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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 27/07/2026

and the need to strengthen the comprehensive dictatorship over the bourgeoisie. The story teaches that one must keep one's eyes wide open and strengthen the comprehensive dictatorship of the glorious Party over the perfidious bourgeoisie.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 27/07/2026

This 1975 novel depicts the activities of the "Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius" movement in a Beijing socialist compound. Within the compound, a fierce struggle unfolds between the new socialist forces and the corrupt capitalist forces. Fang Qi, the "child leader," relying ...

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 19/07/2026

overseas interests. As opening to the outside world expands, national interests continuously extend globally, forming a major overseas interests pattern and it is necessary to establish global security guarantees. Wherever national interests extend, security guarantees must follow.”

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 19/07/2026

“China and the West in terms of social system and ideology are irreconcilable (不可调和的) We will not change our banner or alter our course, and they will not change their tune or alter their course either ... If political security cannot be guaranteed, China will inevitably ...

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 03/07/2026

This isn't a fatal flaw to any of the overall analysis of Chinese naval development, but the point is that if we haven't even translated core texts like Liu Huaqing's memoirs and selected works, what other maritime texts are we not adequately considering? It turns out to be a lot.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 03/07/2026

But when you go back to the original speech, nowhere does he frame it as a "metal" chain. In fact, even the precise naming of which islands constitute the First Island Chain is not part of his original speech, but added as a footnote by the editors of the text in 2008.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 03/07/2026

This can cause problems. For example this book, citing a 1987 speech by Liu Huaqing, claims that he likened the First Island Chain to a "metal chain." Framing this as Liu's "metal chain" speech has caught on, and you can find it being called this in many subsequent Western analyses

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 03/07/2026

As an example, while there is near universal agreement about Liu Huaqing's influence over China's naval development and strategy, we have still never bothered to fully translate either his memoirs or Selected Works series and make it available to a broader set of researchers.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 28/06/2026

including, most significantly, how the basic term "military strategy" should be defined (primarily, as a product of either war--the AMS view--or the broader concept of "military struggle"--NDU's position). That distinction, however, deserves a more detailed exploration.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 28/06/2026

One reminder, though, the NDU version of The Science of Military Strategy is distinct from the Academy of Military Science (AMS) version under the same title (confusingly), which was last updated in 2013. Here there are more substantial differences between the two approaches ...

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 28/06/2026

The biggest change in the 2020 version, though, is the addition of a whole chapter, "Joint Logistics Support Force Construction and Development," reflecting the fact that the new Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) was formally established in 2016.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 28/06/2026

The 2020 version keeps these 2017 additions but adds some more of its own, specifically new sections in both the "War Planning' and "War Actions" chapters which covers strategic support, recon & early warning, and maritime mobile operations.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 28/06/2026

But what prompted the (relatively) quick updates in the 2017 & 2020 editions? The increase in content wasn't too significant--about a 6% increase in word count. For the 2017 update, the biggest change was adding "Biological" and "Intelligent" as new struggle domains.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 28/06/2026

First, it should be noted that the 2015 edition was the first update NDU produced since its inaugural 1999 version. It was a significant upgrade--almost a third larger in content--including topics such as deterrence, war control & new domains that were absent in the 1999 version.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 28/06/2026

Between 2015 and 2020, the PLA's National Defense University published three separate versions of its flagship strategic text, The Science of Military Strategy 《战略学》Since neither of the later versions explain the reasons for the updates, here is what I noticed is new ...

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 02/05/2026

talents who understand military affairs, politics, and logistics. The training direction for senior commanders in our army should be to make them both military experts and statesmen, diplomats, and economists, not just those who can fight wars."

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 02/05/2026

General Zhang Zhen, First PLA NDU President (1985): "The concept of national defense includes military affairs & related political, economic, cultural, diplomatic, and other aspects. It is not limited to the military and is not equivalent to the military. From the perspective of

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 24/04/2026

through modern information means. The key to presenting lies as truth is to make the lie sound exactly like the truth, so as to cover up the real situation. As the saying goes: “Truth becomes fiction when the fiction's true; Real becomes not-real where the unreal's real.”

