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GitHub - hakluke/hakoriginfinder: Tool for discovering the origin host behind a reverse proxy. Useful for bypassing cloud WAFs!

Also worth checking the program policy first. Spraying IP ranges with a spoofed Host header hits hosts that aren't your target, and some programs may put origin IPs out of scope. Great tool by @hakluke 👇

github.com

Tool for discovering the origin host behind a reverse proxy. Useful for bypassing cloud WAFs! - hakluke/hakoriginfinder

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One thing to keep in mind: a MATCH is a similarity score and not proof. Send something the gateway would block and see if the origin serves it. If it doesn't, the origin is filtering by gateway IP, using mTLS, or checking a header the gateway adds.

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To check IP address spaces, you can use hakoriginfinder. It fetches the gateway first, then requests each IP with the Host header set, and scores the responses with Levenshtein distance. prips x.x.x.x/24 | hakoriginfinder -h

api.targetx.com

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If that doesn't work, there's active recon. There are two ways to do this: via subdomains or via IP addresses with vhosts. To check subdomains, just do your usual subdomain enumeration and then check each subdomain to see if any of them respond the same as the gateway.

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Then check records that may outlive the change: - DNS history (SecurityTrails, ViewDNS). If the gateway was put in front of an existing app, the old A record still points at the origin - Certificate Transparency (crt.sh) for hostnames they issued certs for but never linked - Shodan/Censys

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First, try searching for it throughout the app. Some common places it pops up: - Error messages - JS source - CORS headers - Cloud storage

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So how do we find the origin server? Let's say that the gateway is at api.targetx[.]com

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Some security controls, such as auth checks, rate limiting, WAF rules, and IP allowlisting are often implemented with a gateway. If you're able to discover the origin host and it accepts requests directly, you can bypass all of that by sending your requests straight to the origin.

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Tested on sequelize 6.37, mongoose 9.9, typeorm 1.1, knex 3.3, prisma 7.10, express 5.2

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On the read path, findOne returns your own row whatever the order. The issue is on findAll/find, which returns both. Mongo operators like {"$in":[124]} can hit only the victim, but fail every middleware check I tested. Only reachable where the field isn't inspected.

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You always write to your own row too. [124] alone would hit only the victim, but the middleware rejects it because your ID isn't there. To get past the check you have to include yourself, and the ORM writes to everything in the list.

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You don't need a JSON body either. Duplicate params gave me an array in every Express config I tried: user_id=124&user_id=123 -> ["124","123"] They arrive as strings, so includes(123) fails, but some(x => x == 123) still passes and Sequelize still fires: IN ('124','123')

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Then it's up to the ORM: Sequelize -> IN (124,123), both rows written Mongoose -> implicit $in, both rows written TypeORM -> throws RangeError Knex -> throws on bind Prisma -> throws, Expected Int, provided (Int, Int)

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One that surprised me, though it's already known: parseInt([123,124]) === 123 is true. The array becomes the string "123,124" and parseInt stops at the comma. So put your own ID first to get past a parseInt check.

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This only works if the middleware checks whether your ID is in the array. These pass: [].concat(id).includes(123) [].concat(id).some(x => x == 123) Strict == and === both reject [124,123]. So does Number().

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0xacb @0xacb.com · 11/09/2026

Been testing the IDOR trick where you wrap the identifier in an array, in Node JS. You are 123, victim is 124. {"user_id": [124, 123]} The ORM doesn't pick the first element. Sequelize and Mongoose turn it into WHERE id IN (124, 123) and can write both rows.

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How to trick an AI into downloading and running malware, by @wunderwuzzi23:

Also: MySQL's default is utf8mb4_0900_ai_ci. The ai means accent insensitive, so 'admin' = 'ádmin' is true there. SQL Server defaults to _AS and returns false. Tested on SQL Server 2022 + 2025, MySQL 8.4/9.7/26.7, Postgres 18.6, default configs.

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MySQL is case insensitive by default too, but its 8.0+ default doesn't pad: 'admin' = 'admin␣' is false. Older ones like utf8mb4_general_ci still do. Postgres does neither. App assumes one thing, DB does another. This can lead to some weird bugs and bypasses.

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Other things I tested: Only the space char. Tab, newline and CR still count Leading spaces still count = and LIKE disagree: 'admin' = 'admin␣' is true, 'admin' LIKE 'admin␣' is false A UNIQUE index under CI rejects ADMIN as a duplicate of admin, so it's a lookup bug not a signup one

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Now if someone fixes it like: username.ToLower() == "admin" stops ADMIN, but lets 'admin␣' through. Moving the column to a CS collation also stops ADMIN, and also lets 'admin␣' through. Two different fixes, same half of the bug left open.

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So if an app blocks a username in app code: if (username == "admin") deny; <- checks case and spaces WHERE username = @username <- checks neither Send ADMIN, or 'admin␣'. The check doesn't fire and the DB still finds the admin row.

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I tried CS, BIN, BIN2 and a UTF8 collation. They all pad the space away. Looks like only a VARBINARY cast sees the difference.

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0xacb @0xacb.com · 07/09/2026

I was playing with SQL Server and noticed the default collation is case insensitive (SQL_Latin1_General_CP1_CI_AS). admin and ADMIN are the same string to the DB. That part is well known. Less talked about: = also ignores trailing spaces. 'admin' = 'admin␣' is true (␣ is an actual space char)

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This is how user data can be exposed via prompt injection, explained by @wunderwuzzi23:

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0xacb @0xacb.com · 04/09/2026

Did you know you can actually steal a dev's GitHub account using their expired domain? Here's how @0xLupin did it. It's pretty cool:

Breaking the M365 Copilot Sandbox with ChatMate

Bug was in Azure Container Runtime, so AKS and Container Apps were also affected. Any SSRF that can reach the node's localhost = root on the node. 5 issues, 4 Microsoft products, $48k bounty. Cool research by Ori Lahav 👇

zerolabs.rubrik.com

ChatMate, the first documented instance of remote prompt execution, shows how a malicious document can lead to sandbox escape.

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5. The node has internet but the sandbox doesn't. And that channel goes both ways: the attacker sends prompts down and Copilot answers, with the victim's identity and full M365 access.

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How it works: 1. A Word doc with a hidden prompt injection gets uploaded to Copilot 2. Launder intent (using a gzip payload) to bypass safety filters 3. Escalate to root inside the sandbox 4. Execute a full container-to-host escape (CVE-2026-32193)

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0xacb @0xacb.com · 01/09/2026

What happens when an attacker gets a live, interactive shell inside Microsoft 365 Copilot? @vbcrlf.bsky.social from Rubrik Zero Labs dropped ChatMate, the first publicly documented Remote Prompt Execution (RPE): an attacker manipulating a victim's assistant, prompt by prompt.

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How do we prevent Hackian (our hackbot) from performing destructive actions? Here’s how we do it: 👇

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0xacb @0xacb.com · 31/08/2026

IDOR to image-based data exfiltration on an AI chat agent. Here’s a clip from @monkehack’s talk, explaining how they did it.

0xacb @0xacb.com · 24/08/2026

This is how @0xLupin bypassed the supply chain security of major companies like Google, Salesforce, Netflix, and many others. Here’s the clip: