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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 22h

My colleague Matt Green published velociraptor-skills, a set of reusable AI skills for DFIR with Velociraptor. Read the full blog post here: labs.infoguard.ch/posts/ai_ate...

labs.infoguard.ch

AI Ate My Velociraptor - InfoGuard Labs

Introducing velociraptor-skills, a set of reusable AI skills for DFIR with Velociraptor.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 27/09/2026

This GPO-based “ransomware without ransomware” technique is pretty cool: abuse trusted Group Policy to deliver the impact, without ever dropping an encryptor on Windows endpoints.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 27/09/2026

MacSync's iCloud Calendar trick is pretty cool. One MacSync downloader analyzed by Securelist contains a URL such as: caldav.icloud[.]com/published... It retrieves a public .ics calendar, creates an anonymous pipe, launches zsh -s, sets the pipe as stdin, and feeds it into it line by line.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 24/09/2026

For the love of the (macOS) game. My new blog post covers a macOS DFIR blind spot: zsh startup files such as .zshrc, .zprofile, and .zshenv can have compiled .zwc counterparts. The full blog post here: dfir.ch/posts/compil...

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 22/09/2026

On a recent Incident response case, we encountered VMkatz. "It extracts Windows secrets - NTLM hashes, DPAPI master keys, Kerberos tickets, cached domain credentials, LSA secrets, NTDS.dit, BitLocker keys - directly from VM memory snapshots and virtual disks, on the NAS, the hypervisor.." [1]

github.com

GitHub - nikaiw/VMkatz: Extract Windows credentials directly from VM memory snapshots and virtual disks

Extract Windows credentials directly from VM memory snapshots and virtual disks - nikaiw/VMkatz

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 16/09/2026

New blog post: Living Inside the Shell: zsh Modules on macOS zsh is much more than a command interpreter. Through its module system, the shell can perform operations that defenders often associate with separate binaries dfir.ch/posts/zsh_mo...

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 14/09/2026

Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat: Block web pages from automatically running Flash plugins. 😂 Source: microsoft.com/en-us/securi...

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 14/09/2026

My new "field note" shows how a seemingly generic Microsoft Defender alert can lead to a much more useful forensic finding when correlated with filesystem artifacts. Full article here: dfir.ch/posts/field_...

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 11/09/2026

Someone at BSides Frankfurt asked me this week if I could share the slides from my talk. Of course - and not just those. 🙂 All my conference presentations are available here: github.com/malmoeb/pres...

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 11/09/2026

If you're at BSides Tallinn, come join our anti-forensics workshop. I'm offering a 4-hour hands-on training session packed with lessons from years of incident-response work. Techniques you can apply directly in your own investigations.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

After a fantastic first session at BruCON Spring Training earlier this year, we’re very happy to teach our Anti-Forensics course again - this time at DeepSec in Vienna. Really looking forward to teaching this one again - and to a full classroom! :) More information here: deepsec.net/schedule.html

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 23/08/2026

After a bit of tinkering, I was able to replicate the Google Docs attack vector described in the Huntress blog post [1] Attackers can use Google’s “App Scripts” feature (in Docs) to create a clever pretext. Essentially, the attack works as follows:

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 23/06/2026

In a recent ISC SANS Diary, Xavier Mertens 🇧🇪 discussed a malicious ZIP archive that led to Remcos, a pretty common RAT. As Xavier noted, "Most of the files used in this infection path remain undetected by most AVs." [1]

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 22/06/2026

I created two blog posts based on my Fantastic Cleartext Passwords talk, which I presented last year at BSides Munich, and I released the first part (Linux) today. The second part (Windows) will be released next week.

dfir.ch

Fantastic clear-text passwords and where to collect them (Part 1 - Linux) | dfir.ch

Technical blog by Stephan Berger (@malmoeb)

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 17/06/2026

Dumping LSASS to a file named lsass.dmp is not exactly stealthy tradecraft anymore. However, I was reading the analysis of the BravoX ransomware group from my colleague Florian Scheiber, and he writes:

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 16/06/2026

We recently analyzed an interesting piece of malware that utilizes the legitimate JavaScript runtime, Deno. The malware was used as a first-stage implant after the user was tricked into downloading and running the malware. Read the full article here: labs.infoguard.ch/posts/anatom...

labs.infoguard.ch

Anatomy of a Deno-Based Proxy & RAT - InfoGuard Labs

Analysis of a Deno-based malware intrusion that began with mailbombing and a fake Microsoft Teams IT-support call, leading a victim to execute a malicious archive. The payload is a modular JavaScript ...

