, it was a "thought experiment".
110