iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

This case is interesting because wrong-house raids are the exact scenario that Congress amended the FTCA to address. But courts are so deferential to the government that they've distorted the statute's meaning so badly that it no longer does the exact thing Congress intended.

As Justice Sotomayor explained in her concurrence in this
case, there remains an open question of whether the context of the
passage of the law enforcement proviso amendment to the FTCA
means that the discretionary-function exception should not be construed
to cover wrong-house raids. See Martin, 605 U.S. at 420 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring). That makes this case an exceptionally important
vehicle to reexamine our discretionary-function exception
jurisprudence.

2246

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 7h

Then, Judge Jordan, writing for the entire panel, called for the Eleventh Circuit to go en banc and start from first principles. He agreed it makes no sense to say that deciding whether to raid the right house or the wrong house is a "discretionary function" of the FBI.

Therefore, in my view, there is line-drawing within the
Gaubert framework that would benefit from this Court’s en banc
review. How can it be that the conduct here—which is essentially
the equivalent of a government driver making a wrong turn onto
a one-way street—is defeated by the discretionary-function exception
because there is no “mandatory regulation or policy” dictating
that a member of the SWAT team is required to check the street
sign or the house number on the mailbox? See Autery, 992 F.2d at
1526. Must a government agency memorialize such a rudimentary
requirement to raid the correct house? There must be a point between
conscious decisionmaking and mistakenly raiding the wrong
house based on a GPS-related mistake that would require us to
reexamine the language of Shivers (and cases like it) and perhaps
revisit Mesa.
* * * * *
As Justice Sotomayor explained in her concurrence in this
case, there remains an open question of whether the context of the
passage of the law enforcement proviso amendment to the FTCA
means that the discretionary-function exception should not be construed
to cover wrong-house raids. See Martin, 605 U.S. at 420 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring). That makes this case an exceptionally important
vehicle to reexamine our discretionary-function exception
jurisprudence.
“When Congress amends legislation, courts must presume
it intends the change to have real and substantial effect.” Ross v.
Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 633 (2016) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted and alteration adopted). As the court’s opinion explains,
Congress amended the FTCA in 1973 in direct response to
the Collinsville wrong-house raids. See S. Rep. No. 93-588 (1973).
Against the backdrop of the ambiguity of the discretionary function
exception, I would, at least, consider the familiar facts of the Collinsville
raids and the raid here. See Martin, 605 U.S. at 419 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
I hope that, at some point, we will convene en banc to reexamine
our discretionary-function exception jurisprudence. This
case seems like a good vehicle in which to do so.

1234

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 7h

The panel decision was "per curiam," so no judge put their name on it. And they seemed to say our arguments fit the text of the FTCA and the SCOTUS precedent. And despite SCOTUS telling CA11 to take a close look on remand, the court "reluctantly" held it was still bound by bad circuit precedent.

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs contend that the Supreme
Court’s instruction to carefully reexamine this case in the first instance
gives us an opportunity to reconsider Shivers. See id. See also
id. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that Shivers’ “approach,”
suggesting that the discretionary-function exception applies
unless a source of federal law specifically prescribes the course
of conduct “which even the Government does not defend before
this Court, would run headlong into this Court’s precedents”).
We reluctantly disagree. As a later panel, we are bound by a
prior published decision like Shivers unless the “Supreme Court
case actually abrogate[s] or directly conflict[s] with, as opposed to
merely weaken[ing], the holding of the prior panel.” United States
v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009). We cannot, therefore,
revisit Shivers’ holding that the discretionary-function exception
immunizes unconstitutional conduct. See 1 F.4th at 929–35.

1143

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 7h

Last year, we won at SCOTUS in Martin v. United States, a case about whether the Federal Tort Claims Act provides a remedy for wrong-house raids Last night, we got a very interesting decision on remand. The panel ruled we lose under circuit precedent. But all 3 judges agreed that precedent is bad.

Cover page in Martin v. United States, Eleventh Circuit case number 23-10062

Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save
as it consents to be sued[.]” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,
586 (1941). Through the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress waived
that immunity for certain torts committed by federal government
officials and employees. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. But, in
so doing, Congress recognized that there are certain governmental
functions that should not be “disrupted by FTCA lawsuits” and
carved out 13 separate exceptions (one of which has a proviso). See
Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 312 (1992).
This case, which arises out of a wrong-house raid, presents
us with two of those exceptions—the discretionary-function exception
and the intentional-tort exception. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a), (h).
We also address the grant of qualified immunity to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation agent who was in charge of the raid.
Following review of the record, and with the benefit of oral
argument, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to the United States on the plaintiffs’ FTCA claims. We reverse
the grant of qualified immunity to the FBI agent.
I
This case is before us on remand from the United States Supreme
Court. In Martin v. United States, 605 U.S. 395 (2025) (Martin
II), the Court expressly abrogated three of our prior cases, vacated
our prior opinion in full, and remanded for further consideration

JORDAN, Circuit Judge, joined by JILL PRYOR, and KIDD, Circuit
Judges Concurring:
“All agree that the Federal Tort Claims Act permits some
suits for wrong-house raids.” Martin v. United States, 605 U.S. 395,
399 (2025). But, in this Circuit, the discretionary-function exception
is a mess, as interpreted bars all (or certainly most) FTCA suits
based on wrong-house raids. And we are not alone in the doctrinal
bog. See id. at 401 (noting that “several of our lower court colleagues
report that they have struggled to discern what [the discretionary-
function exception] requires of them”) (citing Xi v. Haugen,
68 F.4th 824, 842 (3d Cir. 2023) (Bibas, J., concurring)) (alterations
adopted). See also 5 American Law of Torts § 17:7 (2026) (“To say
that [the discretionary-function exception] has been difficult to apply
is an understatement”); 14 Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc.
Juris. § 3658.1 (4th ed. 2015 & Apr. 2026 update) (explaining that
the discretionary-function exception “is among the most criticized
features of the FTCA” in part “for having generated a ‘quagmire’
of interpretive confusion”) (quoting Baird v. United States, 653 F.2d
437, 440 (10th Cir. 1981)).
I join the court’s opinion in full and write separately to set
out my view of the discretionary-function exception under first
principles. I explain what I think is the correct understanding of the
exception, applying United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991), and
navigating our numerous decisions on the exception. I bear in mind
that “we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the [FTCA’s

43613

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 8h

Things got more insane just about as soon as I posted this last night. DHS is now arguing that we cannot even put the names of ICE officers in our lawsuit against those officers. Their position is that, if a defendant works for DHS, they cannot be named in a lawsuit. Never seen anything like it.

