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The broader implication is that we need to look beyond the average when studying electoral systems. District magnitude is not just about how permissive an electoral system is overall, but also about how permissiveness is distributed across districts

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Importantly, we also show that this variation hampers electoral coordination over time: when incentives to coordinate differ across districts, coordination becomes more difficult.

We test the argument using evidence from 54 democracies, more than 400 elections in 30 European democracies between 1945 and 2019, and district-level evidence from Portugal and Spain provides. The results show that within-country variation in district magnitude increases party-system fragmentation.

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This produces a contamination effect: small parties that can win seats in large-magnitude districts have incentives to compete in smaller districts too, even when their chances of winning there are limited. As a result, variation in district magnitude can increase the overall number of parties.

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District magnitude affects party fragmentation through two mechanisms: overall district permissiveness and variation in permissiveness across districts. When magnitudes vary, parties face different incentives to coordinate across districts.

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The conventional wisdom is that larger district magnitudes produce more parties. But electoral systems often have substantial variation in district magnitude, and this variation is usually reduced to a single average. We argue that this misses an important part of the story.

We are grateful to participants at the SPARC Seminars at the **Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon (ICS-ULisboa)**, especially @pcmagalhaes.bsky.social. I also gratefully acknowledge the Salvador de Madariaga Fellowship, which supported my research stay at ICS-ULisboa

🧵 New article in *Political Research Quarterly*: “Beyond the Average: Revisiting How District Magnitude Shapes Party Systems,” co-authored with @santiagolagop.bsky.social. 📄 DOI: doi.org/10.1177/1065...

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5/5 The findings show that the type of decentralization matters. Compared with both centralized and symmetrically decentralized systems, asymmetric decentralization weakens national electoral accountability while increasing the territorial fragmentation of party competition.

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4/5 We test these arguments using survey data from Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Spain, together with panel data covering 709 legislative elections in 73 democracies between 1960 and 2018.

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3/5 We also expect asymmetric decentralization to reduce the nationalization of party systems. As electoral incentives vary across regions, parties compete under different conditions, leading to greater territorial variation in voting patterns.

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2/5 We argue that asymmetric decentralization has distinctive political consequences. When regions have different policy responsibilities, citizens attribute responsibility differently across the country, weakening accountability in national elections while strengthening it in regional elections.

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1/5 How does asymmetric decentralization affect democracy? While we know that decentralization shapes politics, we know much less about whether giving different powers to different regions changes electoral competition and democratic accountability.

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Uneven decentralization: political competition under asymmetry

Very happy to share another publication with my good friend André Blais. In this paper, we examine how asymmetric decentralization shapes democratic accountability and party system nationalization across democracies. 📄 Read the paper here: [rdcu.be/fvFVs]

rdcu.be

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Ignacio Lago @ignaciolago.bsky.social · 24/07/2026

3/5 We also show that asymmetric decentralization reduces the nationalization of party systems. As electoral incentives vary across regions, parties compete under different conditions, leading to greater territorial variation in voting patterns

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Ignacio Lago @ignaciolago.bsky.social · 24/07/2026

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Ignacio Lago @ignaciolago.bsky.social · 24/07/2026

UPF Ciències Polítiques i Socials @politiquesupf.bsky.social · 13/07/2026

Reposted by Ignacio Lago

🏅 El nostre Departament ha estat reconegut oficialment com a Unitat d'Excel·lència "María de Maeztu"! Avui hem recollit l'acreditació de mans de la ministra Diana Morant @dianamorantr.bsky.social en l'acte oficial celebrat a València. @sdrecercaupf.bsky.social @upf.edu 😀

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Reposted by Ignacio Lago

UPF Ciències Polítiques i Socials @politiquesupf.bsky.social · 08/07/2026

REF: CPIS-PSR-2026-16 Full-Time Project Manager of the “Maria de Maeztu” Unit of Excellence within the Department of Political and Social Sciences at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF). www.upf.edu/web/politiqu...

upf.edu

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Ignacio Lago @ignaciolago.bsky.social · 17/06/2026

Congratulations to you and @flindersuniversity.bsky.social! I don’t understand how @griffith.edu.au could let an asset like you go.

Ignacio Lago @ignaciolago.bsky.social · 16/06/2026

Este artículo me ha gustado. Es interesante y tiene importantes implicaciones de políticas públicas reis.cis.es/index.php/re...

reis.cis.es

REIS. Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas

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Ignacio Lago @ignaciolago.bsky.social · 05/06/2026

I honestly don't understand—who on earth would be willing to lose both of you?