iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

End. With limited info for April 2026, we’ll save guesses for later. Based on current data, Ukraine operates a steady strike campaign damaging Russia’s war effort monthly, and Russia likely can't fully stop it with current A2AD attrition. This highlights the importance of long- and mid-range strike.

161

5. The last element of the puzzle is the general outlook on this campaign. Everything proceeds at a normal pace, with the exception of the sharp increase in March 2026. The graph reveals an important fact that Crimea is still crucial for the ongoing war.

161

4. There is an evident difference in the types of targets that have been hit within Russia. The attack on electricity grids, specifically railway stations, is quite notable among all other attacks.

141

3. The Ukrainian air campaign has also extended into Russian territory, maintaining constant pressure on Belgorod Oblast, which is understandable given its role in military operations against Ukraine.

171

2. When the data is disaggregated by category, it becomes clear, consistent with our previous work, Ukraine has primarily targeted air defence assets, with a total of 307 strikes. This is followed by assets associated with power generation, and then by military bases and staging grounds.

182

1. The overall trend shows a steady pace, which surged in March 2026 with 288 strikes recorded. However, keep in mind that the April 2026 data is still incomplete at the time of publication. Crimea and Donetsk are the most heavily targeted oblasts overall.

182

Controlling the Board: Ukraine’s Aerial Strike Operations (27-04-2026) - Tochnyi.info

🧵Controlling the Board: Ukraine’s Aerial Strike Operations (27-04-2026) Today, together with my colleagues at Tochnyi , we publish an update on the aerial campaign conducted by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and within Russia. tochnyi.info/2026/04/cont...

tochnyi.info

After our first work on the strikes on air defence, this article offers and updated overall view of all the strikes recorded by Tochnyi since July 2025 up to

193

yrouille 🌍🇪🇺 🇫🇷 (💛💙) @yrouille.bsky.social · 12/02/2026

We all dream a nice car park for trips to the Artic. Thank you for sharing it I will put in my website to keep checked!

110

Reposted by Daniele

Great article 👍 I also update weekly a map of long range strikes : www.datawrapper.de/_/EUS5j/ Our datas seem to be consistent.

datawrapper.de

2026-Q1 | Ukrainian 🇺🇦 long-range strikes on Russian 🇷🇺 infrastructures | Created with Datawrapper

171

There is a concept, of shift in momentum. Sometime when there is a stalemate or situation is uncertain a strong shift can be triggered by an external factor. My guess is that Ukrainian force tried to us long range strikes to do this, and they succeeded, at least partially.

020

Yes, weather has an impact on drone range and operational capabilities. We are talking about drones that have to fly relatively low and therefore are more affected by bad weather. However, there are also a more strategic reasons in hitting certain targets in certain moment.

020

As always, I would like to thank the entire team at @tochnyi, and if you would like to read the entire research find us at: x.com/hartreefock/...

x.com

190

end/ Summer 2025 demonstrated how deep strikes are critical and effective. Future trajectory depends on: • Sustainability of Ukrainian long-range drone production. • Effectiveness of Ukrainian new long-range missiles. • Russian industrial repair resilience.

1120

8/ Strategic consequences: Air defence redeployment away from other theatres Increased infrastructure hardening costs, anti-drone nets over substations and fuel depots. Logistical friction along entire operational depth. the Psychological erosion of rear-area immunity

1100

7/ Logistical interdiction expanded geographically. Bridge strikes: 8 confirmed in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod. Rail sabotage: 30+ incidents in Crimea & Melitopol–Tokmak corridor. 9+ relay cabinet sabotage actions. In several cases, the attacks occur on the entire train line.

1100

6/ Air defence strikes followed a pattern. Low activity in June–July → sharp escalation in August–September. The key objectives of this can be summarised as: Degrade defensive envelope Enable follow-on infrastructure strikes Force redistribution of AD assets from frontlines

190

5/ A few documented strikes: Novoshakhtinsk refinery (Aug 21), satellite imagery confirmed strike location and tank damage. Early September, Slavyansk Eko Oil suspended production entirely following a combined drone/missile attack.

190

4/ Target distribution indicates priority on fuel logistics. Oil depots were the most frequently targeted category by mid-September. Depots provide immediate operational leverage: destruction disrupts the frontline supply rapidly.

2100

3/ Total confirmed strikes (June–early October): • 44 oil refinery strikes • 40+ oil depot strikes • 30+ oil facility strikes • Sharp rise in S-300/S-400 air defence strikes • 8 bridge strikes (Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod) • 30+ railway sabotage/drone in occupied Ukraine

1110

2/ The analysis in depth can be found on our website link below: x.com/hartreefock/...

x.com

170

Daniele @hartreefock.bsky.social · 01/01/2026

1/ Ukrainian Summer Offensive: Assault on the russian hone front At @tochnyi.info we investigated Ukraine’s June–October 2025 deep-strike campaign, which represented a structured operational shift from tactical interdiction to systemic infrastructure targeting.

2289

No UK won't use M777 but US and other are going to benefit from it. Plus BAE has also other product lines which depends on gun barrel production. This initiative is going to create several opportunities.

000

End. This preliminary release aims to underscore the enduring importance of long-range strikes, whether through missiles, drones, or sabotage operations. Ukraine has demonstrated that even when facing a theoretically superior opponent, airspace can remain highly vulnerable.

0240

4/4 Investigating the aftermath of long-range strikes or sabotage is very challenging because a large fireball in footage does not always lead to conclusive evidence from satellites. In some cases, despite the fire and explosion, the damage remains limited.

1200

3/4 The team analysed most of the operations, focusing on those more relevant, such as air defence attrition, particularly in the Occupied Ukrainian Territories. From an initial analysis, we have strong evidence of a correlation between AD destruction and LRS.

1190

2/4 We have been analysing reports from various sources, including Telegram, VK, Russian news outlets, and Ukrainian channels. The data collection is mostly manual, but processing uses coding to filter relevant statistics for our analysis.

1201

Daniele @hartreefock.bsky.social · 21/09/2025

1/4 🗺️ Kinetic Operations in Russia & Occupied Ukrainian Territories With my colleagues at @tochnyi.info , we are pleased to release today the first density map of all Long-Range Strikes, Short-Range Missile attacks, and Sabotage activity since June 2025.

43915

An honour for me to be there and speak with such an eminent and competent person. Come and stay with us tonight, lot to discuss and unpack always with facts in one hand and coffee in the other!

0102

End. Finally, a big thank you to the entire @tochnyi.info team for their support.

170

6. Disrupting nodes like Alabuga is not simple. But understanding its ecosystem and the vulnerabilities hidden within it is essential to countering Russia’s drone surge. Especially when one of the key components of Shaed is still hand-made.

181

5. But here’s the paradox: Alabuga’s “self-sufficient” war industry depends on fragile supply chains. Carbon fibre production is impossible without an adequate flux of oxygen & nitrogen, once supplied by Air Liquide’s infrastructure.

150

4. Inside the plant, workers hand-layer carbon fibre for Shahed airframes. That carbon fibre comes from Alabuga-Fibre (UMATEX), acquired by Rosatom, aiming to hit 10,000 tonnes per year by 2030.

130

3. Alabuga has expanded quickly: new production halls, dormitories, and workshops. Thanks to tax breaks, customs benefits, and state investment, it has turned it into one of Russia’s most important industrial clusters.

130

2. Over the past 5 months, Russia has tripled its use of Shahed-type drones, now averaging 103 launches per day. Ukraine hasn’t had a single day without attacks. In April 2025, Russia launched 2,485 Shaheds. By July, 6,297. That’s a 1,378% increase compared to July 2024.

130

Alabuga plant – No Chain is stronger than its weakest link – Tochnyi.info

1. If you’d like to dive straight into the full investigation, you’ll find the link below. But for those following along here, this thread offers a summary of our main findings. tochnyi.info/2025/08/alab...

tochnyi.info

131

Alabuga plant: No Chain is stronger than its weakest link New @tochnyi.info investigation on Shahed drones and the Alabuga plant, first in a mini-series. If the Shahed is the arrow and the launch sites the bow, today we cover the blacksmith forging the arrow.

22410

End. Due to its importance, we encourage others to investigate more: @rusi.bsky.social @csis.org As always, big thanks to @tochnyi.info team for supporting this and to Jonathan for peer review and to Chris for the graphics.

070

5. When completed, it could intercept radio signals thousands of km away, track NATO comms, and talk to subs deep under the Baltic. A relic of Soviet “Krug” tech… updated for modern electronic warfare. And it’s rising right on NATO’s doorstep.

180

4. 🚧 Construction timeline: • Mar 2023, first new roadwork spotted • May 2023, two outer rings defined • Jul 2023, forest cleared, perimeter walls rise • Jul 2024, all rings visible from space • Jul 2025, central hub taking shape Source: Sentinel-2

140

3. The site spans up to 1.6 km in diameter, far larger than most known military antenna arrays. Six concentric rings. 180 evenly spaced points are likely for vertical antennas. This isn’t a radar. It’s something bigger: a CDAA a Cold War–era listening giant reborn. 🎯

150

2.📍 Hidden in the forests of Kaliningrad, just 25 km from Poland’s border, using satellite imagery we noticed: a massive, perfectly circular construction. Huge size. Strategic location. We decided to investigate. 🛰️

150