All this time, while Defendants have refused to identify Does 4 and 5 or respond to Leo’s discovery requests, the six-month statute of limitations on his FTCA claims has nearly expired. So, on October 6, Leo sought Defendants’ consent to file an amended complaint that (1) adds his FTCA claims against the United States and (2) adds the names of Does 1, 2, and 3. These minimal changes are shown in a redline attached to this filing.
Defendants, however, refused to consent to Leo’s amendments because there is not a protective order in place. One of Defendants’ positions with respect to the protective order is that the “full legal names” of all government employees “should be confidential.” (ECF 109, at 2). That position, apparently, means that Defendants even oppose Leo identifying specific officers in his lawsuit against those very officers based on their misconduct in carrying out their public duties. Because Defendants will not consent to Leo’s amendments, Leo has filed this motion for leave.

Justice also requires granting Leo leave to name the Doe officers as defendants. Despite DHS’s remarkable position that all government employees’ names are confidential, parties routinely sue government employees by name. In fact, Rule 10(a) “requires a complaint to ‘include the names of all the parties.’” Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 322 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)). “Lawsuits are public events.” Id. Rule 10(a) “protects the public’s legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved, including the identity of the parties.” Id. Only in an “exceptional case” can a party’s name be withheld from the public. Id. And that bar is even higher for public employees since their employment “diminishes their privacy interests” given “the corresponding public interest in knowing how public employees are performing their jobs.” Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1984);

24026

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 07/10/2026

It's been a struggle for reporters to get DHS to provide the names of officers who violate people's civil rights. Now, in our case against DHS's construction-site raids, the government is arguing in court that its employees names are "confidential" and should not be made public during litigation.

DHS's position on the protective order: "We cannot agree to the striking of this provisions. The phone numbers, physical addresses, full legal names, and email addresses of current and former employees in the federal government ... should be confidential."

185

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 07/10/2026

A quick video on our victory over qualified immunity on a wrong-house raid in NC: www.tiktok.com/t/ZPLYARPWM/ www.instagram.com/reel/DeKvuZz...

2279

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 02/10/2026

Yeah, the court basically says while the two are different, the differences aren’t meaningful

take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (10th Cir. 2001). The
Supreme Court echoed this principle in Carpenter:
As Justice Brandeis explained in his famous dissent, the Court is obligated—as "(s)ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government"-to ensure that the "progress of science" does not erode Fourth Amendment protections. Here the progress of science has afforded law enforcement a powerful new tool to carry out its important responsibilities. At the same time, this tool risks Government encroachment of the sort the Framers, "after consulting the lessons of history," drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.
585 U.S. 296, 320 (2018) (citations omitted); see also Chatrie, 609 U.S. _ 146
S.C.t 2193, 2207(2026) ("A new technology should not transform what
individuals had reasonably thought they could withhold from the
Government.").
To be sure, ALPR technology does not provide the same precision in
location information as cell phones. But it could still reveal a lot about a
person's whereabouts, and it is easy to imagine the kinds of sensitive
information it collects. It could track and log a couple struggling to start a
family at the fertility clinic. It could show how often someone visits a liquor
store or casino. It could show which doctor someone goes to or what lawyer's
office someone visits. It also collects mundane information about people's
commutes, but it collects a tremendous amount of such information all the
time. It is possible that a dedicated team of law enforcement officers could

2605

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 02/10/2026

A federal district court just held that police use of Flock cameras without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment. storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

constitutionally collect this information about one car-and its driver-by
following that vehicle on public roadways over a month. But this leaves the
question of why is it the government's business where everyone goes all the
time? The government cannot go snooping through our personal lives and
business without an adequate basis to do so. That is what the Supreme Court
has said since its decision in Katz through its decision in Chatrie this year,
nearly sixty years later. It is not too much to draw the line at indiscriminate
mass surveillance.
No doubt, ALPR technology comes with remarkable benefits that the
Court cannot ignore. But the Fourth Amendment requires courts to draw a line when the cost is too great. Alaniz's search in just the ALPR system
provided him with more than 50 individual records of Kyle's whereabouts
across the country for an entire month. The Court finds that because the
ALPR systems Alaniz used to search Kyle's historical location information
intruded on her reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of her physical
movements, it was a search under the Fourth Amendment. Based on the
information in the record, the only reason Alaniz conducted that search was
because he saw her license plate was from California. That search was not
supported by probable cause, and it was done without a warrant in violation
of Kyle's Fourth Amendment rights. That search also has a nexus to the
remainder of the traffic stop because Alaniz began following Kyle's car while

181553425

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

One big thing we’re trying to establish with this case is that a prosecutor leading a grand jury investigation is acting as an investigator, not presenting the state’s case in court. That means you get to sue them just like you would a cop who led a bad investigation to violate your civil rights.

1. Precedent and history confirm that grand juries serve an investigative function that precedes a prosecutor's role as an advocate.

As discussed, prosecutorial immunity protects only those acts
"intimately associated with the judicial stage of the criminal process." Buckley,
509 U.S. at 271 (citation omitted). A grand-jury investigation necessarily
precedes an indictment and, with it, the judicial stage of the criminal process.
The eventual return of an indictment "does not retroactively transform" the
prosecutor's investigative work into a prosecutorial function. Id. at 275-76.
The district court's decision to the contrary mistakenly focused on the grand
jury's eventual indictments rather than Billy's preceding investigation, for
which he's subject to suit.
A grand jury "is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition." Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282(1919). It "belongs to no branch of the institutional Government [.]" United States v. Williams,
504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). The "ex parte investigation" a grand jury conducts is
non-adversarial, "to determine whether a crime is committed and whether
criminal proceedings should be instituted." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 343-44 (1974) (emphasis added).

