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The Journal of Philosophy

@jrnlofphil.bsky.social
958 followers 795 following 154 posts

One of the world's top academic philosophy journals, JPhil is published monthly by the non-profit organization, The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 07/10/2026
This event is full as of 10/7/26, and further registrations will be considered waitlist only.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 23/09/2026
Organized and introduced by David Malament. Additional introductions by Lydia Goehr and Jonathan Levi. Chaired by Jenann Ismael and David Z Albert. Panelists include André Carus, Erich Reck, Robert DiSalle, and JB Manchak.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 23/09/2026
NYC, please join us on Friday, October 23, 2026, for a one-day conference: Philosophy, Physics, Mathematics: On the Work of Howard Stein philosophy.columbia.edu/events/work-... Please register by Friday, October 16, 2026. We thank the Isaac Levi Memorial Fund for its generous support.
Flyer for "Philosophy, Physics, Mathematics: On the Work of Howard Stein"
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
"Alethic Pluralism and Kripkean Truth" Andrea Iacona, Stefano Romeo, Lorenzo Rossi Volume 123, Issue 6, June 2026 Pages 356-388 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... @lorenzorossi77.bsky.social @stefanoromeo.bsky.social
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Alethic Pluralism and Kripkean Truth - Volume 123, Issue 6, June 2026
According to alethic pluralism, there are different ways of being true, that is, there is a plurality of truth properties, each of which pertains to a specific domain of discourse. This paper shows ho...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
"Enforcement and Supererogation" Joseph Bowen Volume 123, Issue 6, June 2026 Pages 329-355 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #newpaper #philosophy #philsky
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Enforcement and Supererogation - Volume 123, Issue 6, June 2026
Many believe that we have duties to rescue. Many believe, further, that these duties to rescue are in principle enforceable. Some defend a third claim: we are sometimes under a duty not to rescue in s...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
"'Just a Little Gay': How Sexual Orientation Comes in Degrees" Volume 123, Issue 5, May 2026 Kevin Richardson Pages 295-328 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #newpaper #philosophy #philsky
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"Just a Little Gay": How Sexual Orientation Comes in Degrees - Kevin Richardson - The Journal of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center)X
You can be a little gay or a lot gay. You can be mostly heterosexual. You can be somewhat lesbian. What I am saying is: sexual orientation comes in degrees. This point is well established in sexuality...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
"Mathematical Access Worries and Accounting for Knowledge of Logical Coherence" Volume 123, Issue 5, May 2026 Sharon Berry Pages 269-294 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #newpaper #philosophy #philsky
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Mathematical Access Worries and Accounting for Knowledge of Logical Coherence - Volume 123, Issue 5, May 2026
A range of current truth-value realist philosophies of mathematics allow one to reduce the access problem for mathematics to a problem concerning mathematicians’ ability to recognize which conceptions...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 01/09/2026
Congratulations to Evan Behrle on the inclusion of his paper "Desert and Economic Interdependence" in the Philosopher's Annual for 2025.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 27/08/2026
Abstract (also in alt text)
Abstract of the paper "The Ground of Truth" by Bruno Whittle: Suppose that p is true. What is the relationship between this fact—p’s being true—and the fact p itself? There is an answer to this question that goes back at least to Aristotle, and that is a mainstay of contemporary work on metaphysical explanation (or grounding). According to this: p is true is grounded by p. For example, snow is white is true because snow is white. The initial aim of this paper is to challenge this answer. Our strategy is to take the best formal work on truth as a guide to its metaphysics. This yields a natural account of the grounds of facts involving truth, and one that satisfyingly resolves the puzzles of ground (due to Fine and others). But this account fundamentally reconsiders the relationship between truth ascriptions and their subjects. Under the proposal, p fails to ground p's being true in every case in which p is itself about truth.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 27/08/2026
"The Ground of Truth" Volume 123, Issue 4, April 2026 Bruno Whittle Pages 241-268 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #newpaper #philsky #philosophysky
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The Ground of Truth - Volume 123, Issue 4, April 2026
Suppose that p is true. What is the relationship between this fact—p’s being true—and the fact p itself? There is an answer to this question that goes back at least to Aristotle, and that is a mainsta...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 27/08/2026
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Abstract of the paper "Belief About Probability" by Ray Buchanan and Sinan Dogramaci: Credences are beliefs about evidential probabilities. We give the view an assessment-sensitive formulation, show how it evades the standard objections, and give several arguments in support.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 27/08/2026
"Belief About Probability" Volume 123, Issue 4, April 2026 Ray Buchanan and Sinan Dogramaci Pages 213-240 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #newarticle #philosophy #philsky #philosophysky
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Belief About Probability - Volume 123, Issue 4, April 2026
Credences are beliefs about evidential probabilities. We give the view an assessment-sensitive formulation, show how it evades the standard objections, and give several arguments in support.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 13/08/2026
Submissions will reopen on Monday, August 17th. Please review our updated guidelines prior to submitting. www.journalofphilosophy.org/memotoauthor... #philosophy #philsky #philosophysky
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The Journal of Philosophy
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (3/3) CONLAN, PAUL, GIOVANNI MERLO, and CRISPIN WRIGHT. “EYES DIRECTED OUTWARD.” Transparency and Self-Knowledge, by ALEX BYRNE. The Journal of Philosophy 117, no. 6 (2020): 332–51. www.jstor.org/stable/48655....
