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gabe schoenbach

@gabey.zip
541 followers 356 following 63 posts

phd student @UChicagoCS. interested in cryptography, algorithms, combinatorics. gabey.zip

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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 25/02/2025
apple notes using LLMs (i assume) to auto-complete math expressions fundamentally misunderstands the point of the notes app. i’m using this to take notes, not to make calculations. OTOH i would LOVE it if they added LaTeX support…
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ePrint Updates @eprint.ing.bot · 24/02/2025
Fine-Grained Complexity in a World without Cryptography (Josh Alman, Yizhi Huang, Kevin Yeo) ia.cr/2025/324
Abstract. The study of fine-grained cryptography has proliferated in recent years due to its allure of potentially relying on weaker assumptions compared to standard cryptography. As fine-grained cryptography only requires polynomial gaps between the adversary and honest parties, it seems plausible to build primitives relying upon popular hardness assumptions about problems in P such as k-SUM or Zero-k-Clique. The ultimate hope is that fine-grained cryptography could still be viable even if all current cryptographic assumptions are false, such as if P = NP or if we live in Pessiland where one-way functions do not exist.

In our work, we consider whether this approach is viable by studying fine-grained complexity when all standard cryptographic assumptions are false. As our main result, we show that many popular fine-grained complexity problems are easy to solve in the average-case when one-way functions do not exist. In other words, many candidate hardness assumptions for building fine-grained cryptography are no longer options in Pessiland. As an example, we prove that the average-case k-SUM and Zero-k-Clique conjectures are false for sufficiently large constant k when no one-way functions exist. The average-case Zero-k-Clique assumption was used to build fine-grained key-exchange by Lavigne et al. [CRYPTO’19].

We also show that barriers for reductions in fine-grained complexity may be explained by problems in cryptography. First, we show that finding faster algorithms for computing discrete logarithms is equivalent to designing average-case equivalence between k-SUM and k-CYC (an extension of k-SUM to cyclic groups). In particular, finding such a reduction from k-CYC to k-SUM could potentially lead to breakthrough algorithms for the discrete logarithm, factoring, RSA and quadratic residuosity problems. Finally, we show that discrete logarithms with preprocessing may be reduced to the k-CYC-Index problem, and we present faster algorithms for average-case k-SUM-Index and k-CYC-Index.
Image showing part 2 of abstract.
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Ryan Williams @rrwilliams.bsky.social · 21/02/2025
New paper: Simulating Time With Square-Root Space people.csail.mit.edu/rrw/time-vs-... It's still hard for me to believe it myself, but I seem to have shown that TIME[t] is contained in SPACE[sqrt{t log t}]. To appear in STOC. Comments are very welcome!
people.csail.mit.edu
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 20/02/2025
Honest-but-curious Abe
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Jake Gosselin @jaketg.bsky.social · 13/02/2025
First WP is up! Looks at classic micro-to-macro question: What happens to GDP when an individual sector is negatively shocked? Presents novel estimation of sector-yr parameters governing propagation, for 66 ind. from 97-23. Finds sectoral/temporal heterogeneity which changes answer(1/11) #EconSky
arxiv.org
Heterogeneity in Sectoral Production and the Macro Effect of Sectoral Shocks
The effect of a negative sectoral shock on GDP depends on how important the shocked sector is as a direct and indirect supplier and how easily sectors can substitute inputs. Past estimates of the para...
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 11/02/2025
is there something in between a theorem and a lemma
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 06/02/2025
panel of three profs giving advice to phd students. prof A: you should focus solely on a particular subfield; become an expert. prof B: you’ll never have this much time. take advantage and explore broadly! prof C: everyone takes their own path; don’t overindex on any one piece of advice :)
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 05/02/2025
it may sound fun but it’s basically never worth it to make prosciutto-wrapped asparagus. even if you fill them with garlicky whipped cream cheese and roast at 350 for a few minutes.
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 04/02/2025
i used to be scared of polynomials but i’m becoming much more comfortable with them lately
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 29/01/2025
it’s pretty cool to live in the same time that terry tao is doing mathematics
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 28/01/2025
is it possible to put gifs in pdfs?
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ePrint Updates @eprint.ing.bot · 27/01/2025
How to Prove False Statements: Practical Attacks on Fiat-Shamir (Dmitry Khovratovich, Ron D. Rothblum, Lev Soukhanov) ia.cr/2025/118
Abstract. The Fiat-Shamir (FS) transform is a prolific and powerful technique for compiling public-coin interactive protocols into non-interactive ones. Roughly speaking, the idea is to replace the random coins of the verifier with the evaluations of a complex hash function.