A prosecutor's use of the grand jury to build a case by subpoenaing
documents and witnesses is investigative. ' Those steps necessarily occur
before the grand jury determined there was probable cause to return the
indictments. Even if the prosecutor has, in his own mind, decided he will
eventually seek an indictment, he continues to function as an investigator so
long as he's trying to gather evidence to plug holes in the case. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273-74; Watkins, 986 F.3d at 663. A prosecutor is not functioning in his prosecutorial capacity while he is still searching "for the clues and
corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a
suspect be arrested." See Rivera, 359 F.3d at 1353.

162

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

We filed our brief in the Eleventh Circuit last night, explaining why prosecutors do not get absolute immunity when they help gather evidence to have someone arrested. The facts of Escambia County DA Stephen Billy’s conspiracy to punish school board members and journalists are nuts.

Cover page for Appellera-cross-appellant’s principal and response brief in Digmon v. Billy, 11th Cir case number 26-11358

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
When the school board in Escambia County, Alabama, decided not to renew the superintendent's contract, the county prosecutor, Stephen Billy, pressured them to let her keep her job. He told the Board that he'd worked
with the superintendent personally and warned that, in his "professional
opinion," voting against her would violate the Board members' oaths of office.
To ratchet up the pressure, Billy also announced that he was conducting
a "secret investigation" into some Board members and had been collecting
"statements and affidavits." Billy issued the Board at least five subpoenas, warned he had "complete control" over the grand jury, and said he'd charge Board members with a felony if they "divulged" his investigation.
After the Board voted again not to renew the superintendent's contract,
Billy searched for evidence to justify pretextual arrests. He subpoenaed one Board member's phone records, helped the Sheriffs Office get a search warrant for her and another Board member's phones, and advised the Sheriffs Office to also seize the payroll supervisor's phone without a warrant.
Based on this evidence, Billy advised the Sheriffs Office that they could arrest the two Board members, Sherry Digmon and Cindy Jackson; the payroll
supervisor, Ashley Fore; and Don Fletcher, a journalist who'd written about his threats and one of his subpoenas. Sherry was arrested three times in the
six weeks following the vote. The phone seizures and arrests were all based
on the same baseless legal theories that Billy had threatened to use against
the superintendent's opponents-disclosing grand jury documents, talking
badly about the superintendent, and baseless claims of ethics violations.

1103

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Last night, @ij.org won a jury trial against a Texas sheriff’s office using ALPRs to flag cars for pretextual stops and K9s to falsely alert. ij.org/press-releas...

9:134
•1 ? •
• INSTITUTI I for TUSTICH
five steps: First, surveillance cameras across the state and
country recorded license plates and logged when and where cars went.
Second, analysts and anonymous tipsters flagged ordinary travel, like driving toward the border and back, as suspicious. Third, Bexar County sheriff's deputies invented a traffic violation to justify pulling over the flagged driver. Fourth, deputies pulled drivers into their front seats, interrogated them and asked consent to search their car. Finally,
fifth, if the driver refused to consent to a search, a K-9 alert from a manipulated dog supplied the probable cause to search
ij.org
anyway. This practice happened for

9:144
1 X
& LUSTITE®
三
The tip reached Bexar County through a group chat on WhatsApp, a private messaging app, called the
"Northwest Highway Group."
Deputy Babb testified the information came from a man he knew only as "Kiki," who Babb believed worked at a federal fusion
center in Laredo. To make the stop, Deputy Babb parked on the shoulder, waited for the truck, followed it, and eventually stopped it. Babb said the reason for the stop was that Alek had drifted across the fog line on the road. Evidence shown at the trial showed Schott
never veered outside the lines.

1106

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 24/09/2026

My colleague Alasdair Whitney testified at the Senate hearing on Flock today about how it’s bad for the government to monitor all our movements.

Photo of five witnesses being sworn into today’s hearing

0135

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 11/09/2026

We knew they were fining a lot of people, but we never dreamed they were dumb enough to set a quota (courts don't like quotas). Turned out they were fining 50 people per week until they ran out of properties to fine.

Transcript of me asking the code enforcement officer how long they had a 50-property-per-week quota. And he responded until code enforcement told management there were no longer enough properties left to fine at that rate.

052

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 11/09/2026

Now that we settled against Humboldt, I can finally post my favorite part of discovery. Their code enforcement officer kept saying he'd go in every Monday to 50 voicemails from people they fined. His attorney tried to get him to say 50 was an exaggeration. Turned out it was an enforcement quota:

Transcript from deposition. Opposing counsel asks if 50 voicemails on Monday was hyperbole, and the witness responds "No, it was generated based on the fact that management wanted us to post 50 notices a week." Opposing counsel just says, "Oh, I see."

151

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 28/08/2026

Have to think the Ninth Circuit responding to Humboldt’s argument with these looks played a role in their decision to settle.

Panel expressing skepticism to Humboldt’s attorney during oral argument

050

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 20/07/2026

Sorry, “a case of beer” was hyperbolic. It was a six pack of Bud heavy.

(i)
QUESTION PRESENTED
The "touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause" is that the amount of the fine
"must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish." United States v. Ba-jakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). Below, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of petitioner's $95,000 airplane because, the court reasoned, petitioner knew that one of his passenger's grocery bags contained a six-pack of Budweiser.
In so holding, the court captured vividly a lower-court conflict over the standard for evaluating the gravity of a property owner's offense under the Excessive Fines Clause. Aligning with the Eleventh Cireuit, the Alaska Supreme Court examined the gravity of the defendant's offense at a stratospheric level of abstraction. Meanwhile, the federal circuit in which Alaska sits-in line with many other state and federal courts—holds that "[ilt is critical" to "review the specific actions of the violator rather than by taking an abstract view of the violation."
The question presented is whether, in determining whether a fine contravenes the Excessive Fines Clause, courts may consider the gravity of the underlying offense purely in the abstract or should consider the gravity of the specific defendant's wrongdoing.