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EYES DIRECTED OUTWARD | JSTOR
PAUL CONLAN, GIOVANNI MERLO, CRISPIN WRIGHT, Review: EYES DIRECTED OUTWARD, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 117, No. 6, JUNE 2020
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (2/3) Williamson, Timothy. “Cognitive Homelessness.” The Journal of Philosophy 93, no. 11 (1996): 554–73. doi.org/10.2307/2941....
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (1/3) Shoemaker, Sydney S. “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness.” The Journal of Philosophy 65, no. 19 (1968): 555–67. doi.org/10.2307/2024....
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Review of Matthew Boyle: _Transparency and Reflection: A Study of Self-Knowledge and the Nature of the Mind_ Volume 123, Issue 3, March 2026 Annalisa Coliva Pages 208-212 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #philosophy #philsky #philosophysky
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Matthew Boyle: Transparency and Reflection: A Study of Self-Knowledge and the Nature of the Mind - Volume 123, Issue 3, March 2026
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (3/3) Edman, Irwin. “The Challenge of the Arts to Philosophy.” The Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 15 (1947): 407–12. doi.org/10.2307/2018....
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (2/3) Savery, Barnett. “Intrinsic Good.” The Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 9 (1942): 234–44. doi.org/10.2307/2017....
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (1/3) "Uniqueness, Intrinsic Value, and Reasons" Gwen Bradford Volume 120, Issue 8, August 2023 Pages 421-440 doi.org/10.5840/jphi...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
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Abstract of the paper "On the Value of Irreplaceable Objects" by Robbie Kubala, Harvey Lederman, and Adam Lovett: Bradford (2023) calls attention to the fact that the strength of our reasons to preserve distinctively valuable objects increases as the number of such objects decreases. Bradford develops an account of this phenomenon in terms of ‘irreplaceable value’, and in particular in terms of a notion of the degree of such value, which is distinct from its amount. We present an alternative explanation of this pattern in our reasons, which appeals to the value of diversity: the world is better, other things equal, insofar as it contains more kinds of value. We develop this view in two connected ways: one appeals to evidential probability under conditions of uncertainty, and the other appeals to the value of diversity. We conclude by discussing some explanatory advantages of our view over Bradford’s.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
"On the Value of Irreplaceable Objects" Volume 123, Issue 3, March 2026 Robbie Kubala, Harvey Lederman, and Adam Lovett Pages 194-207 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #philosophy #philsky #philosophysky
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On the Value of Irreplaceable Objects - Volume 123, Issue 3, March 2026
Bradford (2023) calls attention to the fact that the strength of our reasons to preserve distinctively valuable objects increases as the number of such objects decreases. Bradford develops an account ...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (3/3) Gibbard, Allan. “Reasons Thin and Thick.” The Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 6 (2003): 288–304. www.jstor.org/stable/3655730.
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Reasons Thin and Thick | JSTOR
Allan Gibbard, Reasons Thin and Thick, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 100, No. 6, Jun., 2003
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (2/3) Buss, Sarah. “Needs (Someone Else’s), Projects (My Own), and Reasons.” The Journal of Philosophy 103, no. 8 (2006): 373–402. www.jstor.org/stable/20619....
