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Graeme Auld

@graemeauld.bsky.social

493 followers 272 following 51 posts

Professor, School of Public Policy & Administration @carletonsppa.bsky.social, Carleton University. Environment. Governance. Regulations. (web: carleton.ca/sppa/people/auld-graeme?) Co-Editor, Regulation & Governance @reggovjournal.bsky.social

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Graeme Auld @graemeauld.bsky.social · 08/03/2025

A post about an older paper. This one is an assessment of why some Canadian fish stocks do better, the same, or worse than expected, & what else might explain this divergent performance. #fisheries #openaccess onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10....

Abstract
Despite progress in the management of assessed fish populations, many countries lag behind international commitments to restore overexploited stocks to healthy abundances. Here we use a mixed-methods positive deviance approach, also known as ‘bright spot’ analysis, to understand what drives the successful governance of exploited species by learning from positive outliers, or ‘deviants’. We use Canada as a case study, identifying factors driving the abundance of 230 commercially exploited fish and invertebrate populations, of which only 28% were classified at healthy abundance in 2022. We first applied a generalized linear model to test how diverse socio-ecological fishery attributes relate to stock health. We found healthier stocks are positively and significantly correlated with certain management regions, more selective gears, eco-certification, and high fishery value. Counterintuitively, healthier stocks were also associated with high inherent fishing vulnerability and the absence of reference points. We then used fishery expert surveys and interviews to investigate the social and institutional characteristics of stocks healthier than expected, given their circumstances. We found that fisheries targeting these positive outliers have lower conflict among users, balanced stakeholder involvement in data collection and decision-making, and improved accounting of mortality sources. Lessons from these positive deviants can be applied to improve underperforming management systems that are struggling to reverse overexploitation in Canada and elsewhere. More generally, we suggest that a positive deviance approach, already used in public health, could be a promising tool to learn about successful fisheries management interventions, and the diverse actors responsible for ensuring these interventions are successful.

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Graeme Auld @graemeauld.bsky.social · 02/03/2025

Latest article w/ Stefan Renckens in New Political Economy 'Rethinking capacities of regulatory market-assurance intermediaries: the case of seafood sustainability audits' #openaccess #privateregulation #intermediaries #fisheries Abstract below 👇 www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

ABSTRACT
Credible assurances about the invisible qualities of goods and services – such as sustainability features – are key to market governance. The theory of regulatory intermediaries offers a lens for assessing diverse regulatory contexts where differently configured actors serve as market-assurance intermediaries between rule-makers and rule-targets. Studies using this theory have clarified the consequences of these configurations for regulatory capture, co-regulation, feedback effects, and the (re)production of knowledge and power. However, the distinction and relations between organisational and individual intermediaries remain under theorised. We reconceptualise the individual capacities of expertise and independence and assess these for 283 individuals performing 312 seafood sustainability audits for the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). Examining the individuals and teams performing these audits uncovers otherwise invisible biases within intermediary processes, including in assessors’ professional, educational and personal backgrounds, the composition of assessment teams and assessors’ experience in conducting MSC audits. The analysis highlights that intermediary capacities are co-determined by individual assessors and audit organisations and are only partly under the control of the MSC as regulator. A shift to an individual level of analysis thus elucidates new consequences for the legitimacy of the regulator and intermediaries and for the (re)production of power and inequities in global market governance.

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