030

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 28/05/2026

Yesterday, we had a mini trial in Leo’s case against ICE raids. A DHS official and his attys at DOJ all said they don’t need warrants for construction sites and that REAL IDs are unreliable. Two pretty incredible positions to take imho ij.org/case/alabama...

Court steps interview after the preliminary injunction hearing in Garcia Venegas v. Homan

Leo speaking to reporters outside the courthouse after our preliminary injunction hearing.

0105

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 20/05/2026

Good news for Leo: The court ruled he has standing & set an evidentiary hearing for next Wednesday. The court agreed we showed the DHS policies exist and that, despite Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Perdomo, Leo is likely to be injured by these policies again. www.courtlistener.com/docket/71498...

A. Plaintiff has sufficiently established the DHS policies exist
According to the Government, Plaintit has not shown that he faces an imminent injury
from any policy, pattern or practice implemented by the Federal Defendants" because "no such
policies exist." (Doc. 46). For support, the government relies on the Declaration of Philip Lavoie
(Docs. 44-1). (Id.) In response, Plaintit argues the policies exist based on Plaintitt's declarations
deschoine nis two previous encounters with uns and the encounters or two orners ne personally
witnessed. Plaintiff has also relied on public statements, news reports, and
declarations.
To show an actionable "policy, pattern, or practice," plaintiffs must identify conduct that
is systemic and widespread, not merely the result of isolated or sporadic incidents. Thus, to establish standing, Plaintiff must
show that the policy, in tact, exists and that it requires federal Otcials to take the challenged
actions.
The Court is not compelled by the Government's position that no policies exist tor several
reasons. First, treating the allegations in the Complaint as true, it is beyond question that Plaintiff
has alleged the three subiect policies exist. Plaintiff has additionally put forth factual support that
the policies exist. Second, a declaraton, like the one submitted by the Government, does not -
at this stage-override what a olaint has clearly alleged. Ihird. even it the decaranon were
dispositive, the Court is unsatisfied that it conclusively negates that such policies exist. Rather, at
best, Mr. Lavoie has contrmed he is not aware or such policies. Fourth
in addition to the court's determination that the Government's supporting documentation is not
compelling, the Court also finds that the totality of Plaintiff's supporting documentation when
considered along with the well pled allegations of the Complaint, support the conclusion that the
policies exist for purposes of Article III standing.

The Government's alternative position based on Lyons is equally unconvincing.
…
Here, Lyons and Noem do not support the outcome Defendants seek. More specifically,
the facts here plainly establish that Plaintiff's exposure to the alleged policies are not limited to a
single isolated incident in the past. Rather, at the time the Complaint was filed, Plaintiff had
already been on the receiving end of the policies twice. Since the litigation has been pending.
Plaintiff has been stopped a third time. These facts establish what the Plaintiff in Lyons could not.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff here had not been stopped numerous times already, the nature of the
policies here and factual allegations are distinguishable from the policies at issue in Lyons, given
that the policies in this action a will subject an individual to future encounters when he/she is
simply going about his life. Accordingly, the Court finds the instant case more analogous to Church
because Plaintiff "is unable to avoid repeating the conduct that led to the original injury at the

02214

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 15/05/2026

QI isn’t our worry in a case against the feds. But the Eleventh Circuit, in a panel with Bill Pryor, thought the presumption of legal status created by an ID was so clear that it denied a claim for QI by an officer who held a citizen for ICE. caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-11t...

5-50-67.2. Thus, Alcocer's possession of a Georgia driver's license-even a suspended one-created a presumption of legal status, whether as an
authorized alien or a U.S. citizen. As to her possession of a Social Security number, under federal law, a person is eligible for that only if she is a U.S. citizen or an alien otherwise lawfully present in the United States. See, e.g.,
20 C.F.R. §§ 422.104, 422.107. And if not a citizen, a person requires legal status for employment in this country.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.z

000

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 12/05/2026

DHS told CJ that they never detained Leo despite putting him in leg irons and locking him in the back of a police car. I appreciate CJ's obvious follow-up question.

Leo with his legs shackled in the back of a DHS vehicle

In response to a request for comment, DHS appeared to deny that Venegas was ever detained by the ICE officers.

"Leonardo Garcia Venegas was NOT detained last week," a DHS spokesperson said in a statement. "On Saturday, May 2, ICE conducted a routine vehicle stop on a car registered to an illegal alien. After Venegas' identity was established, he was released."

The DHS Office of Public Affairs did not immediately respond to a follow-up question asking how officers could release someone they had not detained.

17528

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 05/05/2026

Our case alleges that DHS lets agents “preemptively detain” anyone who fits their profile for undocumented workers. And then refuses to let them go when they show a REAL ID, Social Security card, or even a passport. Shackling someone no questions asked violates 4A, the INA, and DHS’s regulations.

Leo, shackled around the legs, in the back of an ICE vehicle

Defendants' policies. In support of his preliminary injunction motion, Leo explained
that the detentions at issue here "are not Terry stops-they are not brief and there is no
inquiry... One explanation for why these raids do not function like Terry stops is that
DHS believes it can arrest people based on the 'reasonable suspicion' it thinks attaches to
2
someone's ethnicity and occupation." PI Br. (ECF 30-1) at 11. Leo further explained that
"DHS has ordered officers to 'err on the side of action, not caution, which "[in practice
... means refusing to accept all government-issued IDs-including the REAL IDs that DHS
certifies are issued only to people with lawful status [.]" Id.
The details of Leo's third detention make it even more likely that he will show
Defendants' policies exist as alleged. This third detention was, once again, not the brief inquiry that Terry allows; nor did it end once Leo dispelled the (immigration) justification
for the stop. Like both times last year, immigration officers approached Leo and physically
restrained him without asking any questions. Like both times last year, immigration officers
ignored Leo telling them he is a citizen and refused to even consider, let alone credit, Leo's
Alabama STAR ID (a DHS-compliant REAL ID) as evidence of his citizenship. And like both
times last year, the officers continued to detain Leo well after he presented this evidence
to refute any suspicion about his lawful status. Ex. A 999-10, 14-16, 25; see also PI Br. at
3-6 (detailing Leo's prior detentions).

