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Reposted by Holger Roonemaa

ingaspringe.bsky.social @ingaspringe.bsky.social · 03/01/2025

In a recent #RUSI podcast, @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social and I discuss how Russia's security service conducts sabotage in the Baltics. My investigation was based on court documents; Holger's team went undercover. Listen and read here: rusi.org/podcasts/sus...

rusi.org

Episode 9: Understanding Russia’s Growing Campaign of Sabotage

We explore the growing threat of sabotage attacks across Europe and the technological tools used for financing and recruitment.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

It is almost certain that RU will not be able to destroy UA's energy system to the extent that it significantly affects the war by the end of winter. There will be no catastrophe.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

❗However, RU does not have enough ballistic missiles to cause a complete blackout of UA’s electrical system. Such attacks might lead to temporary restrictions on electricity use, but the hits are not that massive, and UA is able to restore power supply.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

UA's energy infrastructure is holding up. Interruptions occur, but RU’s attacks are not frequent enough. UA handles cruise missiles well, but ballistic missiles pose more challenges except where air defenses are very strong.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

Even there, the consequences of the attacks were quite limited. A prolonged collapse of energy systems, like the one at the beginning of 2023, did not occur.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

Last week, there were warnings of a new Oreshkin attack, but it did not materialize. Instead, there was a missile attack on Western Ukraine and its energy infrastructure, where UA’s air defense is weaker.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

‼️Oreshkin is being hyped far beyond its actual importance. It is largely about playing on Western fears, just like RU’s entire nuclear deterrence narrative. It does not have a substantial impact on the course of the war.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

Some say that it exploded before hitting ground and failed to demonstrate any significant destruction power. It is also uncertain whether Oreshkin would reach a target in areas with UA's best air defense systems. This may be why Dnipro was chosen as the target.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

The Oreshkin missile is purely a propaganda tool. RU certainly does not have many of these missiles. They are also certainly not capable of putting Oreshkin into serial production at this time. It is not even clear how successful this one launch was.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

This would be an absolute loss of RU prestige. It demonstrates that RU's resources are far smaller than it has managed to project. However, the events in Syria do not have a direct impact on the war against UA.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

Now, it is worth observing what happens to RU’s bases in Syria. Will RU leave them completely? The naval base in Tartus has been in their possession since 1971 and is RU's only base in the Mediterranean.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

From the moment relatively small units moved out of Idlib, the regime collapsed in ten days. While RU’s operation to capture Kyiv in three days and UA in two weeks failed, Turkey and HTS succeeded in Syria.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

The process that began on October 7, 2023, led to a situation where IRN and its allies were so weakened that they could not ensure Assad's survival. TUR recognized this and strongly supported opposition movements.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

For RU, a noteworthy event is the collapse of Assad's regime. This demonstrates the classic weakness of dictatorships. Two weeks earlier, no one believed this could happen. TUR did perceive the weakness of RU and IRN.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

❗We are still planning procurements for 2028 rather than for March 2025. I do not sense a shift in routine. True, GER's defense industry has significantly increased its pace, but the French and British industries have not done so to the same extent.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

(Regarding Rutte's warnings about an approaching war and the need to prepare for it.) I am not confident that Rutte's words are having effect in Europe. EUR defense budgets are gradually increasing, but I do not see the arms industry experiencing significant acceleration.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

Another issue is that it would be very dangerous to undertake this without the U.S. If such security guarantees are to be provided to UA, they must include the U.S. to some extent. This is also in EUR's strategic interest.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

If Europe must eventually take on this role, it will be a significant challenge. EUR ground forces are not particularly strong, and a peacekeeping mission would rely heavily on ground troops.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

There is much talk about sending EUR peacekeepers to UA, but this is not a relevant topic right now. It can only be discussed if some kind of peace or ceasefire is in place, and we are far from that. At present, this discussion only creates confusion.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

The GER chancellor is playing a very domestic political game. Statements from Scholz, such as the need to communicate with RU and that it should not be left solely to Trump, will likely emerge before elections. This is aimed at keeping the party's left wing on his side.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

Signals from people who have met with Trump's circle indicate a message of "peace from the position of strength." This theme runs through many discussions. It is an adequate approach. RU can only be forced into peace from a position of strength.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

That said, Trump's statement was unnecessary. It emboldens RU. In theory, Trump could reverse this decision, but he can control UA only if he offers something in return.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

(About Trump's criticism of Biden allowing UA to use missiles on RU territory.) I think it more reflects opposition to Biden rather than Trump's true thoughts. Previously, several of Trump's close associates criticized Biden's administration for not making this decision.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

‼️I think U.S. aid to UA will continue as it does today, and there will not be a complete cessation of aid. The war will continue in its current form for a considerable time.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

The key is to ensure that if RU responds with a rigid "no," the U.S will punish RU, not UA. There is a risk that it might be easier to pressure those who are more easily influenced. This was also the downside of the Minsk negotiations: GER and FRA put more pressure on UA than on RU.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

The question then becomes what Trump will do next. If he wants to force RU to negotiate, he will need to provide significantly more military aid to UA. Whether he does this, whether aid to UA increases slightly, decreases slightly, or remains at its current level, is unknown.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

But RU will continue its rhetoric about revising the entire European security structure and returning to its December 2021 ultimatum. This position is a nonstarter, and no one will negotiate on it. RU itself understands this as well.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

I believe that Trump’s administration will try to present some sort of plan within a month of taking office. What follows will depend on the reactions of the parties involved. UA will at least take it into serious consideration.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

Another Kursk-style offensive is unlikely. Further developments depend on what plan Trump proposes and how long it takes him to do so. Currently, Trump does not have a comprehensive plan ready.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

❗The current war dynamics are such that what happens on the battlefield is far less important than the political game surrounding it. Militarily, there is no reason to believe that the front lines will see major surprises in the next 3–4 months.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

For the next 2-3 months, air force activity will also be more limited than usual. With cloudy weather the air force cannot operate very actively.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

RU has no hope of reclaiming Kursk within a month. There is no sign of such successful offensives. On other parts of the front, the situation is relatively stable. In some places, RU is applying pressure, but no significant advances have been made.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

There are likely to be further incidents, such as when North Koreans fired on Kadyrovites. The language barrier is so significant. NK units have been integrated into RU battalions. There aren't enough interpreters for every 200–300 men.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

In Kursk, North Korean soldiers are involved in the fighting, but they do not bring any major changes. It only allows RU to recruit fewer of its own people. North Koreans are cheaper cannon fodder.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

In Kursk, RU is also pushing, but it is harder to assess the front line there. There are no well-established defensive fortifications, and both sides are conducting dynamic attacks into the other's rear. RU has not achieved significant success in Kursk.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

Pokrovsk is a larger city and a transportation hub. There is much more urban infrastructure and property in which to hold positions. RU on their part, has more to destroy, and this takes time.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

Some bloggers claim that Kurakhove has already fallen, but it seems that this is not yet so. UA continues to resist, but after some time, RU will take it. Pokrovsk is farther away, and urban battles there could last a long time. There is no real threat of RU capturing it within a couple of months.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

The situation on the frontlines has not significantly changed in the last month. For UA, the most difficult area remains the southern part of the eastern front—Pokrovsk and Kurakhove. RU continues to advance there, but very slowly and at the cost of heavy losses.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

Ever since Feb 2022, @michaeldweiss.bsky.social and I have been regularly consulting with an Estonian analyst "Karl" to get his assessments about where the war is going. Karl is known for his sober and non-alarmist analysis. Here is Karl's latest. 👇👇

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Reposted by Holger Roonemaa

ingaspringe.bsky.social @ingaspringe.bsky.social · 19/11/2024

Igauņu kolēģi gadu analizēja satelīttatēlus no Krievijas militārajiem objektiem, kas izvietoti gar Baltijas un Polijas robežas. Šeit sīka analīze ar attēliem. Galvenie secinājumi🧵 www.delfi.lv/52302987/int...

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/11/2024

I'm happy that our investigation has sparked quite a bit of discussion and debates already. Talking about our vulnerabilities is the only way how to improve. Please read our long-read for more (& let me know if the visuals aren't loading, we've had some issues 😳) ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/120...

ekspress.delfi.ee

Satellite imagery analysis. What’s going on in Putin’s military bases behind the Estonian border and how big a threat they really pose us

Russia has a number of military bases behind the borders of the Baltic states and Poland. The war in Ukraine has depleted these bases, but recent satellite images show rapid infrastructure development...

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/11/2024

The good news is that both, the EE armed forces and NATO know how to militarily hit back. "All the enemy's military force must be wiped out in the first few days," says Gen Herem. That’s why EE is buying €1.6b worth of weapons & ammunition, incl ATACMS.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/11/2024

The second mistake would be that the West, fearing escalation, would limit how deep into Russia it would be allowed to attack back.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/11/2024

Any type of RU military campaign against the Baltics would lead to a series of dilemmas for NATO’s political leaders. According to Gen Palm, the first mistake would be Western politicians only allowing to hit back at the precise locations from which Russia is striking.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/11/2024

Imagine a scenario where Russian troops enter EE, LV or LT, occupy part of it, and then stop and ask, 'Do you really want to start a nuclear war over this?'

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/11/2024

The most likely scenario wouldn’t be RU trying to fully occupy the Baltic countries. “Their real goal would be to break up NATO: to show that the alliance and its members are not really ready to come to the aid of every country,” Hodges said.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/11/2024

In the worst case scenario, EE and LV could wait for 2-3 weeks for allies help to arrive, according to Ben Hodges (@general-ben.bsky.social ). “NATO airpower would probably appear immediately. You're not alone, but you won't see a long column of Abrams tanks in the first two weeks."

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/11/2024

Luckily, the units & especially the 76th have been hit hard in UA and have lost a lot of their quality. EE mil int assesses it has 30% of former capacity remaining. This might be described well by the fast expansion of the Pskov military cemetery.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/11/2024

35 km from EE border in Pskov is the home of the 76th VDV & the 2 spetsnaz brigade. These units would be some of the first to engage in case of war. They would try seize key locations in EE or LV.

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Holger Roonemaa @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social · 19/11/2024

Early warning is one of the toughest challenges for the Baltic states. RU can stockpile ammunition during exercises. Ukraine’s experience showed that deploying 200k troops took RU only 18 days.

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