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Needs (Someone Else's), Projects (My Own), and Reasons | JSTOR
Sarah Buss, Needs (Someone Else's), Projects (My Own), and Reasons, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 103, No. 8, Aug., 2006
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (1/3) Korsgaard, Christine M. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” The Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 1 (1986): 5–25. doi.org/10.2307/2026....
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
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Abstract of the paper "New Work for an Old Theory of Action" by Marshall Bierson: In this paper I defend the ancient thesis that agents always act under the guise of the good. I do so by arguing that the role that goodness plays in action is isomorphic to the role that truth plays in belief. In particular, I argue that the guise of the good thesis allows us to: (i) fix the topic of ethical and metaethical disagreement just as the aim of belief allows us to fix the topic of alethiological disagreements, (ii) explain the thinness of thin moral concepts in parallel to the thinness of concepts like truth, (iii) develop an account of moral testimony that parallels the best non-reductive accounts of theoretical testimony, and (iv) explains why we are open to our values changing over time in much the same way that we are open to our theoretical premises changing over time.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
"New Work for an Old Theory of Action" Volume 123, Issue 3, March 2026 Marshall Bierson Pages 164-193 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #philosophy #philsky #philosophysky
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New Work for an Old Theory of Action - Volume 123, Issue 3, March 2026
In this paper I defend the ancient thesis that agents always act under the guise of the good. I do so by arguing that the role that goodness plays in action is isomorphic to the role that truth plays ...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (3/3) MAITZEN, STEPHEN. “SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE: CONTINUOUS, CONSISTENT, OBJECTIVE.” The Journal of Philosophy 114, no. 10 (2017): 551–62. www.jstor.org/stable/48568....
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SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE | JSTOR
STEPHEN MAITZEN, SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE: CONTINUOUS, CONSISTENT, OBJECTIVE, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 114, No. 10, OCTOBER 2017
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (2/3) Parsons, Charles D. Infinity: An Essay in Metaphysics, by José A. Benardete. The Journal of Philosophy 65, no. 14 (1968): 431–37. doi.org/10.2307/2024....
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
Of related interest (1/3) Blake, R. M. “The Paradox of Temporal Process.” The Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 24 (1926): 645–54. doi.org/10.2307/2013....
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
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Abstract of the paper "Grim Reaper Paradoxes and Patchwork Principles: Severing the Case for Finitism" by Troy Dana and Joseph C. Schmid: Benardete paradoxes involve infinite collections of Grim Reapers, assassins, demons, deafening peals, or even sentences. These paradoxes have recently been used in arguments for finitist metaphysical theses such as temporal finitism, causal finitism, and discrete views of time. Here we develop a new finite Benardete-like paradox. We then use this paradox to defend a companions in guilt argument that challenges recent applications of patchwork principles on behalf of the aforementioned finitist arguments. Finally, we develop another problem for those applications by examining the notion of exact duplication.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 12/08/2026
"Grim Reaper Paradoxes and Patchwork Principles: Severing the Case for Finitism" Volume 123, Issue 3, March 2026 Troy Dana and Joseph C. Schmid Pages 137-163 doi.org/10.5840/jphi...