23520

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 05/05/2026

On Saturday, Leo Garcia Venegas was wrongfully detained by ICE for a 3rd time in a year. Officers followed him home; he said he’s a citizen and had his REAL ID in hand. But they didn’t care. They tackled and shackled him, no questions asked. We’ve got a hearing tomorrow on our prelim injunction.

Photo of Leo being led by five ICE agents into the back of an unmarked ICE vehicle. His hands are cuffed behind his back and he’s in leg shackles.

5. I left the store around 7:20 a.m. and began driving home. I was approaching my house when I noticed an unmarked vehicle following me closely that appeared to be law enforcement.
6. I parked my car in front of my house and turned off the engine.
7. The officers pulled in front of my vehicle to block it in. They exited their vehicle and quickly approached my truck.
8. Without a word, the officers tried to open my driver's side door, but it was locked. Because I already experienced two immigration raids, I knew it was important to tell them I was a citizen and use my REAL. ID to prove my lawful status. So, I took out my Alabama Star ID, unlocked the door, and immediately told the officers that I am a United States citizen.
9. Still without asking me a single question or issuing any lawful commands, the officers pulled me out of my car, tackled me to the ground, and shackled me around both my arms and legs.
10. The officers did not listen when I said I was a citizen. And they showed no interest in looking at my Alabama STAR ID, even though it is a REAL. ID issued only to people who can prove their lawful status.
11. Within two minutes of when I stopped in front of my house, a few other cars arrived, including a K-9 unit with the local police.
12. There were about seven or eight officers in total surrounding me. All but two of those officers were dressed in plain clothes with tactical vests and appeared to be ICE
agents. The other two wore uniforms of the local police. At least one of the local police officers arrived with a K-9.
13. The initial stop was initiated by the ICE agents, and it was those ICE agents who took responsibility for my arrest.
14. The ICE agents led me, shackled, to one of their cars and placed me in the back seat. At this point, the officers still had not asked me a single question or bothered to look at my Alabama Star ID that would have shown they had no basis for my detention.

481754687

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 23/04/2026

Got to watch Marimar Martinez, George Retes, Ryan Ecklund, and Pastor Black testify before the House Committee on Homeland Security today. The whole room was in stunned silence while Marimar got up and showed the bullet holes a CBP agent bragged about putting in her.

George Retes, Benny Johnson, Marimar Martinez, and Ryan Ecklund posing for a picture after the hearing

George Retes, Benny Johnson, Marimar Martinez, and Ryan Ecklund talking after the hearing

0148

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 10/04/2026

Government agents entered our clients property a bunch of times without a warrant and tampered with their surveillance camera. Today, the court dismissed our case based on an undergraduate intern’s “bench brief” that the judge attached to the order. Don’t worry, he starts law school this fall.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 63) filed by the STATE OF ALABAMA, by and through the OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, is hereby GRANTED based on the following:
A detailed analysis or bench brief of this matter was prepared by the trial court's
intern from the University of North Alabama, who was subsequently hired by the trial court as a Clerical Aid, namely Will Calhoun, and Mr. Calhoun s bench brief is hereby incorporated by reference as if set out in full herein (Court Ex. "A," filed concurrently with this Order).
2. Mr. Calhoun's legal analysis covers both search and seizure issues, as well as the
immunity doctrine, both at issue here.
3. Mr. Calhoun begins his study of law at the University of Alabama School of Law
this fall, August 2026.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Costs taxed to the Plaintiffs, and any other pending motions are either MOOT or otherwise DISMISSED; thereby making this ORDER OF DISMISSIAL a FINAL ORDER.

494

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 01/04/2026

This bit in the opinion about @ij.org “upsetting his little town” and costing them their reputation by publicizing their bad behavior is a rich text.

10. Plaintiffs Speak to the Media: October 2023
In mid-October 2023, Mr. Benoir and Ms. Bastien began speaking with mem-
bers of the news media about their view that the town should repeal the Food Truck
Ban or otherwise work something out with them before their annual business license
was scheduled to expire in May 2024. Bastien Decl. ¶ 73; Benoir Decl. ¶ 77. This
resulted in news coverage on October 19, 2023, and subsequent dates. Pl. Mem. Supp.
Ex. 35 ¶¶ 12–13, ECF No. 59-35 (“Monel Decl.”); Pl. Mem. Supp. Ex. 20, ECF No. 59-
20. Mayor Russell stated that the media coverage had “upset [his] little town[.]” Pl.
Mem. Supp. Ex. 10 at 44:08–09, ECF No. 59-10. Mayor Russell also testified that he
blamed Plaintiffs’ counsel, the non-profit Institute for Justice, for helping Plaintiffs
obtain media attention that was unfavorable to the town. Id. at 94:18–95:09. Mayor
Russell further stated that the Institute for Justice:
[T]ook this little simple thing and blew it up into a gigantic story that
was all over the internet, all over the newspapers, and you guys did it.
You sent it out. You CC’d it to everybody. You are the ones that promoted
this. If you hadn’t got involved in this, we would have worked out some-
thing with these poor people and they would be selling hotdogs right
now. But you guys were the ones who promoted all this hate and discon-
tent and dissatisfaction. The Institute for Justice did that.
Id. at 98:12–24 (cleaned up). In Mayor Russell’s view, the media attention that the
Institute for Justice helped Plaintiffs obtain was like a “atom bomb” that cost Parks-
ley its reputation. Id. at 56:03–04, 96:20–21.

1137

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 25/03/2026

We just beat absolute prosecutorial immunity on four claims in our retaliation case against Escambia County DA Stephen Billy! That includes our claims for a civil conspiracy with the sheriff. Almost all claims against the sheriff & deputies go forward, too. www.courtlistener.com/docket/69393...

