Sign in

Martin R. Albrecht

@malb.bsky.social
936 followers 308 following 133 posts

Cryptography Professor at King's College London and Principal Research Scientist at SandboxAQ. Erdős–Bacon Number: 6. He/him or they/them. malb.io

PostsRepliesMedia
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 15/08/2026
eprint.iacr.org/2026/1693
Screenshot of the title page of the paper. Text:

The ePrint:2026/1591 Quantum Algorithm
Does Not Solve DCP
Aparna Gupte
MIT
Seyoon Ragavan
Google Quantum AI
& MIT
Mark Zhandry
Google Quantum AI
& Stanford University
Abstract
In this note, we formally show that the recent algorithm by Simon (ePrint:2026/1591, August 11 2026) does
not extract the least-significant bit of the dihedral coset problem (DCP) secret with non-negligible guessing advan-
tage, and therefore does not solve DCP. We emphasize that our result is not merely about Simon’s analysis of his
algorithm; we are showing directly that the algorithm cannot possibly work.
Our no-go encompasses a much broader class of algorithms than the specific algorithm by Simon. The main
message of our no-go is that an algorithm for DCP following the template of the reduction by Regev (SIAM Journal
on Computing, 2004) will probably have to make extensive use of the classical Fourier labels in the uncomputation
stage. On the other hand, the algorithm by Simon can be implemented, up to error poly(n)2−n/3, using only the
most-significant third of the classical Fourier labels, and therefore cannot succeed.
To help with verifiability, we release Lean 4 code for our results, available at this GitHub repository.
1214
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 01/08/2026
OpenAI claim a proof that CPV is NP-hard for polynomial approximation factors. openai.com/index/ten-ad...
Screenshot of the text: "Closest vector problem. Polynomial-factor hardness of approximation for the closest vector problem, a foundational lattice question related to post-quantum cryptography."
084
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 01/07/2026
A Real-World Law-Enforcement Hack: The Case of Encrochat martinralbrecht.wordpress.com/2026/07/01/a...
Cover of the paper at https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1319.pdf
062
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 12/06/2026
Hardness of hinted ISIS from the space-time hardness of lattice problems martinralbrecht.wordpress.com/2026/06/12/h...
Morpheus (from the movie The Matrix) asking: "What if I told you that ISIS is hard even given a trapdoor"
0102
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 11/06/2026
Dear Journalists, That "crosshair" you're referring to is a Celtic cross, a well-known white supremacist logo: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Celtic_... www.adl.org/sites/defaul... This is what these rioters are: white supremacists.
A screenshot of https://www.ft.com/content/bbdf1851-1255-4217-9544-e87c8044b5cb?syn-25a6b1a6=1A screenshot of https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2026/jun/11/how-the-belfast-stabbing-was-the-spark-to-a-fuse-loaded-with-grievance-and-provocation
061
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 03/06/2026
Leiden Declaration on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics leidendeclaration.ai#declaration
Screenshot of text that reads:

All of these challenges arise at a moment when the consequences of large-scale investment in artificial intelligence are being widely discussed in regard to warfare, mass surveillance, political disruption, and environmental damage. These raise grave ethical concerns. By failing to act, we run the risk of becoming complicit in the support of technologies which threaten much more than the practice of mathematics.

We thus feel that there is an urgent need for a considered response from the mathematical community. The following constitute brief descriptions of actionable recommendations. We encourage professional organizations to endorse this Declaration, and to add provisions according to their own values, priorities, and governance.
030
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 13/01/2026
Social Foundations of Cryptography: Autumn School London, UK | 15 to 17 September 2026 social-foundations-of-cryptography.gitlab.io/school
We're hosting an Autumn School in London, UK, from 15 to 17 September 2026, to bring together ethnographers and cryptographers to discuss ways in which the two fields can be meaningfully brought into conversation.

This is also the premise of our Social Foundations of Cryptography project: to ground cryptography in ethnography. Here, we rely on ethnographic methods, rather than our intuition, to surface security notions that we then formalise and sometimes realise using cryptography.

Our intention is to 'flip' the typical relationship between the computer and social sciences, where the latter has traditionally ended up in a service role to the former. Rather, we want to put cryptography at the mercy of ethnography.

But how do we do this? How do we as cryptographers interact with and make sense of ethnographic field data? How can we refine, improve or extend this interaction? What obstacles do we face when we make cryptography rely on ethnographic data which is inherently 'messy'? How do we handle that cryptographic notions tend to require some form of generalisation but ethnographic findings can only be particular?

How do ethnographers retain the richness of ethnographic field data in conversations with cryptographic work? Indeed, our project has already highlighted some limitations of our approach. It has brought to the fore concrete challenges in 'letting the ethnographic data speak' while still making it speak to cryptography.

The Autumn School is an opportunity to explore these questions jointly across ethnography and cryptography, through a series of talks, group discussions and activities.

We say a bit more about the programme and registration for the Autumn School here.
196
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 13/08/2025
11 Sep UK Crypto Day in Manchester: uk-crypto-day.github.io/2025/09/11/u... Together with @rikkebjerg.bsky.social I'll be talking about our upcoming work with @bedow.bsky.social and Simone Colombo: At-Compromise Security: The Case for Alert Blindness
Screenshot of https://uk-crypto-day.github.io/2025/09/11/uk-crypto-day/ with text:

Rikke Bjerg Jensen & Martin Albrecht: At-Compromise Security: The Case for Alert Blindness

We start from the observation (Blanchette’12) that cryptography broadly intuits security goals – as modelled in games or ideal functionalities – while claiming realism. This stands in contrast to cryptography’s attentive approach towards examining assumptions and constructions through cryptanalysis and reductions. To close this gap, we introduce a technique for determining security goals. Given that games and ideal functionalities model specific social relations between various honest and adversarial parties, our approach is grounded in a careful social science methodology for studying social relations in their contexts: ethnography. As a first application of this technique, we study security at-compromise (neither pre- nor post-) and introduce the security goal of alert blindness. Specifically, as observed in our 2024/2025 ethnographic fieldwork with protesters in Kenya, alert blindness captures a security goal of abducted persons who were taken by Kenyan security forces for their presumed activism. It may have applications elsewhere.

Joint work with Simone Colombo and Benjamin Dowling.

See also: Social Foundations of Cryptography

Bios. Rikke Bjerg Jensen is a Professor in the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London. Her work is ethnographic and grounded in explorations of information security practices and needs among groups of people living and working at the margins of societies.

Martin Albrecht is a Professor of Cryptography at King’s College London. He works broadly across the field of cryptography but focuses on the analysis of deployed or soon-to-be deployed cryptographic solutions and on analysing the security of lattice-based cryptography against classical and quantum computers.
032
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 15/04/2025
Here's a previous take on said book from social-foundations-of-cryptography.gitlab.io/2024/06/12/p...
Website excerpt:

Here, the authors consider a whistleblower setting which then motivates the definition of ring signatures. Thus, a ring signature claims to be at least also a formalisation of the social setting in which a member of a group wishes to alert outsides to something without revealing themselves while still convincing the outsider that they have access to the information being leaked. Put differently, cryptography presumes and models social relations. As such, cryptography is also a social science. However, cryptography is unaware of itself as a social science and we cryptographers more or less speculatively make up the social settings we model in our paper’s introductions. I highly recommend Jean-François Blanchette’s “Burdens of Proof: Cryptographic Culture and Evidence Law in the Age of Electronic Documents” for a deeper dive into this observation.

This begs the question if cryptography gets that part of its models right? In general, we work hard to have precise definitions and definitional work is a central activity of cryptography. Yet, the correctness of this part of the definitional work is usually simply presumed: “On these questions, the literature remains silent” as Blanchette put it.
031
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 15/04/2025
This long read is quite something: www.npr.org/2025/04/15/n...
Article extract: From what he could see, the data leaving, almost all text files, added up to around 10 gigabytes — or the equivalent of a full stack of encyclopedias if someone printed them, he explained. It's a sizable chunk of the total data in the NLRB system, though the agency itself hosts over 10 terabytes in historical data. It's unclear which files were copied and removed or whether they were consolidated and compressed, which could mean even more data was exfiltrated. It's also possible that DOGE ran queries looking for specific files in the NLRB's system and took only what it was looking for, according to the disclosure.Article extract: It houses information about ongoing contested labor cases, lists of union activists, internal case notes, personal information from Social Security numbers to home addresses, proprietary corporate data and more information that never gets published openly.
010
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 06/04/2025
On digital currencies and the great power conflict between the US and the EU: "The battle for the global payments system is under way" www.ft.com/content/40f6... (I know the FT is paywalled, sorry about that!)
An excerpt from the linked FT piece that reads: "So the fight for domination of the future payments system is on — and the US wants to win. The broader European public may be blissfully unaware. But those in charge of the Eurozone are also determined that this battle for technological control over the economy is one that the EU must not lose. This is the fundamental motivation for the digital euro — a central bank-issued official digital currency that, if done well and fast enough, will rival or outperform the attractiveness of dollar stablecoins."
060
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 21/03/2025
Update on crypto.iacr.org/2025/
 Given recent instances of US visa holders and residents being detained or deported by US immigration authorities, we understand that some members of our community may not feel safe traveling to the US for Crypto this year. We want to assure everyone that we will provide the option to present and attend remotely.
26639
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 11/03/2025
Together with @kennyog.bsky.social we're organising a meeting at Eurocrypt to discuss how the, let's say, "dramatically changing political landscape" affects cryptography and our community, both domestically in some countries but also internationally eurocrypt.iacr.org/2025/communi...
 Wednesday, May 7, 14:30-16:00 (Room TBD): Cryptography in a Changing World: Navigating Geopolitical Uncertainty and Security Risks

Join us to discuss what we as a community can and should do in light of a dramatically changing political landscape, both domestically for some of us and internationally for all of us. We don't have ideas to pitch to you, but we think it will be useful to meet and to start a discussion.
For more information: Martin Albrecht and Kenny Paterson.
33714
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 01/03/2025
Rerandomising LWE martinralbrecht.wordpress.com/2025/03/01/r...
Drake No: A(s,e) + A(t,d)
Drake Yes: UAO
0163
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 06/02/2025
Algorand be like: DOGE, love what you're doing with the US Government, would love to help. www.mitrade.com/insights/new... x.com/AlgoFoundati...
471
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 16/01/2025
Yup yup yup! Friends don't let friends disclosure through HackerOne et al eprint.iacr.org/2024/532
A worrying trend in this area is that vendors “outsource” this process to “bug bounty” service providers. These services are based around the idea of vulnerability disclosure being financially rewarded, often in return for some form of agreement on non-disclosure. This process is unsuited to the activities considered here; both with regard to their motivation – improving security independently of financial reward – and with regard to their content – cryptographic vulnerabilities are rarely disclosed and thus the industry around vulnerability disclosures and bug bounties is inexperienced in dealing with them.

We recommend avoiding any intermediaries in the disclosure process, since they may impose their own policies with negative consequences. For example, our disclosure of the previously mentioned plaintext recovery attack against (Open)SSH  was hampered by us going via the UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, resulting in the following notification on the OpenSSH project webpages:

  The OpenSSH team has been made aware of an attack against the SSH protocol version 2 by researchers at the University of London. Unfortunately, due to the report lacking any detailed technical description of the attack and CPNI’s unwillingness to share necessary information, we are unable to properly assess its impact.[1]

[1] See https://www.openssh.com/txt/cbc.adv.
3143
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 29/11/2024
We got a PhD Position in Lattice-Based Cryptography at King's College London martinralbrecht.wordpress.com/2024/11/29/p... cryptographers.kcl.ac.uk
0105
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 12/11/2024
Reminder, you must register your Real World Crypto 2025 submission by Friday AoE to have it considered, but you can finalise it until Monday (not AoE!), see submit.iacr.org/rwc2025/dead... We hear there's a competing S&P deadline and we're nice like that.
072
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 24/03/2024
010
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 16/12/2023
184
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 02/09/2023
Our work - with Ben Dowling and Dan Jones - formally analysing @matrix.org is out on eprint: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1300 Here is my attempt to summarise our interpretation: martinralbrecht.wordpress.com/2023/09/02/a...
084
Martin R. Albrecht @malb.bsky.social · 05/07/2023
68 (UK affiliated) researchers working on security and privacy have raised alarms about provisions in the UK #OnlineSafetyBill: "our concern is that surveillance technologies are deployed in the spirit of providing online safety." Read our letter here: haddadi.github.io/UKOSBOpenletter.p…
01214