Reposted by Lena Heimberger
Sources: Anthropic has embedded around half a dozen forward-deployed engineers within the NSA to help the agency deploy Mythos for offensive cyber operations (Financial Times)
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Lena Heimberger
@meyira.bsky.social
43 followers 60 following 13 posts
Cryptography and Privacy @tugraz heimberger.xyz
![Abstract. We study a new pairing, beyond the Weil and Tate pairing. The Weil pairing is a non-degenerate pairing E[m] × E[m] → μ_(m), which operates on the kernel of [m]. Similarly, when μ_(m) ⊆ 𝔽_(q)^(*), the Tate pairing is a non-degenerate pairing E[m](𝔽_(q)) × E(𝔽_(q))/[m]E(𝔽_(q)) → μ_(m), which connects the kernel and the rational cokernel of [m]. We define a pairing
⟨ ⟩_(m) : E(𝔽_(q))/[m]E(𝔽_(q)) × E(𝔽_(q))/[m]E(𝔽_(q)) → μ_(m)
on the rational cokernels of [m], filling the gap left by the Weil and Tate pairing. When E[m] ⊆ E(𝔽_(q)), this pairing is non-degenerate, and can be computed using three Tate pairings, and two discrete logarithms in μ_(m), assuming a basis for E[m]. For m = ℓ prime, this pairing allows us to study E(𝔽_(q))/[ℓ]E(𝔽_(q)) directly and to simplify the computation for a basis of E[ℓ^(k)], and more generally the Sylow ℓ-torsion. This finds natural applications in isogeny-based cryptography when computing ℓ^(k)-isogenies.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:fwa55bujvdrwlwlwgqmmxmuf/bafkreibl542dwky563ijtb47nfbrttztnwtvnfd2k5s7hibtzsg6iv5fqa)
![Abstract. Oblivious pseudorandom functions (OPRFs) are an important primitive in privacy-preserving cryptographic protocols. The growing interest in OPRFs, both in theory and practice, has led to the development of numerous constructions and variations. However, most of these constructions rely on classical assumptions. Potential future quantum attacks may limit the practicality of those OPRFs for real-world applications.
To close this gap, we introduce Leap, a novel OPRF based on heuristic lattice assumptions. Fundamentally, Leap builds upon the Spring [BBL+15] pseudorandom function (PRF), which relies on the learning with rounding assumption, and integrates techniques from multi-party computation, specifically Oblivious Transfer (OT) and Oblivious Linear Evaluation (OLE). With this combination of oblivious protocols, we construct an OPRF that evaluates in less than a millisecond on a modern computer.
Efficiency-wise, our prototype implementation achieves computation times of just 11 microseconds for the client and 750 microseconds for the server, excluding some base OT preprocessing overhead. Moreover, Leap requires an online communication cost of 23 kB per evaluation, where the client only has to send around 380 bytes online. To demonstrate the practical applicability of Leap, we present an efficient private set intersection (PSI) protocol built on top of Leap. This application highlights the potential for the integration of Leap into various privacy-preserving applications: We can compute an unbalanced set intersection with set sizes of 2^24 and 2^15 in under a minute of online time and just over two minutes overall.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:fwa55bujvdrwlwlwgqmmxmuf/bafkreievkp4b5vh6ytktue2l33o3kxb257f46dt6nhfxo2g4z4kypgwapy)