Reporters Sherry Digmon and Don Fletcher sitting at a wooden table in the Atmore News’ office, with copies of their newspapers detailing their own arrests

VICONCLISION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that:
(1) The Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and Incorporated Brief filed by Defendant
Stephen Billy, District Attorney for Escambia County (Doc. 29, filed April 10, 2025), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Page 49 of 52|
Case 1:24-cv-00425-TFM-B Doc# 47 Filed 03/25/26 Page 50 of 52 PageID# 884
(a) The motion is DENIED as to the following claims against District Attorney
Stephen Billy:
(i) Plaintiffs Sherry Digmon's and Cynthia Jackson's claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment in Count I related to their allegations that their respective cell phones were seized and searched;
(i) Plaintiffs Sherry Digmon's, Cynthia Jackson's, and Veronica Ashley Fore's Fourth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Count Ill related to their allegations that their respective cell phones were seized and searched:
（i）
Plaintiffs Sherry Digmon's and Cynthia Jackson's claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for conspiring to violate their First Amendment rights in Count V related to their allegations that their cell phones were seized and
(D)
(iv)
Plaintiff Sherry Digmon's, Cynthia Jackson's, and Veronica Ashley Fore's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conspiring to violate their Fourth Amendment rights in Count V related to their allegations their respective cell phones were seized and scarchod.
The motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to all remaining claims for monetary
damages asserted by Plaintiffs against District Attorney Stephen Billy.
To the extent Plaintifis assert claims against District Attorey Stephen Billy
in Count I and Count V for securing Sherry Digmon's indictment on ethics
charges: securing indictments of Cindy Jackson, Don Fletcher, and Sherry
Page 50 of 52

094

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 23/02/2026

Lot of gems in here: After arresting Noah, the mayor told him to "go take his activism somewhere where someone cares." The criminal complaint charged Noah with "speaking negatively towards the Mayor and Police Chief." And the mayor admitted the rule didn't apply to people who praise the police.

-5-
During his remarks, Petersen referred to Mayor Hansen and Chief Burdess as “fascists” who “need to be removed from power.” Id. at 114. Mayor Hansen immediately gaveled him down and warned Petersen not to “address the chief of police in that manner.” [ECF No. 27-4 at 53]. When Petersen reiterated his criticism, Mayor Hansen suspended the meeting and ordered him to leave the chambers. Id. As Petersen walked toward the exit in apparent compliance, Lieutenant Christopher Wing intercepted him at the door and arrested him for disorderly conduct. [ECF No. 27-2 at 630]. When Petersen protested that he was attempting to leave as directed, Wing placed him in handcuffs and served him with a 24-hour no-trespass order. [ECF No. 27-4 at 54]. After the arrest, Mayor Hansen addressed the remaining audience members and instructed them to “go do your activism somewhere where somebody cares” rather than at city council meetings.2 Id. The criminal complaint filed against Petersen explicitly stated he was arrested for “speaking negatively towards the Mayor of Newton and the Police Chief.” [ECF No. 27-5 at 35].

"When pressed on why accusations against the rental inspector did not violate the Rule, [the mayor] offered shifting explanations: the speaker was a 'very good friend." .... "Most revealing is the mayor's own admission that praising the police department would, "of course" not violate the Rule. Criticism was restricted; praise was welcomed."

190

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 20/02/2026

We filed our brief opposing the gov’s motion to dismiss our case against the ICE raids of construction sites in Alabama. Remarkably, they don’t even argue any of it is legal. They just don’t think anyone should be able to stop them. www.courtlistener.com/docket/71498...

INTRODUCTION
Defendants filed two motions to dismiss some of Leo's claims. This brief deals with
the Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's APA claims (ECF 57). Because Defendants scantly
mention the merits, this brief mostly focuses on Leo's ability to seek relief from three
Department of Homeland Security policies that allow immigration officers to raid Leo's
worksites without a warrant, detain him without particularized suspicion, and continue to
hold him after he dispelled any doubt about his lawful presence. This Court should deny
the motion to ensure that innocent U.S. citizens like Leo can work in the construction
industry without fear that the federal government will treat them like criminals.

III. Leo Has Adequately Stated His Claims for Relief
The four counts relevant to this motion all state plausible claims. Count I claims
that the three policies violate the Fourth Amendment and should be enjoined. Count Il
22
Case 1:25-cv-00397-JB-N Doc#61 Filed 02/18/26 Page 33 of 42
PagelD# 716
claims that, because the policies are unconstitutional, they should be set aside under
Section 706(2)(B) of the APA. Count III claims that the policies exceed DHS's statutory
authorization. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). And Count IV claims that the policies violate
DHS's regulations. See id. § 706(2)(A), (D).
Defendants don't question the merits of Leo's claims. Their only merits arguments
are that (1) Leo lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in his worksites and, again,
(2) the policies don't exist. But the second one doesn't get them anywhere. A Rule 12(b) (6) motion is not the time to dispute Leo's factual allegations (though, that doesn't stop them from trying). See MTD 12-13. Leo will explain in Section III.A.1 why he can challenge the
Warrantless Entry Policy, and then quickly go through his remaining, unchallenged claims.

29428

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 12/02/2026

Eight claims for damages. It's ambitious. I'm excited to watch them work. www.aclu.org/documents/ro...

Prayer for relief from the case: https://www.aclu.org/documents/rodriguez-et-al-v-porter-et-al-class-action-complaint

140

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 06/02/2026

Memphis has been severely overcovered. Most southern cities have. There are these task forces all over with agents from agencies across DOJ and DHS. It's not just ICE/CBP, and it's not just the few main cities that make the news. Check out all the agencies making immigration arrests in Mobile:

Facebook post from FBI Mobile's office listing all the agencies enforcing immigration laws in Alabama, and noting that only 4 of the 19 people arrested that day had "prior criminal histories."

021

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 27/01/2026

The immediate pivot from birthright citizenship to admin warrants followed by a podcast announcement screams “look at me.” Just can’t tell if it’s a desperate plea for a place in the in-group or a bet that there’s always a market for amoral hacks.

Ilan Wurman, looking like a dead-eyed weasel, announcing his podcast named for another terrible legal pun

000

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 23/01/2026

Enjoying the new Adobe Acrobat feature where they cover the document in AI popup ads every time you open a new PDF. I can see four ways to access the AI Assistant, but I cannot see my file.

091

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 22/01/2026

We just filed another mistaken identity case A SWAT team showed up to arrest someone as a nearby school let out students for lunch. They held a random kid at gun point because he had the same skin color as the suspect, & still perp walked him after realizing their mistake ij.org/case/maine-m...

