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walking mirage @wolf.observer · 20/02/2026

"we would prefer if our astronauts weren't Boeing to die" - nasa administration www.nasa.gov/news-release...

NASA Releases Report on Starliner Crewed Flight Test Investigation - NASA

At a news conference on Thursday, NASA released a report of findings from the Program Investigation Team examining the Boeing CST-100

Liquid Coyotes ☉∇ @liquidlatrans.bsky.social · 20/02/2026

Holy crap this is one of the most scathing incident reports we've ever seen

bannedaxolotl @banneduser.at.app.wafrn.net · 20/02/2026

Love the phrase Type A mishap

000

walking mirage @wolf.observer · 20/02/2026

Jesus fucking christ. Commercial spaceflight was a mistake

Key Technical Anomalies
1. Service Module (SM) RCS Thruster Anomaly
a. Five thrusters triggered fail off FDIR during ISS rendezvous resulting in a temporary loss of 6
Degrees of Freedom (6DOF) control.
b. In-situ troubleshooting recovered four of five jets, enabling docking.
c. Manual piloting did not specifically contribute to thrusters triggering their fail-off FDIR.
d. Most probable proximate (direct) causes and contributing factors:
i. Two-phase oxidizer flow (vaporization and cavitation)
ii. Teflon poppet extrusion in oxidizer valves, restricting flow
iii. Mechanical demand from GNC firing requests
2. Crew Module (CM) RCS Jet Failure
a. A thruster failed to fire during descent, reducing the system to zero fault tolerance.
b. Leading theory:
i. Corrosion from carbazic acid formed by residual propellant and CO₂
3. Helium Manifold Leaks
a. Seven of eight SM helium manifolds leaked during the mission.
b. Most probable proximate (direct) cause and contributing factor:
i. Material incompatibility of seals with oxidizer, leading to degradation and leaks
ii. O-ring sizing and poor gland fill/squeeze tolerances
4. Deorbit Capability Fault Tolerance
a. The propulsion system lacked required two-fault tolerance for deorbit burns, which was a design flaw present since early development but not identified until CFT pre-launch

Key Findings and Observations (Truncated Summary)
• Inadequate Qualification Testing: The propulsion system lacked enveloping, missionrepresentative testing, and NASA accepted insufficient verification data in lieu of qualification.
• Insufficient Flight Data: Low telemetry sample rates and lack of onboard data storage limited
the ability to assess thruster performance and contributed to misdiagnosis of anomalies on
Orbital Flight Test (OFT) 1 and OFT2.
• Anomaly Resolution Discipline: Acceptance of unexplained anomalies (UAs) without root
cause resolution allowed systemic issues to persist from OFT1 and OFT2 into CFT.
• Oversight and Insight Limitations: NASA’s insight into subcontractor-level data was
restricted, limiting its ability to independently verify system readiness.
• Schedule Pressure: Persistent proximity to launch over several years created a high-stress
environment, dictated a restrictive risk reduction initiative, and contributed to degraded trust
with the workforce and overall fatigue.
• Cultural and Contractual Misalignment: The shared accountability model was poorly
understood and inconsistently applied, leading to muddling of roles, responsibilities, and risk
ownership.
• Hardware Longevity and Sparing Concerns: Starliner’s limited hardware spares and the impending retirement of the Atlas V launch vehicle raise concerns about the program's long-term viability.
impending retirement of t

Near-Real Time Cultural and Organizational Findings
1. Decision Authority
• Overlapping roles between NASA’s CCP, ISSP, and Boeing led to unclear governance.
2. Erosion of Trust
• Mistrust between NASA and Boeing was intensified by selective data sharing, perceived
favoritism, and inconsistent transparency.
• NASA teams outside CCP felt excluded from critical decisions, while CCP felt overwhelmed
by external input.
3. Leadership Approach
• CCP and Boeing leadership were perceived as overly risk-tolerant and dismissive of
dissenting views.
• A risk-acceptance posture created division and undermined confidence in the decisionmaking process.
4. Team Dynamics and Communication
• The mission was marked by chaotic meeting schedules, unclear roles, and communication
breakdowns.
• Survey data shows low effectiveness ratings in team dynamics and organizational structure.
5. Cultural Divergence
• NASA’s traditional culture of technical rigor clashed with the commercial model’s emphasis on provider autonomy.

Root Causes (Organizational)
While these root causes are specifically separated out to bulletize each, it is nearly impossible to
consider one without the others. It is important to keep in mind, NASA created and implemented
the contract structure; Boeing built the vehicle. Together the organizations agreed to fly.
• NASA’s hands-off contract approach limited insight into the Starliner’s development.
• Boeing’s inadequate systems engineering and reliance on subcontractors without
sufficient oversight created gaps in hardware qualification.
• NASA CCP’s culture prioritized provider success over technical rigor.