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 24/04/2026

Disintegration Warfare & The Dream of the Red Chamber: “Using lies to confuse truth is also an important method of public opinion deception. It refers to using various means to cover up the true appearance of things with false appearances. Implement public opinion dismantlement

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 09/04/2026

And this interpretative confusion filters down into all of our extant English translations. Note that for this same passage, three of our most popular translations manage to come up with three completely different and contradictory meanings.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 09/04/2026

But even this is an interpretation of what Sun Tzu meant and others disagree. In fact, many of the historical commentators, such as Du Mu, Chen Hao, and Wang Xi contradict Guo Huaruo's interpretation. They believe Sun Tzu's intent was to divide one's own forces, not the enemy's.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 09/04/2026

Many may not realize that none of us are reading "direct" translations of Sun Tzu. We are reading interpretations--even the Chinese. What Sun Tzu conveys in four characters, a contemporary Chinese translator, like Guo Huaruo, needs to use 16 characters to make this intelligible.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 27/03/2026

difficult to implement and achieve results. One should choose the opportunity to carry out preemptive strikes on the enemy’s forward bases set up in third countries and destroy its support for operations, which can achieve the effect of “taking firewood from under the cauldron.”

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 27/03/2026

Lesson the PLA is learning from the Battle of the Hong River (638 BC): “Destroy the enemy’s forward bases. Military bases are the way for a strong enemy to conduct operations and affect the scope, intensity, and duration of operations. Without forward bases as support, ...

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 25/03/2026

His key takeaway, though, is measured. While he decries the amoral methods employed by Yue in support of its dogged determination to annihilate the Wu hegemon, he admires Yue's ability to transcend traditional norms and "boldly adopt unconventional approaches."

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 25/03/2026

Professor Ye identifies a key lesson from this history as one in which "the Yue State’s diplomatic ideology of 'strategic pragmatism transcending moral constraints' allowed it to effectively 'bide its time' and reach its end goal of destroying the power of the Wu state."

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 25/03/2026

When Chinese scholars discuss grand strategy, do they begin their analysis with Thucydides? No, they draw from their own strategic canon. Ye Zicheng's "The Grand Strategy of China" begins with the 5th cent BC example of Yue's methodical destruction of the reigning hegemon, Wu ...

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 23/03/2026

industry and commerce, we are in the forefront of the world. China's capitalists will be the advanced ones in the future—I can write that check too." — Speech at the Symposium on the Socialist Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce (Oct. 29, 1955)

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 20/03/2026

Cleary is no longer translating Sun Tzu's original text, but simply transmitting his own beliefs. As Yu Rubo explains in his own critique of Cleary: "The Art of War is a military classic exploring cautious warfare, intelligent victory, stratagem, and winning in battle, it is not an anti-war text."

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 20/03/2026

Most notably, Cleary completely omits the opening verse of Chapter 2 (Giles' version below), in which Sun Tzu outlines the military force one needs to assemble, presumably because this violates Cleary's belief that a true Daoist abhorred weapons and wouldn't discuss them.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 20/03/2026

Of note for anyone undertaking a serious study of Sun Tzu's Art of War in english, avoid Thomas Cleary's version (1988) at all costs. He was so intent on proving that Sun Tzu was an icon of peace that he deliberately omitted parts of the original text which implied violence ...

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 18/03/2026

Also, if you are looking for how the Chinese have historically approached the text, this remains the best source on this topic. Unfortunately it has never been officially translated, but I can send you a copy of my translation of it if you want.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 18/03/2026

Relying solely on one translation is problematic (as I attempt to illustrate here). My preference is to start by comparing verses using these three (Griffith, Sawyer & Ames). Giles, Nylan, and the latest Modern library version are ok as well for comparison, but suggest avoiding Cleary.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 08/02/2026

which determines that our struggle and competition with them are IRRECONCILABLE (不可调和) ... We will not change our banner and sails, and they will not change their tune. Our struggle and competition is thus inevitably long-term, complex, and sometimes extremely sharp.”