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Grim Reaper Paradoxes and Patchwork Principles: Severing the Case for Finitism - Volume 123, Issue 3, March 2026
Benardete paradoxes involve infinite collections of Grim Reapers, assassins, demons, deafening peals, or even sentences. These paradoxes have recently been used in arguments for finitist metaphysical ...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 22/07/2026
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Abstract of the paper "The Past as Prologue: Accountability for Exacerbating Prior Wrongs" by Saba Bazargan-Forward and Meradjuddin Oidermaa: Is it possible for someone, right now, to become accountable for a wrong committed by someone else hundreds of years ago? Barring backward causation, it seems moral facts about the past are as indelible as historical facts. We argue, though, that this presumption is mistaken. We can affect the severity of the past wrongs others committed by adding wrong-making features to their actions. We thereby can become accountable for the portion of that past wrong we worsen. After explicating and defending this principle, we apply it. Doing so reveals a deep connection among three distinct but related moral issues: on benefiting from injustice, on historical reparations, and on accessorial accountability. In excavating this connection, we present a univocal analysis of all three moral issues. We end by suggesting that the principle we defend helps unlock a host of other important and topical social issues as well.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 22/07/2026
"The Past as Prologue: Accountability for Exacerbating Prior Wrongs" Saba Bazargan-Forward and Meradjuddin Oidermaa doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #onlinefirst #newpaper #philosophy #philsky
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The Past as Prologue: Accountability for Exacerbating Prior Wrongs - published on July 22, 2026
Is it possible for someone, right now, to become accountable for a wrong committed by someone else hundreds of years ago? Barring backward causation, it seems moral facts about the past are as indelib...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 08/07/2026
The Journal of Philosophy is very pleased to welcome Melissa Fusco, Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University, to its editorial board. #philosophy #philsky
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 08/07/2026
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Abstract of the paper "What Is It to Be a Solution to Cantor's Continuum Problem" by Douglas Blue: Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis (CH) asks what the cardinality of the real line is. It is a mathematically precise problem. Yet, because it cannot be solved using the standard axiomatic framework for mathematics, it is seen by many as a philosophical problem. I want to show what philosophy can contribute to solving the problem by returning it to mathematics, and I will do that by elucidating what it is to be a solution to a mathematical problem. I will argue that CH is an ordinary mathematical problem like the Riemann Hypothesis. I will do this in the course of countering two objections to an alleged solution to CH. This alleged solution, I argue, embodies the general form any solution to CH must take. From this we will see what a solution to CH must be like. It is just like what a solution to the Riemann Hypothesis must be like.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 08/07/2026
"What Is It to Be a Solution to Cantor's Continuum Problem?" Volume 123, Issue 2, February 2026 Douglas Blue Pages 102-136 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #philosophy #philsky #newpaper
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What Is It to Be a Solution to Cantor's Continuum Problem? - Volume 123, Issue 2, February 2026
Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis (CH) asks what the cardinality of the real line is. It is a mathematically precise problem. Yet, because it cannot be solved using the standard axiomatic framework for ma...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 08/07/2026
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In an anonymous referee report written in 1945, Church suggested a sweeping argument against verificationism, the thesis that every truth is knowable. The argument, which was published with due acknowledgment by Fitch almost two decades later, has generated significant attention as well as some interesting successor arguments. In this paper, we present the most important episodes in this intellectual history using the logic that Church himself favored, and we give reasons for thinking that the arguments are less than decisive. However, we present some new arguments against verificationism that we believe to be dialectically effective.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 08/07/2026
"Unknowable Truths" Volume 123, Issue 2, February 2026 Zachary Goodsell, John Hawthorne, Juhani Yli-Vakkuri Pages 77-101 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #philosophy #philsky
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Unknowable Truths - Volume 123, Issue 2, February 2026
In an anonymous referee report written in 1945, Church suggested a sweeping argument against verificationism, the thesis that every truth is knowable. The argument, which was published with due acknow...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 29/06/2026
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Article abstract of "Ex Ante Pareto and the Opaque-Identity Puzzle" by Johan E. Gustafsson and Kacper Kowalczyk: Anna Mahtani describes a puzzle meant to show that the Ex Ante Pareto Principle is incomplete as it stands and, since it cannot be completed in a satisfactory manner, decades of debate in welfare economics and ethics are undermined. In this paper, we provide a better solution to the puzzle which saves the Ex Ante Pareto Principle from this challenge. We also explain how the plausibility of our solution is reinforced by its similarity to a standard solution to an analogous puzzle in quantified epistemic logic. We also show that even if the puzzle were to remain unsolved, its impact on welfare economics and ethics would be limited.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 29/06/2026
"Ex Ante Pareto and the Opaque-Identity Puzzle" Volume 123, Issue 1, January 2026 Johan E. Gustafsson and Kacper Kowalczyk Pages 63-76 doi.org/10.5840/jphi...