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 04/06/2026

One of our pentesters was tasked with assessing a customer's perimeter and found an exposed FTP server. They queried the server's FQDN on a specialized service and (surprisingly?) found leaked login credentials.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 02/06/2026

People who have been following me long enough should know by now how much I love these nitty-gritty details of forensics, the little breadcrumbs that give you critical clues about your ongoing case.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 01/06/2026

On a recent Linux-based Incident Response case, we found a dropped GSocket binary as a persistence mechanism [1]. The threat actor planted the dropped binaries under user-space directories to blend in, masquerading as legitimate system processes: ./.config/dbus/php-fpm ./.config/htop/defunct

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 17/04/2026

Here’s another IG Labs post. After my teammate Evgen published his research on ViperTunnel last week, my other teammate, @schnee_FLO_cke, published a blog post today on BravoX, a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) provider. Well done - such a great team! :) labs.infoguard.ch/posts/bravox...

labs.infoguard.ch

BravoX - The new Kids on the Block - InfoGuard Labs

This article provides an overview of BravoX, a new ransomware player whose operations combine familiar tactics with a few distinctive twists, offering insight into their techniques, tooling, and notab...

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 13/01/2026

In the Metasploit Wrap-Up from last week, a new Python Site-Specific Hook Persistence module was released. [1] I wrote a detailed blog about this persistence, which I think is pretty cool. [2] If you have never heard of this technique, you might want to read up on it.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 09/01/2026

To quote my teammate Evgen Blohm (@ChaplinSec): "Shadow IT at its best." He responded to an intrusion involving (successful) brute-force attempts from an unknown IP range. Yup, not just an unknown IP address or device, from an unknown IP range (Yikes). The customer later informed us:

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 31/12/2025

My teammate Asger Deleuran Strunk worked on a case where the TA tried to dump LSASS with procdump on a server, resulting in Defender blocking the attempt:

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 30/12/2025

This was an interesting alert, raised by an EDR: **** Uncommon creation or access operation of sensitive shadow copy by a high-risk process The process HoboCopy.exe created or accessed a sensitive Shadow Copy volume path.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 28/12/2025

I recently thought about the different pop-ups I receive every day on my Mac, AND how malware does the same to trick people into entering their password.. and I wondered if I could tell a legitimate prompt from a malicious one. I found a good article, depicting exactly this topic:

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 27/12/2025

As last time, the TA brought infected files into the compromised network, helping spread the infection. The file and registry paths have not changed in our case and are still the same as in my old X post.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 26/12/2025

Companies frequently approach us to discuss their security posture, playbooks, architecture, etc., but I wonder how many of them also regularly check basic configuration settings? An example from a recent case:

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 25/12/2025

During a recent engagement, we reviewed the collected AutoRuns data from all endpoints on the network. In that dataset, we identified the following scheduled task: Name: 523135538 Command Line: C:\programdata\cp49s\pythonw.exe

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 14/12/2025

My team colleague, Yann Malherbe, worked on a case where the attacker used Everything [1] (locate files and folders by name instantly) to search for password files on the beachhead.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 13/12/2025

The picture below depicts a (malicious) Inbox Rule. I slightly modified this Inbox Rule to protect our customer, but the gist is that it filters incoming mail from a specific bank employee, moves it to the RSS Folder, and marks it as read.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 12/12/2025

For a new project, I started to dig into older threat reports, like for example, "The ProjectSauron APT" from 2016. [1] The interesting thing about these old reports is that you see techniques mentioned before that are still used 10 years later.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 11/12/2025

We are familiar with eMClient and axios, so let me introduce Trufflehog, the new kid on the block. Trufflehog made headlines during the recent "Shai-Hulud" campaign, in which threat actors used it to search for passwords and sensitive information. [1] According to the Trufflehog GitHub page:

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 07/12/2025

I was playing around with bincrypter from THC (The Hackers Choice) [1]. The interesting points, as you can see in the screenshot below, are that the binary is encrypted, obfuscated, and 100% in memory. No temporary files, etc.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 30/11/2025

Look at my tweet from February 2022. As simple as putting NG into the country field. Guess what I found in this week's Business E-Mail Compromise? Successful logins from NG. Oh well..