May 13, 2025, started like any ordinary day for Amber and Nathan Miller's sixteen-year-old son L.M., whose name is withheld because he is a minor. L.M.
attends Deering High School, where it's common for students to leave campus to get lunch.
As he was walking down a sidewalk to join his friends to drive to McDonald's for lunch, a team of police in SWAT tactical gear carrying rifles rounded the corner behind him.

The officers were after a different person: a man named Miles Hibbard, who lived in the neighborhood and was suspected of a minor burglary.
Although Hibbard had never been accused of any crime before, much less one involving weapons, violence, or hostility toward police, South Portland police decided to send an entire SWAT team to arrest him—they came prepared for a shootout next to a high school in the middle of its open lunch period.
Before the officers saw anything more than the back of L.M's head, they drew their rifles, ordered him to stop and put up his hands. Terrified, L.M.
immediately complied. He continued to comply as officers ordered him to walk toward them in the street, lie down on his stomach, and put his hands behind his back.

8855323

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 21/01/2026

A SWAT team shot off flash bangs in the living room, ripped the kids from their beds and interrogated them in the back of a van without their parents. All without bothering to check the color, model, or license plate on the car parked out front. Nissans aren’t rare cars. ij.org/case/north-c...

Alisa Carr and Avery Marshall standing in front of their home with a gray Nissan parked out front.

050

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 14/01/2026

If you don't think armed government agents should act with impunity, now's as good a time as any to support @ij.org's Project on Immunity & Accountability. The project exists solely to make sure there's a remedy when the government violates your rights. ij.org/issues/proje...

022

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 19/12/2025

DOJ say fences and No Trespassing signs aren't enough to make construction sites private. Here's an HSI agent running right past a No Trespassing sign after he hopped a fence to go tackle an American citizen while he poured concrete for a new house.

HSI agent in a brown tactical vest, white T-shirt, and Vans running onto a construction site past a Job Box posted with a No Trespassing sign

Job Box posted with No Trespassing sign that reads, "WARNING: DESIGNATED CONSTRUCTION SITE. TRESPASSERS WILL BE PROSECUTED TO THE FULL EXTENT OF THE LAW."

000

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 19/12/2025

ICE is arguing that construction sites are like “open fields” that don’t require search warrants because they’re freely “accessible to the public and the police.” Here are two sites that they went into without a warrant. Do these homes look like open fields?

Nearly finished house in Fair Hope, Alabama, that officers entered without a warrant on June 12 to arrest Leonardo Garcia Venegas

Home in Chicago getting some renovations done that ICE entered without a warrant

32317

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 18/12/2025

We filed our reply and cited this paragraph from their dec at least a half dozen times. storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

In response to this motion, Defendants argue that they don’t need warrants for construction sites because they’re “open fields.” They also admit that officers went to Leo’s site with no idea who they’d find, let alone particularized suspicion. And they admit that they kept Leo in handcuffs after seeing his REAL ID because, they say, states can issue REAL IDs to illegal aliens. But that’s simply false. And the Secretary of Homeland Security, a Defendant here, should know better since her agency administers the REAL ID program. Unable to refute the policies’ existence, Defendants feebly question Leo’s standing and warn that an injunction would imperil immigration enforcement. They suggest that requiring immigration officers to get warrants to search private worksites and to detain only those people for whom they have particularized suspicion—two basic tenets of the Fourth Amendment—would “curtail[] every on-the-ground immigration search and detention” and “chill routine field operations.” Defs.’ Br. Opp. PI (ECF No. 46) 2–3, 28 (“PIOpp.”). But Leo does not question the federal government’s broad authority over immigration, just three lawless policies. That those policies have become so “routine” is exactly why an injunction is necessary. American citizens like Leo must be free to work without living in constant fear that they’ll be wrongfully detained based on how they look.

week, after Escobar Molina enjoined DHS from reducing the evidentiary threshold for immigration arrests, DHS reiterated, in a comment about Leo’s lawsuit, that arrests require mere reasonable suspicion. Ex. A (McClain Decl.) ¶ 4. Add that to the fact that the Chief Border Patrol Agent has emphasized that they consider how people “look” to be reasonable suspicion, Windham Decl. ¶ 18, and there’s ample reason to doubt that HSI follows the law by developing particularized suspicion. The top officials in these different subagencies are taking their orders directly from Secretary Noem, McClain Decl. ¶ 3, and the Administration’s policy statements to the press and on social media are disseminated to “a broad audience, which includes law enforcement officers under DHS’s command.” Escobar Molina, 2025 WL 3465518, at *24. And besides, the little that ASAC Lavoie does tell us about HSI’s January training runs counter to federal law and DHS’s own regulations. He says REAL IDs are unreliable evidence of lawful status because some states issue them to illegal aliens. Lavoie Decl. ¶ 16. But a quick skim of the REAL ID Act and its implementing regulations would have alerted ASAC Lavoie that his agency has the law wrong. Infra III.C. Nevertheless, Defendants ask this Court to ignore almost all evidence besides ASAC Lavoie’s unreliable claim about HSI’s training. They ask the Court to disregard all media reports. PI Opp. 15–16 n.5. And they call the experiences of non-citizens irrelevant. See id. at 16. Same for people who live outside the District, id., as if Defendants—who direct raids across the Southeast and take orders from D.C.—created special rules for Southern Alabama. Contra McClain Decl. ¶ 10 (Defendant Schrank discussing raids in Northern Alabama). And it’s no wonder. Only by ignoring Leo’s corroborating evidence can

1112

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 18/12/2025

I would simply die. www.centralmaine.com/2025/12/15/m...

The lawyers who called Scott Greaney this fall seemed to him to make a good point.
The women, the 61-year-old turkey farmer from Mercer said, told him that two seats on a state
committee overseeing funds meant to support Maine farmers, loggers and others were reserved by
statute for people representing “historically underserved racial populations.”
“At face value,” Greaney said in an interview via telephone Monday, “the whole thing about
reserving two seats for specific types of people — that ain’t right.”
So he agreed to help the lawyers, who wanted to challenge whether that was constitutional.
But what Greaney did not realize was that he was signing on to be the sole plaintiff in a federal
lawsuit filed Friday against two state officials — and that the national, libertarian-leaning
Pacific Legal Foundation would issue a Friday evening press release that Greaney says was
misleading.
“I have no use for liars and no use for thieves,” Greaney said. “I don’t know what this is all about. I
was planning on calling (the lawyers) today and saying, ‘What the hell is this?’ I’m trying to run a business in the state of Maine, and it has me looking like a punk.”