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Ex Ante Pareto and the Opaque-Identity Puzzle - Volume 123, Issue 1, January 2026
Anna Mahtani describes a puzzle meant to show that the Ex Ante Pareto Principle is incomplete as it stands and, since it cannot be completed in a satisfactory manner, decades of debate in welfare econ...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 29/06/2026
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Article abstract of "Why Coherence Matters" by Stephan Hartmann and Borut Trpin: Explicating the concept of coherence and establishing a measure for assessing the coherence of an information set are two of the most important tasks of coherentist epistemology. To this end, several principles have been proposed to guide the specification of a measure of coherence. We depart from this prevailing path by challenging two well-established and prima facie plausible principles: Agreement and Dependence. Instead, we propose a new probabilistic measure of coherence that combines basic intuitions of both principles, but without strictly satisfying either of them. It is then shown that the new measure outperforms alternative measures in terms of its truth-tracking properties. We consider this feature to be central and argue that coherence matters because it is likely to be our best available guide to truth, at least when more direct evidence is unavailable.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 29/06/2026
"Why Coherence Matters" Volume 123, Issue 1, January 2026 Stephan Hartmann and Borut Trpin Pages 35-62 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #philosophy #philsky
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Why Coherence Matters - Volume 123, Issue 1, January 2026
Explicating the concept of coherence and establishing a measure for assessing the coherence of an information set are two of the most important tasks of coherentist epistemology. To this end, several ...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 29/06/2026
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Abstract of the paper "Neo-logicism and Conservativeness" by Stephen Mackereth: Neo-logicists have claimed that Hume's Principle (HP) may be taken as a stipulative definition of cardinal number. However, this claim is threatened by the fact that HP is not conservative over pure second-order logic. I argue that the dominant neo-logicist response to the conservativeness objection is not satisfactory. Then I propose a novel version of neo-logicism, based on Heck's Two-sorted Hume's Principle (2HP), which does meet the conservativeness objection—provided that conservativeness is understood semantically and not deductively. I also argue that on my proposal, the Bad Company problem is solved by conservativeness.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 29/06/2026
"Neo-logicism and Conservativeness" Volume 123, Issue 1, January 2026 Stephen Mackereth Pages 5-34 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #philsky #philosophysky #philosophy #newpaper
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Neo-logicism and Conservativeness - Volume 123, Issue 1, January 2026
Neo-logicists have claimed that Hume's Principle (HP) may be taken as a stipulative definition of cardinal number. However, this claim is threatened by the fact that HP is not conservative over pure s...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 29/06/2026
Evan Behrle summarizes his award-winning JPhil paper, "Desert and Economic Interdependence," in @jacobinmag.bsky.social doi.org/10.5840/jphi...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 23/06/2026
Index to Volume CXXII - The Journal of Philosophy Volume 122, Issue 12, December 2025 Pages 695-696 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #philosophy #philsky #philosophysky
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Index to Volume CXXII - Volume 122, Issue 12, December 2025
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 23/06/2026
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Abstract of Duen-Min Deng's paper titled "The Consequence Argument Across Levels": The consequence argument aims to show that if determinism is true, such that all our actions are the necessary consequences of the remote past and the laws of nature, then no one could have done anything other than what she has in fact done. However, a recent challenge invokes a formal framework of ‘levels’ to argue that this argument actually commits a category mistake, since it is not legitimate to claim that determinism at the physical level precludes alternative possibilities at the agential level. Nevertheless, in this paper, I argue that the consequence argument can still be validly constructed even within a formal framework of levels, provided that we accept the plausible principle that anything is possible at the agential level only if it is physically realizable.
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 23/06/2026
"The Consequence Argument Across Levels" Volume 122, Issue 12, December 2025 Duen-Min Deng Pages 669-693 doi.org/10.5840/jphi... #philosophy #philsky #philosophysky #newpaper
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The Consequence Argument Across Levels - Volume 122, Issue 12, December 2025
The consequence argument aims to show that if determinism is true, such that all our actions are the necessary consequences of the remote past and the laws of nature, then no one could have done anyth...
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The Journal of Philosophy @jrnlofphil.bsky.social · 23/06/2026
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Abstract for Alyssa Ney's paper titled "The Argument from Locality for Many Worlds Quantum Mechanics": One motivation for preferring the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics over realist rivals, such as collapse and hidden variables theories, is that the interpretation is able to preserve locality (in the sense of no action at a distance) in a way these other theories cannot. The primary goal of this paper is to make this argument for the many worlds interpretation precise, in a way that does not rely on controversial assumptions about the metaphysics of many worlds.
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