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The central argument is that aggressive rhetoric cannot substitute for credible commitments, adequate resources and dependable partnerships. King, Angus, and Mark Hertling. “Lethality and Testosterone Will Get Us Only So Far.” The New York Times, 12 Oct. 2026

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Their proposed remedy is to renew support for Ukraine, rigorously enforce Russia sanctions, reverse force reductions in Eastern Europe and stop alienating allies.

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They also cite the previous year's strikes against Yemen's Houthis, which they say did not eliminate the threat to Red Sea shipping. In their view, stronger adversaries may interpret those outcomes as evidence that U.S. military superiority has limits.

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They see the campaign against Iran as exposing a different weakness: capacity. The authors assert that months of bombing and economic blockade have failed to achieve most strategic aims while depleting munitions and exposing American bases.

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They argue that reduced support for Ukraine, along with troop reductions in Germany and fewer rotational deployments to Eastern Europe, emboldens Vladimir Putin and signals to Xi Jinping that Washington may not sustain a prolonged confrontation.

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According to King and Hertling, U.S. policy toward Ukraine has undermined the perception of American will.

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Article 5, which treats an attack on one NATO ally as an attack on all, was designed to prevent aggressors from picking off countries individually.

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During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence helped prevent direct superpower conflict, while NATO, other alliances, forward deployments, intelligence sharing and economic cooperation extended deterrence to conventional attacks.

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The authors define deterrence as persuading an adversary that aggression would bring an unacceptable response. They distinguish two essential ingredients: capacity—the forces and weapons needed to impose costs—and will—the demonstrated readiness to use them.

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They contend that rivals such as Russia and China are increasingly inclined to test American commitments because Washington appears both unreliable and militarily constrained.

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In this New York Times opinion essay, Senator Angus King and retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling argue that U.S. national security is becoming less secure because the Trump administration has weakened the credibility of American deterrence.

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credibility, exhausting military resources, and alienating allies, thereby increasing the risk of confrontation with Russia and China. ARTICLE SUMMARY

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Senator Angus King and retired Lieutenant General Mark Hertling argue that President Trump's foreign policy has dangerously weakened American military deterrence by undermining U.S.

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LETHALITY AND TESTOSTERONE WILL GET US ONLY SO FAR By Angus King and Mark Hertling | The New York Times | October 12, 2026 ONE-SENTENCE SUMMARY

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Under President Trump's second term, the trend has gone the other way. Analysis: www.wichitaliberty.org/economics/bi…

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BIDEN VS. TRUMP INFLATION: WHAT THE CPI DATA SHOWS

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" The $5,000 dividend has no funding mechanism and would require an act of Congress. Assistance from Claude AI. Summary and fact-check: www.wichitaliberty.org/politics/tru…

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cheaper than under Biden (the national average was about $4.36 on October 12), the $21 trillion investment figure is more than double the White House's own tally, core inflation is 2.4%, not 1.8%, and drug prices cannot fall "700%.

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" Our fact-check found that several of his most-repeated claims are real but stretched - record median income and a record-low official poverty rate check out; a historically low 2025 murder rate is real, though "lowest since 1900" can't be proven - while others are flatly wrong: gasoline is not

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decision an "indelible stain" that "we will not forget.

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" He signed an executive order on stage in Nebraska letting anyone buy tax-free red-dyed diesel, promised $90-to-$100 Medicare checks and touted $500 Obamacare refund checks, announced a Presidential Medal of Freedom for Roger Clemens in Texas, and in Syracuse called Norway's Nobel Peace Prize

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a $5,000 "Trump Dividend.

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In five rallies across eight days, President Donald Trump delivered a nearly identical closing argument for the November 3, 2026 midterms: "pretend I'm on the ballot," because if Democrats win Congress "you will have a 1929-style economic depression," and if Republicans win, every adult citizen gets

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FIVE RALLIES, ONE SCRIPT: WHAT TRUMP TOLD VOTERS IN NEBRASKA, TEXAS, NEW YORK, TENNESSEE AND OHIO - AND WHAT CHECKS OUT

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testimony from grieving parents. Repetition across five cities shows the core message is scripted, while the digressions - Husted's body, Clemens's statistics, "Trump Ocean" - reveal an improvising performer who measures success by crowd affection.

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The influence strategy is a tightly sequenced template: an existential fear appeal (a "1929-style depression" and "the last Republican president" if Democrats win), a transactional reward (a $5,000 "Trump Dividend"), a barrage of superlative statistics presented as suppressed truths, and emotional

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" His psychological signature combines grandiosity (he deserved "eight Nobel Prizes"), grievance (the "fake news," Norway, an "ungrateful" Cuellar) and a loyalty ledger in which favors create debts.

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Across five rallies, Trump presents a self-concept built on fusion: he is the movement, the ballot, the economy and the nation's peacemaker, and voters are asked to "pretend I'm on the ballot" because, "in a true way, I am running.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL AND RHETORICAL ANALYSIS: TRUMP'S OCTOBER 2026 MIDTERM RALLY TOUR

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" His psychological signature combines grandiosity (he deserved "eight Nobel Prizes"), grievance (the "fake news," Norway, an "ungrateful" Cuellar) and a loyalty ledger in which favors create debts.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL AND RHETORICAL ANALYSIS: TRUMP'S OCTOBER 2026 MIDTERM RALLY TOUR

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The gap is wider in total jobs than in private-sector jobs alone, which traces back to opposite trends in government employment during the two windows. How much weight to put on that pattern, given the caveats above, is where reasonable people will disagree.

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By both measures shown here – total nonfarm payrolls and private-sector payrolls – job growth was slower in the first 19 months of Trump’s second term than in the final 19 months of Biden’s term, whether measured by monthly average or cumulative percentage growth.

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Lining these two periods up side by side, month one against month one, is one way to compare the pace of job growth under each.

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Six charts below use that data to compare two specific stretches of time: the last 19 months of Joe Biden’s term (roughly July 2023 through January 2025) and the first 19 months of Donald Trump’s second term (roughly February 2025 through August 2026).

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Every month, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports how many jobs the U.S. economy added or lost.

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