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 26/11/2025

Reading a report from a recent Incident Response case from my teammate, Asger Strunk. "It was observed that an unknown hostname “DESKTOP-LDIG48N” from the VPN DHCP IP address 192.168.128.149 made multiple failed login attempts using the username “admin” against various hosts within the network."

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 25/11/2025

I was reading an older report from CrowdStrike the other day: "CrowdStrike was able to reconstruct the PowerShell script from the PowerShell Operational event log as the script’s execution was logged automatically due to the use of specific keywords." [1]

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 24/11/2025

A customer sent malware over. The file magic was CART.. What's that? Turns out, something pretty cool. "This is where CaRT (which stands for Compressed and RC4 Transport) comes in. CaRT is used to store and transfer malware, as well as its metadata.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 17/11/2025

I analyzed and recreated (a simpler version) of a PHP backdoor we detected in a recent Incident Response engagement. I used the backdoor to install an RMM agent on the compromised machine; the installed EDR did not raise a single alert.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 15/11/2025

I love reading Incident Response reports from my colleagues. This one here from Matthieu Chatelan: "Note that over 1700 lines (of risky sign-ins) were generated for this user account over the last 3 months.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 14/11/2025

Craig Rowland never disappoints 🥇 He is showing us cool tricks for finding inconsistencies in the output from different Linux commands, pointing to an active Kernel rootkit.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 14/11/2025

This is wild. From a recent IR engagement led by my teammate Florian Scheiber: "The investigation showed that the attacker first compromised the Administrator’s personal Gmail account, redacted@gmail.com. Those credentials appeared in a combolist leaked on 2 June 2025.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 12/11/2025

taskhostw.exe writes a PE file (see the classic TVqQAAMAAAA sequence there) inside the UCPD\DR registry key? Microsoft implemented a driver-based protection to block changes to http/https and .pdf associations by 3rd party utilities, the so-called UCPD driver (UserChoice Protection Drive).

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 11/11/2025

This slide also didn't make the cut. Yes, anyone who has spent more than five minutes on a Hack The Box machine will know pspy, but what about my blue-team colleagues?

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 10/11/2025

The following slide hasn't made it into my "Fantastic cleartext password" talk, however, it's still a good one to share 🤓 "This simple tool logs usernames and passwords from authentication attempts against an OpenSSH server you control.

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 08/11/2025

Two of my teammates published artifacts on the Velociraptor Exchange this week 💪 Yann Malherbe released several VHDX artifacts, as described in his detailed blog post. [1]

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 02/11/2025

Dropping ngrok in a ZIP file onto disk results in the file being removed and an alert being raised, but installing ngrok via winget works just fine? 🤔🤷‍♂️

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 01/11/2025

This one here is a goodie! A customer called us because they had several incidents where the system time "magically" jumped days, sometimes even months, back and forth (see screenshot). You can imagine the issues inflicted by this behavior. So the question was.. Cyber? Attacker? Misconfiguration?

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 31/10/2025

So, I wrote about "Behavior:Win32/SuspRclone" before. [1] "This behavioral monitoring signature gets triggered if the file Rclone.exe has been observed residing in a suspicious folder on a device." [2]

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malmoeb.bsky.social @malmoeb.bsky.social · 30/10/2025

Just when you think you know your way around Linux.. binfmt_misc: Hold my beer. dfir.ch/posts/today_...

dfir.ch

Today I learned: binfmt_misc | dfir.ch

Technical blog by Stephan Berger (@malmoeb)

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