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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 05/09/2025

Bergedorfer ’94: German minister blunt on NATO, Swiss expert warned on Ukraine, Polish envoy exposed Russia’s lack of goals. Putin & Kokoshin hinted post-91 borders were “unsatisfactory.” No one spoke of a NATO “promise.” I unpack the story on my Substack: bartekgajos.substack.com/p/putin-at-b...

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 07/08/2025

The tone? Often open, occasionally heated. Sobchak praised reforms. German journalist and a historian warned of authoritarian backlash. Some Western participants feared Russian revanchism. And Putin? Sitting quietly - but he spoke, too. 5/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 07/08/2025

The transcript - mostly forgotten for decades - reveals how early many realized what was at stake. Participants debated whether democracy in Russia was real, whether the state would hold, and whether the “strongman” model would return. Spoiler: many were right. 4/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 07/08/2025

The official themes: – Russia’s internal political direction – NATO–Russia relations – Russia and the West The timing was critical: just months after Yeltsin shelled the Russian parliament and new constitution was introduced. 3/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 07/08/2025

Among the participants: – Anatoly Sobchak (mayor of St. Petersburg) – Vladimir Putin (his deputy) – Andrei Kokoshin (Deputy Defense Minister) – Meyer-Landrut, Rühe, Gasteyger, Morel, Pavlova-Silvanskaya – OSCE, MGIMO, German & French diplomats, academics, Pole and Estonian 2/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 07/08/2025

In March 1994, a group of politicians and experts gathered in St. Petersburg for a little-known event: the 101st Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis - a closed-door roundtable. The topic? Russia’s internal situation and relations with NATO.🧵 LINK: bartekgajos.substack.com/p/st-petersb...

bartekgajos.substack.com

St. Petersburg 1994: When Putin Listened and the West Worried (Part I)

Russia’s democratic turn looked fragile. Western delegates said so — in front of Vladimir Putin.

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 06/08/2025

Folks, I’m cooking something for you on my Substack - dropping tomorrow. In 1994, Putin, Sobchak, Ruhe, Meyer-Landrut, and others discussed the future of Russia and its relations with the West. The protocol from Bergedorfer adds a lot to our understanding of Putin and the Russian elite.

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

To the outside world, this may look like revanchism or paranoia. But to the Kremlin, it’s the response to a century-old betrayal - by Lenin, by the Soviet structure, and by the West’s recognition of these borders. The metaphor isn’t about security. It’s about identity 18/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

This is why the “time bomb” metaphor persists in Putin's rhetoric. It reflects a durable conviction that Russia’s post-Soviet borders are historically wrong - and that correcting them isn’t aggression, but justice. 17/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

For many in Moscow, imperialism and ethnonationalism weren’t contradictions - they were complementary. The mental map of new Russia was reimagined not as domination over others, but as reunification with Russian kin “wrongly” separated by Leninist borders. 16/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

This mindset wasn’t confined to fringe figures. In August 1991, Yeltsin’s spokesman Voshchanov issued a warning: if no union treaties were signed, Russia reserved the right to raise the issue of border revision - specifically with Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 15/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

“Crimea… It cannot be returned. It is a disgrace to Russia’s national consciousness.” - Anatoly Chernyaev, 1991 14/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

“The right to self-determination… was taken to the point of absurdity. It created a completely distorted map of the national-state structure.” - Anatoly Sobchak, 1995 13/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

After 1991, Russian elites debated different models of the nation: civic (rossiyskiy), imperial, or ethnic (russkiy). But what marked a qualitative shift was the growing dominance of ethnonationalism - as the primary criterion for imagining Russia’s borders. 12/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

“I’m referring not only to Crimea or northern Kazakhstan, but also, for example, the Kaliningrad region.” The mention of the Kaliningrad region is most likely a mistake in the transcript or a slip of the tongue. 11/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

He also addressed the issue of borders: “In the name of peace in Europe, Russia voluntarily ceded vast territories to the former Soviet republics […] which had historically always belonged to Russia..." 10/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

Putin spoke only once and said the following: “As a result, today 25 million Russians suddenly live outside the country’s borders - and Russia simply cannot afford, even from the perspective of European security, to leave these people to their own fate.” 9/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

Thanks to a post by Wolfgang Ischinger, I learned about this event and accessed the full transcript. What Putin said back then isn’t exactly how Ischinger quoted it. Judging from the protocol, Ischinger didn’t participate in the event himself. 8/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

Let's go back to Putin and his take on Russia's post-1991 borders. At the Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis in 1994, Putin described Russia’s post-Soviet borders as fundamentally unfair. 7/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

Digression: you might recognize the name: he was the father of Alexander Rahr, the better-known pro-Russian lobbyist. 6/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

But the metaphor didn’t originate with Putin. It likely came from Gleb Rahr, an émigré nationalist who in 1991 described Lenin’s USSR as a “time bomb” beneath the Russian nation. His broadcasts in Radio Svoboda framed the 1922 founding of the USSR as anti-Russian by design. 5/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

Want an early example of Putin using the metaphor? In a 1992 documentary, he said: “The activists of October 1917 planted a time bomb under this edifice… the unitary state that called itself Russia.” 4/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

The “time bomb” metaphor, famously used by Putin several times, including his piece 'On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainian', expresses the conviction that the USSR’s constitutional structure - by giving republics the right to secede -made disintegration inevitable.3/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

These elites didn’t just mourn lost territory. They imagined a “real Russia” based on ethnonational principles - where ethnic Russians “left behind” outside the new borders were seen as victims of Lenin’s federalist design. This gave rise to the metaphor of the “time bomb.” 2/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