The FS transform is known to be sound in the random oracle model (i.e., when the hash function is modeled as a totally random function). However, when instantiating the random oracle using a concrete hash function, there are examples of protocols in which the transformation is not sound. So far all of these examples have been contrived protocols that were specifically designed to fail.

In this work we show such an attack for a standard and popular interactive succinct argument, based on the GKR protocol, for verifying the correctness of a non-determinstic bounded-depth computation. For every choice of FS hash function, we show that a corresponding instantiation of this protocol, which was been widely studied in the literature and used also in practice, is not (adaptively) sound when compiled with the FS transform. Specifically, we construct an explicit circuit for which we can generate an accepting proof for a false statement.

We further extend our attack and show that for every circuit C and desired output y, we can construct a functionally equivalent circuit C^(*), for which we can produce an accepting proof that C^(*) outputs y (regardless of whether or not this statement is true). This demonstrates that any security guarantee (if such exists) would have to depend on the specific implementation of the circuit C, rather than just its functionality.

Lastly, we also demonstrate versions of the attack that violate non-adaptive soundness of the protocol – that is, we generate an attacking circuit that is independent of the underlying cryptographic objects. However, these versions are either less practical (as the attacking circuit has very large depth) or make some additional (reasonable) assumptions on the underlying cryptographic primitives.
Image showing part 2 of abstract.
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 10/01/2025
okay i did meet someone and that someone is the vaunted NPR radio show Wait Wait Don’t Tell Me. premiered jan 3 1998 babyyy
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 07/01/2025
this is such a great article.....
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 06/01/2025
Georg Cantor died 107 years ago, today
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 06/01/2025
when do we think the last basketball scorigami was?
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 06/01/2025
i want to write a math paper that’s sooo clearly explained that every result sounds obvious
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 01/01/2025
i’m obsessed with making conjectures
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 01/01/2025
my new year’s resolution is to love both of my cats equally
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ciara mountains @ciaramountains.bsky.social · 29/12/2024
Having the time of life editing pics of my friend @jaketg.bsky.social, who radiates an uncanny “photo of a serial killer in the background of an event in a Netflix documentary” vibe.
A black and white photo of a group of people standing around a table, with a yellow arrow pointing out someone in the background A group of people dancing at a wedding, with a red circle around one man in the background People dancing at a wedding, with a bright yellow circle around one man A group of people playing beer pong and celebrating, with a red circle around one man in the background
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 28/12/2024
much like andrew wiles, i have been spending a long time attempting a proof by induction
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 27/12/2024
i would like to meet someone born on my exact birthday
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Thomas Steinke @stein.ke · 19/12/2024
me, poorly explaining why driving isn't easy to my kids: You need to control the location of the car, but you can only directly control the second derivative of its location with respect to time. Furthermore, a good driver should keep the third derivative bounded.
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 16/12/2024
rip steve jobs you would’ve hated iOS 18
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 12/12/2024
does exposure to light affect the circadian rhythms of people who are blind?
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 11/12/2024
some days it feels like the only significant software innovation they’re doing for iOS is figuring out how to make it charge slower
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 11/12/2024
slowly but surely exiting my cookie era
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Jessamyn Dukes @rhymeswithspecimen.bsky.social · 10/12/2024
the group chat is having a discussion about which days of the week feel "even" or "odd" and I am mathematically distressed
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 07/12/2024
ideal conversation flow
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 06/12/2024
how do you define Combinatorics? serious question. i'd like to have a better definition than "has to do with counting" and "the set of problems that i like"
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 06/12/2024
i hate when my time is nigh
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Greg Bodwin @gbodwin.bsky.social · 06/12/2024