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 08/02/2026

Deng Xiaoping (1974): “The contradiction between the two superpowers [U.S. & USSR] is IRRECONCILABLE (不可调和); one either overpowers the other, or is overpowered.” Xi Jinping (2012): “Our social system and ideology are fundamentally different from those of Western countries,

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 09/11/2025

While Kissinger remains the most famous modern American strategist within the name dropping set in China, amongst serious Chinese strategic thinkers, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and particularly this 1997 book of his, appears to be much more influential in their own writings.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 02/11/2025

Liu Huaqing (2001): “Defense development is a gradual accumulation process. We cannot ignore it for a decade or two and then rush to address it when funds are available. Many development projects have long cycles, and if we don’t prioritize key projects, the gap will widen.”

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 01/11/2025

“Comprehensive national power competition strategy is to compel adversaries not to take military action against oneself while striving to achieve predetermined strategic objectives through non-war means. It uses strength as the material foundation for deterring adversaries. It emphasizes defeating …

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 09/09/2025

Wang Huning (1994): “Marxism first asserts that a communist society is an objective necessity, not a subjective desire of individuals. The internal driving force of historical development & the contradictory movement of various social relations inevitably lead to realization of a communist society.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 03/09/2025

"If a situation arises during combat where the military commander and the political commissar have differing opinions, the responsibility falls to the one whose role pertains to the issue [and] anyone at any time has the right to report the situation to a higher organization."

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 03/09/2025

"The division of responsibilities among commanders specifically means that, under the unified collective leadership of the Party committee, military administrative issues are handled by the mil. commander, while political work is organized and implemented by the pol. commissar."

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 03/09/2025

“What if, during combat, the division commander orders to go east, but the political commissar orders to go west?” An explanation of the roles of the operational commander & political commissar within PLA ranks from a 2000 book, "Heart-to-Heart Talks with Leading Cadres" ...

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 26/08/2025

You then start seeing it seep into military doctrine. The first version of the Science of Military Strategy (1987), makes no reference to CNP, but the 1999 version starts including it, and every subsequent update to the text discusses CNP as the basis for strategic competition.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 26/08/2025

Or Wu Chunqiu's book on how CNP can be applied at the highest strategic levels: "Building and employing CNP to achieve grand strategy objectives is the core content of grand strategy and one of its fundamental characteristics distinguishing it from other strategies."

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 26/08/2025

Following this text from these three members of the Academy of Military Science (AMS) you start seeing a lot more theoretical work coming out of AMS on this subject. For example, Huang Shuofeng's extensive study on both the components of CNP and the math necessary to calculate it

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 17/08/2025

There are also collective military writings from other prominent PLA figures not named Mao that should be translated and further studied. These figures and their writings still influence contemporary PLA thinking, but rarely get discussed in the West because we have limited ability to access them.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 17/08/2025

Much like in the West, there is also a ton of mediocre & uninteresting works, but there is more than enough good material produced in China that we should at least take seriously & study more systematically. To date though, there has been little demand signal to translate any.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 17/08/2025

China has their own equivalents to military strategy academics like Michael Howard and Colin Gray, but because we don't bother translating anything beyond a few niche texts we continue to think everything about Chinese strategy can be gleaned from Sun Tzu, Mao, and Unrestricted Warfare …

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 16/08/2025

From one of 67 speeches delivered from 2012-2017 found in the book “Xi Jinping on Strengthening and Reviving the Military” —an internal (neibu) document meant for PLA regiment and above commanders only.

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John F Sullivan @johnfsullivan.bsky.social · 16/08/2025

suffer setbacks in maritime rights how can we face our nation and our ancestors? Focus all our thoughts on warfighting, direct all our efforts toward warfighting and ensure that the troops can be summoned, fight when called, and win decisively." -- "On the Issue of War Guidance"

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