24512

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 15/12/2025

They said our client stepping to his right to keep filming his brother’s suspicionless arrest from 25 feet away created reasonable suspicion he “was attempting to interfere with an arrest, threatening Officer Safety, and that he may be an alien.” But the explanation & cite for his 2nd arrest is 🤌🏼

Similarly, while ICE has no record of the June 12 encounter, if this brief—no longer than thirty-minute police-citizen [Doc. 1, PageID.26, ¶152] encounter—occurred, then the Federal Defendants had a reasonable suspicion to detain him. [Doc. 44-1, PageID.469, ¶15]. This authority is rooted in the HSI Special Agents’ training and experience and immigration authority. Kavanaugh, J., concurring in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, No. 25A169, 2025 WL 2585637, at *3 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2025) (granting stay) (“Importantly, reasonable suspicion means only that immigration officers may briefly stop the individual and inquire about immigration status. If the person is a U. S. citizen or otherwise lawfully in the United States, that individual will be free to go after the brief encounter. Only if the person is illegally in the United States may the stop lead to further immigration proceedings”). Thus, Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits and this Court should deny his request for a Preliminary Injunction. The Federal Defendants conducted a lawful general immigration enforcement and lawful detention(s).

010

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 13/12/2025

The point he’s trying to make about unreliability is that some states give licenses to people without status. But the REAL ID Act requires those licenses to say in a prominent place that they’re not REAL IDs.

020

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 13/12/2025

It’s true that non-citizens can get one, but people here without legal status cannot. And if the point of the stop is about confirming legal status, the REAL ID does that. Here’s Sam Alito agreeing.

The Continued Detention Policy authorizes the very type of seizures that Alcocer
forbids-but at scale. Many of these seizures turn into arrests that exceed the officers'
power under 8 C.FR. § 287.8(c)(2) (i)-(ii). Under the policy, immigration officers can
detain workers-initially seized on the premise that they are undocumented-even after
workers show proof of citizenship or lawful presence. Supra pp 11-12. It happened to Leo
twice. Both times, officers had his driver's license in hand within minutes. Supra pp. 5-6.
Alabama issues licenses only to citizens or those who are lawfully present, Ala. Code § 31-13-29(c) (1), (g), specifically "to discourage illegal immigration within the state and
maximize enforcement of federal immigration laws through cooperation with federal
authorities." United States v. Alabama, 691 F3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012). Thus, Leo was "entitled to the presumption that he... [was] lawfully present." Ala. Code § 31-13-
3(11). Leo's license also has a star in the corner, which he could obtain only with the
documents DHS certifies are compliant with the federal REAL ID Act. 6 C.ER. § 37.71.5
Under that Act, a REAL ID "suffice[s] to establish lawful presence." Arizona v. United States,
567 U.S. 387, 449 n.1 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in part).

250

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 13/12/2025

Even a young(er) Sam Alito agreed having a REAL ID would establish legal status. storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

0399

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 13/12/2025

DHS is also the agency responsible for certifying that state IDs comply with the REAL ID Act. storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

1224

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 13/12/2025

The government has decided, with no basis other than feeding its new tech, that our biometrics are only IDs that count.

16. Only after being cuffed, Plaintiff stated that he had identification in his pocket. He
was then brought to stand by the government vehicles. A subsequent search of his pocket by the
HSI Special Agent located Plaintiff's wallet, containing Plaintiff's REAL ID-compliant Alabama driver's license, as well as a second driver's license. The HSI Special Agent needed to further
verify his U.S. citizenship because each state has its own REAL ID compliance laws, which may
provide for the issuance of a REAL ID to an alien and therefore based on HSI Special Agent
training and experience, REAL ID can be unreliable to confirm U.S. citizenship.

From page 4
Case 1:25-cV-00397-JB-N Doc# 44-1 Filed 12/11/25 Page 6 of 10 PagelD# 470

2168

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 12/12/2025

Add to this that HSI just filed a declaration in our case challenging these policies saying they can’t trust REAL IDs as proof of status. So showing your papers isn’t even enough to end the stop.

751211390

Jared @jaredmcclain.bsky.social · 10/12/2025

Last week (left), a federal judge found that DHS had an unlawful policy of arresting Latinos without probable cause based on Tricia McLaughlin's statements saying they only need reasonable suspicion. This week (right), Tricia repeats the company line to WIRED. Their lack of shame helps in court.

Heeding these orders, DHS’s leadership has, according to plaintiffs, implemented a policy and practice of arresting people who live or work in the District and whom they perceive to be Latino, without the required probable cause findings that those individuals are in the United States unlawfully and are likely to escape before an administrative warrant can be obtained. See Pls.’ Prelim. Inj. Mot. at 6.
Finding that defendants have implemented such a policy and practice does not require a far leap of logic: defendants themselves have repeatedly emphasized an abandonment of the probable cause standard. For example, Tricia McLaughlin, DHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and “the principal advisor to Secretary Noem on all external and internal communications,” has made multiple public statements confirming this point.32 On September 25, 2025, in response to this lawsuit, McLaughlin, as DHS spokesperson, is quoted as making the following public statement:

“Allegations that DHS law enforcement officers engage in “racial profiling” are disgusting, reckless, and categorically FALSE. What makes someone a target for immigration enforcement is if they are illegally in the U.S.—NOT their skin color, race, or ethnicity. Under the fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution, DHS law enforcement uses “reasonable suspicion” to make arrests. There are no “indiscriminate stops” being made. The Supreme Court recently vindicated us on this question. DHS enforces federal immigration law without fear, favor, or prejudice,” assistant secretary for public affairs at DHS Tricia McLaughlin tells WIRED.

073