I was reminded this week of an open problem in graph theory that has absolutely no business being open. 🧵
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 02/12/2024
if you recently bought a sofa with area larger than 2.2195… time to send it back :///
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 01/12/2024
great rundown of the costs required to operate a private messaging service
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Matt Macauley @visualalgebra.bsky.social · 01/12/2024
I made a Starter Pack for #MathSky, since the one @tienchihmath.bsky.social made (go.bsky.app/66Us7WW), is at max capacity. But I need your help! Let's crowdsource this to make it better. Reply with suggestions. **Please don't feel shy to self-nominate!** go.bsky.app/GiRFQ8D
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ciara mountains @ciaramountains.bsky.social · 30/11/2024
Lincoln square is the Sonoma of Chicago
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 30/11/2024
in ann arbor the amtrak never comes from the direction you expect
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 26/11/2024
i don’t think full professors should emoji react to messages. junior scholars only!
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 24/11/2024
so much in that excellent formula
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 22/11/2024
you guys are pronouncing it like "brewski" right?
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Jake Gosselin @jaketg.bsky.social · 22/11/2024
Getting back into for loops
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 21/11/2024
new proof technique! on the red line
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 21/11/2024
it is snowing in chicago(!)
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 20/11/2024
every couple years i’m reminded of curry-howard isomorphism and it blows my mind
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Ayliean @ayliean.bsky.social · 19/11/2024
I’m working on a very silly project at the moment where humans say the new Mersenne prime out loud, using the power of teamwork✨ Anyone can join in (please join in!) saytheprime.com
saytheprime.com
Say the prime
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Jake Grumbach @jakemgrumbach.bsky.social · 17/11/2024
People have super wrong hot takes about subgroup vote choice because of sampling bias and measurement error in exit polls, and super wrong hot takes about turnout because mail ballots weren’t all counted yet. Sad!
A wrong post
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 16/11/2024
northern california is just unbelievable. it cannot be overrated
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ciara mountains @ciaramountains.bsky.social · 15/11/2024
I’m running unopposed for Roku city council
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gabe schoenbach @gabey.zip · 15/11/2024
i have found a collision for sha256, but the margins of this tweet are too short to contain it
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ePrint Updates @eprint.ing.bot · 20/05/2024
Enhancing Watermarked Language Models to Identify Users (Aloni Cohen, Alexander Hoover, Gabe Schoenbach) ia.cr/2024/759
Abstract. A zero-bit watermarked language model produces text that is indistinguishable from that of the underlying model, but which can be detected as machine-generated using a secret key. Unfortunately, merely detecting AI-generated spam, say, as watermarked may not prevent future abuses. If we could additionally trace the text to a spammer’s API token or account, we could then cut off their access or pursue legal action.

We introduce multi-user watermarks, which allow tracing model-generated text to individual users or to groups of colluding users. We construct multi-user watermarking schemes from undetectable zero-bit watermarking schemes. Importantly, our schemes provide both zero-bit and multi-user assurances at the same time: detecting shorter snippets just as well as the original scheme, and tracing longer excerpts to individuals. Along the way, we give a generic construction of a watermarking scheme that embeds long messages into generated text.

Ours are the first black-box reductions between watermarking schemes for language models. A major challenge for black-box reductions is the lack of a unified abstraction for robustness — that marked text is detectable even after edits. Existing works give incomparable robustness guarantees, based on bespoke requirements on the language model’s outputs and the users’ edits. We introduce a new abstraction to overcome this challenge, called AEB-robustness. AEB-robustness provides that the watermark is detectable whenever the edited text “approximates enough blocks” of model-generated output. Specifying the robustness condition amounts to defining approximates, enough, and blocks. Using our new abstraction, we relate the robustness properties of our message-embedding and multi-user schemes to that of the underlying zero-bit scheme, in a black-box way. Whereas prior works only guarantee robustness for a single text generated in response to a single prompt, our schemes are robust against adaptive prompting, a stronger and more natural adversarial model.
Image showing part 2 of abstract.
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