Between 1989–1994, Russian elites - across ideological lines - shared one belief: the USSR’s collapse left Russia with “unjust borders.” This conviction united liberals, communists and nationalists alike: Yeltsin, Sobchak, Popov, Chernyaev, Solzhenitsyn, Baburin, Zyuganov. 1/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 04/08/2025

What came first: Russian imperialism or NATO enlargement? This isn’t your mem historian’s take that traces every war back to the Neolithic. We’re talking about formative political debates - those that shaped Putin’s worldview in the 1990s. My📜 in Nationalities Papers.🧵

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 28/06/2025

This from Navalnaya is troubling. “Crimea belongs to Ukraine, but de facto it’s in Russian hands. It becomes a complicated issue, millions of people have Russian passports… even Ukrainian authorities admit it’s complicated,”. Normalization of occupation without openly endorsing?

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 28/06/2025

A much-needed panel on Russian opposition and society at RUTA. Key takeaway: when Russian opposition leaders adapt to society as it is - imperial and apathetic in its majority - they risk replicating the regime. @ervitz.bsky.social, Franziska Davies, V. Pekar.

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Reposted by Bartłomiej Gajos

annien.bsky.social @annien.bsky.social · 19/06/2025

@bartekgajos.bsky.social Historien 🇵🇱 de l’ #URSS : « Victory » Reoladed. Pourquoi les élites de #putinTheButcher combattent l’ #Ukraine 🇺🇦 avec le langage de la Seconde Guerre mondiale ? Ce n’est pas tous les jours qu’une élite 🇷🇺 (80 pers) publie un volume 📌🧵 bartekgajos.substack.com/p/victory-re...

bartekgajos.substack.com

“Victory” Reloaded: Why Putin’s Elites Are Fighting Ukraine with WWII Language

It’s not every day that a Russian elite publishes a collective volume on WWII that reads like a policy memo for contemporary warfare against Ukraine - but in today’s Russia, nothing is accidental.

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

as a brilliant strategist for expanding Germany’s territory by 230,000 square kilometers in 1938 without firing a single shot. Feel the difference? 14/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

As a historian, I have no issue writing that Stalin was a capable strategist provided I give all the context. Just imagine German politicians writing about Hitler... 13/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

We’re witnessing restalinization - but it’s not Brezhnev’s version. It’s tailored to today’s regime. – Ivanov: the effective manager – Lavrov: the diplomat – Matviyenko: the legitimate ruler – Medvedev: the visionary All roads point to one model: Putin. 12/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

From Matviyenko: “Stalin’s legitimacy… is beyond doubt.” This speaks volumes. In today’s Russia, legitimacy isn’t earned - it’s declared. By the state. To the people. 11/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

Let’s look at examples. From Ivanov: “Stalin would pause work only for a short nap past midnight… There was no room for sentiment.” Stalin is framed as a tireless wartime leader. The message? Ruthlessness = leadership. 10/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

Some quick stats: – Stalin: 57 mentions – Hitler: 75 – Putin: 21 Seems expected in a WWII-themed book… until you look closer at tone. 9/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

If the anti-Stalin camp is shrinking - a trend the Kremlin has quietly supported - why not lean into it? In the book 'On the 80th Anniversary of the Great Victory' allegedly authored by members of Russia’s Security Council Stalin appears 57 times and in 12 photos. 8/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

That calculus no longer holds. In 2014, 19% of Russians viewed Stalin with fear or aversion. Now? Just 8%. Meanwhile, admiration jumped from 40% to 63%. 7/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

What’s changed in recent years? Until recently, it was fringe groups like communists who honored Stalin. United Russia steered clear. One key rule in the Kremlin playbook was: don’t divide society. 6/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

I still remember visiting Tambov in 2017. A Stalin bust had just gone up - gifted by South Ossetian communists in thanks for Russia’s role in the 2008 war with Georgia. 5/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

Back in 2023, a Stalin bust was unveiled outside the Battle of Stalingrad Museum - just ahead of Putin’s visit to Volgograd. This time, local authorities gave their blessing. 4/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

In May, a new bas-relief appeared in Moscow’s Taganskaya metro. In its center: Stalin. A passerby caught a man praying to it on video. It went viral. x.com/NatalkaKyiv/... 3/x

x.com

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

I recently wrote a piece on the Russian elite’s evolving approach to Stalin, using data science methods. The inspiration came from the book allegedly about the IIWW published by the Russia's Security Council. 2/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

We have a new poll from the Levada on whom Russians consider the most outstanding figures of all time. Stalin remains at the top. Imagine if German officials or public praised Hitler’s strategic brilliance in 1938. Let me explain🧵

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 11/06/2025

Big thanks again to Michał Lubina, Katja Hoyer and Maximillian Hess. Until next year.

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 11/06/2025

Elvira Nabiullina deserves an 11/10 for managing Russia’s war economy. But that’s no compliment. Her skill props up a regime committing war crimes. She's not just an economist -she’s an enabler. 15/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 11/06/2025

Europe doesn’t just need weapons - it needs will. A mental shift is required: political courage, public awareness, and readiness to act against provocation. 14/x

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Bartłomiej Gajos @bartekgajos.bsky.social · 11/06/2025

Russia doesn’t want a reset with the U.S. - it wants victory in Ukraine. That’s why offers like Trump’s go nowhere. For Moscow, Ukraine is the main theater. 13/x

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